26 JUN 2009 _______________________________________ *Inquiry to Focus on Flights’ Sensor Malfunctions *NTSB Is Examining A330 Airspeed Discrepancies *The importance of Flight 447's missing black boxes *Qantas cancels orders for 15 Boeing 787s *Study, FAA disagree over minimum chopper altitude *NBAA Attempts to Block FOIA Request, Foiled by FAA *************************************** Inquiry to Focus on Flights’ Sensor Malfunctions By MATTHEW L. WALD WASHINGTON — The National Transportation Safety Board said Thursday evening that it had begun an investigation into two recent incidents involving Airbus A330s, the same kind of plane as the one operated by Air France that crashed over the Atlantic Ocean on June 1. Times Topics: Air France Flight 447In both cases, the system for sensing speed through the air malfunctioned, a problem that apparently occurred on the Air France plane shortly before it crashed. The safety board said one incident to be investigated took place on a TAM Airlines flight from Miami to São Paulo, Brazil, on May 21, and the other on a Northwest Airlines flight between Hong Kong and Tokyo on June 23. Both planes landed at their destinations without injuries or damage. The pilots of the TAM flight lost information on speed and altitude in cruise flight. The autopilot and auto throttle also disconnected. In the case of Air France Flight 447, automated messages from the plane to a maintenance base indicated a loss of speed information and a switching off of the autopilot and auto throttle. The National Transportation Safety Board said in a brief statement that the problem on the Northwest plane was “possibly similar,” but it did not provide details. French and American naval ships are searching the Atlantic for the “black boxes” from the Air France flight, but for now the automated messages appear to be the major source of information on the cause of the crash. The plane went down early on June 1 about 620 miles off the coast of northern Brazil with 228 people on board. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/world/americas/26france.html?ref=global-ho me *************** NTSB Is Examining A330 Airspeed Discrepancies Two Flights Reported Difficulty With Speed And Altitude Information The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating two recent incidents in which airspeed and altitude indications in the cockpits of Airbus A-330 aircraft may have malfunctioned. The first incident occurred May 21, 2009, when TAM Airlines flight 8091 (Brazilian registration PT-MVB) flying from Miami, Florida to Sao Paulo, Brazil, experienced a loss of primary speed and altitude information while in cruise flight. Initial reports indicate that the flight crew noted an abrupt drop in indicated outside air temperature, followed by the loss of the Air Data Reference System and disconnections of the autopilot and autothrust, along with the loss of speed and altitude information. The flight crew used backup instruments and primary data was restored in about 5 minutes. The flight landed at Sao Paulo with no further incident and there were no injuries or damage. The Safety Board has become aware of another possibly similar incident that occurred on June 23 on a Northwest Airlines A-330 (registration unknown) flying between Hong Kong and Tokyo. The aircraft landed safely in Tokyo; no injuries or damage was reported. Data recorder information, Aircraft Condition Monitoring System messages, crew statements and weather information are being collected by NTSB investigators. Further information on both incidents will be released when it becomes available. FMI: www.ntsb.gov aero-news.net *************** The importance of Flight 447's missing black boxes Black box data can provide key clues to how the crash happened, information that's vital for future airline safety and design. If the flight data recorders from Air France Flight 447 are never recovered – as seems increasingly possible – their absence will make it difficult to figure out what caused the accident and to apply any lessons for improving future air safety, say some aviation analysts. The so-called black boxes, which are actually bright orange, contain recording equipment that hold keys to understanding what happened in the last minutes aboard the Airbus 330-200 aircraft before it apparently broke up over the Atlantic Ocean June 1. The Airbus was on a routine flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris with 228 people aboard. There were no survivors. The flight captain and the steward were among the 50 bodies recovered so far, according to Air France. Black box data include recordings of the pilots' last words in the cockpit, as well as a computerized record of how key parts of the plane were functioning. Combined with physical information gleaned from the wreckage, the data help investigators piece together what happened – and, from that, to recommend changes either to aircraft design or pilot training to improve future aviation safety. Without that data or more recovered wreckage, aviation analysts say, there's little to go on other than speculation. "That would probably cast a cloud over a number of things that conceivably could be cleared up with greater information and physical evidence – which may be unfair," says Robert Mann, president of R.W. Mann & Co., an aviation consulting firm in Port Washington, N.Y. "It may also be insufficient to really force more fundamental changes" to improve safety, he says. "In the absence of either more physical evidence or the data recorders, we're going to miss the opportunity to do both of those things." The Airbus 330-200 has design and material features that are increasingly used in other new aircraft, making it especially important to find out what happened. Some analysts have looked at the possibility that on-board computer problems contributed to the accident. The Airbus is a fly-by-wire aircraft, which means the flight controls are electronically controlled. The system's computer is designed in such a way that, if a pilot makes an error or an unusually strong wind gust throws the plane off course, the computer will automatically right it, overriding the manual controls. Several Airbus planes have had problems with what are called "uncommanded movements," initiated by the computer. Another concern has to do with the parts of the Airbus 330-200 made of composite materials, including the rudders and the tail fins known as the vertical stabilizers. These materials, engineered from spun fabric and resins, are believed to be as strong if not stronger than some metals. But they are also more difficult to test for potential problems and can delaminate internally, weakening the materials. New generations of planes are being made with more sophisticated computers and more composite materials than in the past. So understanding what happened to Air France Flight 447 could be vital to future aviation safety, analysts say. "Given the quantum leaps we're making in becoming more reliant on [computer-controlled] aircraft that cannot revert to manual control, and a predominance of composite structures [in aircraft construction,] the [Air France Flight 447] data would be an important one to have to tell us it's OK to continue to move in those directions," says Mr. Mann, "or that maybe we've already moved too far and the certification standards haven't kept up." http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0625/p02s14-usgn.html ***************** Qantas cancels orders for 15 Boeing 787s SYDNEY, Australia (AP) — Qantas Airways Ltd. said Friday it had canceled orders for 15 Boeing 787s and delayed the delivery of a further 15 aircraft due to turbulent market conditions. Qantas Chief Executive Alan Joyce said the decision had not been influenced by Boeing's announcement earlier this week of a design issue in the 787 and further delay to the aircraft's first flight. He said discussions with Boeing about the order had started some months ago. Qantas said it had reached a mutual agreement with Chicago-based Boeing Co. to defer the delivery of 15 Boeing 787-8 aircraft by four years and cancel orders for 15 Boeing 787-9s (which are slightly larger) scheduled for delivery in 2014 and 2015. Joyce said Qantas remained committed to the 787 as the right choice for the international expansion of Jetstar, its low-cost subsidiary, and as an eventual replacement for Qantas' Boeing 767 fleet. The 787 is the first commercial jet made mostly of light, sturdy carbon-fiber composites instead of aluminum. Large parts of the plane, such as the fuselage sections and wings, are made in factories around the world and flown in a huge modified 747 to Boeing's widebody plant in the Seattle area, where they are essentially snapped together. Boeing said Tuesday that it needed to reinforce small areas near the connection of the wings and fuselage before conducting a test flight of the jet. The cancellation of orders for 15 787-9s would reduce the group's aircraft capital expenditure by $3 billion based on current list prices, Joyce said. He said Qantas announced its original 787 order in 2005 and the "operating environment for the world's airlines has clearly changed dramatically since then." "Delaying delivery, and reducing overall B787 capacity, is prudent, while still enabling Qantas and Jetstar to take advantage of growth opportunities and market demands, both domestically and internationally," he said in a statement. **************** Study, FAA disagree over minimum chopper altitude HONOLULU (AP)—There have been fewer tourist helicopter crashes in Hawaii since a 1994 emergency rule set a new minimum altitude for flying, but those that have occurred have been deadlier, according to researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health's Center for Injury Research and Policy. They found the rule change issued by the Federal Aviation Administration led to an increase in crashes attributed to poor visibility encountered by pilots using visual flight rules who fly into bad weather, called instrument meteorological conditions. They are called VFR-IMC crashes. "Our data suggest the FAA should reconsider the rule's clause that established a minimum flying altitude of 1,500 feet, as we know higher altitudes are associated with more cloud cover," Susan P. Baker, director of the study's research and professor with the injury center, said in a news release. FAA spokesman Ian Gregor defended the altitude minimum, which applies only to Hawaii sightseeing helicopters, saying the agency reviewed the requirement just two years ago. "The review showed that there is no causal link between the 1,500-foot rule and pilots flying into bad weather," he said. "In other words, the rule is not responsible for pilots flying into bad weather." The minimum altitude was one of a number of regulations included in the rule directed at Hawaii helicopter tour operations in the wake of an escalation in the number of fatal crashes. The study used information from the National Transportation Safety Board's aviation accident database to compare tour helicopter crashes that occurred in Hawaii during the 14 years before and 14 years after the rule went into effect in late 1994. The year had seen crashes involving 10 of 97 Hawaii tour helicopters operating at the time, the researchers said. Hawaii Sightseeing helicopter tours are popular with vacationers who want to get an unhurried aerial view of towering mountains, inaccessible sea cliffs, lush valleys, waterfalls, an erupting volcanoes and lava flows. Helicopter tours also fly over the Grand Canyon, Las Vegas, the San Francisco Bay area and other scenic spots, but the study covered only Hawaii, which has more helicopter operators and accidents than other tourist spots. The most recent fatal tour crashes in Hawaii were in March 2007 when five people were killed in two crashes on Kauai within four days of each other. From 1981 through 1994, there were 37 tour helicopter crashes in the islands, compared with 22 from 1995 through 2008, a decrease of 41 percent, said the study published in the July issue of Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine. However, the number of crashes attributed to poor visibility, or VFR-IMC crashes, increased from two in the 14 years before the rule was imposed to seven after it went into effect, or from 5 percent of the 37 crashes to 32 percent of the 22 crashes, according to the study. Seven of the nine VFR-IMC crashes occurred after 1994. Seven of those (78 percent) were fatal, compared with 10 of the 50 crashes (20 percent) that were not VFR-IMC, the study said. There were eight fatal crashes before the rule went into effect and eight after, but the study said, "The proportion of crashes that were fatal increased due to the increase in VFR-IMC crashes, which have a high fatality rate." "Our finding that VFR-IMC crashes increased in numbers and from 5 percent to 32 percent of helicopter air tour crashes suggests this is a growing problem and supports the conclusion that the 1,500-foot AGL (above ground level) minimum altitude may influence helicopter pilots to fly at altitudes where clouds in Hawaii are more likely," it said. The FAA's review looked at crashes during the 12 years before and after the rule was imposed. "The review showed that there is no causal link between the 1,500-foot rule and pilots flying into bad weather," FAA spokesman Gregor said. "In other words, the rule is not responsible for pilots flying into bad weather," he said. Gregor also said pilots are allowed to dip below 1,500 feet to escape bad weather if they inadvertently fly into it. "If pilots take this action for safety reasons, we do not take enforcement action against them," he said. Gregor also said the National Transportation Safety Board did not identify the 1,500-foot rule as a contributing factor in weather-related crashes. http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_12693379 **************** NBAA Attempts to Block FOIA Request, Foiled by FAA Following last fall's bad publicity surrounding the Big Three's bailout request, major carmaker GM was prompted to prevent the public from tracking its planes in databases compiled by the Federal Aviation Administration. Shortly thereafter in December, investigative journalism group ProPublica filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain a complete listing of companies who requested to have their tail numbers excised by the FAA. Earlier this month, the FAA deemed the information public, and planned to release the list on June 16. That is until the National Business Aviation Association filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on Monday in federal district court in Washington, D.C. The group, which learned of the request from the FAA, argues that the records should be exempt from disclosure, citing that they contain confidential commercial information that was submitted voluntarily. Releasing the list would also generate a higher level of interest in the companies that had tried to block public knowledge of their aircrafts' movements, it said. "Upon learning that a specific aircraft tail number is included in the [blocked] list, a member of the public could readily track down the identity of the owner (through the FAA's public aircraft registry database) and attempt to investigate the reason the owner seeks blocking of the aircraft data," Steven Brown, the association's senior vice president wrote in a March letter objecting to the FOIA request. However, The FAA reviewed the association's objections to ProPublica's FOIA request and ultimately determined on that the information did not qualify for an exemption. In response to the failed attempt, the NBAA reiterated that it supports the Blocked Aircraft Registry Request (BARR) Program, which allows information to be kept hidden to protect the security of executives and to prevent disclosure of business trips. "The Blocked Aircraft Registry Request (BARR) Program was established over a decade ago in response to recognized security concerns and competitive considerations," spokesman Dan Hubbard said in a statement. "NBAA has long supported the BARR program and believes the reasons for its creation remain relevant today, given that access to information about certain flights can be used to inappropriately impact the competitive landscape." http://www.charterx.com/resources/article.aspx?id=4413 ***************** Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC