05 JAN 2009 _______________________________________ *Plane skids off runway at Vancouver International Airport *Atlanta-bound Delta jet diverted to Canada *8 dead, 1 in critical condition in helicopter accident in Terrebonne *NTSB blames 747 flight crew for 2005 nose gear accident *Pilots call for handheld laser ban *NTSB Report Provokes Speculation In Denver Crash *NTSB: Night-Time Collision with Goose Brought Down UND Seminole *Learjet 45 Accident (Colorado) *AAL B737-800 Engine Failure (Colombia) *Qantas involved in another A330 mid-air mishap *China's Shenzhen Airlines starts pilot recruitment firm *FAA’s Sabatini Reflects on Key Safety Initiatives *************************************** Plane skids off runway at Vancouver International Airport A small private jet skidded off the runway at Vancouver International Airport on Sunday evening as it was trying to land. There was no fire and no one was injured. The plane sustained structural damage in the landing, which took place around 5:30 p.m. Airport spokeswoman Rebecca Catley said the Cessna Citation jet, which had flown in from Mexico, carried five people. The pilot apparently contacted the airport before landing to say there was a problem with the plane's landing gear. The accident occurred on runway 12 at the South Terminal. There was extensive damage to the front end of the Cessna, and Transport Canada is now investigating the incident. There were no interruptions to the operations at the airport. The weather was poor at the time with wind and snow but Catley said it wasn't clear whether the weather was a factor in the malfunction. http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090104/bc_plane_crash_ 090102/20090104?hub=Canada&s_name= ************** Atlanta-bound Delta jet diverted to Canada Authorities take unruly passenger into custody An unruly passenger so disrupted an international Delta Air Lines flight Sunday afternoon, the Atlanta-bound plane was diverted to a Canadian airport where authorities took the subject into custody. Flight 47 from Moscow to Atlanta made an unscheduled stop at Gander International Airport in Newfoundland, and the unidentified passenger was arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, said Delta spokeswoman Susan Elliott. The plane was carrying 206 passengers when it departed Moscow earlier Sunday. Elliott said the decision to eject the passenger was made by the plane’s captain. She would not release details about the individual or what that person allegedly did to merit being booted from the plane. Flight 47 was expected to arrive at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport about 9 p.m. Sunday, roughly four hours late due to the stopover in Newfoundland, Elliott said. http://www.ajc.com/business/content/business/delta/stories/2009/01/04/delta_ flight_diverted.html ************* 8 dead, 1 in critical condition in helicopter accident in Terrebonne TERREBONNE, La. -- Eight people are dead after a helicopter crashed Sunday into a marshy area in the lower southwest portion of Terrebonne Parish, according to Coast Guard officer Jaclyn Young. There were nine people on board a PHI, Inc. helicopter at the time of the crash, which happened around 3:30 p.m. near Bayou Penchant. One of them was transported to a nearby hospital, while the Coast Guard put on a search for the ninth person. That person was found dead later, raising the death toll in the accident to eight. Richard Ravinelli, Director of Human Resources for PHI, said the chopper had just taken off from the PHI operating base in Amelia and was heading to an offshore oil platform at the time of the crash. Barbara Bryant's son was among those killed in the accident. "He has worked since he was young," Bryant said. "He just spent 3 months offshore, just because he wanted to save up enough money for a down payment on his own house, and he's been living with me to save his money to do that." Bryant says her son has worked on oil rigs for more than three years, but could never get used to boarding helicopters -- the most common way crews get out to the rigs. "I'm thinking about him being in those marshes out there," Bryant said. "He didn't want to fly anyway. He just took the water survival course for this company for shell the week before Christmas, and said how terrified he was he did that, so that's on my mind.. or that he's out there. "He didn't make it." The medevacted passenger, who is a 28-year-old man, is listed as in critical condition and is awaiting to be transferred to Oschner Medical Center from the Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center in Houma. Officials said that because of inclement weather, they are trying to transfer him by ground ambulance. The U.S. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center in Virginia originally picked up the distress signal from the helicopter and alerted the Coast Guard station in New Orleans, Young said. Shortly thereafter the Coast Guard launched a HH-65C rescue helicopter from New Orleans to the scene of the accident. According to their website, PHI, Inc. is a helicopter services company that provides transportation to offshore oil and gas, onshore mining, and medical and technical services industries. They are independently owned. Last year there was an accident involving a PHI helicopter. In June, three PHI crew members and a patient they were transporting died after their helicopter crashed in Texas. The exact location of the accident, as well as the cause, is not yet known. The Terrebonne Sheriff's Office and Airforce Rescue Coordination Center is assisting in the investigation. Ravinelli said the names of the victims would not be released until all family members are notified, likely sometime Monday. http://www.wwltv.com/topstories/stories/wwl010408cbphicrash.3b4c6c24.html ************* NTSB blames 747 flight crew for 2005 nose gear accident January 5 — The crew of Northwest Flight 74 failed to follow the landing gear checklist and failed to verify that the plane’s landing gear was extended, “which led to a landing with the nose gear retracted,” according to the National Transportation Safety Board. The flight from Japan landed at the Guam airport with it nose gear up Aug. 19, 2005. Two passengers were slightly injured during the accident and the plane was damaged beyond repair. According to a probable cause report by the NTSB, the plane's flight crew failed to confirm there were five green landing gear indicator lights, as stated in the checklist. The crew instead made general comments about the lights, such as "got em all," the report states. A factual report released by the NTSB last month states the flight crew was aware of a potential landing gear problem, believed it had corrected the problem, and was given clearance to land. The probable cause report notes that, had the airport been made aware of the specific problem, the controller could have visually confirmed whether the landing gear was extended. http://www.guampdn.com/article/20090105/NEWS01/90105013 *************** Pilots call for handheld laser ban Airline pilots have called for some handheld laser pointers to be banned after a number of pilots were dazzled while landing at Dublin airport. IALPA's Captain Adrian Hinkson of said the planes were hit with the laser lights at a critical time and pilots could be left temporarily blind by the beams. Captain Hinkson said the lasers should be classified as weapons making it illegal to possess one except under license. AdvertisementThe Irish Aviation Authority has said ten such incidents have taken place since September and that gardaí have used aerial support to try and pinpoint the laser sources. Aer Lingus has said six of their flights have been targeted with laser light beams in recent months. A spokesperson said the pilots advised air traffic control of the incidents immediately, who then informed gardaí. http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0104/airport.html ************* NTSB Report Provokes Speculation In Denver Crash Gusty Conditions Provided Strong Crosswind Component Information released in the National Transportation Safety Board preliminary report on the December 20 crash of Continental Flight 1404 at Denver International Airport has given rise to speculation about the part gusty prevailing winds may have played in the incident. According to the NTSB report, weather observations at the time of the accident showed winds were from 290 degrees at 24 knots (28 mph), gusting to 32 knots (37 mph). In attempting to take off on runway 34R (listed as 350 degrees magnetic, 001 degrees true), one thing is certain -- Flight 1404 experienced a substantial crosswind. While still within the demonstrated crosswind component range for a Boeing 737-500, speculation about the role the winds played has intensified, with questions about the choice of runway at the forefront, the Associated Press reported. As ANN reported, Continental Flight 1404 crashed the evening of December 20 after aborting a troubled takeoff at Denver International Airport, injuring 37 of the 115 passengers and crew aboard the Boeing 737-500. The airliner careened off the left side of runway 34 Right, crossing a field, a taxiway, and a service road, shearing off the landing gear and finally coming to rest at the bottom of a wide, shallow ravine nearly 2,000 feet off the end of the runway. All of the injured have since been released from the hospital, including the pilot. The NTSB is still investigating the incident, with a final report not expected for a year. FMI: www.ntsb.gov, www.continental.com aero-news.net ************* NTSB: Night-Time Collision with Goose Brought Down UND Seminole Tragic Accident Killed CFI and Student An investigation into the night-time training accident that killed two pilots in the fall of 2007 has revealed some troubling data... with strong evidence that a goose collision contributed to the outcome. Pilot Adam Ostapenko (20), of Duluth, Minn., and CFI Annette Klosterman (22), of Seattle, were lost in this tragedy. The Probable Cause report states that, "The accident flight was the third of a three-leg dual instructional night cross-country flight. The airplane was established in normal cruise flight at 4,500 feet mean sea level (msl) when the airplane abruptly departed controlled flight and impacted a bog. The bog was about 15 to 20 feet deep, with a thin layer of vegetation floating on the surface. The airplane came to rest inverted, and damage to the airframe was consistent with an inverted impact to the surface of the bog. Data recovered from the airplane's flight display system indicated that the airplane was in stable flight on a 320-degree magnetic heading, at 4,500 feet msl, and approximately 160 knots true airspeed prior to the accident, when it abruptly departed from controlled flight. The airplane rolled approximately 20 degrees left wing down, yawed to the left about 30 degrees, and simultaneously pitched nose-down about 40 degrees. It then reversed and immediately entered a descending, right roll for the duration of the flight. The airplane impacted the bog within 30 seconds of the upset. The post accident examination noted that the left half of the horizontal stabilator was bent upward approximately 90 degrees, inconsistent with the damage to the remainder of the airframe. This damage was consistent with the initial left yaw and nose down pitch recorded during the upset. In addition, a depression and tear were observed on the upper wing skin near the left wing tip. Microscopic examination and DNA testing of material on the inside surface of the wing skin was identified as remains of a Canada goose. The natural history of this species was consistent with the location, time, and date of the accident." The aircraft's problems seemed to have happened "abruptly." According to the investigating report, the Seminole's (file photo, below) Avidyne avionics "normally retain flight parameters in non-volatile memory within the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Multifunction Display (MFD) units. Download of the data associated with the MFD was not successful due to damage sustained in the accident. Download of the PFD data was successful, however." The PFD data indicated that the airplane was in stable flight on a 320-degree magnetic heading, at 4,500 feet msl, and approximately 160 knots true airspeed prior to the accident. About 2211:46, the airplane abruptly departed from controlled flight. It rolled approximately 20 degrees left wing down, yawed to the left about 30 degrees, and simultaneously pitched nose down about 40 degrees. The airplane then reversed and immediately entered a descending, right roll for the duration of the flight. The recorded data ended about 2212:10. A section of upper wing skin was taken from near the left wing tip, at a point about mid-chord. The post accident examination noted the presence of material on the inside surface of the wing skin inconsistent with those used in the construction of an aircraft. The wing skin section was along a tear in the skin, adjacent to the spar. This portion of the airplane was submerged in the bog after the accident until recovery of the airplane. Microscopic examination and DNA testing by forensic ornithologists identified the material on the wing skin section as remains of a Canada goose. The ornithologists further noted that the natural history of this species was consistent with the location, time and date of the accident. Of additional note, in the NTSB data, was an observation concerning a portion of the wreckage, "The left half of the stabilator was bent upward approximately 90 degrees at the tip, which was inconsistent with the damage to the remainder of the airframe. The inboard leading edge skin was torn from the spar. The spar was deformed but appeared otherwise intact. The stabilator section remained attached to the airframe by the spar, remaining stabilator skin aft of the spar, and the anti-servo trim tab." The NTSB reports added some interesting info to this report: Analysis of bird strike data from 1990 through 2004 by the United States Department of Agriculture, Wildlife Services, determined that 74 percent of bird strikes occurred within 500 feet of the ground, 19 percent between 500 feet agl and 3,500 feet agl, and 7 percent above 3,500 feet. Of the 26 percent of bird strikes that occurred above 500 feet, about 7 times more strikes occurred at night than during daylight hours. This was due to the fact that about 61 percent of the reported strikes above 500 feet agl occurred at night while only 18 percent of aircraft movements occurred at night. In addition, a proportionally higher incidence of strikes occurred between September and November, and between April and May, as compared to the number of flight operations. Further review of the data indicated that the probability of a bird strike decreased by 32 percent for every 1,000-foot increase in altitude. Outside of the airport environment, the altitude zone from 500 feet agl to 3,500 feet agl was the most hazardous, especially at night. Canada geese were attributed to 668 strikes with civil aircraft between 1990 and 2002. Of those strikes, 112 resulted in substantial damage to the aircraft. The average mass of a Canada goose is 9.2 lbs for a male and 7.8 lbs for a female, with a maximum mass of 13.8 lbs. This species exhibits strong flocking behavior. The University of North Dakota provided additional pilot training regarding bird strike hazards and mitigation. In addition, they recommended to all of their pilots and flight instructors that when possible higher cruise altitudes should be selected, especially on night cross-country flights, in order to minimize the probability of a bird strike. The NTSB's Probable Cause determinations states that "An in-flight collision with at least one Canada goose, and the resulting damage to the left stabilator that caused the airplane to become uncontrollable. Contributing to the accident was the night lighting condition, which precluded any possibility of the flight crew seeing the bird(s) prior to impact." FMI: www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20071102X01708&key=1, (ANN thanks Chuck Szmurlo for the use of the photo of the Canada Goose). aero-news.net ************** Learjet 45 Accident (Colorado) Date: 03-JAN-2009 Time: 16:54 Type: Learjet 45 Operator: Aero Jet Services Registration: N279AJ C/n / msn: 45-279 Fatalities: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 Other fatalities: 0 Airplane damage: Substantial Location: San Miguel County Colorado - United States of America Phase: Landing Nature: Ferry/positioning Departure airport: KSDL Destination airport: KTEX Narrative: Aircraft reported in press as totaled, in a landing accident in snowy conditions at Telluride Regional Airport. Two crew on board said to have suffered minor injuries. (aviation-safety.net) ************* AAL B737-800 Engine Failure (Colombia) Date: 03-JAN-2009 Time: 9:50 am Type: Boeing 737-800 Operator: American Airlines Registration: C/n / msn: Fatalities: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 148 Airplane damage: Minor Location: Medellin - Colombia Phase: Take off Nature: International Scheduled Passenger Departure airport: MDE Destination airport: MIA Narrative: Flight AA-924 declared emergency after one of the engines failed during departure. A passenger reported, that she saw one engine on fire a few minutes into the flight, followed by an almost immediate announcement by the flight crew, that they'd be returning to Medellin. The landing was very rough, the crew used maximum braking according to their announcements. The stairs arrived only two hours after the landing. (aviation-safety.net) *************** Qantas involved in another A330 mid-air mishap Australian authorities are investigating a mid-air incident last month involving a Qantas Airways Airbus A330 and have suggested this latest incident is very similar to one that occurred in October, also involving a Qantas A330. On 27 December a Qantas A330-300 was cruising at 36,000ft enroute from Perth to Singapore and about 260 nautical miles (482 kilometres) northwest from Learmonth when the aircraft's auto-pilot disengaged and the flight crew received a message indicating a fault with the air data inertial reference units (ADIRU) number one, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) says in a statement. It appears this incident is "a similar event to a previous event involving an A330" on 7 October, says the ATSB, adding that the December incident "will be included as part of the earlier investigation". The ATSB is referring to an accident on 7 October in which another Qantas A330 disengaged from the autopilot and descended suddenly because the ADIRU number one on-board fed erroneous information to the flight control primary computers. Following October's accident the aircraft-maker Airbus issued an Operations Engineering Bulletin applicable to all A330s fitted with Northrop-Grumman ADIRUs. In today's statement, the ATSB says the pilots involved in the 27 December incident "actioned the Airbus Operations Engineering Bulletin procedure by selecting the inertial reference one push-button to off and the air data reference one to off". The crew then decided to return to Perth and landed the aircraft there successfully, it adds. The ATSB also says the latest incident occurred when the aircraft was cruising at 36,000ft and was enroute from Perth to Singapore and about 260 nautical miles northwest of Perth. The 7 October accident occurred 154km west of Learmonth, Western Australia when the A330, local registration VH-QPA, was being flown from Singapore to Perth. ATSB has yet to issue a final report into the 7 October accident. The ATSB has already stated publicly that one avenue it is exploring is whether "external sources of electro-magnetic interference" - such as the Harold Holt very low frequency transmitter near Exmouth in Western Australia - may have played a part. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news ************** China's Shenzhen Airlines starts pilot recruitment firm Chinese carrier Shenzhen Airlines has established a stand-alone business, Flightcrew Resources International (FRI), specialising in the recruitment of foreign pilots for airlines in Asia and China. Shenzhen Airlines says in a statement that the airline is already the largest recruiter in China of foreign pilots so it decided to capitalise on its experience by establishing FRI, a stand-alone business that will lease flight crew to airlines in Asia and China. FRI will be competing in a market currently dominated by western companies but argues it is well-placed to compete, particularly in China, because it has "a deep understanding of Chinese laws and civil aviation regulations". It also says it has "a comprehensive service programme in relocating foreign pilots" because Shenzhen Airlines already has experience sourcing pilots from countries such as Australia, Brazil, Bolivia, Norway and the USA. According to FRI's website the firm is currently recruiting captains to operate Kunpeng Airlines Bombardier CRJ 200s, Kunpeng Airlines Embraer 190s, Shenzhen Airlines Airbus A320s and Shenzhen Airlines Boeing 737s. Kunpeng is Shenzhen Airlines' regional carrier. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news ************* FAA’s Sabatini Reflects on Key Safety Initiatives Aviation Week & Space Technology Jan 05 , 2009 Few are more passionate and committed to building aviation safety than ­Nicholas A. Sabatini. After nearly 30 years with the FAA, he turned in his badge Jan. 3 to pursue a second career in—what else?—aviation safety, this time from the private sector. He earned gold stars serving in a variety of positions, from safety inspector in the field to the top safety officer responsible for the certification, regulation and oversight of U.S. airlines, as well as manager of 7,000 employees. Sabatini met with Senior Safety and Training Editor Frances Fiorino in the days prior to his retirement, to review some of the high, and low, points of his decades with the FAA. AW&ST: Many in industry call you a visionary and credit you with building the FAA’s strong safety culture and raising the bar on aviation safety, not only in the U.S. but globally. Why leave now? Sabatini: It just feels right to leave while at the top of the game. I’m moving on, but definitely not retiring to a rocking chair. I’ll continue to do what I’ve done at the FAA: Getting the regulators and the regulated to work together in the common interest of safety. I have never thought of myself as a visionary—I’m a very practical kind of person. Over the years, my time as an FAA field inspector gave me the unique opportunity to observe firsthand the agency’s strengths and weaknesses. My current position gave me the opportunity to enhance those strengths and address the weaknesses. What was the FAA’s Achilles’ heel, and what ignited your passion to fix it? The issue of the FAA’s being inconsistent and lacking standardization, an organization whose businesses functioned as stovepipes. I became passionate about taking these individual stovepipes and getting them to function seamlessly, horizontally. Not because it was the nice thing to do, but because I take my job very seriously: The FAA is the custodian of the public trust and we are to deliver what they expect of us. Let me put that into context. I was particularly taken with the concept of “organizational risk” presented in James Reason’s book, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. He proposes that an organization [not the FAA specifically] can unwittingly contribute to accidents by its own behavior. So I began to introduce this notion of how the FAA’s inconsistency and lack of stan­dard­ization could contribute to accidents. In recent times, we’ve seen several examples of where FAA’s behavior could have put safety at risk—for example, last year’s congressional hearings on FAA safety oversight of airlines, and whether the Eclipse 500 very light jet was properly certified. In both cases, independent review teams found the FAA’s approach to safety was valid. What actions did the FAA take in getting the agency’s lines of business to function as an integrated entity? Setting up the Customer Service Initiative [since renamed Consistency and Standardization Initiative] was a first step forward. It enabled operators or any citizen to air concerns about an FAA senior management decision and request a review. That was followed by implementation of the Quality Management System, which looked at processes and identified areas of safety risk. QMS has laid the foundation for the Safety Management System, which is about managing risks, now in the process of development. Why did you zealously pursue the next step, ISO (International ­Organization for Standardization) 9001:2000 registration, for the FAA? I believed the agency had to demonstrate that as an organization we follow our own processes. The FAA is part of the safety equation. The ISO had been established by units of other government agencies, but the FAA was the first in terms of size, scope, complexity and diversity of product—we have eight lines of businesses. The ISO, established in October 2006, provides a rigorous structure mechanism where 7,000 employees can go on-line and file reports on the processes and procedures they are using. It’s a transparent, internal site, and all can see what’s working, what isn’t. Management is required to acknowledge each report and address each concern. And I’m very proud of having brought the discipline, structure and rigorous methodology like ISO to the FAA What were some of your greatest challenges? I’ve participated in 13 congressional hearings and always looked at them not so much as challenges, but opportunities to educate and inform the public about our very complex system. But I did not find that the last three hearings—two on the FAA safety oversight of airlines and the Eclipse 500 certification—fell into that category. These were motivated for reasons people can speculate for themselves. The U.S. aviation system is considered the safest in the world. What’s been the greatest contributor to safety? Technology—think of it as force vectors pressing down on the accident rate—has served us well, and will continue to serve us. The reliability of the turbine engine offered one of the greatest safety benefits. Then there were advances in avionics and crew training. The driver here for me is that government needs to demonstrate, and without compromising safety, that it is open to adapt regulations to new technology, such as enhanced vision systems (EVS). Over the years, I have observed that it was very easy for any agency to stay in the comfort zone and say, “No, we can’t do that because regulation doesn’t permit it.” At one point, Part 91.175 did not allow use of EVS. We took on that issue, and it opened the floodgates to change the regulations. The FAA is working on a proposed rule that will allow Part 121 operators equipped with EVS to commence an instrument approach and descend to minimums plus 100 ft. before making a decision to land. The Europeans are doing the same thing. And I feel really good about that. How will accidents best be prevented in the decades ahead? The future is about preemption of accidents, moving from a post-accident diagnostic approach to prognostics. So sharing data (from voluntary reporting programs) with partners is critically important to maintain the high level of safety required as world traffic grows. From that information, we can analyze the areas of vulnerability, of potential accidents, and preempt those events from happening by applying interventions. It would be irresponsible and reckless as a regulator to wait for the next accident to determine preventive methods. As a regulator, I have a duty to the public that I cannot be put in a position of begging you to tell me what’s going on. I have to be able to see what’s going on. We no longer have common-cause accidents. They’re rare, random and each has a unique set of circumstances. But we cannot relax. Doesn’t the FAA already gather and share data now? What’s the goal of the agency’s Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (Asias) program? The FAA already gathers safety data through its inspectors. There is good flow between the maintenance inspector, the carrier and FAA. But we need to hear the rest of the story from people who operate in the system daily. Asias will be able to reach down into the database and alert inspectors everywhere of what risks to include immediately in surveillance activities. [The safety data are collected from a variety of sources, including voluntary reporting programs, air traffic control and the NTSB.] The aim is to offer Asias on a global scale. Aren’t cultural differences about data-sharing an impediment to such a program? Asias is beginning to add a global dimension. The U.K.’s EasyJet joined, and its data would be aggregated and de-identified. And I’m excited about Shanghai Airlines. The carrier, which has not yet joined Asias, operates in what is considered a “blame and punishment” society. It has initiated a voluntary reporting program, demonstrating it is beginning to recognize the importance of sharing data. When it comes to ATC modernization, the U.S. appears to be mired in costly delays. Will the satellite-based NextGen project ever materialize? Absolutely. I have no doubt that NextGen will be established. But we’ve learned that we’ve have got to force-fit into what the limited ground system permits. The Chinese are going to make great strides and get ahead of us—because they don’t have a ground infrastructure to modernize. NextGen is also about equipping aircraft with all the capabilities—such as satnav, ADS-B and data link—that will enable them to fly anywhere, anytime, in the world, and doing it all on a grand scale. The modernized system has three critical components upon which it is to be built: communications, navigation and surveillance. The FAA took on navigation first, specifically RNP [Required Navigation Performance], because an aircraft spends 100% of its time navigating. And the FAA was instrumental in producing the International Civil Aviation Organization standard for RNP: ICAO 9613 (second edition). You’ve said that Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) are the “next step in the evolution of aviation.” What’s holding up their operations in the National Airspace System (NAS)? It will happen, but it will take time. First of all, I believe in “Do no harm.” The FAA is working closely with defense and civil users to introduce the systems, but rules must be abided by, and we need to protect all users of the airspace as well as people on the ground. The main concern is the level of maturity of the UASs, which come in a wide range of sizes and operate at different altitudes and with different levels of endurance. They were developed to operate in a theater of war, and they have to come a long way before being able to fly in the NAS. So until that time, the FAA is going to have to set limits on their operation. Specifically, we are concentrating on command, control and communications. Air traffic control requires predictability. If a UAS loses communications, the FAA must know the consequences. If control is lost, then what? Will the system perform in accordance with the way it is programmed? Maybe yes. Maybe not. And if not performing according to plan, the system is creating a potential hazard to other users of the airspace. The RTCA Special Committee 203 is working with the FAA to develop Minimum Aviation Systems Performing Standards, which are expected to be determined in about 2012. Companies have claimed to have the technology, but no one has come forward with it. The RTCA says the technology is not there, and it will take time to develop those standards. You start the new year with a new perspective on life. What’s the next item on your checklist? I find Safety Management Systems incredibly intriguing and challenging, and so necessary. But we are teaching it like an academician would teach it, and we’re not getting anywhere. One of my projects will be developing a practical, methodical, easy-to-understand method of teaching SMS. Nicholas A. Sabatini AGE: 72 EDUCATION: John Jay College of Criminal Justice (N.Y.); The Kellogg School, Northwestern University; Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Holds Air Transport Pilot license, numerous ratings, and is a certified flight and ground instructor. CAREER: FAA associate administrator for aviation safety since October 2001. After joining the agency in 1979, he held various operations and management positions. He was manager of the Flight Standards Div. of the Eastern Region and a principal operations inspector. Previously, Sabatini was a pilot for the U.S. Customs Service in New York (1976-79), a police officer and helicopter pilot for the New York Police Dept. (1958-76), and served with the U.S. Army (1956-58). http://www.aviationweek.com/publication/awst/loggedin/AvnowStoryDisplay.do?f romChannel=awst&pubKey=awst&issueDate=2009-01-05&story=xml/awst_xml/2009/01/ 05/AW_01_05_2009_p40-108408.xml&headline=FAA%26rsquo%3Bs+Sabatini+Reflects+o n+Key+Safety+Initiatives **************