Flight Safety Information February 12, 2019 - No. 031 In This Issue Incident: Delta MD88 at Atlanta on Feb 10th 2019, engine shut down in flight Incident: Aeromexico B788 near Isle of Man on Feb 9th 2019, air conditioning problem Incident: Flydubai B738 at Dubai on Feb 10th 2019, charred bird Accident: British Airways A320 near London on Feb 10th 2019, fumes in flight deck and cabin EVAS - Cockpit Smoke Protection Hawker Beechcraft 400A - Runway Excursion (Indiana) IS-BAO Operator Continuous Improvement Roundtable at 2019 NBAA IOC Microburst detection and avoidance...A primer for pilots...By Captain Shem Malmquist HIGH ALTITUDE FLYING COURSE Making GA Safety Policy Honeywell and Curtiss-Wright roll out data-transmitting black boxes VIRGIN PLANE REPORTS CLOSE SHAVE WITH DRONE Embraer delivered 90 commercial aircraft last year The Middle East Needs 3000 New Aircraft In The Next 20 Years Position: Director of Audit Programs / POSITIONS AVAILABLE: IOSA AUDITORS ONLINE SURVEY REQUEST 2019 AIR CHARTER SAFETY SYMPOSIUM Incident: Delta MD88 at Atlanta on Feb 10th 2019, engine shut down in flight A Delta Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-88, registration N915DL performing flight DL-2239 from Atlanta,GA to Charleston,SC (USA), was in the initial climb through about 600 feet AGL out of Atlanta's runway 09L when the left hand engine emitted a loud bang, the aircraft yawed unexpectedly, the crew declared emergency reporting they had just lost their left hand engine (JT8D) and requested to return to runway 09L. A runway inspection found a lot of debris at the end of runway 09L, the runway was closed. The aircraft levelled off at 3500 feet and returned to Atlanta for a safe landing on runway 09R about 20 minutes after departure. A passenger, general aviation pilot, reported at about 600 feet AGL there was a loud bang from the left engine associated with an immediate yaw obviously as result of loss of thrust on the left hand engine. The flight continued the climb into IMC, flew a pattern at about 3500 feet MSL and performed a smooth landing. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/DAL2239/history/20190210/2030Z/KATL/KCHS http://avherald.com/h?article=4c4131b1&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Aeromexico B788 near Isle of Man on Feb 9th 2019, air conditioning problem An Aeromexico Boeing 787-8, registration N967AM performing flight AM-8 from London Heathrow,EN (UK) to Mexico City (Mexico) with 237 people on board, was climbing out of London when the crew stopped the climb at FL260 but continued in the general direction of Mexico City. About 35nm southeast of Isle of Man (UK) the crew decided to return to London, declared PAN and descended the aircraft to FL200 reporting a cabin air compressor failure disallowed them to cross the Atlantic, they were going to perform an overweight landing at London. The aircraft landed safely back on London's runway 27R about 50 minutes after the decision to return. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in London about 20.5 hours after landing back. http://avherald.com/h?article=4c406589&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Flydubai B738 at Dubai on Feb 10th 2019, charred bird A Flydubai Boeing 737-800, registration A6-FEU performing flight FZ-821 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Jazan (Saudi Arabia), was climbing out of Dubai's runway 12R when the crew requested to level off at 7000 feet advising cabin crew informed them about an engine (CFM56) had ingested a bird, however, the engines were fine. A short time later the crew declared PAN PAN advising the engines were still fine, cabin crew however reported smoke in the cabin, they wanted to return to Dubai. The aircraft landed safely back on Dubai's runway 12L about 15 minutes after departure. A replacement Boeing 737-800 registration A6-FDX reached Jazan with a delay of about 4 hours. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for 25 hours, then returned to service. http://avherald.com/h?article=4c412c7b&opt=0 Back to Top Accident: British Airways A320 near London on Feb 10th 2019, fumes in flight deck and cabin A British Airways Airbus A320-200, registration G-EUUP performing flight BA-993 from Berlin Tegel (Germany) to London Heathrow,EN (UK), was enroute at FL360 near Amsterdam when the crew reported that there had been fumes briefly on the flight deck, which quickly dissipated, however, strong fumes occurred in the cabin prompting cabin crew to don their smoke hoods, one cabin crew became sick. The aircraft continued to London for a safe landing on runway 27R. Sources tell The Aviation Herald, that there had been a fume event also on the outbound flight BA-992 from Heathrow to Tegel. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground at Heathrow Airport for about 26 hours, then resumed service. http://avherald.com/h?article=4c412eec&opt=0 Back to Top Back to Top Hawker Beechcraft 400A - Runway Excursion (Indiana) Date: 11-FEB-2019 Time: 10:07 Type: Hawker Beechcraft 400A Owner/operator: Premier Beechcraft LLC Registration: N750TA C/n / msn: RK-226 Fatalities: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: Other fatalities: 0 Aircraft damage: Minor Location: Richmond Airport, IN (RID/KRID) - United States of America Phase: Landing Nature: Departure airport: Waukesha Airport, WI (UES/KUES) Destination airport: Richmond Airport, IN (RID/KRID) Narrative: A Hawker Beechcraft 400XP corporate jet ran off the runway after landing on runway 24 at Richmond Municipal Airport, Indiana, USA. The nose landing gear collapsed as the aircraft came to a stop on a road (Indiana route 227), 200 m past the paved end of the runway. Weather about the time of the incident (1507Z): KRID 111515Z AUTO 08004KT 1SM BR SCT003 OVC015 00/00 A3013 RMK AO2 KRID 111455Z AUTO 08004KT 1/2SM FG SCT003 OVC015 00/00 A3012 RMK AO2 https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=221738 Back to Top Back to Top Back to Top Microburst detection and avoidance A primer for pilots By Captain Shem Malmquist You're on final and there are thunderstorms around. As you line up still 10 miles out you notice that you can see the airport but there is some light rain in the vicinity of short final. Lightning is present in the area, but you are below the bases. Your radar is set to about 5 degrees nose up and not painting anything other than the light rain you see. There are no windshear warnings and you are equipped with predictive windshear. As you approach the FAF the aircraft in front of you, a CRJ 700, lands. The tower asks them for a ride report and they report "smooth all the way down". You can still see the airport through the continuing light rain. Are you safe to continue? The answer to this question depends. I think we all know that most pilots would continue in this scenario. Is the airport equipped with a microburst detection system? "A what?" you ask. Is that not the same as a windshear detection system? Nope, we'll get to that shortly. Most all of the current guidance for microbursts follows along a series of things to look for and then recommendations should you encounter it. However, the items to look for are so common that they are often ignored, or, if followed, would preclude so many airline operations they would grind the system to a halt. From the FAA Windshear Training Guide AC 00-54: While the "high" probability items are fairly straight forward, the "medium" are not. Also, notice the caution? Clearly there are some gaps. With just minimal tools to avoid it in the first place, the industry turned to how to recognize you're in a microburst and how to best survive the event. These started with a description and image, likely similar to this one: That would be followed by something like this: or maybe one like this: The guidance for windshear recovery is well known and practiced in training often, but I will add it here as a good reminder, although the following is very generic (out of the FAA Windshear Training Guide) and so does not reflect methods that may be applicable to some current designs, it never hurts to review: All that is great, but there are two parts to preventing a problem. Astronaut Frank Borman (Col, USAF, Ret.) famously stated "A superior pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill". For the most part, the guidance to on microbursts pilots falls into the "skill" part, and the avoidance of them is left to their intuition or just experience. Unfortunately, microbursts are rare enough that experience is likely not going to be enough. This may also be the reason we do not see more accidents. The odds of a microburst occurring very near the approach or departure path of an airport just when an airplane is there is, fortunately, quite low. Several years ago, while researching material for another project, I had some discussions with a few folks at MIT's Lincoln Laboratory. The Lincoln Lab had developed an algorithm to detect windshear that was not based on the "after the fact". To understand this, look back at the "typical descriptions" we get of microbursts. The focus is all on the way a developed microburst manifests itself and what a pilot would experience flying through it. It starts with a building headwind, then a downdraft and finally a tailwind. The cues pilots are taught are built around that. Windshear alerting systems, both ground based and airborne are designed to look for the differences in the outward flow. They detect lateral flow, parallel to the ground, and if there is enough of a differential they signal a windshear. These systems work well for telling you that a microburst has occurred, but what about detecting one that is about to occur. The below image was developed on work initially done by Dr. Fujita (yes, the same Fujita that originated the scale for tornadoes). This is showing where the water is in the storm, or "Vertically Integrated Liquid" (VIL). The following images come from several papers out of the Lincoln Lab. What you can see if that, for simplicity, a microburst starts as a large updraft holding water aloft. That water finally gets so heavy that the updraft cannot hold it anymore, and so it starts to fall. It may fall directly down, or may be offset quite a bit depending on winds, etc., As it falls it starts to evaporate, cooling it, and accelerating the flow. For practical purposes, the Lincoln Lab developed an algorithm that detects this mass of water aloft. The microburst detection systems they developed using this algorithm are now installed at approximately 67 U.S. airports and Hong Kong. They do not necessarily detect for every runway and the alert is not a "windshear alert" from ATC but rather a "microburst alert". Notice that in the earlier part of a microburst's life cycle the rain is all aloft. Now consider how your radar is set. If you are following what most pilots do, setting just a few degrees up to remove terrain, you are, literally, under-scanning the threat! You will pick up next to nothing. Assuming that the Delta 191 crew was using "standard" techniques, they would not have been painting much on their radar until it was too late. On final, you are below the rain, or maybe just a bit is starting to fall in a thin line that winds its way through the updrafts - sort of a path-finder for the larger mass. Your radar is picking up nothing of significance and you can visually see the runway. All looks great! It is literally "suckering" you in. Then you get too close to avoid it and the mass comes down. Look at the next couple of images. You do not want to be underneath one of these as it collapses on top of you! Going back to the vertical profile, below is an image (you can see my post here for more background on it). Can you tell where you want to scan for the danger? As you probably have surmised, the guidance in most radar manuals and instruction is generally telling us to scan too low to "see" the threat on approach and departure. The solution is to point your beam higher up. Pretty much all airborne radar that I am aware of have a maximum tilt of 15 degrees. Using the tilt formula, one degree equals 1,000 feet at 10 miles, you can see that even at 15 degrees up the maximum you can "see" is 15,000 feet above the aircraft (a bit more depending on your beam width, most large aircraft have approximately 3.5 degrees wide beams). You can use the formula to see where to scan to capture the threat at The illustration below gives some insight. Have an automated system? Know how it works. Read the literature. Like any automated system, we must truly understand how it works to know how to get the information you need. It is very probable you'll have to "work around" the auto mode to "see higher". Some of these systems are further limited when they go into predictive windshear mode, limiting the vertical scan to increase the scan rate. Obviously, this creates a problem, but if you see more water aloft than down below, be careful. Pretty much the only way this can occur is hail, virga or an impending microburst. Of course, virga can be indication of a "dry" microburst as well. I have used this in the real world several times now. A couple of times I was showing my F/O the technique before takeoff and pointing out how a storm looked like it met the profile for a microburst. On one occasion the storm was offset from the departure path so was not going to be a factor, but as we broke ground it "let loose" (several miles ahead and to our left) and we got a "windshear ahead" alert as we could see the bottom fall out of the storm. On another we were in Denver and as we started to taxi I pointed out that as we rolled the tilt up to 15 it went from nothing to green, yellow and red. I said "we are going to have to take a look at this when we get aligned with the runway, but we may need to delay". Just 5 minutes later ATC called "microburst alert" and shut down the airport! Even if you can't get the beam high enough you might still be able to see high enough to get a slightly early warning of an "impending threat". Also, there really is no point in scanning the weather under 10,000 feet. You really can't tell whether what you're seeing is convective or just low altitude heavy rain without tilting upwards. One last caveat. Nothing is 100% sure. This method is just one more to put into your toolbox but continue to rely on all the cues you can get. Pilots around the world are enrolling in Captain Shem Malmquist's acclaimed online High Altitude Flying Course created in association with Flight Safety Information and Beyond Risk Management. He is also the co-author of Angle of Attack: Air France 447 and the Future of Aviation Safety. For more information click here. Back to Top Click here to sign up for the next session with Captain Shem Malmquist beginning in late January. Or call us at 231 720-0930 (EST). High Altitude Flying Overview Second session sold out. The new April course is filling up fast. Book now to reserve your place. ***************** "I think the course is great." Erika Armstrong Director of Instructional Design Air Crew Academy Back to Top Making GA Safety Policy Joint FAA-industry GA safety efforts borrow heavily from those for commercial operations, but it's still too soon to know how effective they've been. By Robert Wright | February 11, 2019 Since the mid-1990s, the FAA has worked proactively with the aviation community to reduce fatal aviation accidents. This has worked spectacularly well with the airlines, which are much more tightly regulated than general aviation, and the safety record shows it. Until recently, however, these efforts haven't trickled deep down to GA. That's changing. Recent, similar efforts involving the FAA and the GA community are picking up in tempo. You've already seen some of the institutional changes: relaxed certification standards for installing advisory angle-of-attack indicators and the new rash of all-electronic attitude indicators, among others, which are designed to help minimize the classic loss-of-control inflight accident. These and other outcomes may be producing tangible results, but it's too early to be sure. Regardless, by using a data-driven approach and producing specific safety enhancements, these efforts are creating some useful outcomes for GA pilots. The way this came to be is an example of why you never want to see sausage made. 'Safer Skies' The FAA's move away from of its traditional role of "enforcing the regulations" really began after a spate of airline accidents demonstrated that merely complying with the regulations was not sufficient to ensure safety. The most spectacular of these was the July 17, 1996, loss of TWA Flight 800, a Boeing 747 that exploded in mid-air south of Long Island, N.Y., which was preceded by the May 11, 1996, crash of ValuJet Flight 592, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9, which plunged into the Florida Everglades after an in-flight fire broke out in the cargo hold, disabling flight controls. I remember ValuJet 592 well, since I was working in FAA headquarters then and was tasked with leading the Flight Standards headquarters team that was managing the accident at one end of the food chain, while a separate NTSB/FAA field team investigated the accident site. The politics of this accident generated a major political storm and, as one result, my boss and his boss eventually lost their jobs. Within the confines of the FAA's Flight Standards, the ValuJet 592 accident generated much hand-wringing about how the FAA should do its safety oversight job. After the accident, I watched for weeks as we tried to find some regulations that the airline violated. They seemed to comply with the minimum standards of the regulations and it took about a month to find a violation forcing the agency to suspend their operating certificate. Some of us already knew that mere compliance with the regulations is a necessary but insufficient action to ensure safety. Flight Standards eventually devised a long-term strategy based on a "system safety" concept that would require proactive cooperation with the community, rather than enforcement, and be data and risk-driven. While Flight Standards was moving slowly, the aviation community and new FAA leadership responded rapidly to political pressure by creating the "Safer Skies" initiative. This concept envisioned the FAA and industry working together to use data to proactively identify accident precursors and then devise mitigations using non-regulatory approaches and risk-based methods. CAST The airline community quickly jumped on the bandwagon and in partnership with the FAA created the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) by 1998. Besides the airlines, the group included manufacturers, pilot unions, FAA offices and other industry organizations. They quickly settled on a data-based analysis taxonomy and started to review accident and other data to determine leading accident causes and precursors. From this analysis they surfaced leading accident "causes," such as loss of control (LOC), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and others. The CAST efforts were rewarded by a spectacular reduction in airline accidents. For example, from 1998-2008, the fatal airline accident rate in the U.S. declined by 83 percent. Yes, there were other factors involved in this reduction, but the CAST effort pioneered the kinds of activity that could influence accident rates. That's due, at least in part, to the tightly controlled and managed airline world, where it is relatively easy to implement widespread changes. The efforts of the CAST, including the proactive way it formed, were recognized within the aviation community. In 2008, the group was awarded the prestigious Collier Trophy. GAJSC What about the general aviation community? Even though the tragic airline accidents of the mid-1990s did not put GA in the spotlight, the FAA and general aviation groups agreed that an effort similar to CAST was needed. After all, the fatal accident rate for general aviation in 1996 was about 40 times that of scheduled U.S. air carriers. The GAJSC was finally organized in 1997 and began to target specific safety issues. The data analysis methodology used by the GAJSC was somewhat different than that used by the CAST. One thing they did was concentrate efforts to improve the quality of GA safety and accident data, which was nowhere near the quality of airline accident data. Nevertheless, the GAJSC produced several reports in the early 2000s on safety issues such as weather, CFIT and runway incursion accidents, as well as a report on aeronautical decision making. And there they sat. FITS After a flurry of these reports were issued in the 2000-2002 timeframe, very little was done to produce tangible mitigations for GA accidents. As the GAJSC's initial activity tapered off, I became the FAA executive leading the General Aviation and Commercial Division and was determined to tackle the GA safety issues raised by the GAJSC. My own analysis convinced me that the general aviation training system was a key impediment to improving safety. The traditional GA training paradigm centered around rote learning, was maneuver-based, depended largely on spoon feeding by the instructor, and did not emphasize advanced pilot skills such as single-pilot resource management (SRM). Consequently, I initiated the FAA Industry Training Standards (FITS) program. The FITS initiative was designed to research and implement new training concepts such as scenario-based training, student-centered learning and grading, and SRM proficiency, especially risk management. In designing the program, I created partnerships with the leading universities with aviation training programs. Among the products that were researched, developed, and tested was an integrated private/ instrument curriculum and course. The research and hands-on real-world testing of FITS proved the embodied concepts were effective. Pilots trained with them performed as well or better than those trained by conventional methods, and performed much better with tasks such as automation management and other SRM elements. General aviation accident rates remained flat. The Community Responds After I retired from the FAA in 2005, progress on FITS slowed as the organization I led went through three successive leadership changes in five years. Meanwhile, the general aviation fatal accident rate was stagnant, even as the airline rate continued its decline toward zero. In late 2010, I decided it might be time to highlight the need for pilot training reform, and to "reinvigorate" FAA and industry action. With several other fellow members of the Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE), we organized a pilot training reform symposium, held in Atlanta, Ga., in May 2011. The symposium was well attended by FAA and industry leaders, and practitioners in the training community, and was keynoted by then-FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. We organized these talented individuals into three work groups and tasked them with creating real-world recommendations for training reform before the end of the symposium. The event produced many recommendations concerning training standards, doctrine, curricula and other elements of modernized training. We transmitted the final report on the symposium to offices in the FAA and several general aviation organizations. The symposium attracted a lot of aviation press attention, and the FAA took notice. Within a few months, action to address symposium recommendations was underway on at least two fronts within the FAA and its partners in the general aviation community. In late 2011, the FAA chartered the first of three work groups under the aviation rulemaking advisory committee umbrella to examine pilot training standards and recommend changes to those standards to address accident causes and other safety issues. I still serve on the third of these three groups, which is finalizing the airman certification standards (ACS) replacing the practical test standards (PTS). The private and commercial pilot as well as the instrument rating ACS documents are currently effective. Other airman certificate ACSs will be issued until all PTS documents are eventually replaced. Also in 2011, the FAA re-chartered and reorganized the GAJSC to identify GA accident causes and develop safety mitigations. The GAJSC was directed to use data analysis methods like those used by the CAST and to develop practical, effective "safety enhancements" (SEs) designed to mitigate general aviation safety problems. Since then, the GAJSC has been busy analyzing accident data, issuing reports on major accident causes, and developing mitigations outlined in the SEs. Their analysis developed, among other data, the infographic reproduced on the opposite page. It's important to point out that the GAJSC relies on NTSB reports and reporting conventions. In my view, these don't always reveal the true root causes of accidents. For example, accidents attributed to LOC-I and CFIT often are describing only the final event in the accident chain that produced the "smoking hole" in the ground. They don't usually describe the "why" of the accident. The Pareto chart above presents GAJSC data describing leading accident causes and their rate of occurrence. Yes, it's hard to read and interpret the abbreviations, but the four leading accident causes include loss of control in-flight (LOC-I), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), powerplant and component failures, and fuel related causes. Collectively, these four causes accounted for 72 percent of the accidents investigated. Improving Trends? Speaking of hype, some in the GA press and community have been touting the reduction in GA fatal accident rates that occurred in 2015 and 2016. For example, the rate per 100,000 flight hours dropped from 1.305 in 2014 to 1.098 in 2015 and dropped again to 0.989 in 2016. Much has been made about how GA has finally cracked the barrier of one accident per 100,000 hours and perhaps how this is due to GAJSC or other FAA/industry accidents. If these numbers truly indicate a sustainable new trend in GA safety is underway, it's clear that would be a good thing. But I would be cautious about attributing cause and effect when describing actions taken by the GAJSC or, for that matter, any other recent actions by the FAA, industry or the aviation community. For example, it could be that the accident rates are decreasing because of the sad demographics of general aviation. In the last 35 years, the number of private pilots has decreased drastically-and the number of student pilots and student starts even more so. This means that the percentage of low-time pilots in the system has fallen to its lowest level in years. The historical record shows that pilots in training have relatively good safety records because they are under an instructor's supervision and that accident rates go up after these pilots receive private certificates, until they gain more experience. While I'm not yet buying this hypothesis, I believe we should remain skeptical about accident trends and even more so about showing cause and effect due to recent FAA and industry actions. (Readers should know that Aviation Safety magazine's Editor-in-Chief actively participated in the GAJSC's efforts to identify safety enhancements designed to mitigate accidents resulting from powerplant failures.) Where's The Beef? So where does any of this leave individual pilots who are looking to the GAJSC or other organizations for information that will help them fly safer and avoid accidents? To answer that question, we might want to look at a few of the safety enhancements (SEs) produced by the GAJSC to see which ones might provide useful and practical information. Below are a few of my favorites that may meet that need. You may find other SEs that may be more relevant to your own operations. In most cases, however, you will find that the SEs are new enough that follow-up action has not yet occurred and there is no "product" in place that will give you the information you need to take leverage the SE. Hopefully, in time the FAA and the GA community will fully implement those SEs that will be of most value to pilots. Risk-Based Flight Review: "The FAA will compile and disseminate risk-based concerns to flight instructors and flight schools to highlight regional and national risks in training and flight reviews. National risk-based concerns identified by the GAJSC in studies for that year should also be shared." Weather Technology/Use of Available Weather Information: "The FAA and industry will educate the GA community on and promote the use of available weather information technologies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Aviation Digital Data Service (ADDS) icing tool." Single-Pilot CRM: "Best practices regarding single-pilot CRM will be identified. The identified best practices should be communicated to the GA community through a public education campaign." For More Information For those readers so inclined, all of the GAJSC's reports, including those dating from its early years, are still available and can be accessed online at the organization's web site: www.gajsc.org/document-center. Readers who may want more information on the FAA Industry Training Standards (FITS) program, various documents are still on the FAA web site at: www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/research. Information on SAFE's May 2011 symposium is available on that organization's web site at: www.pilottrainingreform.org. The GAJSC's safey enhancements (SEs) also are available online: www.gajsc.org/safety-enhancements. Additional details on the GAJSC can be found in my earlier article on the organization and its work in the March 2011 issue of Aviation Safety. Robert Wright is a former FAA executive and President of Wright Aviation Solutions LLC. He is also a 9800-hour ATP with four jet type ratings, and he holds a Flight Instructor Certificate. His opinions in this article do not necessarily represent those of clients or other organizations that he represents. https://www.avweb.com/news/features/Making-GA-Safety-Policy-232270-1.html Back to Top Honeywell and Curtiss-Wright roll out data-transmitting black boxes US aerospace companies Honeywell and Curtiss-Wright have teamed to develop a line of cockpit voice and data recorders that will be capable of transmitting aircraft data to ground stations. Curtis-Wright will also distribute the "HCR-25" recorders, which will be available for business and commercial aircraft by 2020, prior to when new European cockpit recorder rules take effect, says Honeywell. Those rules, set by the European Aviation Safety Agency, require that by 2021 large aircraft have cockpit voice and data recorders capable of at least 25h of recording duration. In addition to meeting the 25h requirement, Honeywell and Curtiss-Wright's new HCR-25 boxes will have ability to continuously transmit aircraft data to ground stations via Honeywell's "Connected Aircraft" software, Honeywell says. The data will stream off the aircraft to satellites and then to Honeywell's data centers. That data can be processed through analytic tools and used by airlines to reduce flight disruptions and otherwise improve their operations, according to Honeywell. Transmitted data would also be easily available to accident investigators, it adds. Honeywell will offer the systems as standalone cockpit voice recorders, standalone cockpit data recorders and combined data-voice variants, the company says. Honeywell has not yet secured orders for the boxes, but is talking with both airlines and aircraft manufacturers, it says. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/honeywell-and-curtiss-wright-roll-out-data-transmitt-455680/ Back to Top VIRGIN PLANE REPORTS CLOSE SHAVE WITH DRONE A drone reportedly came within metres of a Virgin Australia Boeing 737 approaching Brisbane Airport in the latest scare involving the ubiquitous remotely piloted aircraft. Flight VA329 was about 4nm from Brisbane at an altitude of 1300ft on Saturday when it narrowly missed the white drone. "The flight crew from VA329 visually saw a drone on approach into Brisbane Airport on Saturday,'' a Virgin spokeswoman said. "VA329 landed safely in Brisbane and the event has been reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau." The Civil Aviation Safety Authority, which has responsibility for policing regulations on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, was also aware of the incident and appealed to anybody with information to come forward. "Where we get evidence of a breach of the rules, or a potential breach of the rules, we do investigate and where breaches are proven, we issue penalties,'' CASA spokesman Peter Gibson said. "We issued about 60 fines last calendar year. "The challenge, of course, is identifying who is flying the drone and we don't have evidence of that at this point. "So if anybody out there has any information they can assist us with to identify who was flying the drone then we would most welcome that information." Drones flying near airports have been a long-standing issue that gained international prominence in late 2018 after series of drone sighting closed down London's Gatwick Airport in the run-up to Christmas. CASA is running a project to determine how many drones are operated near capital city airports ahead of rule changes in Australia later this year that will require all drones above 250 grams to be registered. While the project is initially being used to collect data only, Gibson the technology was highly likely to be used in the future for enforcement purposes and the kind of incident involving the Virgin plane. The start of the data gathering project was delayed while a stand-alone server was set up to store data because of concerns it was being collected by Chinese technology produced by global drone giant DJI. A 2017 report by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency said it had moderate confidence DJI was providing US critical infrastructure and law enforcement data to the Chinese government. The report said DJI automatically uploaded information gleaned from Android smartphone apps into cloud storage systems located in Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong "to which the Chinese government most likely has access". According to CASA, the implemented changes mean the data will go directly to the stand-alone server and bypass DJI. https://www.airlineratings.com/news/virgin-plane-reports-close-shave-drone/ Back to Top Embraer delivered 90 commercial aircraft last year Brazilian airframer Embraer delivered 90 commercial aircraft last year, in line with its expectation of 85-95. But a similar level of business aviation deliveries, 91 in total, fell below the manufacturer's predictions of 105-125 for the year. Embraer says it delivered four of the re-engined E190-E2 model and 13 of the conventional E190. But deliveries last year were dominated by the E175, of which 67 were handed over. Embraer rounded off the commercial business with deliveries of five E195s and a single E170. Thirty-three commercial jets were handed over in the fourth quarter, the airframer states. Embraer's business aviation activities included delivering 27 executive aircraft from its Legacy range, plus 64 Phenom light jets. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/embraer-delivered-90-commercial-aircraft-last-year-455668/ Back to Top The Middle East Needs 3000 New Aircraft In The Next 20 Years US plane maker, Boeing, has predicted huge Middle East growth over the next two decades. Boeing's Middle East prediction says that the area will need in the region of 2,990 new aircraft in the next 20 years. Boeing predict almost 3,000 new aircraft will be needed in the MIddle East by 2037 Such growth would triple the existing fleet of aircraft in the region. This also comes with the knock on effect of needing more crew, pilots and ground staff to maintain and operate all these new planes, not to mention growth in the supply chain too. The services market outlook in the Middle East Their report on the Services Market Outlook (SMO) 2018-2037 - Middle East Perspective, showcases a growing requirement for services aimed at reducing operating costs and increasing fleet productivity. In addition to almost 3,000 new aircraft, Boeing's report predicted that: • The Middle East would drive 8% of global demand for aviation services, valued at $745bn • Aviation in the Middle East would grow at 4.6% annually • 218,000 personnel (including 60,000 pilots, 63,000 technicians and 95,000 cabin crew) would be required in the Middle East by 2038 Ihssane Mounir, senior vice president of Commercial Sales & Marketing for The Boeing Company, commented on the Boeing SMO findings; "The Middle East is an unmatched location to connect the growing markets of Asia, Europe and Africa. This feeds the appetite in the region for new commercial airplanes and the services to operate and maintain those jets." As part of their Services Market Outlook, defined as a long term forecast to guide business planning and share industry trends, Boeing have been looking at the wider aviation market too. Overall, they expect the commercial aviation market to be worth around $8.8 trillion between now and 2037, with annual spends doubling over that time. A unique position Boeing highlighted the Middle East's unique position geographically in the world. The location of the region on the borders of Africa, Asia and Europe gives the region the opportunity to create hubs connecting east, west, north and south, in a way that many other regions simply cannot. Middle east position Within eight hours flying time of the Middle East, carriers can reach 65% of the global economy and around 80% of the world's population. And with fifth freedom flights and new airline partners, Middle East carriers can look forward to literally connecting anywhere with anywhere. This has led them to estimate the need for 2,990 new aircraft over the next 20 years, an investment that they estimate to be worth $660bn. Taking into account the Middle East's love for the widebody jet, the split of investment has been predicted at: 70% widebody orders, valued at $460bn 27% single aisle orders, valued at $180bn <1% regional jet orders, valued at less than $1bn 3% freighter jet orders, valued at $20bn Boeing middle east perspective Boeing's Middle East growth predictions lay most investments in the widebody class These predictions show that, despite widebody aircraft typically being the jet of choice, the advent of highly efficient, comfortable narrowbodies will influence the mix over the next two decades. By 2037, they predict widebody use will have dropped from 47% down to 42%, while single aisle jets will increase from 45% to 52%. With an aging widebody fleet and a growing need to refresh them with aircraft that are fit for the future, Boeing's predictions are looking pretty realistic, foretelling a promising future for aviation in the Middle East. https://simpleflying.com/boeing-middle-east-growth/ Back to Top Apply Now! - Director of Audit Programs mba is seeking an experienced individual to manage its audit programs with respect to IATA's (International Air Transport Association) IOSA (IATA Operational Safety Audit) program. The candidate must meet the following requirements, be a self-starter and a leader within the organization. • Must obtain and maintain qualification as an IOSA Auditor; including qualification as an Auditor in at least one specific discipline • Must be proficient in Microsoft Word, Excel and PowerPoint • Be willing to travel globally without restriction to perform audits and attend meetings Duties and Responsibilities: • Manage and develop new opportunities for mba in areas of auditing and training, globally • Manage and lead a team of experienced individuals in the performance of aviation safety focused audits • IOSA(IATA Operation Safety Audit) o Maintain and improve IOSA Administrative management system o Responsible for obtaining and maintaining mba's accreditation as an Audit Organization (AO) in accordance with (IPM Section 1); and mba ITO program manual o Ensure that mba is in conformity with all IOSA Program requirements so long as it is an accredited AO. o Responsible for IOSA Records System o Develop and revise, as necessary, IOSA policies and procedures and ensure that these policies and procedures are available to all IOSA Program personnel o Manage all IOSA Auditing Activity o Responsible for auditor and support staffing for IOSA operations o Maintain listing of approved auditors, verify auditor qualifications, and coordinate auditor accreditation with IATA o Responsible for control and surveillance of Audit Activities and Auditor Performance o For each IOSA, designate team members and schedule audit in accordance with Auditee and Auditor requirements and availability o Develop and instruct Auditor Recurrent Training o Perform the functions of Lead Auditor APPLY HERE ************** POSITIONS AVAILABLE: IOSA AUDITORS mba is currently seeking IOSA Auditors! Do you have over 5 years of aviation experience, 2 years' experience in at least 1 IOSA Discipline, and have completed Auditor Training? Then submit your resume to mba@mba.aero for an opportunity to join our IOSA Audit Team! *IOSA is a registered trademark of the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Back to Top ONLINE SURVEY REQUEST Dear Participant, You are being asked to participate in a research study to evaluate pilot decision-making. This study is expected to take approximately 5 minutes of your time. In order to participate, you must be at least 18 years old and currently employed as a professional pilot. Participation in this study is voluntary, and you may choose to opt out of the study at any time. If you choose to opt out, your data will be destroyed. We appreciate your consideration and time to complete our study. Please click on or copy and paste the URL below: https://goo.gl/forms/9ITjTgICot9o9Jjp1 For more information, please contact: Dr. Stephen Rice scrice@outlook.com We appreciate your interest and participation! Curt Lewis