29 JUL 2009 _______________________________________ *NTSB Confirms Deborah Hersman As Board Chair *Pilots report problem with Air France speed sensors *Turkish Airlines places $1.9 billion order for Boeing 777s *9/11 Wrongful Death Suit Receives April Trial Date *Anaheim man convicted of interfering with crew on international flight *FAA readies to issue guidance for PMA endurance testing *ASDE-X Deployed at Newark-Liberty International *Circuit Breaker Safety **************************************** NTSB Confirms Deborah Hersman As Board Chair Senate Also Confirms Her Membership To Run Through 2013 Deborah A.P. Hersman was confirmed Friday as chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. Hersman was nominated by President Barak Obama in June of this year. She has been a member of the Board since 2004, having been first nominated by then-President George W. Bush. "Transportation unions are pleased the Senate has confirmed Deborah Hersman to lead the National Transportation Safety Board," Edward Wytkind, president of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO, said in a prepared statement. "Hersman is deeply committed to the safety mission of this agency and has demonstrated her passion to learn from accident investigations and advocate federal safety policies that make the U.S. transportation system safer. And rather than simply assigning blame to individuals, she investigates the policies, procedures and practices that threaten safe operations." NTSB Chair Hersman At press time, the aviation community had not begun to react to the confirmation, though the industry was generally supportive when she was nominated a month and a half ago. "The Air Line Pilots Association applauds the Obama administration's nomination of Deborah Hersman as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)," the organization said in a prepared statement. "Since her initial appointment to the NTSB, Member Hersman has exhibited tireless dedication to gaining a thorough understanding of the most pressing aviation safety issues of our time. Her willingness to take on safety challenges with new approaches and her enthusiasm in pursuing every opportunity to enhance safety will serve the airline industry well in the future." FMI: www.ntsb.gov aero-news.net *************** Pilots report problem with Air France speed sensors PARIS (Reuters) - An Air France flight from Rome to Paris earlier this month briefly lost its speed readings due to faulty sensors, pilots said on Tuesday, in the latest safety scare involving speed sensors. Several problems with speed sensors, or pitot tubes, made by Thales have been reported since 2008, and investigators are looking to see if they played a role in last month's fatal crash of an Air France plane. A spokesman for France's SNPL national pilot union, Erick Derivry, said the union would ask Air France to see whether the latest incident was similar to those previously reported. If it was, the union would ask the airline to replace its Thales sensors on its Airbus fleet with models manufactured by Goodrich. Air France replaced an earlier Thales model on its planes with a more recent version following the June crash of one of its Airbus A330s. All 228 people aboard died when the Rio de Janeiro to Paris flight crashed into the sea. But the latest incident on July 13 occurred with a new model, the company said. "This incident was caused by new sensors. It lasted a few seconds, with no consequence for the passengers, and an analysis is under way in cooperation with the manufacturers and investigators," an Air France spokeswoman said. The SNPL spokesman said a calculator that converts pressure into a speed reading might also have to be replaced. In June, under pressure from another pilots' union after the crash, Air France changed all pitot tubes on its A330 and A340 planes, having already changed them on its A320s. http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56R6CE20090728 **************** Turkish Airlines places $1.9 billion order for Boeing 777s Boeing said Tuesday that Turkish Airlines is ordering seven Boeing 777 airplanes, which are worth $1.9 billion at list prices. More specifically, Turkish Airlines is ordering another seven 777-300ER, or extended range, aircraft. Turkish Airlines is adding to an existing order for five 777-300ERs that it placed in April. The airline's fleet includes 65 Boeing planes, including 737s and leased 777-300ERs. "This additional order is a further confirmation of Turkish Airline's plans for international expansion and their confidence in the abilities of the 777-300ER to help them meet these goals," said Aldo Basile, Boeing's vice president of sales for Europe and Russia. Here's Boeing's description of the plane ordered: The Boeing 777-300ER is 19 percent lighter than its closest competitor, greatly reducing its fuel requirement. It produces 22 percent less carbon dioxide per seat and costs 20 percent less to operate per seat. The airplane can seat up to 365 passengers in a three-class configuration and has a maximum range of 7,930 nautical miles (14,685 km). The 777 family is the world's most successful twin-engine, twin-aisle airplane. Fifty-six customers around the world have ordered more than 1,100 777s. The order brings Boeing's order total for 2009 for all aircraft to 113. The company has also logged 89 cancellations. http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/174789.asp ************** 9/11 Wrongful Death Suit Receives April Trial Date A federal judge in Manhattan has set next April 12 as the date for the first trial in a wrongful-death lawsuit stemming from the 9/11 terror attack. The judge, Alvin K. Hellerstein of Federal District Court, who is also handling respiratory injury claims by ground zero workers, said he wanted to try a wrongful-death case first. "I think in many respects when we think of 9/11," he said, "we think more of the people in the airplanes than anybody else." Almost all of the more than 90 lawsuits filed by victims and their survivors have been settled; thousands of other claims were resolved through a special compensation fund. The judge said that he wanted the first trial to be finished within a month and that it would involve either two still-pending lawsuits filed on behalf of victims who died on American Airlines Flight 11, the first plane to strike the World Trade Center; or a third unresolved suit, involving a passenger on United Airlines Flight 175, which hit the south tower of the trade center. A lawyer for the plaintiffs in the three cases, Donald A. Migliori, said he would choose by Friday which would go first. One plaintiff, Mike Low, whose daughter Sara, 28, was a flight attendant on Flight 11, said by phone after the hearing that he was gratified that a trial date had been set. "It's something we have sought and pursued for a long time," he said. Desmond T. Barry Jr., a lawyer for the defendants, which include the airlines and aviation security companies, said in court that his clients needed more time to prepare for trial. He also said that the three plaintiffs had rejected settlement offers. The judge said that was their choice. "They didn't have to settle if they didn't want to," he said. "They want to have a trial. I'm here to give it to them." http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/29/nyregion/29trial.html ************** Anaheim man convicted of interfering with crew on international flight An unruly airline passenger who was duct-taped to his seat by flight attendants during an international flight has been convicted of interfering with a flight crew. James Allen Cameron, 50, of Anaheim was convicted Monday of disruptive behavior during an April 23, 2008, United Airlines flight from Hong Kong to Los Angeles International Airport. He was also charged with misdemeanor assault for allegedly hitting an off-duty pilot during the flight, but the federal jury deadlocked on that count. Prosecutors said Cameron had been drinking and was so belligerent and verbally abusive that crew members, a passenger and an off-duty pilot restrained his hands with plastic handcuffs. Still, prosecutors said, Cameron managed to punch a flight attendant on the chin. The crew then held Cameron down and duct-taped his legs and chest, prosecutors said. Cameron was again able to get loose and the crew eventually used several seat belt extensions and metal handcuffs to restrain him. The maximum prison sentence for interference with a flight crew is 20 years, but when all the circumstances are taken into consideration Cameron will probably get a lower sentence, said Assistant U.S. Atty. Priya Sopori. "We do not expect the sentence will be 20 years," she said. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/07/anaheim-man-convicted-of-inter fering-with-crew-on-international-flight.html *************** FAA readies to issue guidance for PMA endurance testing The engine and propeller directorate of FAA tomorrow plans to publish an advisory circular (AC) outlining a method to demonstrate durability of parts manufacturer approval (PMA) parts. PMA parts are developed by companies other than the original equipment manufacturer, and are either approved on identicality or non-identicality. The AC developed by FAA describes a comparative endurance test method for certain turbine engine or auxiliary power unit parts. FAA advises the test could be used when PMA applicants have insufficient comparative data showing the durability of their proposed part is at least equal to the type design, or when PMA applicants introduce changes that could affect the durability of their proposed designs. FAA explains applicants can use the method outlined in the AC when requesting PMA under test and computation, or using comparative test analysis detailed in the agency's PMA approval procedures. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news ************** ASDE-X Deployed at Newark-Liberty International The Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X advanced ground radar system is helping controllers to improve runway safety at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), a Continental Airlines hub. The system, which was commissioned this month, shows controllers the location of aircraft and vehicles on runways and taxiways. When a runway incursion situation arises, such as an aircraft about to land on an occupied runway, the system alerts controllers two ways: An audible warning sounds and a visual cue-circles around the two aircraft on collision course-appears on the controller's screen. The controller, in turn, would alert flight crews to take appropriate evasive action. ASDE-X displays data for both arriving and departing aircraft; Newark Liberty's previous ASDE-3 system displayed only arriving aircraft. The system differentiates aircraft sizes with yellow icons for heavies and white icons for all others, and allows controllers to zoom in on areas of interest. Newark Liberty has 12 mi. of 75-ft.-wide taxiways and handles traffic on its parallel Runway 4/22 (the 10,000-ft. 4R-22L and 11,000-ft. 4L-22R), and uses 8,800-ft. Runway 11-29 for commuter traffic. For the 12 months ending Apr. 30, Newark Liberty handled 34.2 million revenue passengers and 427,686 flights. Boston Logan International Airport was set to commission ADSE-X on July 23. http://www.aviationweek.com **************** Circuit Breaker Safety Business & Commercial Aviation Jul 01 , 2009 , p. 68 Richard N. Aarons The one-push practice does not consider the cumulative nature of wiring damage and the removal of power only temporarily stops the progression of the damage. The NTSB rarely undertakes a full "blue book" investigation into a light-twin accident, but the loss of NASCAR's Cessna 310R on July 10, 2007, is an exception. The Safety Board was attracted by the facts that the piston twin was part of a large turbine fleet; that questions existed about the use of the airplane under NASCAR's standard operating procedures; and that a critical maintenance issue may have slipped through the management cracks. The airplane had departed Florida's Daytona Beach Airport (DAB) at 0822 for Lakeland Linder Regional Airport. A NASCAR physician - holder of a commercial certificate - was the PIC and occupied the left seat. A NASCAR ATP-rated safety pilot was in the right. Ten minutes after departure, upon leveling off at 6,000 feet, the right-seat pilot contacted ATC and declared an emergency stating "smoke in the cockpit. We need . . . to land at [Orlando] Sanford [International Airport]." The controller cleared the flight to Sanford and to descend to 2,000 feet. ATC radar records showed that the airplane turned toward Orlando and began to descend. At 0833:15, controllers heard a radio transmission that seemed to include the phrase, "shutoff all radios, electrical . . ." It was the last communication from the aircraft. Transponder returns ended at this time. The airplane was eight nm northwest of Sanford and descending rapidly. Primary radar returns continued for another minute and a half showing the airplane continuing on a 150-degree heading to Sanford. The last return was recorded when the airplane was about three miles out at 1,200 feet agl. The aircraft crashed into a residential neighborhood about 0.7 nm west of the last primary return. Witnesses told investigators the airplane was traveling "extremely fast," was "very low" and its wings were "rocking" as it descended. Just before impact, the 310 entered a "steep bank" and made a sharp turn to the west. Witnesses reported seeing smoke trailing from the airplane, and one witness stated, "Smoke was trailing from the port side." Both pilots were killed, as were three persons on the ground. Four others on the ground suffered serious injuries. The airplane had struck a north-south line of trees in a right-wing-low attitude at a height of 65 feet agl. About 270 feet beyond the first tree strikes, the airplane struck a palm tree at 20 feet agl. The airplane then grazed the northeast corner of a house and subsequently impacted the next two houses along the street. A post-crash fire destroyed the airplane and the second and third homes. Investigators found the wreckage fragmented and severely burned but uncovered no pre-impact structural, engine or control failures. They did find some parts of the cockpit outside of the post-impact fire zone and were helped by discolorations and/or soot deposits on those parts. For example, the instrument panel deck skin that was found outside the area where the post-crash fire occurred showed signs of thermal damage. Areas of the underside of this component exhibited discolored primer paint, patches of charred/bubbling paint and soot deposits, all of which were consistent with an inflight fire. The instrument panel glareshield showed thermal damage at the attachment point. The cabin door - found about 60 feet away from the main wreckage - was unburned; its latching pins were undamaged. However, numerous soot deposits had accumulated on the interior side of this door. All of this was consistent with an inflight fire. The undamaged latching pins and the location and existence of the observed trailing soot deposit are consistent with the pilots having opened the cabin door to vent smoke. Recovered flight instruments, cockpit avionics, controls, switches and circuit breakers exhibited severe post-impact fire damage and yielded no usable information regarding their precedent configuration or condition. A component of the weather radar antenna assembly and some attached electronic circuit boards exhibited severe impact and thermal damage; however, no evidence of arcing or other electrical faults was observed. Investigators noted that most of the insulation on the aircraft's wiring had burned off. Some of the insulation was polyvinyl chloride (PVC) material that can produce incapacitating fumes when burned. Neither Cessna nor other manufacturers have incorporated PVC-insulated wiring in new designs since the early 1970s. However, the FAA permitted the continued use of PVC-insulated wiring in airplanes - including Cessna 310s - in which it was already being installed. Because PVC-insulated wiring discovered in the wreckage had identifying numbers consistent with wiring commonly used by Cessna, it is likely that Cessna installed the PVC wiring in the accident airplane when it built it in 1977. Investigators turned to the airplane's operational and maintenance history and ultimately focused on a discrepancy reported with the weather radar system. On July 9 - the day before the accident - a NASCAR pilot wrote on a discrepancy form that the "radar went blank during cruise flight. Recycled - no response . . . smell of electrical components burning turned off unit - pulled radar breaker - smell went away. Radar inop." The company pilot told investigators that he documented and reported the weather radar discrepancy to NASCAR personnel, leaving the white original page in the discrepancy binder in the airplane and providing the yellow copy to the director of maintenance (DOM), in accordance with the company's SOPs. However, investigators found that no corrective action was recorded on the original white page of this discrepancy form. "Additionally," says the Safety Board, "NASCAR Aviation Division personnel could not produce the yellow copy of this form or any other written documentation indicating that any troubleshooting or corrective maintenance actions had been taken to resolve the discrepancy before the accident flight." NASCAR's corporate aviation division at that time operated a fleet of nine airplanes, including seven jets, one turboprop and the accident airplane. NASCAR employed 10 maintenance technicians and about 25 pilots. The department flew some 1,950 flights per year for a total fleet use of about 2,500 to 3,000 flight hours. NASCAR purchased the Cessna 310 in March 1995. It was based at Daytona and used primarily to transport parts, goods and documents rather than personnel. However, said investigators, the aircraft was used occasionally by the commercial pilot/physician for personal flights. NASCAR's policies did not permit any pilot who was not an ATP to act as PIC in a company airplane; therefore, the commercial pilot had to be accompanied by the ATP on personal flights. The commercial pilot was 53 years old and held single- and multiengine land and instrument ratings. He had 276 total flight hours, 106 hours of which were in multiengine airplanes, 26 hours of which were in Cessna 310s. The ATP-rated safety pilot was typed in the Cessna Citation (500, 550 and 600), Dassault Falcon (50 and 2000), British Aerospace HS-125, Beechcraft Premier IA, and Learjet 60. He had accumulated 10,580 total flight hours, 67 hours of which were in Cessna 310 airplanes. He had flown about 50 and 17 hours, respectively, in the 90 and 30 days before the accident flight. Both pilots had completed Cessna 310 proficiency training on Jan. 25, 2007. NASCAR's aviation department was operated under FAR Part 91 and, thus, was not required by the FAA to establish official SOPs. The department did develop an SOP manual containing its policies and procedural guidance. However, said the Safety Board, investigators found evidence that the SOP guidance was neither consistently updated nor adhered to by company personnel. Investigators gave as an example a NASCAR SOP that says company airplanes were for corporate use and that a pilot acting as PIC on a NASCAR airplane must hold an ATP certificate. Yet, the commercial pilot, who was not ATP rated, was permitted to fly the accident airplane for personal use. The guidance contained in the SOP manual was also not readily accessible to company personnel and, therefore, was not often referenced. When investigators asked NASCAR's aviation director for a copy of the SOP manual, he could not immediately locate one. The SOPs did not contain any specific information about the methods, procedures, or tools to be used for scheduling or tracking airplane maintenance, and evidence indicates that maintenance information was not accessible to all NASCAR aviation division personnel. The Safety Board gave these examples: Although the DOM used maintenance tracking computer programs to track scheduled maintenance requirements on all the NASCAR airplanes, other NASCAR personnel did not have access to these programs. Maintenance technicians had to contact the DOM to get maintenance information for the airplanes on which they worked. NASCAR did not have a communication procedure for providing flight operations personnel (pilots and schedulers) with airplane airworthiness information. The SOP indicated that the DOM was ultimately responsible for ensuring that all NASCAR airplanes were maintained in an airworthy condition at all times and for releasing airplanes for flight after maintenance; however, the SOP did not specify a means for the DOM to communicate the maintenance status of an airplane to anyone else within NASCAR. NASCAR had no system through which any individual, including the DOM, could remove an airplane from the flight schedule because of airworthiness concerns. In practice, such a decision was made collaboratively by the aviation director, chief pilot and DOM. Planned and unplanned maintenance activities were finalized through a combination of verbal and e-mail coordination between those individuals. As for the accident aircraft, the DOM, chief pilot and aviation director did discuss the weather radar discrepancy write-up, but none of these individuals took any actions to ensure that the discrepancy was addressed before agreeing that the airplane could be flown, said the Safety Board. The chief pilot told investigators that the DOM had told him that: "It will be OK. Just tell [the ATP] not to turn it on." To its credit, NASCAR addressed all these "procedural concerns" immediately after the accident by updating SOPs, maintenance tracing and scheduling procedures. Improvements include: Using aircraft status boards that detail the planned maintenance activity and general status for each airplane in the maintenance department and the schedule and availability of the maintenance technicians; Placing an aircraft status log in each airplane's maintenance discrepancy logbook for pilots to review before flight; Implementing an improved maintenance-tracking tool that provides a report of upcoming scheduled maintenance for each airplane in NASCAR's fleet and is available on-demand to pilots and maintenance and other NASCAR personnel; Developing new serialized maintenance discrepancy forms that include a number of additional entry categories and enable better tracking of maintenance issues. The Accident Exactly what went on in the cockpit immediately before the crash will never be known. However, Safety Board investigators believe that an electrical problem existed in the weather radar components or related wiring. When, on the day before the accident flight, the pilot pulled the radar circuit breaker he "stopped a symptom [the burning smell] of the problem by removing electrical power from the circuit; however, it did not correct the underlying problem." Part 91 allows individual and companies to operate non-turbine-powered airplanes with non-critical inoperative equipment if the inoperative item is not required for flight and is either (1) removed from the airplane, the cockpit control placarded and the maintenance recorded or (2) deactivated and placarded as inoperative. Additionally, an appropriately rated pilot or mechanic must determine that the inoperative equipment does not constitute a hazard to flight. In this case, no one examined the airplane to investigate the discrepancy; no maintenance personnel stated that they had been in the airplane since the discrepancy was reported; and no company personnel (1) removed the airplane from service, (2) reset the circuit breaker, (3) placed a placard in the cockpit regarding the discrepancy or (4) deactivated the weather radar system, collaring the associated circuit breaker and placing a placard in the cockpit indicating the system's inoperative status. The Safety Board concluded that without examining the weather radar system, and then either removing the airplane from service or placarding the airplane and collaring the circuit breaker, as well as making a maintenance records entry, it was not permissible to fly the airplane under federal regulations. "The final safeguard against the operation of an airplane with an unresolved maintenance discrepancy is a thorough pilot preflight inspection," said the NTSB. "In this case, the Safety Board's investigation showed that both pilots had access to information that could have alerted them that the accident airplane had an unresolved maintenance discrepancy on the morning of the accident and could have led them to take appropriate actions to ensure that the discrepancy was addressed before flight. "Post-accident interviews indicated that the ATP was specifically advised of the weather radar discrepancy by a telephone call from NASCAR's chief pilot the night before and in person by the maintenance technician who was responsible for the accident airplane the morning of the accident flight. On both occasions, the ATP dismissed the issue as unimportant." He had sufficient information and cause to reject the aircraft, said the Board. In its analysis, the Safety Board pointed out that on the day before the accident, the airplane was flown uneventfully for at least one hour after the pilot pulled the weather radar circuit breaker. In contrast, on the accident flight, the airplane was only airborne for about 10 minutes before the pilots reported a problem. The airplane crashed about two minutes later. "The most likely reason for the rapid onset of the problem," said the Safety Board, "is that one of the pilots reset the radar circuit breaker, thus reinitiating the development of the problem encountered on the previous flight. The circuit breakers would have been difficult for the ATP to reach and were next to the left leg of the commercial pilot, but nothing was found to indicate which pilot reset the circuit breaker or when." Investigators noted that "general aviation pilots often reset circuit breakers during preflight preparations unless the circuit breakers are placarded or collared to show that the associated system is to remain unpowered." The accident airplane's "Before Starting Engines" checklist included an item stating "Circuit Breakers - IN." Therefore, the Safety Board concluded that it is likely that one of the pilots, consistent with routine and/or the "Before Starting Engines" checklist, reset the weather radar circuit breaker, which restored electrical power to the weather radar system's wiring and resulted in the inflight fire. Circuit Breaker Reset Hazards The Safety Board believes all pilots need better training on circuit breaker dos and don'ts. Breakers are installed on aircraft to protect wiring. When current flow in a system exceeds a predetermined value for a period of time, the circuit breaker activates, or "trips," to stop current flow through that system by breaking the electrical circuit. To use the system after a circuit breaker trips, a pilot must reset that circuit breaker manually. Historically, it has been common practice to reset a circuit breaker on an airplane one time after the breaker trips. The rationale behind this one-time reset practice is that if the circuit breaker tripped because of anything other than a transient or nuisance event and if the triggering condition was still present, the circuit breaker would trip again shortly after being reset. Is this one-push technique sound? The Safety Board doesn't think so. The one-push practice does not consider the cumulative nature of wiring damage and that the removal of power only temporarily stops the progression of the damage. "The aviation industry has begun to recognize the potential hazards of resetting non-critical circuit breakers even once. On Jan. 8, 2004, the FAA issued AC 120-80, InFlight Fires, which stated, in part: Crewmembers may create a potentially hazardous situation if they reset a circuit breaker without knowing what caused it to trip. A tripped circuit breaker should not be reset in flight unless doing so is consistent with explicit procedures specified in the approved operating manual used by the flight crew or unless, in the judgment of the captain, resetting the circuit breaker is necessary for the safe completion of the flight. Although this AC was directed at air carrier pilots, it is not without value for all of us. The Safety Board says general aviation pilots still receive information contrary to the guidance in the AC. "For example, a May 2007 article in Flight Training, a periodical published by the AOPA, provided pilots the following advice: 'Circuit breakers can be reset simply by pushing in the black button. Wait a few moments to allow the breaker to cool before resetting. Also, don't try to reset a breaker more than once. If it pops again after the first reset, it's a good indication that a serious problem exists somewhere in the circuit that demands professional attention.'" When all was said and done, the Safety Board concluded that existing guidance in manuals provided by general aviation airplane manufacturers regarding the resetting of circuit breakers often does not consider the cumulative nature of wiring damage and that the removal of power only temporarily stops the progression of such damage. "If general aviation pilots, maintenance personnel and operators had a more thorough understanding of the potential hazards of a reset circuit breaker [as outlined in AC 120-80], they would be less likely to reset a tripped circuit breaker without knowing what caused that circuit breaker to trip." Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should develop a safety alert for operators (SAFO) informing general aviation pilots and maintenance personnel of the circuit breaker policy contained in AC 120-80. The Safety Board further believes that the FAA should require that the contents of the SAFO be included in initial and required biennial training for general aviation pilots and maintenance personnel. A good idea, I think. Finally, the Safety Board would like to see all corporate operators employ some sort of safety monitoring system and points out that the NBAA is leading the way in helping members establish such systems. This too, in my opinion, is a good idea and the NBAA can be a terrific resource to any corporate flight department setting out to improve its SOPs and SMS program. http://www.aviationweek.com **************** Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC