Flight Safety Information May 12, 2016 - No. 093 In This Issue Polish Special Services to Be Blamed for Concealing 2010 Plane Crash Data Air India MRO aims to double third-party revenue Multiple Failures Put Learjet 35A into the Atlantic 'Israel only country allowed by US to modify new stealth fighter jets' Tauranga laser strikes alarm pilots How did this British Airways flight end up with a square tire? Kazakhstan boosts compliance with global aviation standards ABS Jets Helps Refine Honeywell's In-flight Weather App Congress Approves Arlington Cemetery Burials For Female WWII Pilots Call for Nominations For 2016 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award PhD Research Request Polish Special Services to Be Blamed for Concealing 2010 Plane Crash Data MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Poland's Internal Security Agency (ABW) concealed part of the information from an investigation into the 2010 plane crash near Russia's Smolensk, in which all passengers, including then- Polish President Lech Kaczynski, died, the minister in charge of the ABW, Mariusz Kaminski, said Wednesday. On Wednesday, Poland's ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party is unveiling a report on the work of the previous government, which led the country from 2007 to 2015. The speeches of ministers are being broadcast live on Polish television. According to Kaminski, the agency received images of the crash site from US intelligence two days after the crash and was obliged to hand them over to the prosecutor's office immediately, but this was only done 10 months later when the latter learned about the images from the US side. Kaminski also said that the ABW did provide the authorities with information on a Russian citizen, who appealed to the Polish Embassy in Moscow in May 2010, saying that he had some information on the crash possibly being the result of an attack. The Polish side did not check this information and instead referred the man to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the minister noted. The plane carrying Kaczynski, his wife and a number of high-ranking officials crashed in heavy fog as it attempted to land at an airfield near the Russian city of Smolensk on April 10, 2010, killing all 96 passengers and crew on board. The Moscow-based Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC or MAK) said in a report that the crew's decision not to route the plane to an alternative aerodrome was the direct cause of the crash. In early February, the Polish Defense Ministry said that Warsaw would restart its investigation into the crash from the very beginning. http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160511/1039448433/poland-crash-smolensk-security.html Back to Top Air India MRO aims to double third-party revenue Air India's aircraft maintenance repair and overhaul unit (MRO) aims to nearly double its third-party business revenue to Rs 130 crore in FY2017. It also plans to hire 150 engineers and 450 technicians to cater to growth and replace 15-20 engineers retiring each month. Air India's engineering services was hived off as a separate subsidiary in 2013 as part of its turnaround plan and last January it received approval from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). Last year, the MRO earned about Rs 65-70 crore from third party business and it largely caters to Air India's engineering requirement. The MRO unit has been unable to secure substantial third-party business till now and has grappled with labour issues and an unsuccessful litigation against the hive off of the unit. But the management is now making renewed efforts to attract business from private airlines and secure certification from Federal Aviation Administration and European Aviation Safety Agency for its facilities in Nagpur and Thiruvananthapuram. Air India Engineering Services is currently undertaking a 'C' check (heavy maintenance check carried after about 2 years) on Jet Airways Boeing 777 aircraft. This is the first 'C' check being carried out by Air India for a private airline though it carries out routine maintenance and minor repair works for several years now. At present, Indian carriers outsource about 90% of their repair and maintenance work to companies abroad. This is partly because of the limited capabilities of domestic service providers and partly because of the high tax structure in India. In order for a MRO to be successful, it needs to be cost competitive and work on quick turnaround times. Air India management hopes the engineering arm will be able to achieve that. "We carry out landing gear change and engine replacement work for GoAir. We are also looking for long- term contracts with other private airlines," said HR Jagannath, CEO of Air India Engineering Services. "GoAir has full capability and approval from DGCA for carrying out all land maintenance activities. However, occasionally we do take assistance from other service providers like Air India for undertaking work like landing gear change etc," a GoAir spokesperson said. http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/air-india-mro-aims-to-double-third-party-revenue- 116051100997_1.html Back to Top Multiple Failures Put Learjet 35A into the Atlantic I thought the days of poorly trained captains and seat-warming copilots were long gone in turbine operations - at least those conducted in the U.S. But it would seem there are still operators who are not especially particular about who's in the cockpit, or their level of competency in the face of unexpected situations. This month we'll take a quick look at the loss of a Learjet 35A (XA-USD) fatal to all four occupants on Nov. 19, 2013, when it crashed into the sea off the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, coast just 3 min. or so after takeoff. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was "the pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane following an inflight deployment of the left engine thrust reverser." Further contributing to the accident, it said, "was the flight crew's failure to perform the appropriate emergency procedures, the copilot's lack of qualification and capability to act as a required flight crewmember for the flight, and the inflight deployment of the left engine thrust reverser for reasons that could not be determined through post-accident investigation." The airplane had just completed an air ambulance flight for Air Evac International from San Jose, Costa Rica, to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL) and was repositioning back to its base in Cozumel, Mexico. Weather at FLL included few clouds at 2,500 ft. and a scattered layer at 6,500 ft. The wind was calm and visibility was 9 mi. The temperature was 23C, the dew point was 22C, and the altimeter setting was 29.93 in. of mercury. The Flight Investigators used FAA ATC voice and radar recordings to determine the Learjet's track and timeline. The airplane departed Runway 10 at FLL at about 1950 and climbed straight ahead. When it reached an altitude of about 2,200 ft. and a groundspeed of 200 kt., the copilot requested radar vectors to return to the runway due to an "engine failure." The controller directed the flight to maintain 4,000 ft. and turn to a heading of 340 deg. The copilot replied, "Not possible" and requested a 180-deg. turn back to the airport. The controller acknowledged, but the airplane continued a gradual turn to the north as it slowed and descended. Two minutes later, the copilot declared a "Mayday!" and again requested vectors back to FLL. During the next 3 min., the copilot requested vectors to the airport multiple times. While the copilot requested, received and acknowledged increasingly sharper and tighter turns to the southwest from ATC to return to the airport, the airplane continued its slow turn and descent to the north. During the 2 min. following the copilot's declared intention to return to FLL, the airplane descended to 900 ft. and slowed to 140 kt. as it flew northbound, parallel to the shoreline and away from FLL. At 1955:15, the copilot reported the airplane was ". . . 200 ft. over the sea." After that, there were no intelligible transmissions received from the airplane, and communications with the airplane were lost. A search began immediately, but there was no evidence of survivors. Some floating wreckage was recovered by the U.S. Coast Guard. It showed impact damage but no evidence of fire. The main wreckage was located on the ocean floor on Dec. 3, 2014. The wings were separated from the fuselage, and the outboard section of the left wing was missing. The left and right wingtip tanks were detached from the wings. Both ailerons were identified, and one wing flap was found at the retracted position. Both main landing gear were retracted. On the throttle quadrant, the left power lever was found past the maximum position and damage to the forward stop was consistent with over-travel. The right lever was found one-half inch from its maximum travel. There was no visible damage to either the idle or cutoff stops. The thrust reverser control panel and panel chassis were deformed by impact forces. The internal electronic components were corroded and/or coated with dried materials indicative of immersion in salt water. The UNLOCK, DEPLOY and BLEED VALVE annunciator light assembly for both left and right engines appeared intact. The NORMAL/EMERGENCY STOW switch on the thrust reverser control panel was found intact in the control panel and in the NORMAL position. The engine N2 rpm gauges indicated 96.8% on the left engine and 96.5% on the right. The engine turbine temperature gauges indicated 781C on the left engine and 780C on the right. The engine fan gauges indicated 89.2% on the left engine and 89.8% on the right. It would seem the engines had been operating at near maximum thrust. Thrust Reverser System Photographs taken of the submerged wreckage before its recovery from the ocean floor showed that the left engine's thrust reverser and blocker doors were not in the stowed position. Examination of components from both thrust reverser systems (left engine and right engine) after recovery indicated that the components sustained impact- and seawater-immersion damage. This damage precluded testing for electrical, pneumatic and mechanical continuity. Examination of the left engine's thrust reverser system components found that the upper blocker door was attached to the reverser and was in a partially deployed position. The lower blocker door was found hanging from one of its tension links. The lower blocker door's rod arm was missing a section of its clamping arm, and the pivoting pins were broken. The lower blocker door showed a gap between the door skin and door pan with a bend at the forward edge near the gap. Areas of paint and skin on the left engine nacelle skin and body structure forward and aft of the cascade exhaust showed discoloration and scorching, with some paint blistered or missing. The entire perimeter of the outer fan duct behind which the blocker doors stow (when the thrust reverser was stowed) was missing. Examination of the right engine's thrust reverser system components found that the upper and lower blocker doors were in the stowed position. There was no visible damage or interference observed between the blocker doors and the surrounding structure. There was no evidence of heat damage on the engine nacelle outer skin or paint. The Pilots The wreckage examination (and later bench testing) indicated clearly that the left reverser had deployed in flight. The fact that the airplane ended up in the water suggested that something went very wrong in the cockpit. Both pilots were employed by Vuela SA de CV, which was an independent company that "leased" the pilots to Aero JL SA de CV. Both companies were owned and operated by the same individuals. The pilot held a Mexican commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine, airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane, and an ATP and type ratings in Learjets and the Gulfstream GI. The operator told investigators the pilot had accrued 10,091 total hours of flight experience, of which 1,400 hr. were in the 30-series Learjet. On July 5, 2013, the operator issued the pilot a certificate of training for 8 hr. of crew resource management. On the same day, he was issued another certificate for an additional 8 hr. of instruction on controlled flight into terrain. The copilot held a commercial pilot certificate issued by Mexico, with ratings for airplane single-engine, airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane. The copilot's total flight experience could not be reconciled. Documents provided by the operator suggested the copilot had accrued an estimated 1,243 total hours of flight experience, of which 29 hr. were in the Learjet 35. According to company records and a resume, the copilot began flying Learjets for the Vuela SA/Aero JL organizations on May 1, 2013. At that time, the copilot declared 1,206 total hours of flight experience, of which 82 hr. were "observer" time in Learjet 25s. From the day of employment to the day of the accident, the copilot accrued 37.16 hr. of flight experience in Lear 25/35 airplanes. A certificate stamped "General Technical Department of Licenses," which was forwarded by the operator to the NTSB, suggested the copilot accrued 175 hr. in the Learjet 35A between July 4, 2013, and Oct. 30, 2013; however, his total documented flight experience increased only 29 hr. over the same time period. On Aug. 20, 2012, the copilot received a diploma for classroom instruction received for the Learjet 20 series airplanes from a technical training school in Mexico that had neither airplanes nor flight simulators. There was no evidence that the copilot completed any training or practical tests in a Learjet airplane or flight simulator. On July 5, 2013, the operator issued the copilot a certificate of training for 8 hours of crew resource management. On the same day, he was issued another certificate for an additional 8 hours of instruction on controlled flight into terrain. Pay records for the pilot and copilot show identical hours, deductions, and pay over several consecutive pay periods. The pilot and copilot had flown together on three occasions before the accident flight. The accident flight was their first flight together in the United States. The Safety Board said a search of student records by "two prominent Learjet training vendors in the United States" revealed no records of simulator flight training or attendance by either the pilot or copilot. Emergency procedure training for an inflight deployment of a thrust reverser could be performed only in an appropriately equipped flight simulator. The Director General of Civil Aeronautics (DGAC) for the government of Mexico examined the pilot and flight training records for both pilots and summarized their findings for the NTSB report: "Both the pilot and copilot records showed inconsistencies on the verifications of training and certifications based on the way official government stamps and certifications were displayed over, and with, the entries. They were copies, and did not represent entries properly certified by the Government of Mexico." Some of the captain's experience and certifications were based on logbooks never presented. The copilot's records showed the training for the Learjet 20/30 series airplanes provided and conducted exclusively by the operator, Aero JL. Further, there was no "original foreign license and logbook," no "official license certificate" or DGAC file records to support a claim that the copilot had 1,243 total hours of flight experience. According to the DGAC, the copilot had actually accrued only 206 total hours of flight experience. The copilot was evaluated by the DGAC in the airplane on May 2, 2013, and his performance during the practical test was found to be "unsatisfactory." The CVR The transcript of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) certainly reflected the training situation just outlined. No checklists were called for, offered or used by either crewmember during normal operations (before or during engine start, taxi, takeoff) or following the announced inflight emergency. There were no challenge- and-response checklist callouts between the pilot and copilot at any time during the flight, no elements of crew coordination and no identification of the emergency. After the "engine failure" was declared to ATC, neither crewmember asked for or offered the "Engine Failure" checklist, nor was there any attempt to complete an emergency procedure and then ask for a checklist verification of actions taken. The pilot asked the copilot for unspecified "help" because he did not "know what's going on" and he could not identify the emergency or direct the copilot in any way with regard to managing or responding to the emergency. At no time did the copilot identify or verify a specific emergency or malfunction, and he did not provide any guidance or assistance to the pilot. According to Learjet, in the event of an inflight emergency, the typical convention was for the pilot flying to fly the airplane and take over communications with ATC. The pilot monitoring should then complete the appropriate checklist, while audibly announcing his actions as they are completed. The pilot flying was to verify these actions prior to completion. Although different flight departments may adopt their own procedures, there was no evidence that any crew coordination actions took place on the accident flight. Specifically, the Safety Board said, "Based on the wreckage evidence and data recovered from the left engine's digital electronic engine control [DEEC], the thrust reverser rocker switch was not placed in the "EMER STOW" position, and the left engine was not shut down. "The DEEC data showed a reduction in N1 about 100 sec. after takeoff followed by a rise in N1 about 35 sec. later. The data were consistent with the thrust reverser deploying in flight [resulting in the reduction in N1] followed by the inflight separation of the lower blocker door [resulting in the rise in N1 as some direct exhaust flow was restored]. "Further, the DEEC data revealed full engine power application throughout the flight. Although neither flight crewmember recognized that the problem was an inflight deployment of the left thrust reverser, certification flight test data indicated that the airplane would have been controllable as it was configured on the accident flight. If the crew had applied the "engine failure" emergency procedure [the perceived problem that the copilot reported to the air traffic controller], the airplane would have been more easily controlled and could have been successfully landed." Unwanted TR Deployment Manufactured in 1979, the accident airplane was powered by two Garrett (Honeywell) TFE731-2 turbofan engines. Its most recent continuous airworthiness inspection was completed Nov. 4, 2013, at 6,842 aircraft hours. The Lear was equipped with an Aeronca Inc. 45-1000 thrust reverser system. When reverse thrust was commanded from the cockpit during a landing roll, the thrust reversers operated to reverse the direction of the engine exhaust gases to assist with stopping the airplane on the runway. The thrust reversers were designed to deploy only when the squat switches were in the "weight on wheels" mode and the throttles were in the idle position. When activated, the thrust reverser system used 28-volt power for reverser control and engine bleed air to deploy the translating structure. The electrical system in the thrust reverser incorporated an automatically initiated "stow" command if the pneumatic latches became unlocked in flight. A rocker switch in the cockpit could be positioned to either "NORM" (normal) or "EMER STOW" (emergency). Three indicator lights in the cockpit for each thrust reverser provided the flight crew with thrust reverser status and position information. These lights, "UNLOCK," "DEPLOY" and "BLEED VALVE," illuminated and extinguished during the application and stowing of the thrust reversers. The "UNLOCK" light would remain illuminated any time that a thrust reverser pneumatic latch disengaged or was not in the locked configuration after a thrust reverser was stowed, or if a thrust reverser failed to stow completely. The AFM Aeronca TR Supplement stated "an inadvertent thrust reverser deployment during takeoff will be indicated by illumination of the affected thrust reverser UNLOCK and/or DEPLOY lights." If this occurred below V1 speed, an aborted takeoff should be performed. If this occurred above V1 speed, the flight crew should maintain directional control, reduce the affected engine thrust lever to idle, place the NORM-EMER STOW switch to EMER STOW and continue the takeoff. The procedures stated that, "If UNLOCK or DEPLOY lights do not go out, Thrust Lever [affected engine] - CUTOFF." The procedures stated that the ENGINE SHUTDOWN IN FLIGHT procedure in the basic AFM should be performed. The AFM Supplement also contained "Abnormal Procedures" for an inadvertent thrust reverser deployment in flight. Those procedures also specify that, if the UNLOCK or DEPLOY lights do not go out, the ENGINE SHUTDOWN IN FLIGHT procedure should be performed, followed by the SINGLE-ENGINE LANDING procedure from the basic AFM. Safety Board investigators reviewed airplane manufacturer's records and the NTSB accident and incident database and found no previously documented instance of an un-commanded inflight deployment of a thrust reverser on a Learjet 35. Bottom Line The airplane required two fully qualified flight crewmembers; however, the copilot was not qualified to act as second-in-command on the airplane, and he provided no meaningful assistance to the pilot in handling the emergency. Further, although the captain's records indicated considerable experience in similar model airplanes, his performance during the flight was highly deficient. Based on the CVR transcript, the pilot did not adhere to industry best practices involving the execution of checklists during normal operations, was unprepared to identify and handle the emergency, did not refer to the appropriate procedures checklists to properly configure and control the airplane once a problem was detected, and did not direct the copilot to the appropriate checklists. In short, this was a totally unprofessional operation masked as something well run with well-qualified personnel. And four people and an aircraft were lost as a result of that dangerous illusion. This article appears in the May 2016 issue of Business & Commercial Aviation with the title "Total Failure." http://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/multiple-failures-put-learjet-35a-atlantic Back to Top 'Israel only country allowed by US to modify new stealth fighter jets' Israel is unique among America's allies in that it is the only country on earth that enjoys special dispensation to install modifications on US-made military hardware, according to an Internet report. The tech magazine WIRED reported this week that not only will Israel be the first US ally to receive the brand-new stealth F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter jet, but it will be alone among the Pentagon's customers that will be permitted to outfit the warplane with its own technological enhancements. The first Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter jet, due to be delivered to Israel in December, has entered an advanced production stage. Jeff Babione, head of the F-35 program at Lockheed Martin, said the plane would upgrade Israel's tactical and strategic capabilities, and strengthen relations between the company and the IAF, Defense Ministry, and Israeli defense industries for many decades to come. Israel has purchased 33 F-35A fighters jets at an average cost of $110 million per aircraft. The first two aircraft are due to arrive at the Negev's Nevatim airbase in December this year, and the air force is preparing to integrate them into its operations. According to WIRED, Israel will be permitted to install "customized software and weapons" while also allowing the Israeli Air Force to service the planes independently. The article states that Israel "gets a pass" because of its successful track record with technological enhancements of American-made weaponry, particularly the F-16 and F-15 model fighter jets. Israel's defense industries sell many of these enhancements to the US, including weapons systems, sensors, and communications gear. Israel's geopolitical situation in the volatile Middle East also accounts for Washington's allowing for greater leeway. "When you might go to war at any moment, the argument goes, you can't have your best hardware go out of service for weeks at a time for checkouts that can take just a few days on your own turf," the magazine reported. "What helps Israel helps the United States-and the F-35 will give Israel an overall airpower advantage that could last decades." http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-only-country-allowed-by-US-to-modify-new-fighter-jets-453798 Back to Top Tauranga laser strikes alarm pilots Pilots have raised concerns about night-time laser strikes on aircraft flying above Tauranga - including rescue helicopters and passenger planes. The Civil Aviation Authority has already recorded four reports this year of people shining lasers into or near planes and helicopters in the Bay of Plenty. That equals the number of reports for the entire year in 2015. Six laser strikes were recorded in 2014. TECT Trustpower Rescue Helicopter pilot Liam Brettkelly said he had experienced people using lasers before "but not for a long time". "It does happen in Tauranga." Mr Brettkelly referred to a recent case where a passenger aircraft reported a laser being shone at it as it flew over the Te Maunga area. "It can affect our night vision, absolutely," Mr Brettkelly said. "You know what it's like, shining a bright light into your eyes in the dark. They can affect you for several minutes. Night vision goggles are sensitive to bright lights." Rotorua's BayTrust Rescue Helicopter pilot and base manager Barry Vincent said lasers were extremely dangerous and a major distraction. "Even a small laser from ground level shining up in our cockpit at 1000 feet (304m), the width of the beam widens. It can fill the whole cockpit," he said. Mr Vincent said he had experienced a laser targeting him while in flight. "It's obviously very distracting and can be blinding. You can suffer serious eye damage from it. It's not a sensible thing to do. Unfortunately there are people who still do it." The BayTrust helicopter was often called upon for Western Bay of Plenty emergencies when the Tauranga- based TECT Trustpower Rescue Helicopter was busy. Mr Vincent said he reported his experience to the Civil Aviation Authority. "I know the officials take quite a strong view of it and if they can locate the individual responsible, the police do look on it pretty sternly." Any person believed to have been shining a laser at passing aircraft could be charged with causing unnecessary danger, and face a term of imprisonment of up to 12 months or a fine of up to $10,000. Civil Aviation Authority corporate communications manager Mike Richards said large and medium-sized passenger aircraft were the most commonly targeted, meaning that laser strikes could cause an extremely high level of public harm in an accident. "Pointing lasers at planes is a serious offence under the Civil Aviation Act and represents a threat to safety which we take very seriously," Mr Richards said. "Laser illumination of aircraft can cause distraction, disorientation, and discomfort for pilots resulting in a potentially hazardous situation during critical phases of flight." http://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-times/news/article.cfm?c_id=1503343&objectid=11637616 Back to Top How did this British Airways flight end up with a square tire? A spare tire is one thing, but one British Airways flight landed in London with something many experts have never seen before: a square tire. The Airbus A380-800 departed Hong Kong on May 6 and was climbing when the crew received a tire- pressure notification, the Aviation Herald reports. The plane can land safely with one of its 18 tires deflated, so the crew continued on to London Heathrow. The landing was normal, but the photo of the plane taken afterward -- with one of the tires smooshed into a shape as square as Pat Boone -- drew buzz from plane-watchers. Suggestions as to how the tire was forced into the square shape were many and varied. Some Aviation Herald readers questioned the temperature when the tire was inflated, some blamed the pressure of descent crushing the tire and some just wanted to argue about why the other reasons were wrong. Royal Aeronautical Society aviation safety expert Kumar Mysore was quoted in the Daily Mail as blaming the way the plane distributes weight. "The effect of the weight on the deflated tire is the same as when you squeeze a rubber ring toy with different intensity, it can turn into a different shape," he said. "In an A380, for this particular situation, it happens to be squarish. In a 747, for instance, the load of the aircraft does not give rise to this particular shape." One Aviation Herald reader didn't care about the reason, but was fascinated with the result, writing, "I wish to acquire this tire and exhibit it in a sculpture park." http://www.cnet.com/news/how-did-this-british-airways-flight-end-up-with-a-square-tire/ Back to Top Kazakhstan boosts compliance with global aviation standards A Significant Safety Concern (SSC) in Kazakhstan has been finally resolved through joint efforts in early May, Tengrinews reports citing the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This leaves no crucial concerns indicated by ICAO for Kazakhstan unresolved, The now-planished aircraft operations SSC was originally identified during a 2009 ICAO audit of Kazakhstan's aviation safety oversight capacities, conducted under the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP). The other critical concern indentified by the audit was an aircraft airworthiness SSC, which a subsequent USOAP Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM) in 2014 identified as being satisfactorily resolved. "Kazakhstan has resolved all the crucial concerns indicated by ICAO," confirmed Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Committee in its statement. "By resolving this matter through coordinated capacity-building, and with support from donor States and International Organizations, ICAO and Kazakhstan have helped to further improve the safety of operations in its territory without any negative impacts on the capacity and efficiency of local air services," remarked ICAO Council President Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu. The joint was jointly led by ICAO European and North Atlantic (EURNAT) Regional Office and the ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau under the 'No Country Left Behind' initiative. It was implemented through a pre-agreed plan developed in conjunction with the Kazakh government and supplemented by training through experts contributed by Portugal, Turkey, Singapore, Ukraine and the ICAO Air Navigation Bureau. Funding for the assistance programme was also collaborative, with contributions coming from Kazakhstan, the ICAO EURNAT Office and the ICAO SAFE Fund. According to First Vice Minister for Innovations and Development of Kazakhstan Zhenis Kassymbek the July 2009 ICAO audit originally identified "82 concerns, including 2 critical ones". The audit contained so much criticism that EU aviation authorities put 59 Kazakh airlines, all the county's airlines except Air Astana, onto the EU "black list" banning their aircraft from making flights to Europe. Most of the airlines are still on the list. But with the progress in Kazakhstan's compliance with the global aviation safety rules, EU authorities may soon reconsider their ban. "We are expecting ICAO's validation of our successful resolution of the concerns to influence the decision of the European Commission's decision to remove Kazakh airlines from the EU Air Safety List," the Kazakh Committee said. "The main concern was that the structure and staff of the Civil Aviation Committee did not meet the safety requirements: the aviation authority employed too few men and could not execute proper control. The level of its experts was insufficiently high either," the Vice-Minister said. Consequently, other concerns included lack of compliance with ICAO requirements in investigation of flight accidents, insufficient control over activities of aviation personnel, air traffic service and meteorological service. After receiving the ICAO report Kazakhstan made a lot of effort to improve its compliance with the international aviation standards. It amended the legislation governing aviation standards twice introducing a total of 80 changes, and passed around 40 regulations to rectify its legal base. It also expanded its force of experts, provided advanced training for its staff and ensured proper certification of its inspectors to address the international aviation watchdog's recommendations. As a result, Kazakhstan's overall conformance with ICAO standards in air safety compliance monitoring by the government and efficiency of implementation of ICAO standards and recommended practices grew from 47% in 2009 to 65% in 2014 and is expected to attain the level of 74% this year, after the final report of the ICAO Validation Commission is released in July. Kazakhstan is not going to stop at that. According to the Civil Aviation Committee chairman Beken Seidakhmetov, it ambitious plan is to bring the compliance of the Committee with ICAO standards to 80% by 2020. https://en.tengrinews.kz/laws_initiatives/Kazakhstan-boosts-compliance-with-global-aviation-standards- 263311/ Back to Top ABS Jets Helps Refine Honeywell's In-flight Weather App Prague-based business jet operator ABS Jets has been collaborating with Honeywell on further enhancements of the latter's in-flight weather awareness iOS app, Weather Information Service (WIS). Under the effort, ABS Jets' crews and operations personnel have worked with Honeywell on the design and validation of new features that will be in future releases of WIS. The application was first demonstrated at Brno last June on Honeywell's Boeing 757 testbed and was later adjusted to become compatible with Airbus cockpit philosophy. ABS Jets is now working with WIS on its iPad-based Class II EFBs to assess the benefits for business aircraft. Using WIS improves crews' strategic decision making, thus benefitting efficiency, safety and passenger comfort, ABS Jets said. WIS provides a suite of graphical meteorological products that complement onboard weather radar observations. This data allows crews to adjust their flight paths to avoid turbulence (including clear-air turbulence) and hazardous weather. ABS Jets CEO Vladimir Petak said he has been impressed by the results. "I am pleased to be working with this application on our fleet of aircraft. It is great for our flight crews to be able to have accurate notifications about weather patterns along the route. It is also good news for the passengers, ensuring a smoother and more comfortable flight." http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2016-05-11/abs-jets-helps-refine-honeywells- flight-weather-app Back to Top Congress Approves Arlington Cemetery Burials For Female WWII Pilots (WASP (from left) Frances Green, Margaret Kirchner, Ann Waldner and Blanche Osborn leave their B-17, called Pistol Packin' Mama, during ferry training at Lockbourne Army Air Force base in Ohio. They're carrying their parachutes. - National Archives) Congress has passed legislation to allow the cremated remains of women who served as Women Airforce Service Pilots, or WASP, to be buried in the revered Arlington National Cemetery, a space reserved for people who have served in the U.S. armed forces. The legislation will now go to President Obama for his signature. In the 1940s, when the U.S. was faced with a shortage of pilots, the WASP became the first women to fly military aircraft. Training women to fly noncombat and training missions freed up male pilots for combat duty overseas, as NPR's Susan Stamberg reported for Morning Edition in 2010. But the female pilots' jobs weren't without danger. In fact, 38 female pilots died in service, including 26- year-old Mabel Rawlinson from Kalamazoo, Mich. Susan reported: "Rawlinson was stationed at Camp Davis in North Carolina. She was coming back from a night training exercise with her male instructor when the plane crashed. Marion Hanrahan, also a WASP at Camp Davis, wrote an eyewitness account: " 'I knew Mabel very well. We were both scheduled to check out on night flight in the A-24. My time preceded hers, but she offered to go first because I hadn't had dinner yet. We were in the dining room and heard the siren that indicated a crash. We ran out onto the field. We saw the front of her plane engulfed in fire, and we could hear Mabel screaming. It was a nightmare.' "It's believed that Rawlinson's hatch malfunctioned, and she couldn't get out. The other pilot was thrown from the plane and suffered serious injuries. Because Rawlinson was a civilian, the military was not required to pay for her funeral or pay for her remains to be sent home." Now, the question regarding the WASP remains is about to be settled once and for all. As NPR and WBUR's Here & Now reported earlier this year, the WASP spent years fighting to win status as war veterans before a federal law finally recognized their military service in 1977. As veterans, the WASP had been eligible for years to have their ashes buried in Arlington National Cemetery. But that changed last year, when the Army revoked their right to be laid to rest in the veterans cemetery, citing limited space. "The Army is giving some bureaucratic answer that makes absolutely no sense," said Rep. Martha McSally, R-Ariz., on Here & Now in March. McSally introduced the legislation to allow the WASP the honor of being buried at Arlington. "These women should have been active duty at the time," McSally said. "The requirements to being in Arlington are very clear: To have your ashes inurned you have to have served on active duty and you have to have been honorably discharged. And they meet that criteria retroactively." More than 1,100 young women, who were all considered civilian volunteers during the war, "flew almost every type of military aircraft - including the B-26 and B-29 bombers - as part of the WASP program," Susan reported. She added: "They ferried new planes long distances from factories to military bases and departure points across the country. They tested newly overhauled planes. And they towed targets to give ground and air gunners training shooting - with live ammunition. The WASP expected to become part of the military during their service. Instead, the program was canceled after just two years." But the women's service to the country was not forgotten. In 2010, U.S. lawmakers awarded the WASP the highest honor Congress can bestow: the Congressional Gold Medal. Burial in Arlington, however, transcends personal awards, as 94-year-old Nell Bright, one of about 100 WASP who are still living, told Here & Now. "Its a great honor to be buried at Arlington," she said. "I think that the WASP deserve to have that honor." McSally agrees, dismissing lingering concerns about space as "sexism." "I realize that at some point they are going to run out of space at Arlington. We understand that," the congresswoman said. "But look, when we are totally out of space ... why would we not want to have the story of the WASP as part of that legacy?" http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/11/477716378/congress-approves-arlington-cemetery- burials-for-female-wwii-pilots Back to Top Call for Nominations For 2016 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award ALEXANDRIA, Va. -- The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation and Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) are now accepting nominations for the 2016 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award, honoring a leader in aviation safety. The award will be presented during the 69th Annual International Air Safety Summit, taking place Nov. 14-16 in Dubai, UAE. Presented since 1956, the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award recognizes notable achievement in the field of civil or military aviation safety in method, design, invention, study or other improvement. The award's recipient is selected for a "significant individual or group effort contributing to improving aviation safety, with emphasis on original contributions," and a "significant individual or group effort performed above and beyond normal responsibilities." Mechanics, engineers and others outside of top administrative or research positions should be especially considered. The contribution need not be recent, especially if the nominee has not received adequate recognition. Nominations that were not selected as past winners of the Award can be submitted one additional time for consideration. Please note that self-nominations will not be considered. The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award's story dates back 70 years. On April 14, 1945, after visiting family in Pittsburgh, Laura Taber Barbour was aboard a Pennsylvania Central Airlines DC-3 when it crashed into the rugged terrain of Cheat Mountain near Morgantown, West Virginia. All passengers and crew were killed. In the years following, her husband, Dr. Clifford E. Barbour and son, Clifford E. Barbour, Jr., established the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award in her honor. The Award Board, composed of leaders in the field of aviation, meets in June of each year to conduct a final review of nominees and selection of the current year's recipient. Please help us honor this year's most deserving recipient. Nominations, including a 1-2-page narrative, can be submitted via the Laura Taber Barbour Foundation website at http://ltbaward.org/the- award/nomination-form/ or the Flight Safety Foundation website at http://flightsafety.org/aviation- awards/laura-taber-barbour-air-safety-award. Nominations will be accepted until June 1, 2016. For more information, including a complete history of Award recipients, see www.ltbaward.com. ABOUT THE LAURA TABER BARBOUR AIR SAFETY AWARD: The Award was established in 1956 through early association with the Flight Safety Foundation and from its founding has enjoyed a rich history of Award Board members, nominees and Award recipients. In 2013, the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation was formed from members of the Award Board, the aviation community and the Barbour family. As the foundation plans to broaden the scope of its intent, with great purpose, the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award will continue to spotlight those champions who pioneer breakthroughs in flight safety. Back to Top PhD Research Request Helicopter Pilots, This is a request for you to participate in a research study for my doctoral degree. The purpose is to study the relationship between safety management systems, incidents and accidents, and company performance for small helicopter companies with less than 5 aircraft and in the last 10 years. This research is in conjunction with safety efforts by the US Helicopter Safety Team and the Helicopter Association International. There are series of questions regarding safety management systems, incidents and accidents, and company performance. To participate, you must be between age 21 to 60, had some aircrew experience with any type of small civil helicopter organization (5 aircraft and under) and in the United States in last 10 years. Current helicopter student pilots can participate. Please follow the link below and fill but if you start, please finish the survey. It will only take about 12 minutes to complete. The survey does not include any identifiable data about the crewmember, places of employment, or OEM. https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5VPCZZ5 Thank you very much for your participation! Principal Investigator Scott Burgess Doctoral student at Northcentral University S.Burgess4793@email.ncu.edu Curt Lewis