Flight Safety Information September 4, 2012 - No. 179 In This Issue Safety experts seek predictive evolution National Transportation Safety Board investigating pilot's crash in Iowa air show Marine Corps pilot ejects from FA-18C Hornet over NAS Fallon, Nev Dana: Aviation group seeks nullification of coroner inquest...(Nigeria) Safety is much more than no accident Safety Pilot Landmark Accident: Pointing fingers PRISM Certification Support New FAA Safety Briefing Magazine Highlights Aviation Educators Airbus Sees 28,200 Aircraft Market Over 20 Years on Asia India will need 1,450 planes over next 20 years: Boeing Air India's new MRO coming up in Nagpur Aeromexico, Delta to build joint MRO facility in Mexico Bristow Group invests $250 mln in Canada's Cougar Helicopters Graduate Research Survey Safety experts seek predictive evolution NTSB Board Member Mark Rosekind moderates panel discussion at ISASI Seminar Prediction and risk reduction are the next steps in aviation safety investigation, industry specialists agreed at a convention last week. Speaking at the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI) Annual Seminar in Baltimore, where the theme was "Evolution of aviation safety - from reactive to predictive," Flight Safety Foundation director-technical programs Jim Burin said comprehensive data and the support of decision makers were crucial to this safety evolution. "Just because we can predict does not mean prediction will be successful in reducing risk," Burin said. "Decision makers, particularly bureaucratic decision makers, are reactive by nature ... we need to be able to show the risk, and show the ability to reduce the risk by addressing the probability or the severity." Burin said the availability of data was key to demonstrating risk. "Data will also allow us to address the age old safety dilemma: how do you prove that you prevented an accident from happening if it doesn't happen? By utilizing incident and normal operational data in our prediction process we will be able to show that we reduced the risk of an accident and hopefully avoid having to react to one," Burin said. In her keynote address, US National Transportation Safety Board chairman Deborah Hersman said data, forensics and industry collaboration all have a role in predictive accident investigation work. Southwest Airlines senior director, operational safety Tim Logan also stressed the need for trust. He said many of the US voluntary Safety Management Systems (SMS) programs were created in an environment of "little to no trust" with a "catch me if you can mentality." Logan said better public awareness would help overcome this perception. "We're really good at safety but terrible at marketing," he said, suggesting that industry, FAA and labor groups should produce and promote an education program for US Congress and the public to demonstrate the benefits of proactive safety information collection. Information should be more visible "to the point where we're going to take a risk a little bit," Logan said. "We can't keep keeping this info within ourselves ... we have to lift the veil a little bit." SMS programs include the Aviation Safety Action Partnership (ASAP), Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA), Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) and Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Programs (VDRP). http://atwonline.com/operations-maintenance/news/safety-experts-seek-predictive- evolution-0903 Back to Top National Transportation Safety Board investigating pilot's crash in Iowa air show Glenn Smith fuels his L-39 at the Historic Aviation Memorial Museum hangar at the Tyler Pounds Regional Airport, in Tyler, Texas. Smith died Saturday, Sept. 1, 2012, when his nearly 30-year-old training plane nosedived during an air show in eastern Iowa and crashed into a field, authorities said. DALLAS (AP) - Glenn Smith left a lucrative job at a Dallas-area technology firm for an early retirement of restoring Soviet fighter jets and flying to exhibitions across the country. He died Saturday when his nearly 30-year-old training plane nosedived during an air show in eastern Iowa and crashed into a field, authorities said. Spectators watched the 59-year-old Smith's plane erupt into flames, followed by a cloud of gray smoke. Nobody on the ground was hurt. Smith had been flying in formation with other members of the HopperFlight team at the Quad-City Air Show in Davenport. The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating the crash. Senior air safety investigator Aaron Sauer said Sunday that a preliminary report on the crash is expected within a week, but a final report will likely take several months. He said inspectors would examine the few remaining pieces of the plane, as well as Smith's autopsy and toxicology reports. Smith did not make a mayday call or suggest any sign of distress before the crash, according to Sauer and Randy Ball, a good friend of Smith's. Ball said Smith was a meticulous flier who would map every step of a flight plan beforehand. "They practiced the day before and everything went fine," Ball said. Smith was a longtime technology entrepreneur whose company was acquired by Tyler Technologies, a Dallas-based company that develops software for local schools and government clients, in 1998. He remained an executive at Tyler until 2006, the company said in a statement. After retirement, Smith focused on collecting and flying vintage planes. He kept two rare Soviet MiG-17 fighter jets at the Historic Aviation Memorial Museum in Tyler, about 90 miles east of Dallas, museum president Carolyn Verver said. Ball, who also owns a MiG-17, said he spent countless hours working on planes with Smith. Smith loved to preserve planes so others could see and appreciate them, Ball said. "Those guys are literally using their own money to save a part of history and share that history with everybody else," he said. Smith was also the newest member of the "Hoppers," according to the team's website. The Hoppers are a group of pilots who privately maintain and fly L-39 fighter jets at air shows and other exhibitions. The L-39 Smith flew Saturday was made by a company in the former Czechoslovakia in 1984, according to a Federal Aviation Administration registry. "He kept it absolutely immaculate," Ball said. Part of the Hoppers' mission is to introduce American audiences to planes produced and used by the country's former enemies, according to the website. "It is important for people to remember and for young kids to learn, so that history does not repeat itself," the website said. According to the HopperFlight site, Smith had been a pilot for a quarter-century and has a commercial pilot's license with an additional instrument rating certification. Details about Smith's flight history from the FAA were not immediately available Sunday. A squadron of planes flew over the crash site Sunday in the "missing man" formation before the air show continued. Back to Top Marine Corps pilot ejects from FA-18C Hornet over NAS Fallon, Nev. An unnamed U.S. Marine Corps pilot safely ejected from a single-seat McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C Hornet on Saturday, September 1, 2012 at 3:15 p.m. PDT during a training flight over Naval Air Station Fallon located near Reno, Nev. The aviator was from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 323, nicknamed the "Death Rattlers", based at MCAS Miramar in San Diego, Calif. He was taken to Banner Churchill Community Hospital in Fallon, but later released, according to reports published on Monday, September 3, 2012 by U-T San Diego, KESQ-TV, the Associated Press, KSWB-TV Fox5 San Diego, and other news sources. The F/A-18C Hornet crashed into a remote area of the base and was completely destroyed. It is a twin-engine supersonic, all-weather carrier-capable multiple role fighter jet, designed to dogfight and attack ground targets. The plane was first put into service on January 7, 1983, and is used primarily by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Royal Australian Air Force. About 1,480 of the jet fighters in various models have been produced, ranging in unit cost from $29 million to $57 million. They are also flown by military operators in Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland. The high performance fighters have a maximum speed of 1,190 miles an hour, a range of 1,250 miles, a combat radius of 460 miles, a service ceiling of 50,000 feet, and a rate of climb of 50,000 feet per minute. The aircraft carries a variety of weapons including an M61 Vulcan 6-barreled rapid fire cannon, Hydra 70 and Zuni rockets, and various bombs, missiles, and electronic counter- measures (ECM). The plane has appeared in various films, including the 1996 disaster film "Independence Day", the 2001 action adventure "Behind Enemy Lines", and the 1998 remake of "Godzilla". Since 1996, NAS Fallon has been home to the Naval Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN). The surrounding area contains 84,000 acres of bombing and electronic warfare ranges. The longest runway at the base is 14,003 feet and is a Porous European Mix (PEM) of asphalt concrete. Similar models of the aircraft, the F/A-18D, were involved in crashes that injured civilians. On December 8, 2008, an F/A-18D crashed in a populated area of San Diego, while on approach to MCAS Miramar, killing four people on the ground. The pilot ejected safely. More recently, on April 6, 2012, an F/A-18D crashed into apartment buildings in Virginia Beach, Va. Both crew members ejected. Seven people were injured, including the two pilots, who were taken to the hospital, but all survived. http://www.examiner.com/article/marine-corps-pilot-ejects-from-fa-18c-hornet-over- nas-fallon-nev Back to Top Dana: Aviation group seeks nullification of coroner inquest (Nigeria) An aviation group-- Civil Aviation Round Table-- has asked a Federal High Court in Lagos to nullify the proceedings of the ongoing coroner's inquest into the June 3 Dana air mishap. The News Agency of Nigeria recalls that 153 passengers and some residents of Iju- Ishaga area of Lagos State, where the plane crashed, lost their lives in the incident. A Lagos Coroner, Magistrate Oyetade Komolafe, had on June 18 began an inquest to unravel the cause of the crash and had summoned various witnesses to testify. However, on Monday, Komolafe was forced to adjourn the inquest indefinitely, after he was served with the processes of the suit filed by the aviation group and its president, retired Capt. Dele Ore. The suit, which was filed on behalf of the claimants by their counsel, Mr. Joseph Nwobike (SAN), is challenging the powers of the coroner to investigate deaths arising from aviation accidents. Komolafe is the first defendant in the suit which will be heard on September 6 before Justice Okon Abang. Other defendants in the suit are the Chief Judge of Lagos State, Justice Ayotunde Philips; the Chief Coroner of the state, Justice Lateefat Okunnu; and the state Attorney-General, Mr. Ade Ipaye. Also joined are the Attorney-General of the Federation, the Federal Ministry of Aviation, Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) and the Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB). Other defendants include the Nigeria Airspace Management Authority (NAMA), and Dana Airlines Limited. The claimants asked the court for an order setting aside the proceedings already concluded by the inquest till date, arguing that the coroner lacked the requisite authority to conduct the inquest. They also want the court to nullify all the testimonies given by experts and witnesses at the inquest, claiming that it contravened Section 29 of the Civil Aviation Act No. 6 of 2006. In its response to the originating summons, the Lagos State Ministry of Justice-- through its counsel-- Mrs. Olawunmi Osibanjo, urged the court to dismiss the suit. Osibanjo said the claimants were not in any way affected by the ongoing inquest, adding that the Aviation Round Table was not one of the bodies created by the NCAA Act. Cap N94, Laws of Federation, 2004. She said the coroner had received evidence from witnesses relating only to the circumstance of the death of the victims of the crash and not the technical issues of the aircraft operations http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/news-update/60111-dana-aviation-group- seeks-nullification-of-coroner-inquest.html Back to Top Safety is much more than no accident IT HAS TAKEN MORE THAN THREE YEARS of total time, but really a little less than four- and-a-half minutes, to put aircrew training, management styles, regulators, and aircraft manufacturers under the spotlight again. The 'singularity' that achieved this, rightly or wrongly, was the crash of Air France Flight AF447, an Airbus A330-200, in the South Atlantic on June 1, 2009, with the loss of 228 lives. The repercussions of the accident investigation have had ramifications worldwide, and have already touched operators and regulators in Asia as well as in Europe and the U.S. A previous disaster, the February 12, 2009, crash of a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 turboprop near Buffalo, New York, killing 50 people, sparked a U.S. congressional proposal that would increase the experience required for first officers to 1,500 hours, beginning 2013; require them to possess an air transport pilot (ATP) certificate; and adopt stricter rules governing aircrew fatigue. But in the rest of the world the crash was largely viewed as a U.S. matter, and the congressional move was seen as having little or no relevance outside the U.S. That attitude is especially prevalent in Asia and Europe, where many major airlines run their own internal cadet pilot training programs in concert with certified flight schools, and aircrew working hours have long been less onerous than in the U.S. In any case, the Colgan Air first officer had 2,244 flying hours (though she had a Commercial Pilot certificate, lower than an ATP). Flight AF447 changed that perception. The need to improve various aspects of pilot training has been studied for some years but is now coming into sharper focus, with emphasis not just on training and flying hours but also on the quality of training. Part of the push has come from Australia's regulatory Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), and from Asia, where several airlines--among them Hong Kong-based Cathay Pacific Airways, Japan's All Nippon and Japan Airlines, Taiwan's EVA Airlines, and Australia's Qantas--have been part of working groups partnering with FAA and manufacturers to look at improving aircraft upset recovery programs. Proper training and proper tools Without becoming bogged down in the intricacies of either accident investigation, what happened in essence was that each pilot pulled the aircraft's nose up when it should have been pushed down. For different reasons, both aircraft were mishandled and then stalled, and both crashed--the Q400 landed on a house well short of Buffalo's airport, and AF447 remained stalled while dropping about 37,000 ft to crash into the Atlantic Ocean off South America. The Buffalo accident raised issues of crew training--the captain was recorded as having had problems upgrading to command, and the first officer raised the flaps (unbidden) at a critical time and so contributed to the aircraft's wing becoming stalled. Fatigue was another issue raised by both mishaps, because these pilots regularly commuted considerable distances to reach their working bases. The A330 accident also highlighted the issue of training, but added elements of regulatory and aircraft certification concern: The captain was resting, and it seems that neither of the relief pilots recognized what was happening when airspeed indications became unreliable. Instead of maintaining a level attitude and constant engine thrust, one pilot pulled the nose up and stalled the aircraft while the other became immersed in trying to work out what was happening as automatic system after automatic system dropped offline for want of credible airspeed readings. The problem of 'unreliable airspeed' (UAS) is well known, if infrequent, having contributed to crashes of Boeing as well as Airbus products. In Airbus's case, most often it has been caused by ice crystals at high altitude blocking external sensors. This causes the autopilot and autothrottle to drop offline, throwing the job of managing the aircraft back to the pilot or pilots. The proper drill is to hold the aircraft level manually until the external probes' heating elements manage to melt the ice and the air can flow through them again. Over the past few years there have been 38 Airbus unreliable airspeed incidents reported, of which only one--AF447--ended in a crash. But in many of those events, it was found that the correct procedure had not been followed--the aircraft had been manually guided correctly, but without formal use of the UAS drill, until the problem had resolved itself a few minutes later. This seems to condemn the AF447 first officers out of hand, because of what looks to have been a complete breakdown in their situational awareness. However, this might be unfair: First, the numbers are too small a sample to say whether they represent a trend or merely an aberration. Second, a look at the UAS training regimen seems to show that the officers had not been given the proper tools to do their job of looking after a large airliner at high altitude--and this is where airlines and regulators have major roles to play. A changing field The job of piloting has changed, and so have many of the people who now work for airlines, both as pilots and as managers. Technology has brought increased automation, offering greater safety and reliability as well as financial savings through greater efficiency. To some extent, pilots--particularly on long-range flights--are more machine minders than flyers. Simulators enable pilots to practice emergency procedures that would be too dangerous to use in the real aircraft except in a genuine emergency. Safety overall has indeed improved, and accident rates have declined. But it is not all good. As a British former test pilot put it, "The problem with large aircraft...particularly with modern airliners, is that for 99.9% of the time everything is very simple and the systems don't require any attention once the initial settings have been made. The pilot is therefore sitting comfortably, fully relaxed, but at any moment he or she might suddenly have to take emergency action which he has to remember and get right. Obviously these days a pilot can practice in a simulator...[but] a pilot in a simulator knows that there is going to be a malfunction, so the realism is spoilt...." In short, no one dies from crashing a simulator, so there is none, or very little, of the 'startle' factor (read fear) cited in the AF447 investigation as possibly contributing to the crew's lack of proper performance. An Australian pilot said long ago that his job was not to fly an aircraft, but to save it when things went wrong. In this regard regulators and operators have been deficient as airline operations have changed. Many of today's junior airline pilots have received excellent training (particularly those from the military) in handling aircraft near the ground--for taking off and landing. But surprisingly little attention is paid to high-altitude flight, where an aircraft is much nearer the edges of its performance 'envelope.' It is much easier then for a small error or slight mishandling to develop into a full-blown loss of control such as a stall, because up high the margins between flying too fast or too slowly are far narrower than they are at lower heights. Yet very little training time is spent flying manually at high altitudes. This is a gap that the AF447 investigators recommended be closed as soon as possible; it would also let pilots experience full-stall behavior and recovery instead of merely approaching a stall and then powering away from it. This has its own problems, not least the fact that most simulators do not fully replicate aircraft behavior at the outer edges of performance. There are not enough data points from the real aircraft to do so, and in any case they cannot replicate the sensation of sustained g-forces. Nevertheless, simulators are excellent teaching aids, and recovery from unusual attitudes can still be taught, even if it is necessary to remember that the real aircraft's behavior may be even more unpleasant. Overall, the push is to ensure that a pilot building up hours does so in a useful way, instead of merely bashing around a small airport in a small aircraft as an instructor while awaiting an airline job--that is, to ensure that 1,500 hours are occupied usefully, rather than in simply repeating one hour's 'circuits and bumps' 1,500 times. Underlying the entire discussion is dependency on automation and a resulting loss of basic flying skills. The subject has been on the table for years. For example, a paper entitled "Automatic Complacency" was written by SAS Captain Hans Fugl-Svendsen in the 1960s. More recently, an excellent presentation by an American Airlines pilot in 1997 was entitled "Children of the Magenta" and cited examples of pilots relying on automation that was actually getting in the way. Recommendations and change One recommendation the AF447 investigators made was for European and U.S. regulators to evaluate requiring aircraft makers to install angle-of-attack indicators. These would help pilots avoid stalls by better informing them about the direction of airflow over the wing. That information is available in aircraft systems but is not usually displayed, and it would help considerably in the event of an unreliable airspeed problem. Another suggestion was for regulators to change training requirements to emphasize better knowledge of the aircraft concerned and to ensure that pilots are properly schooled in flying basics, in crew resource management for problem solving, and in handling the unexpected. During the two years before the voice and data recorders were recovered from AF447's wreckage on the sea bed, the investigators had been looking at unreliable airspeed as a likely factor in the accident. Air France devised a revamped training scheme for its crews in the area of UAS and stalls before the final accident report was published on July 5, and other airlines followed suit rapidly in response to recommendations from Airbus and Boeing as well as European and U.S. regulators. Australian regulatory reaction to A330 UAS events has been similar, specifically in response to an incident experienced by Qantas subsidiary Jet-star at high altitude in June 2009, though a total of three such events were noted. That flight (and the other two) continued without problems, but it was found that training for most of the pilots involved had not included UAS procedures. The airline's pilot training was done by a third party--ironically, a Boeing subsidiary that received its training materials from a U.S. source rather than directly from Airbus (which has included UAS training since 2003). CASA is proposing legislation to close some regulatory gaps, but has also reminded operators that whatever items might be outsourced, responsibility is not among them. In the end, aviation involves operating in a medium that can turn hostile very rapidly and in which human or mechanical failure can bring appalling consequences. While today's management-speak contains many terms such as 'risk management' and 'risk mitigation,' there is no such thing as risk elimination. That is why accepting responsibility for people's lives inevitably means that airline flying is always going to be more than just a job: It is a matter of trust. In turn, that is why the regulators' duty of care to the public involves more than just checking lists and rote performance in obedience of rules; it is to see that the people at the sharp end of aircraft are equipped with the proper tools to do their jobs and deliver their passengers safely. Source: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. Back to Top Safety Pilot Landmark Accident: Pointing fingers Inadequate training or inadequate decision making? Bruce Landsberg This month's Landmark Accident is notable not because of the accident; visual flight into marginal VFR or instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) is not as rare as it should be. There are constant reminders by the Air Safety Institute and most aviation publications and websites that this is not a life-prolonging activity. Rather, it was the legal maneuvering afterward that nearly changed the training landscape. This January 2003 accident also illustrates that isolated actions by individual pilots can have a major effect on general aviation when magnified by the legal system. There are similarities to the John F. Kennedy Jr. accident in June 1998 (see "Landmark Accidents: Vineyard Spiral," September 2000 AOPA Pilot), with marginal conditions at night, an almost-rated instrument pilot in a high-performance aircraft, and a strong desire to get to the destination. These factors have consistently proved to be lethal. The determination to press on, which serves us well in personal and business life, can be catastrophic. Pilot The 47-year-old private pilot had logged 248 hours total time, with 57 hours of instrument time and nearly 19 hours at night. He had taken delivery of a brand-new Cirrus SR22 six weeks prior to the accident and completed type-specific training. This resulted in a VFR-only completion certificate and a high-performance aircraft endorsement. At the time of the accident, the pilot had logged 19 hours in the Cirrus with only 0.3 hour of actual instrument time and 2.3 hours of night flight. Almost all of his remaining flight time was in a Cessna 172 in which he was receiving instrument instruction. According to his CFII, he was nearly ready for the instrument rating practical test. The flight At 4:55 a.m. (CST) on the morning of the accident, the pilot called flight service proposing a VFR flight from Grand Rapids, Michigan (GPZ), to St. Cloud, Minnesota (STC), departing at 6 a.m. A friend was to accompany the pilot to a hockey game, where their sons were playing. The weather was marginal with airmets for instrument conditions, scattered snow showers, and turbulence. The pilot called back again at 5:41 a.m. to recheck the weather, but it was essentially unchanged. The pilot mentioned that he was, "Hoping to slide underneath it and then climb out." The briefer didn't discourage him, saying, "The only problem you may have along the route, that I can see, is marginal ceilings." Weather can be deceptive and certainly not uniform. At the time of the accident, Grand Rapids-20 miles north of the accident site-reported few clouds at 300 feet, a broken layer at 1,400, and 2,700 overcast with seven miles visibility and winds northwest at 17 gusting to 22 knots. Twenty-one miles south of the accident site at Aitkin, Minnesota, visibility was 10 miles, with scattered clouds at 2,500. There were two additional factors: It was still dark and morning twilight would not begin for about another hour, but there was a full moon low to the horizon. The Cirrus struck trees at a 15-degree nose-down attitude, creating a 500-foot debris field indicative of a high-speed impact. The final flight path was estimated from radar data. Beginning at 6:30 a.m. the aircraft's altitudes varied between 1,700 and 3,200 feet. At 6:36 a.m. the aircraft began a descending left turn to 2,400 feet at about 1,200 fpm, followed by a climbing left turn of decreasing radius to 2,900 feet. The average true airspeed was estimated at 191 knots. Several witnesses reported the aircraft between 75 and 100 feet agl. One witness stated, "If he'd been two blocks east, he'd have hit the water tower." The witnesses all agreed that the aircraft was moving fast, and weather was generally described as clear-except for one witness who lived a quarter-mile from the accident site, and said it was snowing lightly and the atmosphere was "hazy." The NTSB's examination of the aircraft and engine did not reveal any malfunction. The aircraft had logged 35.7 hours since new. The pilot and passenger died in the impact. Aftermath The NTSB's probable cause statement was, "Spatial disorientation experienced by the pilot, because of a lack of visual references, and a failure to maintain altitude. Contributing factors were the pilot's improper decision to attempt flight into marginal VFR conditions, his inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions, the low lighting condition [night], and the trees." There was no discussion regarding the ballistic recovery system (airframe parachute) or the role of glass cockpits. But the attempt to shift responsibility took some unprecedented turns. The plaintiffs' complaint against Cirrus Design and the University of North Dakota Aerospace Foundation (UNDAF) was based on the contention that the entities did not provide the contracted-for training. Transition training was included in the purchase price of the aircraft, and the pilot had paid for an additional 1.5 days of instruction to become more familiar with the SR22. His training records clearly stated that the training was to VFR standards only, and various autopilot procedures had been reviewed. However, one item in the course syllabus remained unchecked. It was on using the autopilot to escape from IMC. The plaintiffs' belief was that the crash would not have occurred if only that training had been received. It's an interesting theory, but to my knowledge, it has never been tested in any scientific manner. The Private Pilot Practical Test Standards require applicants to demonstrate proficiency in basic instrument flight. Aeronautical knowledge areas include aeronautical decision making and judgment. Also required is the ability to recognize critical weather situations from the ground and in flight, along with the ability to procure and use weather reports and forecasts. To exercise the privileges of the private pilot certificate, we must demonstrate these skills and presumably be able to perform them after becoming certificated. Unfortunately, some pilots let their skills deteriorate, and some CFIs do not "retread" the pilot's basic instrument skills on subsequent flight reviews. That was not the case here. As noted previously, the pilot had nearly finished a full instrument rating program but was inexplicably taking the training in his old aircraft, a Cessna 172. The basics of instrument flight are the same for all aircraft, but the performance characteristics and avionics equipment between these two airplanes could hardly be more different. The CFII was not a defendant. FAR 91.3 is unambiguous in declaring the pilot in command to be responsible for and the final authority as to the operation of an aircraft. The FARs also are clear on certification, testing standards, and VFR pilots staying out of IMC. Even so, the trial jury found Cirrus and UNDAF jointly responsible at 37.5 percent each, and the estate of the pilot at 25 percent. It awarded combined damages of $16.4 million to the families. Legalities and some final questions A Minnesota court ruling prohibits lawsuits for educational malpractice because it's extremely difficult to determine if the teacher failed to teach or the student failed to learn. The plaintiffs and trial court felt that the defendants were not an educational institution and not entitled to such protection. (UNDAF hardly could be anything else, but legal logic is not clear to many of us.) Cirrus and UNDAF appealed, with AOPA filing a friend-of-the-court brief in support because of the potential precedent. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling in a two-to-one split decision. It said, "An airplane manufacturer's common-law duty to warn of dangers associated with the use of its aircraft does not include a duty to provide pilot training. A negligence claim against an aviation-training provider is barred under the educational-malpractice doctrine where the essence of the claim is that the provider failed to provide an effective education." Additionally, the pilot's operating handbook was cited as explaining how to use the autopilot in great detail. There was ample warning about VFR pilots operating in IMC. The court held that the pilot had a duty to review such documents. The trial court's verdict, had it not been reversed, would have been a significant disincentive for both manufacturers and flight schools to provide any training beyond that which is legally required. Unfortunately, expensive and emotional legal battles do not erase the pain for two fatherless families-or the associated negative perception that surrounds GA in the aftermath of accidents like this. The plaintiffs appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which upheld the appeals court ruling, thus settling the matter in favor of Cirrus and UNDAF. Do you believe that this pilot fundamentally understood the risk he was about to undertake? The human psyche is incredibly complex and the statistics of probability and possibility arcane. The beauty of hindsight bias is that we can say, "Of course not." Did a demonic impulse push him to take the risk, or did he honestly think he could make it? If more training in decision making or autopilot management had been provided, would it have mattered? Is it possible to effectively change someone's risk-taking profile? When is enough training provided, and who's responsible after an accident? Should high- performance aircraft be sold to VFR pilots? There are lots of opinions but few facts. The one legal and moral certainty, to my way of thinking, is that the pilot in command is responsible for-and the final authority as to-the operation of an aircraft. This means recognizing your limitations, those of your aircraft, and the vagaries of weather forecasting. What do you think? http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/2012/sp0912.html Back to Top Back to Top New FAA Safety Briefing Magazine Highlights Aviation Educators The Sep/Oct 2012 issue of FAA Safety Briefing explores the critical role of the aviation educator. Articles focus on flight instructor requirements and best practices as well as the many tools and educational resources that can help sharpen teaching skills. The link to the online edition is: http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/2012/media/SepOct2012.pdf Back to Top Airbus Sees 28,200 Aircraft Market Over 20 Years on Asia Airbus SAS (EAD), the largest maker of commercial aircraft, predicted airlines will buy $3.9 trillion worth of planes in the next two decades, driven by demand in India and China. Airlines will buy 28,200 planes, Airbus said in its annual industrywide forecast today. The prediction is 1.3 percent higher than what Airbus anticipated a year earlier, while trailing the 4.7 percent growth forecast in average annual passenger traffic for the next two decades. Airbus, based in Toulouse in southern France, has remained behind Boeing Co. (BA) in deliveries so far in 2012, after leading the industry every year since 2003. Both companies make the bulk of their business with single-aisle aircraft that serve shorter routes, and Airbus predicted today that by 2031, four of the world's biggest traffic flows will be domestic. "Emerging economic regions will represent more than half of all growth in the next 20 years," Airbus said in a statement. Most aircraft, or 35 percent, will go to buyers in the Asia-Pacific region, with China the largest market by value. The global fleet will grow to 32,550 passenger aircraft from 15,550 by 2031, and about 10,350 in-service airliners will be replaced, Airbus said. The total compares with competitor Boeing's July forecast for 34,000 planes valued at $4.5 trillion, including 2,020 regional jets Airbus does not count. Single-Aisle Demand Airbus raised its single-aisle forecast 1.6 percent to 19,500 planes. Single-aisle jets will make up 69 percent of the market, while wide-body jets will constitute 25 percent, Airbus predicted. The aircraft maker's wide-body forecast is only 1 percent higher than last year's. The two dominant aircraft manufacturers compete in the wide-body market with the A330 and A350 airliner from Airbus, while Boeing sells the popular 777 that features the world's largest engine and the new 787 Dreamliner. Airbus is still working on the A350 and has pushed back entry into service of the jet to the second half of 2014. The market for very large aircraft is one area the two aircraft maker's forecasts have differed for some time. While Airbus predicted today that demand will top 1,700 units, or $600 billion in value, Boeing estimates less than half that amount, at 790 units. Airbus offers the A380 double-decker in that segment, while Boeing sells its 747-8 jumbo, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-04/airbus-sees-28-200-aircraft-market- over-20-years-as-asia-grows Back to Top India will need 1,450 planes over next 20 years: Boeing Boeing Co raised its forecast for the Indian plane market on Tuesday, saying the South Asian country would need 1,450 new aircraft worth $175 billion by 2031. NEW DELHI: Boeing Co raised its forecast for the Indian plane market on Tuesday, saying the South Asian country would need 1,450 new aircraft worth $175 billion by 2031. Last year, the U.S. planemaker had forecast demand at 1,320 planes up to 2030, worth $150 billion. "India will have the highest passenger traffic growth in the world, higher than even China's in the next 20 years," Dinesh Keskar, Boeing's senior vice president for Asia Pacific and India, told reporters. Boeing officials forecast passenger traffic to grow by 8.4 percent annually in South Asia, which includes India, and by 7 percent annually in China up to 2031. Boeing and its European rival, Airbus, are locked in a global contest for passenger plane market share and in some cases have resorted to halving prices to bolster orders of newly revamped models of their best-selling narrowbody jets. India, one of the fastest growing aviation markets in the world, offers tremendous growth opportunities to planemakers as more newly affluent Indians take to the skies. However, the Indian market has slowed recently. India's domestic air traffic fell 1.1 percent in July compared to a year ago, the worst performance for any market globally, according to the International Air Transport Association, an industry body representing more than 80 percent of global air traffic. India's airlines are struggling with surging oil prices, high sales taxes on jet fuel and fierce competition that has resulted in cutthroat pricing, leading to massive losses. Boeing has also lost several deals in Asia to Airbus recently, including a $7 billion order from Philippine Airlines Inc, despite massive U.S. lobbying on behalf of Boeing. Boeing has been waiting for months to deliver the first of 27 Dreamliners ordered by state-owned Air India, but the deal has been delayed by more than four years as Air India and Boeing fought over how much compensation Boeing should pay for production delays that disrupted the delivery schedule. China last month signed an agreement with Germany for 50 Airbus planes worth more than $4 billion during Chancellor Angela Merkel's visit to Beijing, the first significant order since a dispute between Beijing and Europe over emissions trading. However, the dispute between China and the European Union has frozen earlier deals and China continues to block the purchase of some 35 larger Airbus aircraft. Airbus booked orders for 1,419 planes worth some 90 billion pounds ($143.05 billion) in 2011, compared with Boeing's 805. Airbus finished last year with a 64 percent market share. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/transportation/airlines-/- aviation/india-will-need-1450-planes-over-next-20-years- boeing/articleshow/16249889.cms Back to Top Air India's new MRO coming up in Nagpur New Delhi, Sep 4 - Air India's maintenance repair and overhaul (MRO) facility in Nagpur will be completed by the year-end and will become operational by the second quarter of calender year 2013, Global aircraft manufacturer Boeing said Tuesday. "The construction work at the facility will be completed by December (2012). After that, equipment and machinery will be installed. The MRO will become operational by the second quarter of calender year 2013 subject to DGCA (Directorate General of Civil Aviation) clearance," Dinesh Keskar, senior vice president, sales, Asia Pacific and India, Boeing Commercial Aircraft, told IANS. The MRO is part of an agreement between the national carrier and Boeing following an order for 737s and 787s Dreamline which were placed by Air India in January 2006. Apart from Air India's aircraft, the MRO will offer services to other carriers which are operating Boeing planes as well. "The MRO is coming up at a total cost of $100 million. The MRO will be handed over to Air India once it's completed," Keskar said. The MRO facility, spread over 50 acres next to the Nagpur airport, will have two hangars. It would offer maintenance and overhauling services to 300 aircraft a year. Both the hangars will have capacity to house three 737 aircraft each or one 777s or 747 each. According to an Air India official, the MRO will form a part of a separate profit-making subsidiary of the airline which has been envisaged in the turnaround and financial restructure plan of the airline. "The new MRO will help us cut cost but more importantly assist us in our other plans for the MRO sector. We will transfer nearly 7,000 employees to our upcoming regional MRO facility for third-party work for generating extra revenues," the official told IANS. The airline said the proposal will help maintain a higher margin on its third party MRO work. "Till February 2012 we had generated a total revenue of around Rs.14.3 crore in the northern region alone. This margin will increase with the new MRO facility." According to a civil aviation ministry report, the Indian MRO industry is expected to triple in size from Rs.2,250 crore ($440 million) in 2010 to Rs.7,000 crore ($1,369 million) by 2020. However, this is quite small when compared to present size of per annum MRO business in the UAE ($1,565 million) and China ($1,956 million). Read more: http://india.nydailynews.com/business/ Back to Top Aeromexico, Delta to build joint MRO facility in Mexico Grupo Aeromexico (AM) and Delta Air Lines (DL) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to build an aircraft MRO facility in Queretaro, Mexico. The companies said the new facility, to be jointly operated, will take over work now being done in Guadalajara and "expand MRO capabilities." According to the carriers, the new facility's heavy maintenance capacity will be seven aircraft simultaneously. DL owns 4.17% of AM (ATW Daily News, June 5). Financial details regarding the Queretaro MRO facility were not disclosed, but the airlines said each will invest equally. DL president Ed Bastian said in a statement that "efforts now move to begin constructing this facility that will usher in lower maintenance costs." AM CEO Andres Conesa said the facility "will consolidate and complement the heavy maintenance and overhaul services both carriers have offered at the Grupo Aeromexico maintenance base in Guadalajara over the last six years." http://atwonline.com/operations-maintenance/news/aeromexico-delta-build-joint-mro- facility-mexico-0831 Back to Top Bristow Group invests $250 mln in Canada's Cougar Helicopters Sept 4 (Reuters) - Bristow Group Inc, which provides helicopter services to the offshore energy industry, said it will invest $250 million to buy a minority stake in privately held Cougar Helicopters, gaining access to a growing Canadian exploration and production market. Bristow will also acquire certain aircraft and facilities from Cougar, which is mainly focused on the offshore oil and gas industry off Canada's Atlantic coast and in the Arctic. The assets being purchased include eight Sikorsky S-92 helicopters and helicopter passenger, maintenance and other facilities located in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia in Canada. The purchased aircraft and facilities will be leased by Bristow to Cougar, which is held by VIH Aviation Group Ltd, on a long-term basis. Bristow can get an additional $40 million based upon Cougar achieving certain performance targets. Cougar had C$124 million ($124.94 million)of revenue in 2011. The deal will close in the fourth quarter. Back to Top Graduate Research Survey Crisis Communication in Emergency Response study: Airline emergency response managers and family members of aviation accident victims needed! Kelli Jones, a graduate student in Emergency Management and Homeland Security at Arkansas Tech University is looking for active airline emergency response managers to help her complete her thesis research. The survey takes approximately 15 minutes to complete and includes questions focused on crisis communication, methods of communication, family assistance, the Internet, and social media. Surveys need to be completed by Friday, September 21st in order to be included in the study. If you would be willing to participate in the study, please contact Kelli at Kjones63@atu.edu or 650-400-6633. Kelli is an aeronautical engineer, accident investigator, and emergency response planner who has worked in aviation for 20 years in the areas of cabin safety, regulatory compliance, and emergency response. Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP, FRAeS, FISASI CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC