04 JAN 2010 _________________________________________ *Flip side of intelligence failure -- poor response *Newark Liberty Airport Reportedly in Lockdown Over Security Breach *Colgan is again tightening fatigue rules *Air France pilots warn of risky speed probes *Industry Aware Of Pitot Tube Issues Since 1995 *Concerns Persist About A330 Speed Indications, Pitot Tube Icing *Jamaican Airport may charge American Airlines for damages *USA issues new security directives for inbound flights ****************************************** Flip side of intelligence failure -- poor response http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_lSXhEtQUdtA/S0Ekm4It0OI/AAAAAAAAAEo/agEgg7fmAnE/s320/Janet+Napolitano.jpg by Christine Negroni With all the attention being paid to the intelligence failures that allowed Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab to board Northwest Airlines Flight 263 with explosives packed into his briefs, it is my hope that the experiences of what happened to the passengers after the plane landed be examined for what seem to be lapses in security and basic crime scene investigation. Listening to the stories of several passengers, its clear in the first few hours after the removal of Mr. Mutallab from the airplane, some basic safety precautions were not taken. I may have some understanding of why, which I'll get to shortly. But first, a brief recap. After the plane was on the ground, uniformed officers boarded and removed Mr. Mutallab and two others who were injured in the tussle to extinguish the fire. Twenty-five to 45-minutes later the passengers were allowed to take their carry-on luggage and leave the plane. They were taken, as a group, directly into the airport baggage claim area, which was empty except for a contingent of uniformed police officers. Passengers waited for some time, their accounts differ but for perhaps up to an hour until plainclothes law enforcement officers arrived and K9 "sniffer" dogs. One of the dogs reacted to a passenger who was handcuffed and led away. The rest of the passengers were hurriedly moved to an area deemed "more secure". For the next 4-5 hours passengers were interviewed by the plainclothes authorities and allowed to collect their baggage and leave the airport. Security experts to whom I have spoken expressed alarm about this story for several reasons, which I'll list point by point below. You can read their specific comments in my blog from January 1. · By leaving the passengers on the airplane they remained at risk if unknown or undetected accomplices had still been in the aircraft · By failing to immediately separate the passengers from the carry on luggage, the passengers were at risk from an undetected explosive or other dangerous device · By allowing the passengers to leave the airplane with their carry on luggage, potential crime scene evidence was removed and undetected explosives or other dangerous devices could have been removed from the aircraft · By waiting for more than 45 minutes to bring K9 dogs into the area where the passengers were being held, any undetected dangerous device in that luggage could have harmed the passengers and others in the airport including the large complement of law enforcement personnel in the holding area · By failing to have the passengers place their carry on luggage in a central area in the holding center, some luggage may have been missed by the K9 detection dogs · By allowing the passengers to leave the airport without physically searching their luggage, undetected devices or other evidence may have been carried out of the airport I've put these points to the Department of Homeland Security and was told that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was in command of the response and that my questions need to be directed there. Stay tuned. In the meantime, I've since learned a few more details about what happened on the flight which leads me to a few tentative conclusions about the law enforcement reaction. The pilots in command of flight 253 did not know the full scope of what was going on in the cabin because it happened so late in the flight. The pilots were already on short final approach to Detroit airport when the pilot communicating with the ground reported that he heard what sounded like firecrackers going off. Since he did not request assistance, the aircraft was directed to the gate. It was only after the plane was on the ground that anyone at the airport knew there was trouble onboard. Knowing now that the information about what Mr. Mutallab had done was so late-breaking, it does seem to explain why the reaction of law enforcement was so laid back. Why did first responders hustle Mr. Mutallab and his subduers off the plane leaving the rest of the cabin uninspected? Probably because they had no idea that they were responding to an attempted terrorist attack. Why were passengers allowed to remove their things and loll around the airport with little concern about what their involvement might have been or what they might have been carrying? Probably for the same reason. But at some point, more critical thinking should have come into play. I need remind no one that seven years have passed since the terror attacks of 9-11. In addition to finding out what's failing in our nation's information and intelligence gathering operations, the experience of Flight 253 should be used to find out whether there are gaps in the way law enforcement handles terror events, even if on first blush, they seem to be something less. http://christinenegroni.blogspot.com/ ************** Newark Liberty Airport Reportedly in Lockdown Over Security Breach A photo posted on Twitter purporting to show the scene at Newark Airport after a security scare. Newark Liberty International Airport is on lockdown after reports of a man breaching security at the Continental Airlines terminal, according the FAA Web site and cable news reports. A male was observed going in the wrong direction through the security area at the aiport's Terminal C, Transportation Security Administration officials told Fox News. Once aware of the situation, TSA officials with assistance from the New York Port Authority reviewed security videotape to identify the errant individual. As of 8:40 p.m. Sunday, security was unable to locate that individual in the terminal. All passengers in the secure part of the terminal were ordered to evacuate the terminal and go through the screening area once again, Fox News learned. There is nothing beyond the report that he went the wrong way to suggest there is anything wrong or serious about this situation, a TSA official told Fox News. The official said this type of situation has happened before where a person quite innocently and for whatever reason walks through the security area improperly. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,581832,00.html *************** Colgan is again tightening fatigue rules Saab 340 WASHINGTON — Colgan Air, which operated the Continental Connection flight that crashed in Clarence last February, is once again getting tougher on pilots who say they are too tired to fly. An internal memo sent to the company's pilots and flight attendants, dated Dec. 30, 2009, indicates that crew members have abused the more-lenient fatigue policy the company instituted after the crash, which claimed 50 lives. "Over the past several months, we have maintained a 'no questions asked' approach to fatigue calls in order to give pilots and flight attendants an ability to report a fatigue condition without any feeling of punishment or retribution," wrote Dan Morgan, vice president of safety and regulatory compliance at Colgan. "However, over the past two months, the instance of fatigue calls with no valid reason for fatigue have increased to the point where frivolous fatigue calls are now the majority." For that reason, the company is making three changes in its fatigue policy, Morgan said. Crew members will no longer be allowed to call in fatigued if they had at least 12 hours rest prior to the start of their shift or if they are returning from days off. In addition, pilots will not be allowed to call in fatigued for future flights. "That is, a crew member cannot declare 'I'm going to be fatigued on my next flight,' or 'I'm calling in fatigue for tomorrow,' " Morgan wrote. Colgan pilots and sources close to the airline provided the memo to The Buffalo News, saying it proved that the airline had not taken seriously the lessons of Continental Connection Flight 3407. "They had changed the policy in light of the crash, but now that things have been swept under the rug they are going back to their old ways," one Colgan pilot said. Fatigue could have played a role in the Clarence crash given that federal investigators found that the pilot spent at least part of the previous night in the crew lounge at Newark International Airport while the co-pilot commuted to Newark on red-eye flights from her home in Seattle. After the crash, Colgan shifted responsibility for its fatigue calls to the Safety Department, which, pilots said, took a much more reasonable approach than the chief pilot, who previously took such calls. Joe F. Williams, a spokesman for Colgan's parent, Pinnacle Airlines, stressed that fatigue calls will continue to go to the Safety Department in wake of the changes announced this week. "This is an enhancement of the policy that was revised earlier this year," he said. "We worked with our crews in developing this policy, and continue to work closely with our crews regarding enhancements." It's clear that tired pilots will still be free to call in fatigued under the new policy, Williams added. But Capt. John Prater, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, stressed that Colgan imposed the policy unilaterally and spelled it out in a memo that amounted to "intimidation." Under the change, Colgan pilots may be scared to call in fatigued — even if they are too tired to fly, Prater said. "Even if [the fatigue policy] is being used wrongly, how many pilots are they scaring off from using it correctly?" Prater asked. Colgan pilots privately acknowledged, however, that some company employees had been abusing the no-questions-asked fatigue policy instituted after the crash. Colgan cited two recent examples of that abuse in the memo. A flight attendant had a 12 hour, 17 minute rest period between flights but still called in fatigued the next day. And a crew member asked to be released from reserve assignment, and when that request was denied, the crew member called in fatigued a few minutes later. "Although our fatigue policy has resulted in professional crew members recognizing and declaring true fatigue situations, the policy has also shown that when given an opportunity to demonstrate a lack of professionalism and maturity, a disappointing number of our crew members will do so," Morgan wrote. Colgan implemented the changes immediately, but Morgan stressed that the company is working with its unions to develop a fatigue program. That program, which will include a review board process, will be in place no later than Feb. 15, he said. Meanwhile, Morgan wrote: "Any further blatant abuse of the fatigue option will be addressed as a disciplinary action, and fatigue resulting from an improper use of rest periods or personal time off duty will be treated as missed trips," meaning the crew member won't be paid. Members of Families of Continental Flight 3407 criticized the fatigue policy change. "I would not think it is wise to categorically declare that fatigue calls following a period of rest will not be accepted," said Karen Eckert, who lost her sister, Beverly Eckert, in the crash. "I don't think any member of the flying public wants to be in a plane which is being flown by a pilot that called in to report that he or she was too fatigued to fly, but who is still flying the plane because their request was denied." And Mike Loftus, a former Continental pilot who lost his daughter, Maddie, in the crash, said: "It still amazes me that their management group is unable to manage their airline. They are reactionary in nature, not what you would call insightful or forward-thinking. It is obvious they are still having morale problems — otherwise the abuse would not be a factor." This summer, eight former or current pilots at Colgan or Pinnacle told The News that before the crash, the company routinely made it difficult for pilots to call in sick or tired. The result, the pilots said, was that pilots would fly even though they knew they shouldn't. "I have done it myself because I was afraid of the hassles I'd get" for missing work, a current Colgan pilot said at the time. http://www.buffalonews.com/cityregion/story/910797.html *************** Air France pilots warn of risky speed probes http://cybermanin.eu/Blogs/Images/News/TubePitot.jpg Paris - Air France pilots have criticised investigators of the carrier's fatal jet crash in June 2009 and warned planes should avoid icy weather until tests prove whether their speed sensors can withstand it, a report said on Sunday. The weekly Journal du Dimanche cited extracts from a report to be submitted to judicial officials this week by two pilots, one the head of the pilots' union SPAF, on the crash of flight AF447 from Rio to Paris that killed 228 people. In a report last month, the French air accident investigation agency BEA said the jet's Pitot speed probes gave false readings before it crashed into the Atlantic and called for better testing standards for such probes. Until these are developed, however, "planes are still flying in weather conditions for which the speed sensors are not certified", which runs "contrary to the safety requirements under current regulations", the pilots' report said, according to the newspaper. Pilots' unions and some of the relatives of victims of June's crash have accused Air France and plane maker Airbus of ignoring longstanding problems with air speed monitors on its jets in the run-up to the June disaster. The companies insist that their jets met all safety standards, but they have nevertheless replaced Pitots made by the French electronics company Thales with a different model produced by US firm Goodrich. The report by the pilots, Henri Marnet-Cornus and SPAF president Gerard Arnoux, said this "would lower the level of risk", but further faults were possible since the probes had not been tested for the effects of ice crystals. The pilots had argued in an earlier report that the freezing of the Pitots had caused the Airbus 330 to crash. The BEA has said they were "one of the factors" in the crash, but not the sole cause. The pilots also criticised what they called "the short-sighted approach of the BEA concerning the faultiness of the Pitot probes", according to the newspaper. They said planes should be banned for the moment from flying into patches of icy weather that could cause the speed probes to freeze up and probes should be certified for all weather conditions and all types of plane. When Pitots are blocked by ice they send false speed measurements to the plane's onboard flight computers, as was the case on the missing flight in June. It sent a string of automated error messages before plunging into the ocean. - AFP http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?fsetid=1&click_id=24&art_id=nw20100103221508586C174735 **************** Industry Aware Of Pitot Tube Issues Since 1995 Barriers to sharing vital aviation safety information may start coming down this year, but the prevailing lack of transparency has allowed deficiencies to fester in the global air transport system for years. The recent focus on pitot tube icing highlights that while various stakeholders were aware of equipment shortcomings, no concerted effort was made to understand what was going on or to remedy the situation. Northwest pilots are among those of several airlines that saw anomalous speed information emanating from the pitot tubes in the noses of the Airbus A330s they were operating. Credit: AIRBUS “It is scandalous that so far no effective safety data-sharing platform has existed,” says Gunther Matschnigg, the International Air Transport Assn.’s senior vice president for safety, operations and infrastructure. IATA, the FAA and the European Commission are launching such a data-sharing initiative this year, and IATA expects to sign a memorandum of understanding for the project by the end of March. One problem is that the reporting system in Europe has remained fractured. The European Commission recently launched a drive to create a centralized clearinghouse for information, with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in the lead. The history of pitot tube problems illustrates how overdue the measures are. Various stakeholders saw problems throughout the past 15 years, but until now no system-wide analysis of the incidents has been undertaken. As early as 1995, Airbus became aware of the deficiencies of the speed probes in extreme weather conditions, following defects on Rosemount pitot tubes. “Strong cumolo-nimbi containing a high density of ice crystals can be encountered particularly in the intertropical convergence zone,” Airbus wrote in a technical follow-up, TFU 34.13.00.005, dated December 1995. “In such an icy and turbulent atmosphere, the aircraft air data parameters (pressure dependent) may be severely degraded even though the probe heaters work properly. It has appeared that the characteristics of such an environment could exceed the weather specifications for which the pitot probes are currently certified.” Airbus subsequently developed more stringent requirements, which were incorporated in new Goodrich devices, and it required the old probes to be replaced in 1996. But that was only made mandatory by French civil aviation authority DGAC five years later, in 2001, and regulators left their certification standards at the lower performance threshold. A serious incident in 1998 led the German air accident investigation authority, the BFU, to recommend that “the specification for the pitot tubes should be changed so as to allow unrestricted flight operations in heavy rain and under severe icing conditions.” An Airbus A320 on approach to Frankfurt temporarily lost all airspeed data as well as autopilot and autothrottle functions until descending to 10,000 ft. Even after Airbus ordered the use of more resilient probes, evidence soon emerged that the new devices were also subject to performance irregularities. In an Operator Information Telex in July 2002, Airbus stated that “several single-aisle operators have reported airspeed discrepancy on aircraft fitted with Thales pitot probes PN CN16195AA.” In 2005, Thales itself launched what it called the Adeline research project aimed at finding alternative technologies that could eventually replace pitot probes. At the time, Thales warned that losing data such as airspeed, angle of attack and altitude could “cause aircraft crashes especially in case of probe icing.” However, the effort to deliver an alternative approach to providing airspeed information was shelved in 2008. In addition, FAA certification standards and those in Europe have diverged over time. EASA issued a notice of proposed amendment (NPA) to harmonize its standards with the more stringent FAA levels only last October. Even that step does not appear to go far enough. The NPA has been rejected by Airbus for several reasons, but mainly because “the [Technical Standard Order] icing conditions are not sufficiently conservative” and “the TSO does not require the probes to be tested in ice crystal or mixed-phase icing conditions.” The FAA also tests probes only in conditions expected to be encountered at altitudes of up to 40,000 ft. and temperatures of -40C. All of the severe icing incidents known occurred at temperatures between -45 and -65C. Differences persist in regulatory authorities’ actions on the pitot tube matter. In August 2009, the FAA issued an airworthiness directive mandating that Thales pitot tubes on A330s be replaced with Goodrich models. It permits one Thales probe of the latest standard to be left in one of three pitot tube positions. A proposed EASA directive preceded the FAA’s action, but the European safety agency never made its recommendation final and now signals it believes problems extend beyond the Thales design. Still, Gerard Arnoux, head of the Syndicat des Pilots d’Air France union and an Airbus A320 captain, contends that Airbus should have blocked the use of Thales AA-standard probes long ago based on all of the information the aircraft maker had available. “We know that the Goodrich probes are far better than the Thales tubes, but Airbus kept Thales devices flying,” Arnoux says. http://www.aviationweek.com ***************** Concerns Persist About A330 Speed Indications, Pitot Tube Icing A330 incidents point to need for better weather information, flight control changes Recommendations to improve aviation safety in the wake of the crash of Air France Flight 447 last June and other Airbus A330 incidents are inadequate, several stakeholders warn. Pilots and industry officials fear that unless more is done, system-wide failures will persist, with dangerous consequences for passengers. The calls to do more would impact Airbus, airline operations and European regulators. They also signal that further equipment and operational changes may emerge in the coming months as investigators learn more about both what has caused a spate of A330s to briefly lose speed information and the crash of AF447. The Air France A330-200 encountered severe weather over the Atlantic enroute from Rio de Janeiro to Paris before it crashed into the ocean, killing all 228 onboard. A final report on the accident is not due until the end of this year. The long history of one key problem, that of pitot tube icing, is moreover raising the question as to why preventative action was not taken earlier. “The AF447 accident could have been avoided,” says Gerard Arnoux, head of the Syndicat des Pilots d’Air France (SPAF) union and an Airbus A320 captain. He claims that the June 1 crash was the result of “collective failure” by Airbus, Air France and regulators such as the French civil aviation authority (DGAC), its air accident organization­—the BEA—and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Arnoux asserts that all failed to act to address known safety deficiencies. That pitot tube performance standards do not meet real-world conditions has been known since the mid-1990s, according to a time line of incidents compiled by Arnoux. Those deficiencies—including blockage of the speed sensors due to icing—had triggered individual actions by regulators or manufacturers but no concerted effort to address shortfalls (see article below). That is now changing. The BEA has called for a complete review of pitot tube certification standards and a scientific assessment of the meteorological conditions that cause problems. Accident investigators are still sifting through the debris of AF447, but they hope to find more once the search for wreckage resumes in February. Credit: MAX POP/LANDOV The BEA is indicating that other changes to aircraft design or procedures could emerge as a result of the scientific review. In addition to pitot tubes, design changes to engine inlets and other aircraft parts could be warranted, says BEA director Jean-Paul Troadec. BEA officials first want to learn about the size and shape of ice crystals formed in the extremely cold high-altitude conditions, which can block pitot tubes and lead to erroneous speed information being provided to pilots and flight control systems. Currently, the probes are certified only to handle temperatures of up to -40C. EASA says climate change could be contributing to more extreme weather conditions at high altitudes that have not previously been encountered by aircraft. Arnoux believes the BEA recommendations “do not go far enough.” If it cannot be demonstrated that pitot tubes can function despite large quantities of ice crystals at an altitude of 41,000 ft. and temperature of -70C without disruption, then operational changes need to be made, he argues. If the probes fail to meet that standard, then Airbus aircraft should “be limited to flying outside of clouds at these altitudes,” Arnoux says. Such a move would have huge operational implications for airlines on many long-range routes by reducing the efficiency of their Airbus wide-body fleets. Aircraft compare data from three pressure probes, but an accident investigator notes that when two pitot tubes freeze and provide anomalous speed information, the data from a third functioning probe can be rejected. The BEA says it has examined 13 significant events from five airlines but notes that data on another 40 events could not be reviewed owing to missing data. BEA data shows many of the events examined occurred in environmental conditions outside the certification standard for pitot tubes and outside the Airbus requirement, which itself is far more stringent than demanded by certification authorities. Airbus and BEA officials stress, however, that the loss of pitot tube data alone should not cause a crash, and that pilots are trained to safely operate an aircraft when those problems occur. The extreme weather conditions AF447 encountered have triggered calls by pilots for improved access to weather information. The main Air France pilots union, SNPL, is urging that better meteorological data be provided and that studies be undertaken to improve detection of adverse weather in flight. In addition to AF447, another Air France flight on the Brazil-Paris route recently declared a Mayday in flight when encountering severe turbulence, but it then continued on to Paris without further incident. In a written response to the BEA’s request for a review, Airbus states that it “fully supports the corresponding recommendation from the BEA that the agencies conduct an industry review to assess all appropriate criteria with which any new equipment have to comply.” An industry official says it is not just the pitot tubes that need to be looked at, but also, more broadly, the way speed information is processed on the A330, noting the 2008 inflight upset of a Qantas A330-300 (Flight QF72). He argues that the flight control system on A320s has greater fault redundancy than does the widebody’s. To help address problems that occurred on QF72, when one of the air data inertial reference units (Adiru) provided faulty data to the flight control system, Airbus has modified the flight control software to filter information better. “The purpose of the modification is to enhance the robustness of the flight control computer against Adiru abnormal parameters,” Airbus says in a written statement. The fixes are being applied to A330s and A340s. Nevertheless, Airbus dismisses the notion of a link between the AF447 and QF72 incidents, pointing out that the two airlines used Adirus from different manufacturers. More work is ongoing to assess what further changes may be needed, Airbus says. A new flight control computer software standard is due this year, safety authorities say. Some regulatory action is already being taken as a result of the AF447 crash. For instance, flight data and cockpit voice recorder standards are headed for an update. In March, a safety committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization will convene to consider enhancements to flight-data recording. The BEA briefed ICAO in November on its proposal to extend to 90 days from 30 the minimum operational life for the beacons attached to cockpit voice and flight data recorders and the proposal to introduce recorders that would be ejected on impact. The BEA has rejected the idea of streaming flight data recorder information via satellites to ground terminals as an alternative to data recorders. Troadec says such an approach would overload communications links, particularly considering that modern recorders monitor 1,300 data points. The BEA also would like to a see a third beacon attached to aircraft, probably the aft fuselage, to help locate wreckage. Starting in February, the BEA plans to direct a third search phase for AF447 debris and the cockpit voice and flight data recorders. Airbus and Air France are contributing to the €10-million ($14.4-million) search costs, but Troadec insists the agency will have the lead and not be compromised by the industrial financial participation. This month researchers are supposed to help refine the search area to improve the chances of finding wreckage using imaging sonar. http://www.aviationweek.com *************** Jamaican Airport may charge American Airlines for damages Picture American Airlines may face legal action if investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) find the airline at fault over a runway incident in Jamaica last week. In Jamaica, speculation is rife surrounding whether the Airports Authority of Jamaica (AAJ) and the operators of the Norman Manly International Airport will sue the airline for damages. The incident, which saw Flight AA331 skid off the runway and injure 44 passengers, forced the airport to close for several hours, subsequently causing major disruptions to other flights. Expenses were also incurred by the airport and AAJ through its emergency services. However, the outcome of the investigation will determine legal action according to local Jamaican attorney Anthony Hylton. "If in fact the fault is the fault of American Airlines then the Airport Authority and the Government of Jamaica can recover damages where damages have been sustained” he told radiojamaica. But the bad weather in Jamaica is to blame according to the former President of the Jamaica Airline Pilots Association (JALPA). Representing Mayday Air Jamaica, Wesley Sampson sent an open letter to both Spirit and American Airlines this week urging the airlines to “exercise extreme care when dispatching flights into Jamaica in marginal weather and not use Jamaican airports as alternates under any circumstances until the NTSB report is final.” “It is not reasonable to assume or expect that two experienced American Airlines pilots, trained to the highest standards of aviation safety, simply flew into Jamaica and crash landed in routine operations” he said. http://www.etravelblackboard.com/showarticle.asp?id=100686&nav=20 **************** USA issues new security directives for inbound flights The US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has mandated new security measures covering inbound flights to the USA effective 4 January. Those measures are the latest response to a foiled attempt on 25 December by a Nigerian national to use explosives to destroy an Airbus A330 operated by Delta Air Lines. The administration's new directive applies to both US and international carriers operating inbound flights, and includes "long-term, sustainable security measures developed in consultation with law enforcement officials and our domestic and international partners", says the TSA. It is mandating enhanced screening for every individual flying into the USA travelling from or through nations that are state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of interest. The directive also increases the use of enhanced screening technologies, and mandates threat-based and random screening for passengers on international flights bound for the US. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news *************** Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC