Flight Safety Information Flight Safety Information December 3, 2010 - No. 248 In This Issue FAA SAFO Covers Hot Fueling, Loading NTSB To Open Docket On Montana Pilatus Accident Investigation CASA Directs Qantas To Conduct Additional Trent 900 Inspections Qantas begins legal action regarding Rolls-Royce A380 engines Concorde Crash Trial May Intimidate Witnesses, Harm Safety, Lawyers Say Five foreign airlines suspended for violating UAE rules FAA's NextGen could cost $160 billion Trent 900 failure caused extensive damage to Qantas A380 FAA SAFO Covers Hot Fueling, Loading Procedure Not Recommended Unless "Absolutely Necessary" A fire which began while a helicopter was being refueled while the engine was still running has prompted the FAA to issue a SAFO directed at part 91, 133, and 137 operators that conduct fueling or chemical loading with the engines running (hot fueling/loading). On May 30, 2009, a Bell 47G-2 helicopter operating under part 137 was being refueled with the engine running (hot fueling) when the ground crew spilled fuel onto the engine while trying to untangle a kink in the hose. The helicopter quickly caught fire and the pilot sustained serious injuries as a result. Additionally, on September 9, 2008, a Bell 206-B helicopter, operating under part 137, sustained substantial damage while conducting hot fueling and chemical loading simultaneously. After fueling was complete, but with the chemical hose still attached, the ground crew mistakenly gave an "all clear" hand signal to the pilot. As the pilot ascended, the chemical hose caused the helicopter to pitch nose down and roll to the right, contacting the ground. The SAFO indicates that hot fueling/loading can be extremely hazardous and is not recommended except when absolutely necessary due to the nature of the operation. Operators who conduct hot fueling/loading should develop standard operating procedures (SOP) for flight and ground crew personnel, and procedures should address the following guidelines: The FAA recommends that hot fueling be conducted only by aircraft utilizing JET A or JET A-1 fuel types. If strict operating procedures are not followed, hot fueling of aircraft utilizing AvGas can be extremely hazardous due to its low flash point. Aircraft being fueled while an engine is operating should have all potential ignition sources located above the fuel inlet port(s) and above fuel vent or tank openings. Sources of ignition include, but are not limited to: engines, exhausts, auxiliary power units (APU), and combustion-type cabin heater exhausts. In accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) section 91.9, hot fueling is not permitted if the Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual contains an associated operating limitation. An appropriately certificated and rated pilot should be at the flight controls during the entire hot fueling/loading process with controls appropriately adjusted to prevent aircraft movement. The pilot should unbuckle all restraints, and be prepared to immediately shut-down the engine and egress the aircraft, if necessary. The pilot should not conduct any extraneous duties during hot fueling/loading. Other personnel should not be on-board the aircraft during hot fueling/loading. Only designated personnel, with proper training in hot fueling/loading operations, should operate fueling or chemical loading equipment. The operatorˇ¦s written procedures should include: precautions for safe handling of the fuel or chemical, emergency shutoff procedures, fire extinguisher use, hand signal use, and precautions regarding moving propeller and rotor blades. At least two ground personnel should be present during hot fueling/loading. One person conducts the fueling/loading, while the other stands by prepared to activate the fuel/chemical emergency shutoff and handle fire extinguishers if necessary. The aircraft should remain well clear of the fuel source, and at no time should the aircraft wing or helicopter blades extend over the fueling source Before fueling, the aircraft must be bonded to the fuel source to equalize static electricity between the fuel source and the aircraft. Grounding of the aircraft and/or fuel truck is no longer recommended because it does not prevent sparks at the fuel source, and the grounding cable may not be sufficient to discharge the electrical current. All doors, windows, and access points allowing entry to the interior of the aircraft that are adjacent to, or in the immediate vicinity of, the fuel inlet ports should be closed and should remain closed during fueling operations. Fuel should be dispensed into an open port only from approved deadman-type nozzles, with a flow rate not to exceed 10 gallons per minute (38 liters per minute). Close port pressure fueling ports are preferable because the potential for spillage is reduced. A fire extinguisher of an appropriate type and size for the fueling operation must be within easy reach of ground personnel at all times during hot fueling operations. Operators who conduct hot fueling should also equip the aircraft with a fire extinguisher in the cockpit, if possible. When fueling/loading is complete, the pilot must ensure that the seatbelt and shoulder harness are properly re-secured as necessary prior to any aircraft movement. The FAA recommends that operators should include this SAFO in initial and recurrent training programs for pilots and ground personnel. FMI: www.faa.gov Back to Top NTSB To Open Docket On Montana Pilatus Accident Investigation March 22 Accident Fatally Injured 14 As part of its continuing investigation into a plane crash in Montana, the National Transportation Safety Board will open the public accident docket on Friday, December 3, 2010. On March 22, 2009, at 1430 mountain daylight time, a Pilatus PC-12/45, N128CM, crashed near the approach end of runway 33 at Bert Mooney Airport (BTM), Butte, Montana. The airplane was owned and operated by Eagle Cap Leasing of Enterprise, Oregon, as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. All 14 people on board the airplane were killed in the accident. There were no ground injuries. The flight departed Oroville Municipal Airport, Oroville, California, at 1110 Pacific Daylight Time (1210 mountain daylight time) on an instrument flight rules flight plan and was destined for Gallatin Field, Bozeman, Montana. The airplane was diverting to Butte at the time of the accident. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The information being released is factual in nature and does not provide analysis. The docket includes: investigative group factual reports, interview summaries, crew statements, air traffic control transcripts, controller statements, the meteorology report, and other documents. Additional material will continue to be added to the docket as it becomes available. Analysis of the accident, along with conclusions and a determination of probable cause, will come at a later date when the final report on the investigation is completed. The docket material will be made available at 1000 EST on December 3 on the NTSB website at in the FOIA electronic reading room. Details are listed by date. FMI: www.ntsb.gov/dockets/foia_fri-dockets.htm#Aviation2010 Back to Top CASA Directs Qantas To Conduct Additional Trent 900 Inspections Procedure To Be Carried Out Within Two Flight Cycles Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has issued a directive to Qantas to conduct a further inspection of the Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines on its A380 aircraft. This direction requires Qantas to inspect an oil filler tube that feeds oil to the engine's high pressure/intermediate pressure bearing structure. The oil filler tube inspection must be carried out within two flight cycles. Under the direction, Qantas is required to conduct the inspections in accordance with detailed technical information contained in a service bulletin issued by the manufacturer Rolls-Royce this week. Inspections will be undertaken using specialist equipment known as a borescope, which is inserted into the oil tube and provides a view of the condition of the wall of the tube. CASA says Qantas engineers will be looking for any sign of the wall of the tube being out of tolerance and reduced in thickness, which could cause the tube to crack and leak oil. Evidence of a problem with the oil tube has been found during the investigation into the Qantas A380 engine failure near Singapore on 4 November 2010. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has identified the condition of the tube as a safety issue and issued a safety recommendation to Rolls-Royce. CASA says it continues to liaise closely with Qantas, the European Aviation Safety Agency, Rolls-Royce, Airbus and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. In monitoring developments CASA will take any further action that may be necessary in the interests of safety. FMI: www.casa.gov.au Back to Top Qantas begins legal action regarding Rolls-Royce A380 engines USA TODAY - In this Nov. 4, 2010, file photo firefighters surround a Qantas passenger plane which made an emergency landing with 459 people aboard in Singapore's Changi International Airport after having engine problems. Qantas has launched preliminary legal action against Rolls-Royce, the manufacturer of the engine that exploded on one of its A380 superjumbos in mid-air last month." That's from The Associated Press, which adds that "the airline said Thursday it has filed a statement of claim in a federal court that will allow it to launch legal action against Rolls-Royce at some point." The New York Times writes "the preliminary action, filed in Australian federal court, allows Qantas the option of pursuing legal action if the airline is not satisfied with a compensation offer from the European engine maker, an airline spokesman said." That news comes amid another report from The Associated Press that says "Australian investigators on Thursday identified the source of an oil leak that caused a superjumbo engine to blow apart in mid air last month, and said a suspected manufacturing defect in the Rolls-Royce engine was to blame." Back to Top Concorde Crash Trial May Intimidate Witnesses, Harm Safety, Lawyers Say (Bloomberg) - French criminal investigations into airplane disasters such as the deadly July 2000 Concorde crash puts the flying public at risk by intimidating people with key information, lawyers and safety experts say. Even if Continental Airlines Inc. and five individuals are cleared by judges in Pontoise, France, on Dec. 6 of manslaughter charges related to the crash that killed 113 people, witnesses may be reluctant to participate in the future for fear of being targeted by prosecutors. "It has a chilling effect," said James Hall, former chairman of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. "I don't think it does aviation safety any good." France is one of the few countries where fatal accidents automatically prompt criminal probes to run parallel with investigations by civil authorities. The two-track approach bogged down the Concorde investigation, with the criminal trial starting almost 10 years after the crash and seven years after the supersonic jetliner's last commercial flight. "Some people question the need for this double investigation," said Pierre Sparaco, author of aviation books including a history of the Concorde. "Technical investigators on one side and criminal on the other often get in each other's way. It's not uncommon that they don't listen to each other." Flight AF4590 Concorde flights were grounded for 16 months following the July 25, 2000, crash of Air France Flight AF4590. While the plane returned to service, air travel demand declined following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and traffic never recovered. The supersonic jet went out of service in 2003. Civil investigators found the Concorde hit a piece of metal from a Continental plane that had taken off earlier. The strip tore into Concorde's wheel, sending debris into fuel tanks, sparking a fire that crashed the plane. The danger posed by exploding tires, noted after five incidents in 1979 and two in 1993, was also cited in a report. Continental declined to comment on the French investigative process or the trial, said Mary Clark, a spokeswoman for the airline. Continental has merged with United Airlines to form United Continental Holdings Inc., the world's largest carrier. The criminal investigators concurred, and in 2008 an investigating judge ordered the men and airline to trial. Continental, a mechanic and his manager erred in replacing an older wear strip with one of titanium, not made by the original manufacturer, according to the findings. Two men who worked on the Concorde program and a former French civil aviation official are accused of failing to address the tire risk. Omitted Witness Reports All deny the charges. The company's lawyer Olivier Metzner declined to comment before the verdict. At a trial that started in February, Metzner argued the investigators omitted witness reports that indicated the plane may have caught fire before hitting the metal strip. By prosecuting everyone from a Texas mechanic to the Concorde program director, France risks scaring witnesses, said John Goglia, an aviation consultant and former NTSB member. "Everyone clams up," Goglia said. "It makes an additional burden on the investigators to try to ferret out the facts. If you think even remotely that you're going to be charged criminally with something, why would you say anything?" There would be no trial in the U.S., people involved in the Concorde trial and observers in both countries say. 'Well-Intentioned People' "Even if the debris caused the crash, those were the actions of well-intentioned people," said John Cox, a former pilot now with Safety Operating Systems LLC in Washington. Fernand Garnault, an attorney for Air France-KLM Group, which is seeking 15 million euros ($19.8 million) in damages for the end of its Concorde program, agreed. "Surely there would not have been a criminal trial in the U.S.," he said, since the unanimous jury verdict requirement for convictions would deter prosecutors from bringing the case. Civil investigators and victims' groups defended the French system, saying there is enough separation between the probes to allow witnesses to come forward. France's aviation investigation authority, the BEA, "is not there to find blame, we are there to determine how the accident occurred," said BEA spokeswoman Martine Delbono. "The criminal investigation does not interfere in our activities." Victims' Rights Victims' rights advocates in France say differences in the legal systems mean criminal investigations are the only way to guarantee fair representation and access to information on what happened to their relatives. "Our system is different; lawyers don't have the means to conduct their own investigations to determine" whether families should pursue individuals, manufacturers or the airlines, said Roland Rappaport, a Paris lawyer representing the Concorde pilot's family as well as the national pilots union in other accidents including last year's Air France crash off the coast of Brazil. "I'm not naive, I'm not saying we have access to everything, but in a country organized like ours, victims have very important rights" under the criminal probe, he said. French judges have only sent one pilot to jail following a crash and the prosecutor called for suspended jail sentences against the Continental employees and the former director of the Concorde program, and dismissals for the two other men. He recommended a 175,000-euro fine for Continental. Still the trial will undermine safety investigations as aviation workers and others see France prosecute the airline and its employees. "When there is an accident, people will remember the prosecution of Continental," said Michael Dworkin, executive vice president of the NTSB Bar Association. "I don't know what this does that will in any way improve air safety." Back to Top Five foreign airlines suspended for violating UAE rules Dubai, Dec 2 (IANS/WAM) The civil aviation authorities in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suspended the operations of five foreign airlines within the Gulf region after they reportedly violated air safety and security instructions. The General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) Thursday informed authorities about its decision regarding suspension of air operation of the five foreign airlines in the UAE for non-compliance with the applicable safety and security standards. The five airlines were, however, not named. One of them was suspended because it went through maintenance at a UAE airport without obtaining a license from the GCAA, another for safety and security reasons, and a third was suspended for violating air instructions applicable in the UAE. 'The GCAA seeks to ensure that all aircraft operating in the UAE comply with the highest international safety and security standards,' said Saif Mohammad Al Suwaidi, GCAA director general. 'Being the authority in charge of the civil aviation sector in the UAE, the GCAA will not hesitate to take any action against any aircraft and against any local or international air operator in the event of any violation of the applicable instructions in the UAE or non-compliance with any security and safety standards,' he said. Back to Top FAA's NextGen could cost $160 billion Federal Aviation Administration-led efforts to modernize the nation's air traffic control system--an effort collectively dubbed NextGen--could cost four times as much as initially estimated. Analysis commissioned by the NextGen Joint Planning and Development Office finds that implementing all of the capability envisioned by NextGen by 2025 could increase the program's costs from $40 billion to $160 billion, say the Government Accountability Office in a letter report dated Nov. 22. Sign up for our FREE newsletter for more news like this sent to your inbox! Even if the highest NextGen performance levels were implemented over longer period ending in 2035, then the cost would still considerably more than $40 billion. As a result, the new JPDO director (Karlin Toner, who became director in February) "has committed to reexamining the long-term goals of NextGen in light of new realities in the economy and the aviation industry as well as the progress and results of NextGen implementation efforts to date," GAO authors state. The FAA also continues to defer key implementation decisions, such as how to incentivize aircraft operators to install NextGen avionics equipment, the report adds. The FAA realizes its needs a strategy addressing whether all aircraft need to be equipped with NextGen avionics in all areas, but it has yet to make any specific decisions for a "best equipped, best served" policy, the GAO letter states. http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/ Back to Top Trent 900 failure caused extensive damage to Qantas A380 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) says the 4 November uncontained failure of a Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine on a Qantas Airways Airbus A380 caused extensive damage to the wing, the aircraft's No 1 engine, and the fuselage. "The failure of the No 2 engine ejected a number of engine components that struck the aircraft or were liberated overboard," says the ATSB. "Sections of the intermediate pressure (IP) turbine disc penetrated the leading edge of the left wing inboard of the No 2 engine, resulting in damage to the leading edge structure, the front wing spar and the upper surface of the wing." A small section of the No 2 engine's "liberated turbine disc" penetrated the left wing-to- fuselage fairing, damaging numerous system components, the fuselage structure, and elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring. Debris also hit the left wing's lower surface, causing a fuel leak from the No 2 engine fuel feed tank and left wing inner fuel tank.. Debris also hit the No 2 engine support pylon, the No 1 engine, the left fuselage keel beam support splice, and the left wing false spar. A small impact region was also observed on the left side of the aircraft's fuselage. The report goes onto add that a dark residue was observed inside the left wing inner fuel tank between ribs eight to 10. This will be further examined. "Impact damage from the liberated engine debris affected a number of aircraft systems," says the ATSB. "Damage was observed to elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring that affected the operation of the hydraulic system, landing gear and flight controls; a number of fuel system components; and the leading edge slat system." After the aircraft made an emergency landing in Singapore, the flight crew was unable to shut down engine No. 1 for over two hours. "Ground engineers also attended the aircraft and attempted a number of methods to shut down the engine, each without success Finally, the decision was taken to drown the engine with fire-fighting foam from the emergency services fire vehicles. The No. 1 engine was reported to have finally been shut down at 0653, about two hours and seven minutes after the aircraft landed." Source: Air Transport Intelligence news Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC