Flight Safety Information July 12, 2012 - No. 141 In This Issue Seven killed in Mauritania military plane crash Delta Fined About $1 Million by U.S for Safety Violations India Shows Aviation Regulator the Door Saudi's GACA shortlists 7 operators for domestic licence Air France Flight 447 Crash Causes in Part Point to Automation Paradox ARGUS PROS Aviation Auditing Airbus encounters A350 wing drilling problems Big United Airlines order expected at Farnborough Puerto Rico's main airport draws two final bids Tiny Jet Plans a Big Comeback Seven killed in Mauritania military plane crash NOUAKCHOTT (AFP) - Seven people were killed Thursday when a military plane crashed during takeoff in the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott, an army source told AFP. The plane crashed near a residential zone. Three of the victims are soldiers, two customs officials and two civilians, whose nationality is not yet known, the military source said on condition of anonymity. The Mauritanian News Agency AMI reported four soldiers and three civilians had been killed in the crash. The cause of the accident was not known. The army source described the plane as "an old, renovated DC3" which was headed for the Taziast gold mine 400 kilometres (250 miles) north-east of Nouakchott "as part of a transport contract" between the army and Canadian mine firm Kinross. Boeing's website describes its Douglas DC3 plane, which first flew in 1935 and was widely used during World War II, as the plane which made air transportation profitable and "the greatest airplane of its time." Witnesses told AFP that the fire brigade was urgently dispatched to put out a blaze after the crash, however journalists were being refused access to the scene. Back to Top Delta Fined About $1 Million by U.S for Safety Violations By Alan Levin and Mary Schlangenstein (Bloomberg) Delta Air Lines Inc. (DAL) was fined almost $1 million by U.S. regulators for failing to perform repairs on two aircraft. The second-largest U.S. airline made 20 flights on a Boeing Co. (BA) 737 with a chip in its nose cone after being notified of the issue by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector on Feb. 25, 2010, the agency said today in an e-mailed release. Atlanta-based Delta also made 884 flights between May 25, 2010, and Jan. 3, 2011, on an Airbus SAS A320 that had a broken cockpit light, the FAA charged. Airlines are allowed to defer such repairs for no more than 10 days, according to the release. In the agency's release, FAA Acting Administrator Michael Huerta said that for safety's sake "operators must follow the proper procedures to maintain their aircraft." Delta never operated either aircraft unsafely, Ashley Black, an airline spokeswoman, said in an e-mail statement. "Once Delta verified the concerns of the FAA, Delta initiated immediate and necessary actions to ensure that the aircraft were in full compliance with the regulatory requirements," Black said. The FAA inspector spotted the damaged nose cone in San Antonio prior to the plane's departure to Atlanta, according to a May 25 document notifying the airline of the agency's findings. The agency released the document in an e-mail. Maintenance Manuals The damage was deep enough that the underlying fiberglass was visible, according to the document. The jet's flight crew had earlier conducted an inspection of the plane's exterior and missed the damage, the FAA charged in the document. Delta maintenance workers told the inspector they didn't have to repair the chip. Only after returning to his office three days later did the FAA inspector discover that Delta's maintenance manuals required that the damage be sealed, according to the document. The investigation found that the airline's maintenance crews failed to spot the damage in two additional inspections during the period, it said. The plane flew to destinations including Mexico City, Miami and Washington. The proposed fine is $687,500, according to the release. In a separate case, the airline failed to repair a light located over the co-pilot's seat in the cockpit during a seven- month period, according to a separate letter to Delta. The proposed fine in that case is $300,000, according to the agency. Fines are often lowered before final resolution is reached. Back to Top India Shows Aviation Regulator the Door The reasons for E.K. Bharat Bhushan's sudden exit are unclear, but a ministry official said it was a routine move. India's Civil Aviation Ministry sprang a surprise Tuesday, removing the country's aviation regulator E.K. Bharat Bhushan from his post barely a week after his tenure was extended to December. Local media cited Mr. Bhushan as saying he was in the midst of preparing a report recommending that ailing Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. be closed down. Mr. Bhushan, who has described Kingfisher's weak finances as a matter of "grave concern", finally seemed ready to crack the whip on the cash-strapped airline which has failed to clear pilots' salaries for several months, leading to doubts over its ability to maintain safe operations. There is no official statement on Mr. Bhushan's exit, but an official at India's aviation ministry Wednesday confirmed that he has been asked to leave. His tenure extension was approved only last week by an Indian parliamentary body that looks after government appointments. The reasons for his sudden exit are unclear, but the ministry official said it was a routine move. He blamed procedural flaws for the extension. "He was slated to go... and the [aviation] minister hadn't approved his extension," the official said. Following an investigation led by Mr. Bhushan into unlawful practices in India's aviation industry, including the use of fake licenses, several pilots and officials at the regulator's office were expelled or arrested last year. The investigation covered more than 10,000 licenses issued to pilots and about 4,000 licenses granted to trainers, according to newspaper reports. He had also summoned India's only profit-making airline, IndiGo, when he thought it had a lax approach to maintaining safety standards. Kingfisher, given its troubled past, was no different. Kingfisher last year had to undertake sporadic flight cancellations, leading aviation minister Ajit Singh to publicly state that its flying license may be canceled. The airline has since stuck to a flight schedule that is just a quarter of its original 400 flights a day. The cutback pacified the ministry, but Kingfisher still hasn't paid salaries, taxes or interest and has several planes grounded at airports. "Kingfisher is sticking to its given flight schedule. What more can we say? The finances are the company's concern," G. Asok Kumar, joint secretary in charge of all airlines except national carrier Air India, said recently. The ministry has acted quickly to find a stopgap replacement for Mr. Bhushan, with joint secretary Prashant Sukul taking the reins. Arun Mishra, India's representative to global regulator the International Civil Aviation Organization, is likely to take up the role on a permanent basis, the ministry official said. http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/07/11/india-shows-aviation-regulator-the-door/ Back to Top Saudi's GACA shortlists 7 operators for domestic licence Saudi civil aviation authority GACA has shortlisted seven of the 14 companies that submitted bids to operate domestic air services in the kingdom, state-run Saudi Press Agency reports. The shortlisted bidders include companies from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and China. GACA invited applications in January, with a view to selecting an operator in September and launching services by April 2013. Saudia and Nas Air are the only two carriers currently licenced to operate scheduled domestic flights in the kingdom. Qatar Airways chief executive Akbar Al Baker earlier this month confirmed that the Doha-based carrier is interested in launching a Saudi subsidiary. He did not formally announce that Qatar Airways had submitted a bid to GACA, however, and the civil aviation authority has not identified any of the applicants by name. Bahraini flag carrier Gulf Air is also widely believed to be in the running. Liberalisation has long been on the cards for Saudi's duopolistic home market, but a domestic fare cap and above-average fuel charges have made life difficult for new entrants. Nas Air has shifted its focus onto international flights in recent years, while the only other private carrier in the kingdom, Sama Airlines, declared bankruptcy in 2010. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/saudis-gaca-shortlists-7-operators-for- domestic-licence-374246/ Back to Top Air France Flight 447 Crash Causes in Part Point to Automation Paradox A deadly combination of pilot confusion, "warning system ergonomics" design and inadequate pilot training were responsible for the crash of Air France Flight 447 on 1 June 2009. This is the conclusion reached by the BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile), the French authority responsible for carrying out safety investigations relating to accidents or serious incidents in civil aviation, in its final report into the crash. BEA's 224-page report indicated that the aircraft might have been flown out of danger if the pilots had realized the situation they were facing. The summary of the report (pdf) provides the following account, which begins with the "unleashing event" of the icing over of the three Pitot tubes that provide airspeed data to the Airbus 330-200's flight computers and which subsequently caused the aircraft's autopilot to disengage: The blockage of the Pitot probes by ice crystals in cruise was a phenomenon that was known but misunderstood by the aviation community at the time of the accident. From an operational perspective, the resulting loss of all airspeed information was an identified malfunction. After initial reactions involving basic airmanship skills, it was supposed to be diagnosed by pilots, and managed if necessary by precautionary inputs on the pitch attitude and thrust detailed in the associated procedure. The occurrence of the failure in the context of flight in cruise completely surprised the crew of flight AF 447. The apparent difficulties in handling the aeroplane in turbulence at high altitude resulted in over-handling in roll and a sharp nose-up input by the PF [pilot flying]. The destabilisation that resulted from the climbing flight path and changes in pitch attitude and vertical speed therefore added to the incorrect airspeed indications and ECAM [Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring] messages that did not help any diagnosis. The crew, whose work was becoming disrupted, likely never realised they were facing a «simple» loss of all three airspeed sources. In the first minute after the autopilot disconnection, the failure of the attempt to understand the situation and the disruption of crew cooperation had a multiplying effect, inducing total loss of cognitive control of the situation. The behavioural assumptions underlying the classification of a loss of airspeed information as «major» were not validated in the context of this accident. Confirmation of this classification therefore requires additional work in terms of operational feedback in order to modify, where necessary, crew training, the ergonomics of the information made available to them, as well as the design of procedures. The aeroplane went into a sustained stall, signalled by the stall warning and strong buffet [the warning at one point sounded continuously for 54 seconds but apparently was ignored]. Despite these persistent symptoms, the crew never understood they were in a stall situation and therefore never undertook any recovery manoeuvres. The combination of the warning system ergonomics, the conditions under which pilots are trained and exposed to stalls during their professional and recurrent training, did not result in reasonably reliable expected behaviour patterns. In short, as BEA head Jean-Paul Troadec is quoted at the crash report news conference last Thursday at Le Bourget Airport in Paris: "It seems that the pilots did not understand the situation and they were not aware that they had stalled." However, Troadec also made it very clear that BEA was not blaming the pilots alone for the accident: "If the BEA thought that this accident was only down to the crew, we would not have made recommendations about the systems, the training, etc." He went on to say: "What appears in the crew behavior is that most probably, a different crew should have done the same action. So, we cannot blame this crew. What we can say is that most probably this crew and most crews were not prepared to face such an event." In fact, BEA made a total of 25 recommendations (pdf) covering everything from better training of aircrews to changes in display logic to improvements in search and rescue. Training pilots to fly aircraft manually at high altitudes is seen as a major need. Many of the recommendations also deal with the so-called "automation paradox," i.e., which as I wrote about for IEEE Spectrum concerns the situation where "the more reliable the automation, the less the human operator may be able to contribute to that success. Consequently, operators are increasingly left out of the loop, at least until something unexpected happens. Then the operators need to get involved quickly and flawlessly." In the Air France Flight 447 case, the crash report stated that the occurrence of the failure in the context of flight in cruise "completely surprised the pilots," and thus being "startled," they were never able to comprehend what the difficulty caused the autopilot to disengage. Going back to the summary of the crash report (with my highlighting): "At present, recognition of the stall warning, even when associated with buffet, assumes that the crew assigns a minimum degree of «legitimacy» to the alarm. This in turn assumes sufficient prior experience with stall conditions, at least some cognitive availability and understanding of the situation, as well as knowledge of the aeroplane (and its protection modes) and its flight physics. A review of pilot training did not provide convincing evidence that the associated skills had been correctly developed and maintained." "More generally, the dual failure of the expected procedural responses shows the limits of the current safety model. When action by the crew is expected, it is always assumed that they will have the capacity to initially control the flight path and to rapidly diagnose and identify the correct entry in the dictionary of procedures. A crew may encounter an unexpected situation causing a momentary but profound loss of understanding. If, in such cases, the assumed capacity to initially control and then to diagnose is lost, the safety model is in «common failure mode». In this occurrence, the inability to initially control the flight path also made it impossible to understand the situation and find the appropriate solution." What the pilots seemed to need was something akin to the "digital parachute" I blogged about last year being developed by Rockwell Collins that will take control of the aircraft's flight management system and return the aircraft to level flight (if possible) when a pilot hits a "panic button" during an emergency situation. A story in the New York Times states that, "The French news media reported late Wednesday that a judicial panel of experts advising a separate criminal inquiry into the crash had recommended that blame not be placed solely on the pilots, saying that Air France, Airbus and European safety regulators also shared responsibility." Supposedly tomorrow, both Air France and Airbus will find out whether they will be charged with manslaughter in regard to their roles leading up to the crash. No word on whether the safety regulators will face legal scrutiny. http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/aerospace/aviation/air-france-flight-447-crash- caused-by-a-combination-of-factors Back to Top Back to Top Airbus encounters A350 wing drilling problems FARNBOROUGH, England (Reuters) - Airbus has encountered problems in drilling holes in the wings on its new A350 passenger jet, helping to drive shares in parent EADS down on Wednesday as analysts reported signals that the glitches were taking longer than expected to resolve. An Airbus spokeswoman quoted Didier Evrard, the head of the A350 programme, as saying on Wednesday there had been a delay of about four weeks in sorting out software for the robot at Broughton, Wales, that will drill the wings for the A350. "The A350 final assembly is progressing well, but there are some problems in drilling holes in the wing (to fasten the skins to the structure), which is taking longer than expected," UBS analysts said in a research note. "It is not possible to quantify the impact of these delays but we believe them to be well within our base assumption of a 1 year delay and a 1 billion euro (1.25 euros per share) overrun". Airbus's chief operating officer reiterated the schedule for the A350 can be achieved but remains tight. "I would say that with the A350 we have made great progress. We delivered (sections of the first test aircraft) as promised to the final assembly line. The overall timing of our commitment is still doable, but challenging," Gunter Butschek told Reuters in an interview at the Farnborough Airshow. However some analysts expressed concerns that the wing drilling problems could lead to financial charges, whose timing could depend on whether they had yet been quantified. Shares in Airbus parent EADS fell 4.7 percent after rising 16.9 percent so far this year. "EADS stock has mainly been falling today because of concerns that there may be a charge in the second quarter," said Nick Cunningham, aerospace analyst at UK-based Agency Partners. An EADS spokesman confirmed that analyst briefings had taken place during this week's Farnborough Airshow. NERVOUS INVESTORS The A350 is a carbon-composite passenger jet being developed to compete with Boeing's 787 Dreamliner, the first airliner built mainly with such lightweight alternative materials. The Dreamliner ran into a series of delays lasting a total of three years including one related to the wing development. The first A350 was originally due to be delivered in mid-2013 before the schedule was moved to mid-2014. Airbus CEO Fabrice Bregier said on Tuesday the assembly process had started for the A350, but there were some areas that needed working out. "This is normal. We will progressively move next year to first flight," he said at the Farnborough Airshow. Airbus said it continued to watch the A350 closely. "In all-new development programs there is always a risk. We are continuously monitoring the program as we progress," chief spokesman Stefan Schaffrath said. Bloomberg meanwhile quoted Airbus sales chief John Leahy as saying it would be a "stretch" to reach its target for 30 A380 superjumbo orders this year. Several analysts said they had already factored in a lower forecast of 26-27 orders for the world's largest passenger jet following problems with wing cracks, but analysts said investors were feeling skittish as the recent order boom slows down, evidenced by a dearth of significant surprises at Farnborough. "To us this is the latest example of general investor nervousness, with particular emphasis being given to negative aerospace comments or developments ... with positive news (big 737 MAX orders, continued resilient global airline traffic, lower oil price etc) having less of an impact," said RBC Capital Markets analyst Rob Stallard in a note. Back to Top Big United Airlines order expected at Farnborough FARNBOROUGH, England (AP) - Airbus unveiled a further set of orders Thursday in what has been a subdued performance at the Farnborough Airshow, ahead of an expected big deal between Boeing and United Airlines. Sponsored LinksThe European aircraft manufacturer, a subsidiary of EADS, said it booked a potential $6.35 billion worth of orders. The four deals, if completed, take Airbus' total by the fourth day of the U.K. airshow to $16.9 billion for a total of 115 aircraft. Airbus said it won commitments to buy 61 aircraft worth $5.8 billion and firm purchase orders for 54 aircraft worth around $11.1 billion. Airbus' total was way down on last year's record total at the Paris Airshow of $72 billion - the French capital and alternate aviation industry showcase venue with Farnborough. The decline in orders is no surprise given the gloomy global economic backdrop and the scale of last year's success, when the European aircraft manufacturer trumped Boeing with a series of deals for its revised short-haul aircraft, the A320neo. Boeing's orders last year totaled a little more than $22 billion. "The quality of orders at Farnborough has been high at the show, with significant endorsement from leading customers of our strategy to continuously innovate and improve our products," said Fabrice Bregier, Airbus's Chief Executive Officer. On Day 4, Airbus revealed that Russian carrier UTair has ordered 20 short-haul A321s in a deal is valued at $2 billion at list prices. The deal, which is firm, represents, the largest order for the type received from a carrier in the region and the first time that UTair has ordered Airbus aircraft. Airbus also announced that Synergy Aerospace, a Latin American company, has firmed up a previous $1.9 billion order for nine long-haul A330 planes. In addition, it said Middle East Airlines has signed a memorandum of understanding to buy 10 A320neo aircraft, worth $1 billion at list prices, and that Irish leasing company Avolon has committed to buy 15 A320neo aircraft, worth $1.45 billion at list prices. Customers rarely pay the full list price when ordering big. Though most commitments end up becoming firm, it's not unknown for them to founder at the last hurdle or two. Boeing, which was tipped to make a comeback at Farnborough this year after last year's order book fell short of expectations, is later poised to reveal details of a deal with United Airlines. It already has announced more firm and committed orders than Airbus at this year's show. This year's airshow has taken place at a time when the global economy is showing signs of slowing down and governments around the world are cutting back costs on military spending as they grapple with high debt levels. The combination of a faltering economy and lower government spending is a difficult combination for the aviation industry as air travel tracks global economic growth. Back to Top Puerto Rico's main airport draws two final bids Luiz Munoz Marin airport busiest in the Caribbean SAN JUAN, July 11 (Reuters) - Two consortia looking to expand holdings in the global aviation infrastructure submitted final competing offers to privatize Puerto Rico's main airport as soon as the year's end, according to the Caribbean island's government. Grupo Aerpuertos Avance and Aerostar Airport Holdings LLC delivered final offers on Tuesday to run the Caribbean's busiest airport for the next 40 years. A winner to run Luis Munoz Marin International Airport should be in place by Aug. 1. A decision would clear the way for final Federal Aviation Administration approval this fall and allow private managers to take control by year's end. The Caribbean nation is an unincorporated territory of the United States. If completed, it has been reported that the deal would deliver $500 million or more to Puerto Rico's Ports Authority. Grupo Aerpuertos is headed by Ferrovial Aeropuertos , which operates six airports in the United Kingdom, including Heathrow, as well as an airport in Chile. Its partner, investment fund Macquarie Infrastructure & Real Assets, has stakes in eight airports in Europe, India and Australia. Its rival, Aerostar, is made up of Aeroportuario del Sureste, which operates nine airports in Mexico, and Highstar Capital, which has made investments in Baltimore and London. Both operators have records of increasing flights and passengers and have close relationships with many of the world's largest airlines, Puerto Rico Public-Private Partnership Authority Executive Director David Álvarez said. While the deal will provide fresh cash to the Ports Authority, which is weighed down by nearly $1 billion in long-term debt, officials say they also expect the deal to yield increases in air routes, passengers and tourism for an island that has been in recession for six years. Alvarez declined to detail the offers, other than to say the U.S. commonwealth expects a large upfront payment, an agreement to share in future earnings, and commitments on capital spending. Puerto Rico's international airport already has under 9 million passengers a year, but is not living up to its potential, according to officials. Outbound boardings fluctuate from 4 million to 5 million annually, or half its capacity, and only half its facilities are in use. Last year, Puerto Rico sold a 40-year concession for major roadways PR22 and PR5 that gave the government a $1.136 billion upfront fee, a commitment to invest $56.1 million in immediate improvements, and another $600 million over the contract's life. Back to Top Tiny Jet Plans a Big Comeback Even Bill Gates Couldn't Guarantee Eclipse's Success. Now New Owners Are Reviving It. (WSJ) Eclipse Aviation Inc. once promised to revolutionize air travel with six-passenger jets powered by tiny engines for well under $1 million-about a quarter of the price of the cheapest jet then on the market. The dream died in 2008 when Eclipse, partially bankrolled by Microsoft Corp. MSFT - 1.50%co-founder Bill Gates, filed for bankruptcy, crushed by massive cost overruns and the financial crisis. Now, a successor company run by a Charleston, S.C., investor who lost his own deposit on one of the small jets is cranking up Eclipse's Albuquerque, N.M., factory again. It plans to deliver the first updated Eclipse 550 planes in about a year. This time around, the company is aiming for a more realistic price tag of $2.69 million per plane and has teamed up with what it considers a more stable group of suppliers, hoping to win back the loyalty of the jets' pilots and owners. "They hated the company, but they loved the aircraft," said Mason Holland, CEO of successor company Eclipse Aerospace Inc., who paid $40 million in 2009 for a company that spent $1.4 billion over 10 years to design, build and deliver 260 aircraft before going under. The original Eclipse 500 project faced myriad setbacks, notably replacing an early engine that shared lineage with those used on cruise missiles because it was too weak to sufficiently power the jet. A display was put up Sunday for the Eclipse 550 ahead of this week's Farnborough air show in England. But the tiny jet's vision was bold. Compared with small propeller, or turbo-prop, planes, it would compete with, the Eclipse promised quieter, faster flying and the ability to soar over troublesome weather. The jet also offered cutting-edge instrumentation and an innovative fire-suppression system. But the early price tag of $837,500 per plane was the real game-changer, fueling dreams of small-plane enthusiasts becoming jet pilots and new air-taxi businesses serving cities within 300 to 400 miles more cheaply than airlines ever could. At the time of Eclipse's rise in the early 2000s, the next-cheapest jet on the market was the eight-seat Cessna CJ1, which sold for $3.55 million in 2000. Led by Vern Raburn, an early Microsoft employee who envisioned building small jets like computer hardware with low-cost suppliers, Eclipse started a race in 1998 to fill the skies with small jets. Cessna Aircraft Co., a unit of Textron Inc., TXT -3.06%Embraer SA, ERJ -7.50%Piper Aircraft Inc., Cirrus Design Corp., Diamond Aircraft Industries Inc. and Honda Motor Co. 7267.TO -2.71%all clamored to get into the low-cost small-jet business and follow Eclipse. Today, only Cessna, Embraer and Eclipse have delivered these small jets; others struggled to find financing and customers amid a flagging economy. The original Eclipse business model was rooted in high-volume, low-cost production and a supply chain spread across the world. Both proved problematic, and the price for the Eclipse 500 quickly climbed above $2 million. The chain of supplier companies spanned from California to Japan and Chile, said Mr. Holland, who said the heavily outsourced program suffered from many of the same challenges as Boeing Co.'s BA -2.38%long-delayed 787 Dreamliner. Both programs faced numerous design changes, and because of part shortages across the range of suppliers, both were hit with production delays. How Eclipse structured the program sowed the seeds of its downfall, said Mr. Holland, who described the relationship between the company and its suppliers as "too bifurcated." Eclipse hoped that accelerated production would quickly decrease the cost to build each jet so it could make a profit. But because suppliers' costs spiraled out of control, Eclipse had to pay higher prices for parts. The jet maker was then faced with losing significant cash for each low-price jet it delivered and pass increased costs on to customers. By the time it declared bankruptcy in November 2008, Eclipse held 2,000 orders for the jet, down from a high of 2,600, as the price rose. Instead of relying on the old company's far-flung production pipeline, Eclipse Aerospace, the new company founded in 2009 by Mr. Holland, turned to Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., a unit of United Technologies Corp., UTX -2.26%which invested about $25 million in the company. Sikorsky is both investor and supplier to Eclipse, and starting next year, PZL Mielec, a Sikorsky unit in Poland, will begin making the bodies, tails and wings of the jets, which will then be assembled in Albuquerque. Rather than having five companies building the body of each jet, its new Polish supplier will supply those parts from nose to tail and wingtip to wingtip-an operating model that greatly simplifies the building of the aircraft. Unlike most of the original 500s, which were rushed through production to meet heavy demand, the 550s will leave the factory with the ability to fly into icing conditions, with automatic speed control, GPS navigation and other new features. Buying an Eclipse the first time around "was the worst business decision I ever made," said Eclipse owner and pilot Tim Musgrave, CEO of tire-inflation-system company Pressure Systems International. He worried after his 2008 jet purchase that his winged investment would spend little time in the air if Eclipse went belly up and persistent problems with the craft weren't solved. He and other owners were forced to spend an extra $300,000 on their jets to bring them up to nearly full operating standards. Even then, his plane could fly only under limited conditions-not into icing conditions or by GPS. Mr. Musgrave was one of the lucky few who purchased their jets for around $1 million. Now, with Sikorsky onboard, he says Eclipse is a whole different company. "I really don't feel like I'm going back for a second [time]," he says. He plans to sell his first Eclipse for significantly more than he paid to help pay for the upgraded 550 model. "The approach they're taking now is the approach they should have taken 10 years ago," says Richard Aboulafia, vice president of analysis of the Teal Group consultancy and a critic of Eclipse's original business model, which he says was based on "impossible numbers with an impossible price tag." Today, Mr. Holland is less concerned with opening new markets, like air taxis, than offering a more economical way to get around for existing types of flying. He says the Eclipse 550 burns 59 gallons of jet fuel per hour while flying 430 miles per hour, compared with 83 gallons per hour for its nearest competition-Cessna's Mustang-at its top speed of 390 mph, and is the only jet that sells for under $3 million. While pursuing charter operators and individual owners, Eclipse hopes to sell its six-seat 550s to the Pentagon and other governments for use in special missions or as replacements for training aircraft, Mr. Holland said. The company plans to deliver 47 jets in 2014 and 50 to 100 in 2016. Mr. Holland estimates revenue of more than $125 million in 2014 and expects to deliver units at an undisclosed profit once it reaches the 50-a-year production mark. Mr. Aboulafia said Eclipse still faces an uphill battle to deliver the jet at a profitable volume in an unpredictable market. "This is still a very difficult market segment with a lot of competitors," he said. Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP, FRAeS, FISASI CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC