15 OCT 2009 _______________________________________ *FAA Proposes Hefty Fines Against United, US Airways for Safety Violations *FAA proposes to slap fines on United and US Airways *Pilot safety bill passes US House *After Hudson air crash, NTSB aims for reforms on alerts *Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash *Summary of the NTSB's report on the crash - Marlin Air, Cessna Citation, N550BP, *Republic Airways to Acquire 10 Embraer 190AR Aircraft from US Airways *EASA issues emergency AD requiring A330/A340 hydraulic system inspection **************************************** FAA Proposes Hefty Fines Against United, US Airways for Safety Violations The FAA said Wednesday it has proposed a $5.4 million fine against US Airways for operating eight planes on a total of 1,647 flights from October 2008 to January 2009 in violation of safety directives or the company's own maintenance rules. WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Federal Aviation Administration wants to levy multimillion dollar penalties on United Airlines and US Airways for safety violations. The FAA said Wednesday it has proposed a $5.4 million fine against US Airways for operating eight planes on a total of 1,647 flights from October 2008 to January 2009 in violation of safety directives or the company's own maintenance rules. The agency also said it is proposing a $3.8 million fine against United for allegedly operating one of its Boeing 737 aircraft on more than 200 flights after the carrier had violated its own maintenance procedures on one of the plane's engines. The fines would be among the highest in the FAA's history if measured by the number of planes involved. **************** FAA proposes to slap fines on United and US Airways The FAA has proposed levying civil penalties totalling $9.2 million against United Airlines and US Airways for allegedly flying aircraft that were not in compliance with either agency airworthiness directives (AD) or their own maintenance procedures. United faces a potential $3.8 million civil penalty for allegedly operating one of its Boeing 737 aircraft on more than 200 revenue flights when two shop towels, instead of protective caps, had been used to cover openings in the oil sump area when maintenance was done in December 2007. United's procedures require use of protective caps or covers on all components that could be adversely affected by entry of foreign materials, the FAA says in a statement. United has 30 days from the receipt of the civil penalty letter to respond to the agency. "We immediately reported the incident and our findings to the FAA. United Airlines has the highest standards for safety and we are fully confident we took appropriate and necessary measures to ensure those standards are met," a United spokeswoman says. US Airways has the same timeframe to respond to FAA's proposed $5.4 million civil penalty against the carrier. The fine is for allegedly operating eight aircraft on 1,647 flights between October 2008 and January 2009 while not compliant with the airworthiness directive and the airline's maintenance program. According to the FAA, US Airways failed to inspect the cargo door to prevent an in-flight opening on one Embraer 190 over 19 flights The airline also allegedly failed to perform inspections for cracking of a landing gear part on one Airbus A320. In addition, US Airways allegedly operated another A320 for 17 flights while not in compliance with the same AD. The FAA found also found that US Airways allegedly failed to meet the requirements of its maintenance policies and procedures manual related to inspections, for example, in five instances. US Airways says today's penalty is related to "challenges we experienced during the integration of maintenance systems and processes on flights that occurred in 2008 and January 2009. Our team worked cooperatively with the FAA to investigate and correct any discrepancies to the FAA's satisfaction". Source: Air Transport Intelligence news *************** Pilot safety bill passes US House The US House of Representatives passed a bill meant to force the FAA and airlines to rapidly boost regional airline safety through enhanced training and hiring requirements, fatigue countermeasures and other interventions following the deadly Colgan Air Bombardier Q400 crash in February. The bill passed even though FAA administrator Randy Babbitt told ATI in July the legislation "is not necessary". However, Regional Airline Association president Roger Cohen says in a statement, "We look forward to working with all stakeholders to implement the requirements of the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act. This bill has many elements mirrored in our own strategic safety initiative including a thorough study of pilot commuting and fatigue." The bill also carried support from the Air Line Pilots Association, which says in a statement that the airline industry will be safer because of the bill. The legislation requires airline pilots to hold an FAA Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) license, which can be obtained with a minimum of 1,500 flight hours. Current law requires a first officer to have a Commercial Pilot License, which can be obtained with 250 flight hours. The bill also requires the agency to raise the minimum requirements for the ATP licenses. Pilots must receive training to function in factors such as a multi-pilot crew, high altitude operations and adverse weather conditions including icing. The legislation also enables the FAA to consider allowing certain academic training hours to count toward the 1,500-hour ATP certificate requirement. Per the bill, the FAA must also ensure that pilots are trained on stall recovery, upset recovery and that airlines provide remedial training on these topics. The bill establishes comprehensive pre-employment screening of prospective pilots including an assessment of a pilot's skills, aptitudes, airmanship and suitability for functioning in the airline's operational environment. Airlines must establish pilot mentoring programs, create pilot professional development committees, modify training to accommodate new-hire pilots with different levels and types of flight experience, and provide leadership and command training to pilots in command, according to the bill. The bill also directs the FAA to update and implement a new pilot flight and duty time rule and fatigue risk management plans to track scientific research in the field of fatigue. Carriers are also required to create fatigue risk management systems approved by the FAA, per the legislation. The bill also requires the US DOT Inspector General to study and report to Congress on whether the number and experience level of safety inspectors assigned to regional airlines is commensurate with that of mainline airlines, mandates that the first page of an Internet Web site that sells airline tickets disclose the carrier that operates each segment of the flight and requires the DOT Transportation Secretary provide an annual report to Congress on what the agency is doing to address each open National Transportation Safety Board recommendation pertaining to commercial carriers. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news **************** After Hudson air crash, NTSB aims for reforms on alerts The National Transportation Safety Board is recommending a post-"Miracle on the Hudson" reform that would make it possible for air traffic controllers to alert each other when a plane is having an emergency. The NTSB announced the recommendation in a letter written from Chairman Deborah A. Hersman to Federal Aviation Administration Administrator J. Randolph Babbitt. The NTSB's investigation of US Airways Flight 1549's emergency landing in the Hudson River continues, but the NTSB believes a change is needed in the radar data processing systems so controllers can designate a flight as "in an emergency situation," Hersman said. On Jan. 15, Flight 1549, which took off from LaGuardia Airport bound for Charlotte, N.C., experienced a double bird strike that robbed the Airbus A-320's engines of sufficient thrust to keep flying. Capt. Chesley Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles were too busy trying to land the crippled jet to turn on the emergency transponder, according to facts set out in the preliminary NTSB investigation. The change would allow controllers to communicate an aircraft's emergency situation. The transponder signal sends unique information from the plane to controllers in towers at other airports and radar facilities. By allowing controllers to designate a plane as being in an emergency, everyone who needs to know could alert other aircraft they could avoid the troubled aircraft. The emergency transponder code would also pop up on area controllers' radar screens, according to the NTSB. Doug Church, a spokesman for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, said the NTSB's recommendations would improve safety. "It is technologically possible to implement the NTSB's recommendations," Church said. "The benefit for controllers is that everyone in the facility would know at the same time that there is an emergency aircraft in the airspace. It would stand out on everyone's radar scopes." Jim Peters, a spokesman for the FAA, said the agency would "carefully review the recommendation and respond." http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/after-hudson-air-crash-ntsb-aims-for-re forms-on-alerts-1.1523964 *************** Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash (Reuters/Airbus) Thirty years after an Air New Zealand plane crashed into Mt Erebus in Antarctica during a sightseeing flight killing all 257 on board, the airline will finally apologise to the victims' families. The apology will be the first to relatives of the victims since the Erebus disaster devastated New Zealand on November 28, 1979. Chief Executive Rob Fyfe is to use the 30th anniversary of the tragedy next Friday to apologise for the way the families were treated after the accident. But he will not apologise for the accident itself or the controversial subsequent investigations, which at first attempted to blame pilot error for the crash. In a statement released this week, the airline said Mr Fyfe would "speak directly about the lessons learned from the Erebus tragedy and the way in which the airline interacted with the families in the aftermath of the accident". Jackie Nankervis, who was 15 when she lost her father and uncle in the accident, said an apology would be "a step in the right direction". She said the only gesture from Air New Zealand to her family at the time was a bunch of flowers. All other contact was with the police. The Erebus disaster, which also killed six Britons, was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy. Sightseeing flights from Auckland to Antarctica were popular day trips at the time, with DC-10s taking passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound before returning to New Zealand. At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, when Flight 901 left Auckland Airport there was nothing to suggest this would be anything other than yet another uneventful flight. The two pilots, Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not made the trip before but both were competent pilots and the flight was considered straightforward. The men entered a series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer but unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning. When these were entered into the computer the changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east which put the plane on a collision course with Mt Erebus. The navigational error combined with a white out that made it impossible for the pilots to see the 3,794m-high active volcano, Mount Erebus looming in front of them to create the setting for a tragedy it would be impossible to escape. By the time the plane's altitude device began blaring out a warning the pilots had just six seconds to collision. The plane hit Erebus with such force it disintegrated, leaving a 600m trail of wreckage. A one-day Royal Commission of Inquiry placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus. However public opinion has remained divided over who was to blame for the crash. Experts said the new flight path would still have been safe if Captain Collins had not descended to 450m, although he had been authorised to drop to this height. Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $NZ150,000 (£70,000). The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public. However the counselling systems that swing into place in the aftermath of disasters today did not exist at the time, and the victims' families were offered no help to cope with their personal grief.. Mr Fyfe has been widely praised for his handling of the Airbus A320 crash off the French coast last November when all seven on board died after the plane plunged into the Mediterranean during a test flight. In a recent letter to the Erebus families, Mr Fyfe wrote: "It was the experience of that accident ... that caused me to reflect on many of the gaps and failings that occurred in the days, months and years after November 28, 1979." He said the most important immediate response to the France crash was to support the families of the victims and learn from the flight safety lessons rather than laying blame. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article6875627.ece **************** Summary of the NTSB's report on the crash Loss of Control and Crash, Marlin Air, Cessna Citation, N550BP, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 4, 2007 NTSB/AAR-09/06 This is a synopsis from the Safety Board's report and does not include the Board's rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing. SUMMARY On June 4, 2007, about 1600 central daylight time, a Cessna Citation 550, N550BP, impacted Lake Michigan shortly after departure from General Mitchell International Airport, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (MKE). The two pilots and four passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was being operated by Marlin Air under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 and departed MKE about 1557 with an intended destination of Willow Run Airport, near Ypsilanti, Michigan. At the time of the accident flight, marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the surface, and instrument meteorological conditions prevailed aloft; the flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the pilots' mismanagement of an abnormal flight control situation through improper actions, including failing to control airspeed and prioritizing control of the airplane, and lack of crew coordination. Contributing to the accident were Marlin Air's deficiencies in operational safety, including the inadequate checkrides administered by Marlin Air's chief pilot/check airman, and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) failure to detect and correct those deficiencies, which placed an ill-prepared pilot in the first officer's seat. The safety issues discussed in this report include pilot actions and coordination, the need for image recording equipment on airplanes not equipped with flight data recorders, autopilot panel design, control yoke wiring installations, identification of circuit breakers for use in emergencies, aural and visual alerts to pitch trim-in-motion, aileron trim power and sensitivity, human factors in airplane design, FAA appointment of check airmen, the scope of Regional Aviation Safety Inspection Program inspections, avenues for expressing safety concerns to Federal authorities, and the operators' financial health. FINDINGS 1. The captain and first officer were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations to act in their respective roles during the accident flight. There was no evidence of any medical conditions that might have adversely affected the pilots' performance during the accident flight. 2. Although the captain's pilot certificates had previously been revoked because of a felony conviction involving the illegal transport of drugs into the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had reissued his pilot certificates, and they were valid at the time of the accident. 3. The accident airplane was properly certificated, was equipped and maintained in accordance with industry practices (except for the wiring installed in the pilots' control yokes), and was within weight and center of gravity limits. 4. If the accident airplane had been equipped with a recorder system that captured cockpit images and parametric data, investigators would have been better able to determine the circumstances that led to this accident. 5. The accident sequence initiated as a result of a control problem that was related to either an inadvertent autopilot activation or a pitch trim anomaly, the effects of which were compounded by aileron and/or rudder trim inputs; however, it was not possible to determine the exact nature of the initiating event. 6. Regardless of the initiating event, if the pilots had simply maintained a reduced airspeed while they responded to the situation, the aerodynamic forces on the airplane would not have increased significantly; at reduced airspeeds, the pilots should have been able to maintain control of the airplane long enough to either successfully troubleshoot and resolve the problem or return safely to the airport. 7. Pilots would benefit from training and readily accessible guidance indicating that, when confronted with abnormal flight control forces, they should prioritize airplane control (airspeed, attitude, and configuration) before attempting to identify and eliminate the cause of the flight control problem. 8. The design and location of the yaw damper and autopilot switches on Cessna Citation series airplanes do not adequately protect against inadvertent activation of a system, which could have disastrous consequences. 9. A rounded type of sheathed wire bundle would fit better and be better protected within the control column shaft than the currently installed flat ribbon cable; replacement of the flat ribbon cable with a rounded type of sheathed wire bundle could result in fewer short circuits and other electrical events. 10. The incorporation of an aural pitch trim-in-motion warning and contrasting color bands on the pitch trim wheel in all Cessna Citation series airplanes would help pilots of those airplanes to more promptly recognize and correct runaway pitch trim situations before control forces become unmanageable. 11. If circuit breakers that a pilot might need to quickly access during an abnormal or emergency situation were equipped with identification collars, pilots would be able to locate them more readily and pull them more easily during such a situation. 12. The circumstances of this accident demonstrate the importance of a program for the FAA to monitor and conduct ongoing assessments of safety-critical systems throughout the life cycle of an airplane; the FAA did not perform this task adequately for the Cessna Citation. 13. The control wheel forces resulting from adjustments to the Cessna Citation's unpowered aileron trim could exceed the control force limits specified by regulations for powered aileron trim surfaces. 14. Limiting the deflection of the Cessna Citation's manually operated aileron trim tab to the deflection certification limit for powered trim tabs and reducing the Citation's aileron trim sensitivity (the unexpectedly significant aileron trim deflection that results from a relatively small amount of trim knob input) would help pilots avoid sudden and excessive aileron trim deflections. 15. If Cessna Citation pilots and operators were informed of the potential hazards related to the sensitivity and responsiveness of the airplane's aileron trim system, they would be better able to avoid problematic aileron trim inputs until a more permanent solution (an aileron trim system retrofit) is in place. 16. As a result of the first officer's poor flying skills, his lack of airplane systems knowledge, and both pilots' lack of communication and coordination, the first officer provided little help to, and likely hindered, the captain during his attempts to deal with the flight control anomalies during the accident flight. 17. The pilots' lack of discipline, in-depth systems knowledge, and adherence to procedures contributed to their inability to cope with anomalies experienced during the accident flight. 18. Marlin Air's selection of the accident captain (who routinely failed to comply with procedures and regulations) to the positions of company chief pilot and check airman, with responsibility for supervision and training of all company pilots, contributed to an inadequate company safety culture that allowed an ill-prepared first officer to fly in Part 135 operations. 19. If the Federal Aviation Administration guidance regarding check airman appointments and oversight contained procedures for principal operations inspectors to follow (such as heightened surveillance) in cases where review of the pilot's background or performance reveals negative information, checkride failures, or other performance-related deficiencies, the agency might prevent inadequate and/or undisciplined pilots from being appointed or retained as check airmen. 20. The Regional Aviation Safety Inspection Program inspection conducted after this accident failed to uncover evidence of training irregularities and did not evaluate the quality of Federal Aviation Administration surveillance provided before the accident. 21. Customers (such as the University of Michigan) who contract with aviation operators may not understand the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) role in aviation safety or know how to contact FAA personnel when safety concerns arise. 22. Had Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel been aware of Marlin Air's financial situation, the FAA would have had an opportunity to increase surveillance of the company. PROBABLE CAUSE The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilots' mismanagement of an abnormal flight control situation through improper actions, including failing to control airspeed and to prioritize control of the airplane, and lack of crew coordination. Contributing to the accident were Marlin Air's operational safety deficiencies, including the inadequate checkrides administered by Marlin Air's chief pilot/check airman, and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to detect and correct those deficiencies, which placed a pilot who inadequately emphasized safety in the position of company chief pilot and designated check airman and placed an ill-prepared pilot in the first officer's seat. RECOMMENDATIONS New Recommendations To the Federal Aviation Administration: 1) Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91K and Part 135 operators to incorporate upset recovery training (similar to that described in the airplane upset recovery training aid used by many Part 121 operators) and related checklists and procedures into their training programs. (A-09-XX) 2) Require Cessna to redesign and retrofit the yaw damper and autopilot switches on the autopilot control panel in Citation series airplanes to make them easily distinguishable and to guard against unintentional pilot activation. (A-09-XX) 3) Identify airplanes other than the Cessna Citation with autopilot control panel designs that may lead to inadvertent activation of the autopilot and require manufacturers to redesign and retrofit the autopilot control panels to make the buttons easily distinguishable and to guard against unintentional activation. (A-09-XX) 4) Issue an airworthiness directive mandating compliance with Cessna Service Bulletin 550-24-14, "Control Wheel Electrical Cable Replacement,"which was issued on January 17, 1992. (A-09-XX) 5) Require Cessna to modify all Citation series airplanes by incorporating an aural pitch trim-in-motion warning and contrasting color bands on the pitch trim wheel to help pilots recognize a runaway pitch trim condition before control forces become unmanageable. (A-09-XX) (This recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation A-07-52 and is classified "Open -- Unacceptable Response".) 6) Require Cessna to replace the Citation pitch trim, autopilot, and any other circuit breakers for critical systems that a pilot might need to access during an emergency situation with easily identifiable and collared circuit breakers to aid a pilot in quickly identifying and easily pulling those circuit breakers if necessary. (A-09-XX) (This recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation A-07-54 and is classified "Open -- Unacceptable Response".) 7) Require airplane manufacturers to develop guidance on the identification of circuit breakers that pilots need to identify quickly and pull easily during abnormal or emergency situations and to provide such guidance, once developed, to operators of those airplanes. (A-09-XX) 8) Require operators to implement the manufacturer's guidance asked for in recommendation A-09-[#7] regarding which circuit breakers pilots need to identify quickly and pull easily during abnormal or emergency situations to their airplanes. (A-09-XX) 9) Require Cessna to evaluate and limit the maximum aileron trim deflection on Citation series airplanes to that required to meet the certification control requirements for powered trim tabs unless there is a design justification to exceed those requirements. (A-09-XX) 10) Require Cessna to reduce the aileron trim sensitivity (the unexpectedly significant aileron trim deflection that results from a relatively small amount of trim knob input) on Citation series airplanes to avoid sudden and excessive aileron trim deflections. (A-09-XX) 11) As an interim measure (pending an available aileron trim system retrofit), notify Citation pilots and operators of the potential hazards related to the sensitivity and responsiveness of the airplane's aileron trim system. (A-09-XX) 12) Revise check airman approval and oversight procedures to incorporate heightened surveillance during a probationary period and at other times as warranted for check airmen whose background evaluation ion uncovers a history of criminal convictions, certificate revocations, checkride failures, or other performance-related deficiencies. (A-09-XX) 13) Conduct a detailed review of the oversight provided to Marlin Air to determine why the oversight system failed to detect (before and after the accident) and correct Marlin Air's operational deficiencies, particularly in the areas of pilot hiring, training, and adherence to procedures. (A-09-XX) 14) Based on the review described in Safety Recommendation [13], revise the oversight system and Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1 as needed. (A-09-XX) 15) Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 and Part 91K operators to provide their customers when a business agreement or contract is finalized with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contact information identified as specifically for use in expressing concerns about flight safety, thus providing customers with a clear means of communicating any safety concerns to the FAA. (A-09-XX) 16) Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91K and Part 135 operators to notify the assigned principal operations inspectors of specific adverse financial events, such as bankruptcy, court judgments related to nonpayment of recurring expenses, or termination of a credit agreement or contract by a vendor for reasons of late payment or nonpayment. Upon receipt of such information, inspectors should increase their oversight of operators who appear to be in financial distress. (A-09-XX) To the American Hospital Association: 1) Inform your members, through your website, newsletters, and conferences, of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) role in aviation safety with respect to medical/air ambulance services and provide FAA contact information. Urge your members to communicate any safety concerns related to medical/air ambulance services to the FAA. Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated and Reclassified in This Report As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration: Amend the advisory materials associated with 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.1309 to include consideration of structural failures and human/airplane system interactions in the assessment of safety-critical systems. (A-06-37) Adopt Society of Automotive Engineers [Aerospace Recommended Practice] 5150 into 14 of Federal Regulations Parts 21, 25, 33, and 121 to require a program for the monitoring and ongoing assessment of safety-critical systems throughout the life cycle of the airplane. Once in place, use this program to validate that the underlying assumptions made during design and type certification about safety-critical systems are consistent with operational experience, lessons learned, and new knowledge."(A-06-38) Safety Recommendations A-06-37 and –38 are reiterated in section 2.2.2.4 of this report. In addition, Safety Recommendations A-06-37 and –38 are reclassified "Open -- Unacceptable Response." Previously Issued Recommendations Classified in This Report The following previously issued recommendations are classified in this report: • Safety Recommendation A-07-52 (previously classified "Open -- Unacceptable Response") is classified "Closed -- Unacceptable Action/Superseded"(replaced by Safety Recommendation [5]) in section 2.2.2.3 of this report. • Safety Recommendation A-07-54 (previously classified "Open -- Acceptable Alternate Response") is classified "Closed -- Unacceptable Action/Superseded"(replaced by Safety Recommendation [6]) in section 2.2.2.3 of this report. http://www.freep.com/article/20091014/NEWS06/91014074/1001/NEWS/Summary-of-t he-NTSB-s-report-on-the-crash ***************** Republic Airways to Acquire 10 Embraer 190AR Aircraft from US Airways INDIANAPOLIS-(Business Wire)-Republic Airways Holdings today announced that it will acquire 10 Embraer 190AR jets from US Airways. Republic will apply the full balance of its $35 million loan from US Airways toward the purchase of the aircraft and assume the remaining debt on the aircraft. Four of the 99-seat jets are expected to enter service in November and December 2009 and will replace Boeing 717 aircraft that are being removed from service at Republic`s Midwest Airlines. The remaining six aircraft are expected to enter service in branded operations during the first half of 2010. With the addition of these 10 aircraft, Republic`s subsidiaries will operate the largest fleet of EJet aircraft in the world with a total of 145 EJets, including 15 E190 aircraft. "We`re pleased to work with our long-standing partner, US Airways, to expand our fleet of EJet aircraft," said Sean Menke, EVP and Chief Marketing Officer of Republic Airways. "The E190 has allowed us to offer unmatched passenger comfort while restoring service to important destinations within our branded network, and these additional aircraft will allow us to continue that process." Republic Airways Holdings, based in Indianapolis, Indiana is an airline holding company that owns Chautauqua Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Lynx Aviation, Midwest Airlines, Republic Airlines and Shuttle America, collectively "the airlines." The airlines offer scheduled passenger service on approximately 1,800 flights daily to 126 cities in 47 states, Canada, Mexico and Costa Rica under branded operations at Frontier and Midwest, and through fixed-fee airline services agreements with five major U.S. airlines. The fixed-fee flights are operated under an airline partner brand, such as AmericanConnection, Continental Express, Delta Connection, United Express, and US Airways Express. The airlines currently employ over 11,000 aviation professionals and operate 294 aircraft. http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS173419+14-Oct-2009+BW2009101 4 *************** EASA issues emergency AD requiring A330/A340 hydraulic system inspection The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring a hydraulic power – high pressure manifold check valve inspection on Airbus A330 and A340 models. An A330 operator experienced a low level of the Yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances. A340 aeroplanes are also equipped with the same high pressure manifold check valves. Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event. Additional cases of CAR401 check valve loosening have been experienced in service on aeroplanes having accumulated more than 1 000 flight cycles (FC). The check valve fitted on the Yellow hydraulic system is more affected, probably due to additional system cycles induced by cargo door operation. The loss of torque due to pressure cycles could contribute to check valve loosening, resulting in a leak and finally the loss of the associated hydraulic system and, in the worst case, of the three hydraulic systems of the aeroplane. This AD requires to perform the following inspection programme to detect any check valve loosening and, if necessary, apply the associated corrective actions: 1st Step: on yellow and blue hydraulic circuits: lock wire inspection, inspection for traces of seepage or black deposit, check valve torque and red marking application. 2nd Step: on green hydraulic circuit: same inspections as required in 1st Step and on yellow and blue hydraulic circuits: inspection of check valves for condition. Finally: on green, yellow and blue hydraulic circuits: repetitive inspection of check valves for condition. (EASA) (aviation-safety.net) **************** Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC