Flight Safety Information June 29, 2011 - No. 131 In This Issue FAA: Airline rules to migrate to charter operations FAA publishes safety recommendations for meteorological towers in wake of Delta crash Passenger's Bag...Sacramento County Sheriff's Office: Man Had Loaded Gun, Live Ammo Military jet fighter crashes during training in Nevada Airport lights operated normally before Tu-134 crash Dutch query RTO training after Ryanair post-V1 abort NTSB investigates ExpressJet close call Budget airlines safety warning (Australia) Jetstar cancelled flights 'for safety, not money' (New Zealand) NTSB Says It Cannot Explain A Piper Malibu's Control Malfunction Congress Passes Another Short Term FAA Extension NASA: July 8 selected for space shuttle program's last blast FAA: Airline rules to migrate to charter operations Flight, duty and rest regulations currently being finalized for Part 121 airlines "can very well migrate over to the Part 135" on-demand sector, John Allen, head of the FAA's flight standards office, warned charter operators at last month's National Air Transportation Association Air Charter Summit. "It's likely that future rulemaking efforts will propose extending Part 121 [regulations] to Part 135," he told attendees. Allen pointed out that Congress "clearly established the FAA's priorities with passage of H.R. 5900, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010." The bill focuses on pilot training, professionalism and professional development and came about as the result of the February 2009 crash of a regional turboprop just outside Buffalo, N.Y. The legislation calls for eight rulemaking actions, as well as 11 studies, task forces or reports to Congress, along with one database. The first of the rulemakings dealt with an overhaul of air carrier crew training, issued as a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM), which is currently out for public comment. http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/faa-airline-rules-to-migrate- to-charter-operations-30356/ Back to Top FAA publishes safety recommendations for meteorological towers in wake of Delta crash Six months after an agricultural pilot died when he slammed his plane into a gray weather tower on a Delta island, federal regulators last week recommended that all such structures be clearly marked to avoid future tragedies. The Federal Aviation Administration said towers 200 feet and shorter should be painted from top to bottom with alternating bands of orange and white and have eight orange marker balls, as well as brightly painted sleeves or flags, attached to the wires that hold them upright. Such markings already are required for towers taller than 200 feet, but the FAA is only recommending the steps for shorter towers. "It's guidance from the FAA," agency spokesman Ian Gregor said. Meteorological towers are designed to evaluate the potential of wind turbines in a given location. The issue gained momentum, according to an FAA report released Friday, following the death of agricultural pilot Stephen Allen, who crashed into an unmarked tower on a remote Delta island in Contra Costa County in January. "It's something that's sorely, and sadly, overdue," said Allen's daughter, Angela Lucero, of Sacramento. "I wish it was mandatory." The FAA did not recommend that towers shorter than 200 feet also be lit, which is required of taller towers and which some pilot advocates had sought. "I'm encouraged the FAA recognized the safety hazards posed by these structures," said Terry Gage, president of the California Agricultural Aircraft Association, which licenses state agricultural pilots. "I'm slightly discouraged it's still voluntary and that the lighting is not included in the recommendations." It is often difficult to provide a power source to the remote locations where the towers are located, the report said. "For those facilities to gather information, there has to be a some kind of power source," Gage said. On Jan. 10, Allen, 58, of Courtland, was killed on Webb Tract after his airplane struck a 198-foot-tall tower that he likely did not see, according to a report from the National Transportation Safety Board. Towers shorter than 200 feet fall under the purview of local governments, which do not typically require the markings mandated by the FAA for taller structures. Five days before Allen's crash, the agency began accepting public comment regarding the marking of shorter towers in response to concerns by associations representing agricultural operators and state governments about their visibility in rural areas, according to the FAA report. The FAA received nearly 500 comments -- many in response to Allen's crash -- and only three opposed marking towers, according to the report. While the FAA recommendations do not require those that build towers to change their practices, they will provide ammunition to a potential plaintiff in a lawsuit involving a crash, Walnut Creek personal injury attorney Stan Casper said. "If a plaintiff files a lawsuit because some pilot is killed, experts will be able to make references to the guidelines," Casper said. "A (judge) is not likely to instruct a jury that if the guidelines were violated, it was (the developer's) negligence. But reference will be made to these guidelines, and it will give a basis for (the plaintiff's air safety) experts." In Contra Costa County, the Department of Conservation and Development is also reviewing its regulations for permitting meteorological towers. Planners are calling other counties with a large agricultural and wind-technology presence, and consulting with the NTSB, FAA, the county Agricultural Advisory Task Force and the California Agricultural Aircraft Association, which licenses agricultural pilots in the state. Building a meteorological tower requires a common land use permit in Contra Costa. The zoning administrator approves or denies the application. A state bill that would require all towers in California from 50 to 200 feet to be marked and lit is before a Senate subcommittee. http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_18371277?nclick_check=1 Back to Top Passenger's Bag Sacramento County Sheriff's Office: Man Had Loaded Gun, Live Ammo SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Calif. - KCRA.com The Sacramento County Sheriff's Office said deputies assigned to the airport division arrested a man who was traveling with a loaded gun early Tuesday afternoon. Deputies said that Tam Nguyen, 49, was detained at the terminal B of the Sacramento International Airport after airport security officers said they believed he was carrying a firearm. Sheriff's office spokesman Jason Ramos said in a press release that deputies found a loaded handgun and several rounds of live ammunition in a magazine at the bottom of Nguyen's backpack. Ramos said that Nguyen was charged with unlawful possession of a loaded and concealed firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Officials said that Nguyen is being held on a $60,000 bond and will be arraigned later this week. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43572405/ns/local_news-sacramento_ca/ Back to Top Military jet fighter crashes during training in Nevada LAS VEGAS (AP) - A spokesman for Nellis Air Force Base says a military jet fighter has crashed during training near Caliente, Nev. Base spokesman Chuck Ramey says one person was on board the F-16C Fighting Falcon when it went down Tuesday evening in southeastern Nevada. The person's condition was not immediately known. The base is on the outskirts of Las Vegas, but the plane went down about 90 miles northeast of the city. The plane involved was the type used by the Air Force's aerial demonstration team, the Thunderbirds. The crash was previously reported by the Las Vegas Review-Journal. Ramey told the newspaper he did not know the cause of the crash. Back to Top Airport lights operated normally before Tu-134 crash Russian investigators have determined that lighting and radio systems at Petrozavodsk airport were operating normally before the fatal Tupolev Tu-134 crash last week. The power loss at the airport "resulted from the crash" rather than any earlier problem, said the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee. It stated that, at a distance of 425m (1,400ft) from the point at which the RusAir Tu- 134 first clipped trees, the twinjet struck a power line. This resulted in a short circuit and the shutdown of a substation which cut the power supply to the airport. But the investigators added that the loss of airport lighting was "short lived" because generators began operating within 5s and restored the power. Before the damage to the electrical transmission lines, said the Interstate Aviation Committee, the airport's radio systems, navigation beacons and approach and runway lights were operational. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news Back to Top Dutch query RTO training after Ryanair post-V1 abort Dutch investigators have queried whether rejected take-off decision-making and procedures ought to be re-examined after inquiring into a late aborted lift-off by a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 at Eindhoven. The take-off was rejected at 152kt, beyond the 141kt V1 decision speed, with the aircraft already rotating and its nose-wheel having lifted from the runway 2s beforehand. A Dutch Safety Board inquiry into the 4 June 2010 incident found that the first officer, who was flying, had trouble keeping the aircraft on the Runway 04 centreline at low speed and interpreted the problem as engine thrust asymmetry. But a cross-check by the captain did not reveal any difference in engine indications, and no such problem subsequently showed on the flight-data recorder. "The collected informationshows that during the take-off roll the aircraft experienced an undetermined atmospheric disturbance," said the inquiry. "The first officer felt and interpreted this disturbance as an unsafe condition to continue the take-off." Despite the carrier's procedures giving only the captain authorisation to abort, the first officer rejected the take-off and the aircraft halted about 500m from the end of the 3,000m runway. The board stresses that the aircraft was not damaged and none of the occupants was injured. But it refers to a Dutch study into rejected take-offs, conducted last year, which compared decision-making before and after the introduction of the Take-off Safety Training Aid tool in 1994, which aimed to cut the number of aborts. The study said the "correctness" of the decision to abort had "not increased" since 1994. It added that a review showed that pilot training has focused on rejected take-off due to engine failure, but that this accounts for less than 25% of aborts. "With the current state of technology and human factors theories available, a re-evaluation of the rejected take-off concept and procedures may be useful and warranted," it said. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news Back to Top NTSB investigates ExpressJet close call Controller error is suspect in a near-miss in clear weather at the Gulfport/Biloxi International airport the afternoon of 19 June when an Expressjet Embraer ERJ-145 with 50 passengers and three crew destined for Houston came within 91m (300ft) horizontally of colliding with a Cessna 172 on a training flight. According to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) preliminary report issued on 27 June, the Gulfport tower local controller, who was simultaneously handling ground control, clearance delivery, flight data and controller-in-charge positions, cleared ExpressJet flight 2555 for takeoff on Runway 14 six seconds after clearing the Cessna to takeoff on Runway 18, which converges with but does not physically cross Runway 14. Straight-out flight paths from the two runways do cross, however. Once airborne, the NTSB says the two aircraft passed within 91m laterally and 0m vertically of each other. ExpressJet is a subsidiary of US regional operator SkyWest. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news Back to Top Budget airlines safety warning (Australia) The senate inquiry delivered 22 recommendations to make budget air travel safer. Picture: Supplied A SENATE inquiry has delivered a warning about the safety of air travel - particularly on low-cost airlines. A report committee, chaired by Liberal Senator Bill Heffernan, delivered 22 recommendations to improve safety. Those recommendations included tougher safety standards, better incident-reporting guidelines, increased training for pilots and more funding for the aviation watchdog, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Independent Senator Nick Xenophon, a member of the committee, said the findings were a "huge wake-up call to the aviation industry". "This shift towards low-cost models has meant that airlines are trying to trim costs wherever they can. We need to ensure that this does not affect safety standards," he said. The Senate inquiry focused on pilot training and airline safety, and looked specifically at two incidents involving Tiger Airways and Jetstar over the past four years. The committee took evidence from a variety of industry players, including pilots, cabin crew, as well as the major airlines. In its findings, the committee called for minimum training hours for senior pilots to be increased to 1500 hours - currently some airlines require pilots to have just 250 hours. The committee also recommended: THE French investigation into the Air France disaster in 2009 should be reviewed by Australian authorities. A REVIEW of the supply of pilots in Australia. CASA prescribe cabin crew training and English language standards. GREATER mentoring and support for inexperienced pilots. The committee heard concerns from pilots and cabin crew about fatigue from demanding schedules. It recommended cabin crew fatigue risk come under the regulation of CASA. A spokesman for Transport Minister Anthony Albanese said yesterday: "The Government notes the Senate Committee's report and will take advice from aviation experts before responding in due course. "Safety is the number one priority." http://www.theaustralian.com.au/travel/news/budget-airlines-safety-warning/story- e6frg8ro-1226081103977 Back to Top Jetstar cancelled flights 'for safety, not money' (New Zealand) JETSTAR says its suspension of flights in response to volcanic ash was made for safety reasons alone, not to save money. The budget airline also rejected suggestions from Air New Zealand's chief executive that it has transferred "thousands" of passengers onto the NZ national flag carrier during the ash crisis. Jetstar group chief executive Bruce Buchanan says claims from one aviation analyst that Jetstar and parent company Qantas chose not to fly to protect earnings were "absurd". "The mere suggestion that grounding your entire operation in market - hundreds of flights over a two-week period - would improve financial performance is out of touch with the tough reality of running an airline," Mr Buchanan said in a statement on Wednesday. "We have lost all the revenue associated with these flights, while we have still had the burden of a significant portion of our cost base." Figures from Jetstar showed the airline cancelled more than 460 flights as a result of the Chilean volcano ash cloud. Mr Buchanan said while Jetstar had suffered a $NZ13 million ($A10.05 million) hit to profits as a result of the disruptions, he noted "some competitors have had a financial windfall capturing additional unexpected last-minute revenue". "We hope all customers understand that Jetstar will always make safety our number one priority ahead of financial gain," Mr Buchanan said. Apart from a small number of cancellations, Air New Zealand has kept flying through the crisis, choosing to fly underneath, or around, the ash cloud, a move that burns more fuel. Air NZ chief executive Rob Fyfe said last week that although Qantas and Jetstar had cancelled services in New Zealand, the two carriers had transferred "thousands of its customers" onto Air NZ flights. Mr Fyfe said it "seems a strange thing to do for your customers if you have concerns about the safety of the airspace". He also angrily rejected rumours that Air New Zealand aircraft had suffered damage from flying through ash. Jetstar spokesman James Aanensen said the airline did not put its passengers onto other carriers. "We offered refunds and travel vouchers for passengers who wanted to take those options," Mr Aanensen said on Wednesday. "If they went onto other airlines, then that was certainly of their own volition." Qantas put the cost of the ash cloud across the group - Qantas mainline and Jetstar - up to June 21 at $21 million. http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/breaking-news/jetstar-cancelled-flights-for-safety- not-money/story-e6frf7kf-1226084317647 Back to Top NTSB Says It Cannot Explain A Piper Malibu's Control Malfunction But Lists The Problem As The Probable Cause Of A March 2010 Fatal Accident It will be one of those accidents that remains largely unexplained. The pilot of a Piper Malibu reported to ATC that the airplane's controls were locked up, but an investigation by the NTSB could not find a reason for such a problem. Based on the statement by the pilot before the accident, and of a survivor during the investigation, the cause of the accident was listed as a control malfunction. NTSB Identification: ERA10FA195 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation Accident occurred Tuesday, March 30, 2010 in Roanoke, VA Probable Cause Approval Date: 06/13/2011 Aircraft: PIPER PA46, registration: N6913Z Injuries: 1 Fatal,1 Serious. About one minute after takeoff, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that the airplane's control wheels were locked. The controller subsequently cleared the pilot to land on any runway. No further transmissions were received from the pilot and the airplane continued straight ahead. Witnesses observed the airplane in a slow, level descent, until it impacted wires and then the ground. During a postaccident examination of the airplane, flight control continuity was confirmed to all the flight controls. Due to the impact and post-crash fire damage, a cause for the flight control anomaly, as reported by the pilot, could not be determined; however, several unsecured cannon plugs and numerous unsecured heat damaged wire bundles were found lying across the control columns forward of the firewall. Examination of the airplane logbooks revealed the most recent maintenance to the flight controls was performed about four months prior to the accident. The airplane had flown 91 hours since then. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was a malfunction of the flight controls for undetermined reasons. According to the manager of an FBO at KROA, the pilot and passenger arrived at KROA around 0930 on the morning of the accident. They had flown into KROA from Charlottesville-Albemarle Airport (CHO), Charlottesville, Virginia, for a meeting with the manager of the FBO. They completed their meeting, had lunch, and then prepared for the return flight to CHO. The passenger was interviewed in the hospital after the accident. He stated the takeoff seemed normal; however, he was seated in a rearward facing seat in the back of the airplane. The passenger reported at some point after takeoff, the airplane made a "flat" right turn and the pilot stated, "I have a problem." The passenger remembered hearing a "clunk" from the right side during the flight but could not recall when. He did not remember the impact, but was conscious afterward and was able to exit the airplane through the passenger door. Several employees of the FBO were inside at the time the airplane departed, and were monitoring the air traffic control tower radio frequency. They heard the pilot announce over the radio, "my controls are locked," and they subsequently went outside to observe the airplane. They observed the airplane above runway 24, near the intersection of runway 33. They estimated the airplane was at an altitude of 150-300 feet. They observed the airplane then begin a "slight right turn" and described the airplane traveling slowly. They lost sight of the airplane behind terrain as it continued to descend. Seconds later they observed smoke in the vicinity of where the airplane was descending. One of these witnesses from the FBO, who was also a pilot, reported the airplane's attitude as a shallow, "flat," right bank. He stated the airplane was moving slowly with a "minimal sink rate." The witness also stated that although the airplane was turning to the right, he did not observe the airplane's wings "dip" at all. The descent remained relatively "flat," until he lost site of the airplane behind terrain. Another witness was driving on a road near the airport when he observed the airplane in a level attitude (not climbing or descending) as it passed overhead. As the airplane passed his position, it was "rocking a little left and right" and then began to bank to the right. The witness stated the airplane was moving "relatively slow...just fast enough to maintain its level attitude." Shortly after, the witness observed the airplane strike a wire with its right wing and then "cartwheel" before it impacted the ground near a building. According to air traffic control information provided by the FAA, the pilot was cleared for takeoff from runway 24. About 1 minute later, the pilot reported, "I got a problem...the ah control wheels are locked." The controller subsequently cleared the pilot to "land on any runway." No further transmissions were received from the pilot. Pilot Information The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third class medical certificate was issued on December 3, 2008. At that time, he reported 3,000 hours of total flight experience. According to paperwork provided by the pilot's family, his most recent flight review and instrument proficiency check were completed on May 24, 2009. The pilot's family also provided a printout of the pilot's computerized logbook, with entries from November 21, 2008 to February 28, 2010. The total flight time accumulated during that period was 110.5 hours, in the accident airplane and another PA46-310P. The pilot also attended "Factory JetPROP DLX ground school of 8 hours and flight training program of 5 hours, including pre-flight and post flight training, flight training, landings, emergency procedures and night flight." Aircraft Information The accident airplane was a low-wing, single engine airplane, manufactured in 1985. The airplane was powered by a Teledyne Continental TSIO-520 engine. According to the co-owner of the airplane, he and the accident pilot had owned the airplane for about 7 years. Examination of the airplane and engine logbooks revealed the most recent annual inspection was completed on May 20, 2009 at a recorded time of 855 hours. Examination of the hobbs meter at the accident site revealed a time of 956 hours. The aircraft logbook (labeled "logbook #2) contained entries from August 6, 1999 to November 25, 2009. Examination of the entries in the aircraft logbook and maintenance paperwork revealed the following entries regarding the flight controls: March 14, 2007, (annual inspection) "...left hand aileron pulleys aft of pitot tube frozen/forward cable off pulley...removed cable guard, lubed and freed pulleys, installed cables on pulleys, reinstalled guard and ops checked, no defects noted at this time.." March 31, 2008, (annual inspection) "...pilots and co-pilots yoke shafts require lube...lubed pilots and copilots yoke shafts with LPS #2....pilots forward elevator stop not hitting...adjusted secondary elevator stop in accordance with PA-46-310 AMM." July 17, 2008: "...found and fixed broken wires at pilot yoke under instrument panel." September 18, 2009: "...left aileron damaged while towing...removed damaged aileron and installed loaner aileron..." November 25, 2009: "...removed loaner aileron and installed factory new aileron balanced and painted..." The Hobbs time on this date was recorded as 864.7 hours. The Hobbs meter at the accident site indicated 956.3 hours. Wreckage Information The initial impact point (IIP) was a wire which was approximately 50 feet tall, and stretched from two posts. Located under the wire was a small piece of aircraft fuselage skin. Approximately 37 feet from the IIP, three ground scars were observed that corresponded with the dimensions of the three propeller blades from the airplane. One of the propeller blades was buried in the ground scar. The remaining two propeller blades were lying adjacent to the ground scars. All three propeller blades were separated from their respective hub sockets at the root of the blade. Two of the three blades displayed chordwise scratching on the leading edges of the blades. The wreckage path was oriented 340 degrees magnetic, and extended approximately 62 feet to the main wreckage. The main wreckage came to rest about 25 feet from the propeller ground scars, upright, at the corner of an industrial building. All components of the airplane were accounted for in the vicinity of the main wreckage, and the airplane was oriented 230 degrees magnetic. The airplane was consumed by a post-crash fire, with the exception of the left aileron. The right wing was separated at the wing root; however, it remained attached to the fuselage through the flight control cables. The right aileron and flap were present in their respective positions on the wing; however, they were completely consumed by the post-crash fire. The left wing remained attached to the fuselage at the wing root. The inboard section of the wing was twisted and came to rest at a 90 degree angle to the root, with the leading edge resting on the ground. The outboard section came to rest upright. The left flap remained attached to the wing; however, it was completely consumed by the post-crash fire. The left aileron was separated from the wing and located about 15 feet in front of the main wreckage. The aileron was intact and did not sustain any fire damage. The tail section was separated from the fuselage; however it remained attached through flight control cables. The left and right horizontal stabilizers sustained severe post-crash fire damage. The elevator and rudder flight control cables remained attached to the respective flight controls and were traced through the floorboard to their appropriate attachments on the control column and rudder pedals. No obstructions were noted on the flight control cables. The left and right side aileron cables were connected to the control column and traced to the wing roots where they were separated. Examination of the control cable ends revealed overstress separation. The pilot and co-pilot control yokes were initially unable to be rotated on scene, due to a misalignment of the stop bracket, which was damaged during the impact. Examination of the area around the pilot and co-pilot control columns on the forward side of the firewall, revealed several unsecured cannon plugs in the vicinity of the control yokes. One cannon plug connector half was noted to be dangling across the co- pilot's control column. Additionally, numerous heat damaged wire bundles were lying across the control columns. The engine was separated from the airplane and came to rest underneath it. After removal from the accident site, a 24-volt battery was directly attached to the starter, and valve train continuity and thumb compression was confirmed on all cylinders. The cylinders were examined with a lighted borescope, and no anomalies were noted. The top spark plugs were removed and they exhibited "normal" wear when compared to the Champion Check-A-Plug comparison card. The fuel pump was removed from the engine and the drive shaft was free to rotate. Disassembly of the fuel pump revealed no internal damage. Fuel was observed in the fuel pump and fuel manifold. All of the fuel injection nozzles were undamaged, and clear of debris. The oil pump was disassembled and the housing displayed no evidence of hard particle passage. Tests and Research The Engine Data Monitor (EDM) device was sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination. According to the Specialist's Factual Report, the device was significantly damaged by fire during the accident; however the device's non- volatile memory was able to be extracted. The data extracted included flights from December 30, 2009 to March 30, 2010. Examination of 13 engine parameters downloaded from the unit, for two flights on the day of the accident, revealed no pre-impact mechanical anomalies. A section of the pilot's control column was retained and sent to the NTSB Material's Laboratory for examination. According to the Investigator's Factual Report, the section of control column was severely damaged by fire. The bearing which provides for the rotational capability of the control column was found to be difficult to rotate and felt rough when it was rotated. The bearing was removed from the control column and was initially examined externally and then internally by sectioning the bearing's body and races. The external examination revealed that the bearing had become contaminated with debris such as soot, resolidified molten plastic, and other particulates consistent with fire debris. When the bearing was sectioned and examined under the stereo microscope it was determined that the bearing balls were all intact with no obvious deformation. The bearing balls had become oxidized and some had thermal discoloration consistent with a high temperature exposure. The bearing races had an overall appearance of high temperature exposure exhibited by thermal discoloration of the metal. There was no evidence to suggest that the bearing was not functioning properly prior to the high temperature exposure. Additional Information The airplane was last fueled on the morning of the accident, with 25 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel in each fuel tank, prior to departing CHO. The accident airplane was involved in a previous accident on November 11, 2008 (NTSB Accident ID: ERA09CA065). According to the co-owner of the airplane, during takeoff he was "correcting to the right, when the airplane departed the runway and ran into a ditch." The co-owner reported no mechanical anomalies with the airplane and there was "nothing wrong with the flight controls." The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was, "the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were gusting crosswinds." A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Report (SDR) database revealed no relevant reports of flight control anomalies with the PA-46-310P. Additionally, a query of the airplane manufacturer revealed only one type of flight control anomaly report for the PA-46-310 series. The report described a 2006 model PA 46-350P, which experienced aileron stiffness and the autopilot failed to disengage in-flight. Examination of the subject airplane revealed the left aileron sector was frozen, due to corrosion in the needle bearing. As a result of the submitted field report, Piper issued a Maintenance Alert to PA-46 owners and operators, which clarified the lubrication requirements of the aileron sector. The aileron sectors in the accident airplane were examined for evidence of this anomaly, but none was observed. FMI: www.ntsb.gov Back to Top Congress Passes Another Short Term FAA Extension 20th Stop-Gap Funding Bill Expires July 22nd On June 27, the U.S. Senate passed an FAA extension by unanimous consent. The bill (HR 2279) will fund the FAA through July 22. The most recent extension prior to this was set to expire on June 30. This will be the twentieth extension since the last long- term FAA authorization took place. Lawmakers say the three-week extension is what they need to make a deal on a multi-year authorization. However, in order to make that happen, negotiations will need to be on a shortened schedule as the Senate is in recess July 4-8 and the House is in recess July 18-22. According to the bill summary published on Thomas, the "Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2011, Part III": Amends the Internal Revenue Code to extend through July 22, 2011, increased excise taxes on aviation fuels, the excise tax on air transportation of persons and property, and the expenditure authority for the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. Increases the authorization of appropriations for the period beginning on October 1, 2010, and ending on July 22, 2011, for airport planning and development and noise compatibility planning projects (known as airport improvement projects [AIPs]). Extends through July 22, 2011, the authority of the Secretary of Transportation to make new AIP grants. Extends until July 23, 2011: (1) the pilot program for passenger facility fee authorizations at non-hub airports, and (2) disclosure requirements for large and medium hub airports applying for AIP grants. Directs the Secretary to extend through July 22, 2011, the termination date of insurance coverage for domestic or foreign-flag aircraft. Grants the Secretary discretionary authority to further extend such coverage through October 31, 2011. Extends through October 31, 2011, the authority of the Secretary to limit air carrier liability for claims arising out of acts of terrorism. Extends through July 22, 2011: (1) grant eligibility for airports located in the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau; (2) grants to state and local governments for land use compatibility AIPs; and (3) authority for approving an application of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority for an airport development grant or for permission to impose a passenger facility fee. Amends the Vision 100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act to extend through Junly 22, 2011: (1) the temporary increase to 95% of the federal government's share of certain AIP costs, and (2) funding for airport development at Midway Island Airport. Congress has not bee able to pass a long-term FAA funding bill since the last one expired in 2007. FMI: www.house.gov, www.senate.gov, http://thomas.loc.gov Back to Top NASA: July 8 selected for space shuttle program's last blast The launch of the space shuttle Atlantis will signify the end of an era, NASA said. (CNN) -- July 8 will mark the start of the final space shuttle mission and the end of an era, NASA announced Tuesday. The U.S. space agency announced the date for the final flight of Atlantis following a flight readiness review at Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida. If nothing delays the countdown, the shuttle would depart at 11:26 a.m. The 12-day mission will be the 135th and final flight of the space shuttle program. Atlantis is scheduled to deliver spare parts and supplies to the International Space Station to help keep the orbital lab going, NASA said. It also will fly an experimental rig to test tools and techniques to robotically refuel satellites in space, according to the agency. After the shuttle program is grounded, NASA plans to temporarily use Russian spacecraft to ferry NASA astronauts to the space station. Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC