February 5, 2010 No.029 In This Issue Blaming the pilot gets us nowhere AA Withdraws Many Proposed Changes In Sport Pilot, Instructor Rules Watchdog: FAA safety initiatives lagging Steven Udvar-Hazy stepped down ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Blaming the pilot gets us nowhere The Airline Pilots Association is furious about the probable cause issued by the National Transportation Safety Board in the crash of Continental Express flight 3407, (Colgan Air http://www.colganair.com/ [http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103007818242&s=6053&e=0016yDG9VW8bQvz_FuH3jRPFUJ2mBmnF9hscTZlV4kVhwUKR-Wr_tpDe3c0grwBB-xIZWhd-7YGm43cF0PH4fxtlpDI8Y75MjcmEXSszZWfBUSsJhTNMlO1gg==]) and not just because the labor union exists to look out for the best interests of its members. No, ALPA is outraged because in determining what happened to Continental Express flight 3407, the NTSB focused on a symptom and ignored the cause. Following a hearing on February 2, the board determined that the pilots of the flight, Capt. Marvin Renslow and First Officer Rebecca Shaw, mishandled a stall, and despite the fact that there was time to recover, failed to do so, causing the crash. The NTSB's hearing was lengthy and detailed including discussion of crew training, fatigue, company policies and hiring practices. But at the end of the day, according to the board's finding of probable cause, responsibility for the accident falls to Renslow and Shaw. In a statement later, ALPA president John Prater pointed out what should be obvious to the board because its a basic truth in accident investigations; there is no one cause. "The Board has missed a valuable opportunity to highlight the many factors that combined to cause this tragedy," Mr. Prater said. The full NTSB probable cause statement follows below, but in summary, the board cites four actions, lapses actually, the crew's failure to monitor airspeed, its failure to observe discipline in the cockpit, the captain's failure to monitor the flight and the airline's operating procedures for flights in icing conditions. It's a list that heaves buckets of blame on the pilot. Okay, he's not qualified by many measures - the most dramatic being a record of failed check rides and an inability to focus on the task at hand as seen from a cockpit voice recorder transcript that demonstrate this guy's mind was everywhere but on the flight. The larger question, one that begs examination, is how was he in the cockpit in the first place? How does a succession of first officers work with a pilot who's flying skills and lack of professionalism are so apparent without passing along their concerns? How does his employer fail to note these shortcomings? John Gadzinski, an airline pilot and fellow member of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (http://www.isasi.org [http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103007818242&s=6053&e=0016yDG9VW8bQv1Ezbe7ZrYix-yzO0Cx8zBOLUU0eyjyXP0Pat1wd6Qu3WlACIJ0Y-7lp1kE9cKN1wcucYCDHSHa_uIxN0rEYIsivy-wBaTdi8=]) told me once - and I'm going to paraphrase here because truth be told, we were drinking at the time - that an airline's commitment to safety can be easily determined by answering this simple question. Is there a gap between its policies and its practices? Colgan repeatedly states that safety is a top concern and yet, here's the gap. Colgan claimed to have a policy prohibiting pilots from overnighting in crew lounges yet it was a well known fact that commuting pilots did just that. Colgan claimed use of personal electronic devices was prohibited and yet the 24-year old first officer on the flight not only felt free to send text messages but when she did so, the captain failed to say anything to her about it. Sterile cockpit? We'll that's not just a Colgan "policy" its an F.A.A.requirement. On the night of the crash, Flight 3407 had an hour-long taxiout at Newark Liberty Airport while waiting takeoff. Virtually the entiretime was spent in conversation, but only sixteen minutes of talk was aboutthe flight. Its just not believable that this kind of cockpit behavior was unknown toColgan. Getting to the heart of why that was the case is entirely relevantto determining why this plane crashed. Its bigger than Mr. Renslow and Ms.Shaw. Its bigger than Colgan too. There's a crisis here, but you'd neverknow it by reading the probable cause statement. Sure, its recognized by the safety board to the extent that it plans two public events, one to study pilot training and standards and another to lookinto "code-share" operations. Whether the effect of future discussions will be as effective as somethingmore comprehensive emerging within the powerful emotional atmosphere of acrash hearing remains to be seen. In discussing the danger of Mr. Renslow's loquaciousness, NTSB member Robert Sumwalt said he squanderedtime he did not have. Waiting too long to address the problems in theregional airline business risks the same fate. PROBABLE CAUSE (http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm [http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103007818242&s=6053&e=0016yDG9VW8bQuHbDGwv32UPVm80ii5pH0GUUdl0spYWKUD6oeB1JvkXV0rezZVsmPuvD2c78PAqrnzdMHHTUKbxnLyyTdyU1ODzU7wZf7qLPjs9ZQxEyHyFf0Uag7UiqQ401vhISnVML0Znw3QX3ajqw==]) The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causeof this accident was the captain's inappropriate response to the activationof the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which theairplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flightcrew's failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of thelow-speed cue, (2) the flight crew's failure to adhere to sterile cockpitprocedures, (3) the captain's failure to effectively manage the flight, and(4) Colgan Air's inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and managementduring approaches in icing conditions. http://christinenegroni.blogspot.com/2010/02/blaming-pilot-gets-us-nowhere.html [http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103007818242&s=6053&e=0016yDG9VW8bQt-3247s7p4-mxWgnLpuLyP9kulnjceycoapnGTenkhVKSL2U3ow2LJys_H0t24OmAGINU-0yY9Bh8H4EvOMG1ifn988U9Jl_t9nUMzgAC7lQJuS_iOgOoHYIKF7w34gYBexgmcXjoE93MX-EvgcAjz3b9S0cQDINNAJaX5L1mLf5GQAVDiCEXq] Back to Top ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ FAA Withdraws Many Proposed Changes In Sport Pilot, Instructor Rules, Changes In Proficiency Requirements, Instrument Instruction Pulled From Final Rule The FAA has decided to withdraw several of its proposed changes to the sport pilot and sport pilot instructor regulations following comments made on the NPRM issued last year. On April 15, 2008, the FAA published an NPRM entitled, "Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Aircraft; Modifications to Rules for Sport Pilots and Flight Instructors With a Sport Pilot Rating" (73 FR 20181). The NPRM proposed to address airman certification issues that have arisen since regulations for the operation of light-sport aircraft were first implemented in 2004. The NPRM contained some 22 rules changes, and over 150 comments were received from individual pilots and instructors, as well as from the EAA, AOPA, NAFI, and others. After reviewing those comments, the FAA did away with many of the proposed changes, and modified others. The first four proposed changes, dealing with replacing sport pilot and sport pilot flight instructor privileges with aircraft category and class ratings; require issuance of category and class ratings by designated pilot examiners; and place all requirements for flight instructors under part 61 subpart H, were withdrawn completely. The FAA agreed with the commenters that the potential burden does not justify adoption of the proposal, and withdrew those portions of the NPRM related to replacing sport pilot and sport pilot flight instructor privileges with aircraft category and class ratings. In addition, the FAA is withdrew the proposed requirement that proficiency checks be conducted by DPEs instead of authorized instructors, as well as the proposal to move all requirements for flight instructors with a sport pilot rating from subpart K to subpart H. Additionally, when the FAA proposed to include all requirements for flight instructors with a sport pilot rating in subpart H, the FAA clarified the limitations set forth in current § 61.415 by proposing to revise § 61.195 to indicate that a flight instructor with a sport pilot rating may only provide flight instruction in a light-sport aircraft. Although the FAA is not adopting the proposal to place all requirements for flight instructors with a sport pilot rating in part 61 subpart H, the FAA is revising the introductory text of § 61.415 to specify that a flight instructor with a sport pilot rating may only provide flight training in a light-sport aircraft. The FAA says this change clarifies the original intent of the 2004 final rule. While the FAA is not adopting its proposal to remove provisions for the conduct of proficiency checks by flight instructors and include provisions for the issuance of category and class ratings by DPEs, the agency remains concerned that it may not have a complete record of those individuals who have received sport pilot privileges as a result of satisfactory completion of a proficiency check conducted by an authorized instructor. Instead, the FAA is implementing non-regulatory procedures, which will improve its ability to obtain a record of all proficiency checks conducted by flight instructors. Another of the withdrawn proposals would have required student pilots seeking a sport pilot certificate and sport pilots operating an airplane with a maximum airspeed in level flight with maximum continuous power (VH) greater than 87 knots calibrated airspeed (CAS) to receive and log 1 hour of flight training on the control and maneuvering of an aircraft solely by reference to instruments. Many commenters, however, objected to the proposed change. They asserted that the proposal would go beyond the intent of the 2004 rule because sport pilots may only fly in day VFR conditions, the FAA did not offer any data to suggest that there is a safety problem that would necessitate such training, and that flight instructors with a sport pilot rating typically receive only 1 hour of instrument training and therefore do not have necessary instrument training to adequately train other airmen. Although the FAA contends that inadvertent flight into instrument conditions by pilots not appropriately rated to conduct such flight constitutes a significant safety hazard, the FAA agreed with the commenters' concern that flight instructors with a sport pilot rating would not have necessary instrument training to adequately train other pilots for flight by reference to instruments. Additionally, the proposal would have required a student pilot seeking a sport certificate or a sport pilot to obtain instruction in an aircraft equipped for instrument flight when the aircraft in which he or she normally conducts flight operations is not equipped for instrument flight. Based upon these concerns and the potential burden the proposed requirement would have placed on the sport pilot community, the FAA is withdrawing the proposed change. Among the proposals in the NPRM that the FAA is adopting is one to require an endorsement for aircraft with a VH less than or equal to 87 knots CAS, EAA, NAFI, and an individual commenter raised objections. The Experimental Aircraft Association and NAFI said they essentially agreed with the concept, but aid that initial certification in a single engine land airplane should be sufficient to fly other single-engine airplanes within the definition of light sport aircraft. The individual commenter did not believe accident data support the 87-knot-CAS division any longer and suggested the distinction be withdrawn from this proposal and removed throughout other light-sport regulations. The FAA does not believe that receiving training in an airplane with a VH greater than 87 knots CAS will adequately prepare a sport pilot to operate a low-speed, high-drag airplane with a VH less than or equal to 87 knots CAS without additional training. The agency maintains the proposed endorsement to operate an aircraft with a VH less than or equal to 87 knots CAS is justified and is adopting this change. The FAA had proposed to eliminate the requirement for flight instructors with a sport pilot rating to have logged 5 hours of flight time in order to provide flight instruction in a make and model aircraft within a specific set of aircraft. The FAA believes that the aeronautical experience requirements for the issuance of a flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating and the endorsements necessary to exercise those privileges are sufficient for an instructor to safely provide flight instruction in any aircraft for which that instructor has privileges. The agency believes that the aeronautical experience requirements for the issuance of a flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating and the endorsements necessary to exercise those privileges are sufficient for an instructor to safely provide flight instruction in any aircraft for which that instructor has privileges. The agency has determined that 5 hours of aeronautical experience in a particular make and model of light sport aircraft therefore should not be required to safely provide flight instruction in these relatively simple, non-complex aircraft. The FAA is adopting this change as proposed. Another significant change would permit persons exercising sport pilot privileges and the privileges of a student pilot seeking a sport pilot certificate to fly up to an altitude of not more than 10,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) or 2,000 feet above ground level (AGL), whichever is higher. The FAA proposed to add the words "or 2,000 feet AGL [above ground level], whichever is higher" to allow sport pilots and student pilots seeking a sport pilot certificate to operate in mountainous areas higher than 10,000 feet MSL when such operations are less than 2,000 feet AGL. The FAA is adopting this rule as proposed. Other rules changes deal specifically with weight-shift control aircraft and powered parachutes. The changes become effective April 2, 2010. FMI: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-2056.pdf [http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103007818242&s=6053&e=0016yDG9VW8bQsUfJh27GQ_AtiQxDbWJ771jry87bs9Hip2ECAAHWqwpZ3xPOb2aKBFexUv3ypEGk5Xid8gm0qUPT1fTfeTqieRRMCLortdXXAVhCdYxx-Thqxvn72rItxTqlQyO6kV4284_P83Yk6HpfHDAneby0ZR] Aero-news.net Back to Top ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Watchdog: FAA safety initiatives lagging WASHINGTON -- A year after a regional airliner crashed into a house near Buffalo, N.Y., killing 50 people, the government has failed to implement most of the safety reforms it promised in response to the accident, a government watchdog said Thursday. Transportation Department Inspector General Calvin Scovel said the Federal Aviation Administration has fallen behind schedule or failed to meet goals on eight of 10 measures the agency said it would take, including new regulations to prevent pilot fatigue and better inspection of training for regional airline pilots. FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt countered that his agency deserves credit for its hard work and said the law requires FAA to go through a time-consuming process before adopting new regulations. "We would all love to move faster," Babbit told the committee. The Feb. 12, 2009, crash is considered one of the most significant aviation accidents in recent years because it pointed to what many experts say is a lower level of safety for smaller regional airlines that operate short-haul flights for larger carriers. Regional airlines provide the only scheduled service to about 440 communities in the U.S., accounting for about half of domestic departures and one-quarter of airline passengers. Regional carrier Colgan Air Inc. of Manassas, Va., was operating the flight for Continental Airlines. The National Transportation Safety Board has said pilot error caused the crash. Scovel said that while the FAA stepped up pilot-training inspections, its inspectors didn't have the background they needed, the inspection program was flawed and important questions were not asked. For example, FAA inspectors observed more than 2,400 airline-conducted tests of pilot skills, but they didn't ask airlines whether the pilots actually passed the tests, Scovel said. Scovel also said the FAA missed a self-imposed deadline to propose new pilot fatigue regulations. Pilot fatigue was among the errors cited Tuesday by the NTSB in its investigation of Flight 3407. The NTSB has urged the FAA for 20 years to update its rules for pilot hours and work days to prevent fatigue, but a previous attempt to create new rules collapsed in the face of disagreements between airlines and pilot unions. "If past is prologue, the new rule could be years in the making," Scovel said. Babbitt said his initial timetable for issuing a new pilot fatigue rule was "overly ambitious" and that writing the regulation has turned out to be "incredibly complex." Regional Airline Association President Roger Cohen said carriers are reviewing NTSB's findings and recommendations in the case. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/04/AR2010020402042.html [http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103007818242&s=6053&e=0016yDG9VW8bQt-MgrJxMJBoIrveDgkrBxNlqiYtYLaXfUSvf8PEAL2DF0J8jElN3kVycZztPNT5gafJq9ViL2PFwpOtBd_YrmmwIQXu-F6g42x2m1KF16f4bQ8m3wJ3K6pAKA3D4xoY4BmxRuug1e-Z9nTaMqwTSvGiXlmAUs8spXhrLYLyyeTClhViblmG_fSi_FXKnFTznI=] Back to Top ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ American International Group Inc. Steven Udvar-Hazy stepped down as chief executive officer of the bailed-out insurer plane-leasing unit he founded 37 years ago as the parent company prepares to sell jets to help repay debt. His departure from ILFC has been expected since the mega-lessor was plunged into a financial morass because of the massive scandal at its parent, AIG. ILFC President John Plueger will succeed Udvar-Hazy as acting CEO. The ILFC Board is considering what to do on a long-term basis. When the US government bailed out AIG and assumed control of 80% of the stock, ILFC effectively became a ward of the state, relying on federal funds to meet debt obligations. Financing airplanes fell to reliance on the ECA for Airbus and ExIm for Boeing airplanes. The ECA imposed humiliating conditions that segregated lease payments and maintenance reserves into restricted accounts. Hazy tried to put together a deal that would enable him to purchase about 10% of the ILFC portfolio. The long effort came to naught late last year when his bid was rejected. "On behalf of AIG, I would like to thank Steve for his tireless service to ILFC," said Robert Benmosche, AIG President and Chief Executive Officer. "We are grateful for the work he has done to continue ILFC's leadership in the industry." In a press release, IFLC said Douglas Steenland, former president and chief executive officer of Northwest Airlines, who became ILFC's non-executive chairman in December, will continue as non-executive chairman. Steenland joined the ILFC board in September and is a member of the AIG board. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news Back to Top [http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103007818242&s=6053&e=0016yDG9VW8bQvmI933OTmYeJuTPDi2yluA2_vHRUSYrtLGTO6cBsEVZpaj3jw-nDUhqtxtetwfj4i5X80C-erSMs1cPCT5Lejq] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC