16 SEP 2009 _______________________________________ * Honeywell Wins FAA Approval of Runway Safety Systems * Pilots question airspeed sensors' troubled history * NextGen is the Only Way * Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) Responds to Article Citing Lack of FAA Oversight on Charter Industry * Foreign Repair Station Questions Slow FAA Reauthorization **************************************** Honeywell Wins FAA Approval of Runway Safety Systems Wed Sep 16, 2009 9:57am EDT New Safety System Addresses National Transportation Safety Board's 'Most Wanted' Issue of Runway Safety PHOENIX, Sept. 16 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Honeywell (NYSE: HON) announced today that its SmartRunway(TM) and SmartLanding(TM) products, technologies developed to reduce runway accidents at crowded airports, have received Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical Standard Order (TSO) approval, allowing the company to deliver its runway products to customers for aircraft installation. Honeywell has the only runway safety products to be certified by the FAA for production. SmartRunway provides visual and aural alerts to pilots about runway and taxi locations and SmartLanding informs pilots of unstable approaches and long landings, when an aircraft lands too far down the runway to safely stop. "SmartRunway and SmartLanding address the $1 billion cost of runway excursions and incursions to the commercial flight industry," said TK Kallenbach, Honeywell Vice President of Product Management. "This new software provides added situational awareness at increasingly crowded airports while reinforcing standard operating procedures." SmartRunway helps break the chain of events that can lead to a runway incursion by providing timely advisories -- aural and/or visual -- to the flight crew about aircraft position compared to runway locations in the database. SmartRunway is the next generation of Honeywell's Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS), the first runway advisory system introduced in 2004, and installed on more than 200 air transport and 1,470 business aircraft, with another 800 airline systems on order. SmartRunway offers two additional advisories over RAAS, as well as visual advisories. Boeing recently announced they are offering SmartRunway as an option on the 747-8 and 777 aircraft, and will offer it on the 737 in early 2010. SmartLanding addresses the chain of events that can lead to a runway excursion event by notifying pilots through aural and/or visual alerts if the aircraft has not met established safety criteria on approach, to help prevent the aircraft from landing too hard or exiting the runway from the end or the sides. The Flight Safety Foundation reports that in the past 14 years, there has been an average of almost 30 runway excursion accidents per year for commercial aircraft. "The systems support both 'quiet' cockpit and 'heads-up' initiatives while complementing electronic flight bag technology by providing safety information to pilots when runway safety is at risk," said Kallenbach. "SmartRunway and SmartLanding are the latest software enhancements to our EGPWS, which is found on more than 30,000 business and air transport aircraft." The systems require just one hour of aircraft downtime for installation and minimal pilot training, and are software upgrades to Honeywell's Mark V and Mark VII Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), the leading Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Warning Systems. Honeywell's EGPWS contains a global terrain, obstacle and runway database and more than 600 million hours of global flight validation. Based in Phoenix, Arizona, Honeywell's aerospace business is a leading global provider of integrated avionics, engines, systems and service solutions for aircraft manufacturers, airlines, business and general aviation, military, space and airport operations. Honeywell International (www.honeywell.com) is a Fortune 100 diversified technology and manufacturing leader, serving customers worldwide with aerospace products and services; control technologies for buildings, homes and industry; automotive products; turbochargers; and specialty materials. Based in Morris Township, N.J., Honeywell's shares are traded on the New York, London, and Chicago Stock Exchanges. For more news and information on Honeywell, please visit www.honeywellnow.com. This release contains certain statements that may be deemed "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, that address activities, events or developments that we or our management intends, expects, projects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Such statements are based upon certain assumptions and assessments made by our management in light of their experience and their perception of historical trends, current conditions, expected future developments and other factors they believe to be appropriate. The forward-looking statements included in this release are also subject to a number of material risks and uncertainties, including but not limited to economic, competitive, governmental, and technological factors affecting our operations, markets, products, services and prices. Such forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, and actual results, developments and business decisions may differ from those envisaged by such forward-looking statements. SOURCE Honeywell http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS128076+16-Sep-2009+PRN200909 16 Karen Crabtree of Honeywell, +1-602-365-5255, karen.crabtree@honeywell.com ************** Pilots question airspeed sensors' troubled history By EMMA VANDORE - Published: Wednesday, Sep. 16, 2009 / Updated: Wednesday, Sep. 16, 2009 01:08 PM Associated Press Writer Paul-Louis Arslanian, head of BEA, the French agency investigating the crash, said the body knew of around seven Pitot incidents on long range planes of the A330-A340 family before the crash, and that Airbus knew of around 20. Europe's air safety authorities say they had been monitoring Thales Pitots on A330-340 long-range planes since 2008, when it was aware of nine incidents of malfunctions. Michael Barr, who teaches aviation safety at the University of Southern California, said it appears Airbus recognized the Pitot problem needed to be fixed but did not make it an urgent priority. "What they hoped for was that the perfect storm wouldn't come up before they got it fixed," Barr said. "They were in the process of doing that when this one hit that perfect storm over the ocean." The cost of replacing all Pitots on a worldwide fleet of planes is hardly major: For Air France, a full speed-sensor overhaul on its A330-A340 fleet would cost around euro153,000 ($222,000), according to AP calculations based on pilot estimates. Both Thales and Goodrich declined to disclose the cost of their sensors. But if prosecutors rule that the crash could have been avoided, the financial penalties and loss of reputation for Air France and especially Airbus, whose aircraft fill the skies every day, would be devastating. There is no hard evidence that faulty Pitots caused the Air France crash, and in past reported incidents of Pitot malfunction, pilots have been able to regain control of the plane. Furthermore, what looks to be a likely cause in the beginning of a crash investigation sometimes shifts after investigators get more information from the flight recorders. However, more than two months after the crash, the European Aviation Safety Agency has reassessed the dangers of faulty Pitots, ordering a continent-wide ban on the types of Thales sensors that were fitted onto Flight 447 on all long range planes. The directive also extends to a newer Thales model, of which there can no longer be more than one on each plane. EASA said at least two of the three probes fitted to each Airbus plane should be made by North Carolina-based Goodrich. This month the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration issued a similar directive for U.S. airlines. The crash, and what EASA spokesman Daniel Hoeltgen calls "an avalanche" of reported Pitot problems among European carriers since the accident, has caused the industry to reconsider its view of the sensors. "Prior to 2008, operators and manufacturers did not deem Pitot issues to be safety-critical," he said. "Now, with all the reporting and testing that's going on, we're saying that we believe as a precautionary measure, that it would be best to have either 3 Goodrich probes or 2 Goodrich probes and 1 Thales." In its airworthiness directive, EASA notes that faulty speed readings can lead to the disconnection of the autopilot and auto-thrust functions. "Depending on the prevailing aeroplane altitude and weather environment, this condition could result in increased difficulty for the crew to control the aeroplane," the agency said. The directive does not apply to the smaller single-aisle and shorter range A320s, because the rule is designed to address the type of Pitot malfunction that occurs only at the altitudes and temperatures flown by the longer-range planes. The newer Thales model had addressed the different problem of water getting into the tubes but is not as good as the Goodrich probe in icy conditions, said EASA's Hoeltgen. EASA has also received reports of incidents with Goodrich probes, but of a "lower magnitude" than with Thales Pitots. Hoeltgen said problems occur "no matter which make and series." Airbus rival Boeing Co. admits to Pitot "incidents" on some of its planes, but says "unreliable airspeed due to Pitot icing or torrential rain is a temporary condition" and procedures exist "to ensure continued safe flight," according to spokeswoman Sandy Angers. She declined to say what make of Pitot Boeing uses on its planes, but said there have been no accidents "attributable to high-altitude icing of heated Pitot probes." Experts caution that without more evidence it's impossible to pin blame on Pitots for the crash of Flight 447. "Pitot tubes have been highlighted in regards to AF 447 but there are a whole bunch of other things that may have gone wrong," said Chris Yates, Janes' aviation security editor. Still, with only the debris and a series of automatic messages transmitted from Flight 447 - which highlight the Pitot problem - some pilots are asking why top officials at Air France, Airbus and the BEA appear reluctant to talk about the role of the speed sensors. Lead investigator Alain Bouillard says Pitots are "an element but not the cause." EADS CEO Louis Gallois insists that Flight 447 was brought down by a "convergence of different causes." Air France CEO Pierre-Henri Gourgeon says he's "not convinced that the sensors are the cause of the accident." Leon Cremieux of the Sud Aerien union at Air France said airlines receive a lot of service bulletins and rely on planemakers and aviation authorities to flag urgent maintenance issues. "There was a dialogue between Airbus and Air France" over the Pitots, he said. "Clearly it wasn't judged important enough to be a question of security." Barr, the USC aviation safety professor, said serious efforts to correct safety problems in the airline industry tend to increase in direct proportion to the number of people killed, while too little action is often taken in response to incidents in which no one is killed. It even has a name: blood priority. "The more blood that is spilled, the more corrective action is taken. The less blood that is spilled, the less corrective action that's taken," Barr said. http://www.heraldonline.com/wire/world/story/1608509-p2.html Associated Press writers Helene Goupil in Paris and Joan Lowy in Washington, D.C., and APTN producer Jeffrey Schaeffer contributed to this report. ************** NextGen is the Only Way John Hickey, Washington, D.C. September 16, 2009 New Technologies Workshop Good morning, and thanks for inviting me. Events like this don't happen all by themselves. Hank [Cabler], Les [Smith], nice job. One of the main criticisms we've heard over the years about NextGen is that people "don't know what it is" - that they "can't define it," or that they "can't see it." Well, for those of us who can remember back that far, I'm reminded of the implementation of the zip code. Back in the day, there was quite a bit of pushback. People "didn't know what it was." They "couldn't define it." And they "couldn't see it." Well, as we all know, what started out as a "zone code" was changed to "zip code." Now, when we put something in the mail without a zip code, we grimace a little. We know that the absence of those digits is going to slow down performance. When zip codes came about, people didn't want to memorize five digits. Now, most of us go the extra step of adding the additional four digits to speed things along. We even get a little bit grumpy when someone sends us something and they don't include our zip code. For what started out as something that couldn't be seen, defined or touched, there's universal acceptance because it's the smart way to go. I think NextGen is a fair comparison. The natural tendency is to be apprehensive about the unfamiliar. Plus, we're asking everyone to sign on the dotted line before delivery. My message today is that NextGen is not a leap of faith. Not only is it the smart way to go, it's the only way to go. I'm sure there was a time where the barnstormers were furious when the bonfires were put out. You can hear them, "You want me to depend on a radio beacon? What the heck is a radio beacon?" We're going to say the same thing about NextGen. I predict that if anything, that one day when we're all long gone, people will wonder what we were nervous about. That kind of nervousness, though, is to be expected. We are living in interesting times. The economy dominates aviation, the United States and the entire world. There's an ever-increasing demand for aviation services and uncertainty in operating expenses. And you've got to be green every step of the way. Always looming, though, is the standard by which we're all really judged, and that standard is safety. Aviation's a lot like surgery. People want and expect us to bat a thousand every day. The thing is, the NAS hits that mark just about all the time. I think that technology is really pushing the envelope - making what was once risky now the routine. Think about advancements in navigation systems like GPS, WAAS, LAAS, and RNP. Think about data link for air traffic, weather, flight planning and surveillance. Even in-flight magazines are competing with an airborne internet. When you take these advances and pop them into everything from light sport aircraft and VLJs all the way to super heavies and unmanned aircraft, you see pretty easily that the landscape we once knew is changing for good. This is not your father's airplane anymore. Looking back, we're going to realize that the bonfires hung around a lot longer than we thought. But like I said, the future is bright. When you give these advanced technologies some real juice, like imaginative operational concepts, the challenges that face us aren't going to be Mount Everest. But without NextGen, we cannot get there from here. NextGen fully integrates the concepts and the technologies to bring the operational benefits that both the FAA and operators need to live long and prosper, both now and into the future. Speaking on behalf of the Aviation Safety Organization, we see this world as part of an aircraft-centric environment. It's like an hourglass. At the top are all the physical things that reside on the airplane, the specific software, the specific type of GPS receiver, or the specific type of electronic flight bag. The bottom is the service provider's infrastructure, like ADS-B, ERAM, and the other automated decision support tools. The place where these things meet in the middle is the policies, regulations, standards, training, and economics. The curve in the bottle is what makes it possible for those specific elements to flow smoothly. NextGen weaves all of these threads into a single nexus, whether they're coming from the ground or in the air. When these threads all come together, you've got operational improvement and the benefits flow. Our job in Aviation Safety is to make sure the threads come together. If there is a disconnect between what the airspace user is capable of doing and what the provider is capable of doing, NextGen is a Ferrari that never gets out of first gear. You heard about how fast this thing was, you just never got to see it. It does no one any good for the service provider to build an advanced data communications infrastructure if there are no operators equipped to take advantage of it. Likewise, what's the point of installing advanced navigation if service providers can't provide procedures for efficiencies, capacity, or access? So what are we doing about it? First, we are simultaneously integrating ourselves into the planning organizations and processes responsible for NextGen. Second, we are continuing to leverage our existing relationships with industry. Third, we're also focusing on the workforce element. We named am AVS national program manager for NextGen Implementation. Across the country already, we're putting people in place throughout our Aviation Safety organization, NextGen Branch specialists in each Flight Standards regional office, whose job it is to facilitate understanding of the big picture. They're going to make sure that our workforce sees and knows and understands where we're headed with NextGen. They're going to make sure that the operational authorization and certification aspects of NextGen are in gear. Equipment and procedures aren't going to amount to much if the players don't know where it all fits and how it all works. I'm going to make sure that our safety workforce knows exactly what's necessary for us to meet NextGen timelines and milestones. While responsibility for making sure NextGen gets implemented rests with Vicki Cox's organization, AVS is nevertheless an integral member of FAA's NextGen Management and Review Boards and the NAS Enterprise Architecture team. AVS provides leadership and significant participation in JPDO's organizations. By teaming with these NextGen planning organizations, AVS provides invaluable input to help ensure a smooth implementation process. Since we're involved early and completely in the planning and implantation process, the go/no-go decision is a thumbs up. For the record, we never want to be in the position where we have to say "No" to a new operation. While the FAA does the heavy lifting to make NextGen a reality, we do not have all the answers. We rely on our partners in industry to help us make NextGen go from concept to cockpit. After all, the manufacturers know best what is technically feasible. And who knows better about what capabilities that passengers and shippers want than the aircraft operators? Not only can they tell us what capabilities they really want, but how best to implement them. In an era of ever-tightening resources, we cannot implement NextGen capabilities with "If we build it, they will come." We need to have a different mindset. But there is good news. We heard yesterday that Industry and the FAA are in total agreement about the need for NextGen and the desire to speed its implementation. In addition, both industry and the FAA see the need for maximizing the benefits of the emerging technologies that are already out there - those "wings" of NextGen. By applying our imagination, we can continue to make greater use of what is already in the existing aircraft fleet. While maximizing benefits of existing technology, we need to keep an eye on the future. Aircraft of the future will continue to become more and more capable. The continued evolution in the capabilities of the aircraft will lead to an ever more aircraft-centric view of the National Airspace System. NextGen is the path forward. But in order to make NextGen a reality, it will take a coordinated and cooperative nexus of effort between industry and government. AVS is up to the task of making these benefits real, but we can't do it without you. Thank you. ### http://www.faa.gov/news/speeches/news_story.cfm?newsId=10801 ************** ACSF Responds to Article Citing Lack of FAA Oversight on Charter Industry Air Charter Safety Foundation, Alexandria, VA, September 16, 2009 An article in USA Today claims to expose failures in Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight of on-demand charter operators. Citing six fatal accidents over a six-year period, the article states that "aviation regulators have missed blatant pilot training violations, failed to identify illegal charter flights and allowed planes to fly that should have been grounded." The Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) continues to promote and enhance the safety of on-demand charter operators. In doing so, the ACSF reminds the public and the industry of several resources available to combat illegal charter operations and enhance safety. The National Air Transportation Association's Illegal Charter Hotline was established to aid the public in reporting illegal charter activities. Anyone can call the toll-free number, 888-SKY-FLT1 (888-759-3581), and report suspicious charter activity. The number is available 24 hours a day, and callers may leave a message to receive a call back if the Hotline agent is unavailable. Reports made to the hotline are forwarded to FAA Headquarters for investigation and follow-up. The ACSF has developed and implemented the Industry Audit Standard (IAS) program specifically for on-demand operators. The audit program not only evaluates an operator for regulatory compliance, it also incorporates evaluation of the operator's Safety Management System (SMS). SMS is a key goal to improving safety, and this is why the IAS requires operators to adopt, implement and show continuous safety management improvement. With the ACSF IAS, the charter consumer can be assured that audited and registered operators are compliant with the highest standards of safety and compliance. By the end of the year, the ACSF will have completed 25 audits and many more are expected next year. Customers should look for the ACSF IAS-registered logo and encourage their preferred charter provider to participate in the program. Validation of an operator's status can be done easily through the ACSF IAS Registry at www.acsf.aero/registry. For further information on the IAS and audit process, please visit www.acsf.aero/audit. Operators wishing to initiate the audit process should contact Russ Lawton at 1-888-SAFE-135 (888-723-3135). The ACSF has also released AVSiS, a revolutionary safety event reporting and tracking system specifically for the on-demand air charter industry and shared aircraft ownership programs. AVSiS, or Aviation Safety Information System, is a powerful software program that collects detailed safety event data for analysis, response deployment and success measurement, and provides a tool for accounting for the cost savings realized by interventions. http://www.amtonline.com/article/article.jsp?siteSection=1 &id=9244&pageNum=1 ************** Foreign Repair Station Questions Slow FAA Reauthorization Wed, 16 Sep '09 House And Senate Bills Still Differ Significantly The $53.5 billion FAA reauthorization bill that has passed the U.S. House of Representatives has a provision that would allow the FAA to inspect foreign repair stations twice a year, and to require those facilities that work on U.S. airliners to introduce mandatory drug and alcohol testing. But the Senate bill currently under consideration, which tips the budget scale at $40 billion, does not make those provisions mandatory. It provides an exception if "a bilateral aviation safety agreement [is] in place that allows for comparable inspection by local authorities." The disagreement between the two could slow the FAA reauthorization process, as differences between the two bills must be resolved before being sent to the President. Air Transport World reports that Dana Jennings, a professional staffer for the majority in the House aviation subcommittee, told the FAA's International Safety Forum "We're just trying to make sure we have the same safety standards [at foreign repair stations] that we have in the US." The EU contends that the stipulation runs contrary to an Aviation Safety agreement signed between it and the U.S. last year. "We negotiated for several years in good faith with FAA," said Luisa Ragher, a representative for the European Commission's Washington delegation. "we trust the FAA" to inspect and certify US repair stations and in turn "FAA trusts us." The House bill passed with little Republican support. Aviation subcommittee Republican Staff Director Holly Woodruff Lyons, who is also the minority's Senior Council, said some U.S repair stations "may have to close" because EASA inspections could come with "heavy fees," which would be more than they could afford to pay. http://www.aero-news.net/news/genav.cfm?ContentBlockID=385492f2-88da-4a7b-87 d4-596466830cdf & ************** Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC