Flight Safety Information June 13, 2019 - No. 119 In This Issue FAA says has no timetable for Boeing 737 MAX's return to service Boeing 737 Max Pilots Had No Idea What They Were Up Against American Airlines plans to use its execs as guinea pigs to convince people that the Boeing 737 Max is Safe Incident: Mesa CRJ9 at Bismarck on Jun 12th 2019, brakes problem Incident: American A321 near Shreveport on Jun 12th 2019, smoke in cockpit Incident: American A321 near Shreveport on Jun 12th 2019, smoke in cockpit Incident: Canada B789 over Atlantic on Jun 5th 2019, hydraulic fault Incident: Spicejet B738 at Dubai and Jaipur on Jun 12th 2019, burst tyre on departure FAA proposes $715,438 civil penalty against Allegiant Air Pilots at MIA's biggest cargo airline warned execs a crash was coming After spate of incidents, Japan increases punishments for pilots who drink and fly Flames: Passenger carry-on bag ignites at airport checkpoint yesterday Slithering stowaway takes flight from Fort Lauderdale to Hawaii FlightAware Rolls Out Premium Flight-data Service Jet Linx Voluntarily Grounds Fleet for Annual Safety Summit Comac gets going with home grown aircraft programmes Mitsubishi revamps its regional jet as it aims for a U.S. market breakthrough CFM wins blockbuster jet engine order from IndiGo: sources India unveils spacecraft for moon-landing mission GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection and Investigation - course Join us in Washington, D.C., on July 15-18 for ALPA's annual...Air Safety Forum FAA says has no timetable for Boeing 737 MAX's return to service An aerial photo shows Boeing 737 MAX airplanes parked on the tarmac at the Boeing Factory in Renton (Reuters) - The Federal Aviation Administration said on Wednesday it does not have a specific timetable on when Boeing Co's troubled 737 MAX jet would return to service after two fatal crashes led to the airplane's worldwide grounding in March. FAA spokesman Greg Martin said the agency has "no timetable" for allowing the 737 MAX to resume flying and will act "only when it is safe to return to service". Bloomberg reported earlier that the troubled 737 MAX aircraft will be back in the air by December, citing a top Federal Aviation Administration safety official. Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment, and has not given a timeline on when the planes would be back in service. Boeing is not expected to submit its formal software fix to the FAA this week or conduct a certification test flight that is required before it can submit the fix and training upgrade for approval, two people briefed on the matter told Reuters. A battered aviation industry has been speculating on when Boeing will win regulators' approval to put the plane back in the air along with a batch of software upgrades and training. American Airlines Group Inc said on Sunday it was extending cancellations of about 115 daily flights into September due to the grounding of the 737 MAX. https://www.yahoo.com/news/faa-says-no-timetable-boeing-145513417.html Back to Top Boeing 737 Max Pilots Had No Idea What They Were Up Against Investigations of the Boeing 737 Max crashes - one by Indonesia's Lion Air in October 2018 and the other by Ethiopian Airlines in March 2019, causing a total loss of 346 lives - have isolated a flight control system, Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), as a probable cause. MCAS took over when it thought the planes were stalling. Except they weren't stalling. Investigators suspect damaged sensors gave a false stall reading and MCAS took control and put the aircraft into a dive. Pilots, never told MCAS was on board, did all they could do, but not knowing about MCAS, they were unable to fight it off. The 737 Max engines are larger and mounted forward and above their previous placement. This started a chain reaction of events resulting in a more powerful control MCAS. (Image courtesy of Boeing.) How Did This Happen? Initially, "a few lines of code," MCAS was rather benign, requiring or demanding no attention, except in rare high-speed situations that had come up in simulator testing early in the development of the 737 Max. However, flight testing revealed the 737 Max was not handling well in low-speed stall conditions due to its larger and more powerful engines. Boeing engineers volunteered a software fix and MCAS was revised to handle low-speed stall. MCAS now had to be more powerful and act more severely to handle low-speed stall. Safeguards that prevented MCAS from taking control at low-speed were removed. Also removed was input from multiple sensors to detect stall. MCAS had initially relied on two angle-of-attack (AOA) sensors, but the new version of MCAS, involved in both crashes, only used the one on the left side. Wind vane AOA sensors are often damaged. Both Lion Air and the Ethiopian Air flights were getting bad data, indicative of damaged sensors. It is not known when or why MCAS came to rely on a single sensor. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had approved MCAS in its initial design for the purpose of handling extreme high-speed situations. It was not informed that the flight control system had grown more powerful and would be applied more in more situations, reported The New York Times (NYT). Not only did Boeing neglect to inform the FAA of the revised MCAS, it sought to keep it a secret from the airline pilots. Boeing's chief technical pilot, Mark Forkner, requested in a March 30, 2016 email to senior FAA officials, that mention of MCAS be stripped from the 737 Max pilot manual, reports the NYT. He neglected to mention MCAS would be taking over in more flight situations, including more often encountered low-speed, stall situations. Boeing, playing by FAA rules, did not resubmit the revised MCAS because the changes of the control system applied during low-speed conditions, not extreme (interpreted as high-speed) conditions. Laboring under the impression that MCAS was functioning in its original benign state and would be rarely used, the FAA approved Forkner's request. Forkner currently works for Southwest Airlines and is responding only through his lawyer. The FAA role - and especially how it may have been led by the very company it was supposed to be watching - is under investigation by the US Senate. When the 737 Max took flight with passengers, the FAA assumed it to be with the wimpy, benign flight control system, content to stay in the shadows, probably never used. But on-board was a pumped up and muscular MCAS, poised to take control of the aircraft. It was no longer chained by constraints. The pilots had no idea of a stowaway on board. The MCAS was programmed to act on signal: trim the stabilizers to pitch the aircraft down. The FAA database of incidents records five complaints of 737 Max pilots who could not control their aircraft. In addition, there were the aforementioned tragedies of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines flights. Boeing test pilots flew the aircraft with the new, more powerful MCAS and tested two situations, a high-speed maneuver and one low-speed stall, where MCAS was activated and then "freezes." What happened when the sensor was damaged? Such a scenario was considered, but was judged to be so unlikely, predicted to occur once every 10 million flight hours. A fleet of one hundred 737 Maxes would have to fly 10 hours a day every day of the year for 27 years to reach 10 million flight hours. It only took 3 years for two 737 Max planes to go down. MCAS is Born In 2012, veteran test pilot Ray Craig testing high-speed situations in a simulator in the early days of 737 Max development, detected problems with the 737 Max in certain high-speed cases. The FAA demands all passenger aircraft be able to handle a battery of extreme cases, like flying into another plane's vortex. Boeing's fix was the MCAS software. Craig, an old-school pilot and probably distrustful of a software fix, relented to MCAS. After all, it would only kick in when speeds were high and there were great g- forces - a combination rarely encountered. When MCAS did kick in, MCAS would take over the control of the stabilizer (the horizontal wings on the tail) and force the aircraft's nose down. The original version of MCAS allowed for a maximum of 0.6 degrees of rotation of the stabilizer for 10 seconds. But in 2016, after the 737 Max took off in its first test flight, test pilots reported "something was off." The pilots were having trouble in low-speed stall conditions. These problems were thought to be due to the bigger, more powerful engines and their placement more forward than in the previous 737 model. Rather than apply an aerodynamic fix or have pilots try to handle these situations, MCAS was offered as a solution. Since stall occurs at lower speeds and altitude but in greater air density, MCAS had to be far more aggressive, be more powerful and be able to rotate the stabilizers four times as fast: a rotation of up 2.5 degrees in 10 seconds. Why Use MCAS? Boeing, the world's biggest aircraft manufacturer, introduced the 737 Max as the next generation of its best-selling 737 model. New on the model were CFM's LEAP-1B engines. CFM, the joint venture of GE and Frances's Safran, had made these massive engines with 69-inch blade diameter, so big that the 737 Max was going to have a problem with ground clearance. Boeing engineers solved this problemby mounting the engines up and forward from where the previous engines were mounted. While this solved the ground clearance problem, the forward mounted, more powerful engines were thought to have caused problems in flight. Sensors Under Attack The AOA sensor used by the 737 Max has a six-inch long, thin wind vane outside and the angle of the vane relative to the aircraft senses the pitch of the aircraft, or whether it is nose down, level, or nose up. The sensors are prone to malfunction, often from bird strikes, but also from ice or water, impact from errant jetways, or even mechanics stepping on them. Investigators of the Ethiopian Airlines flight suspect the sensor used was struck by a bird. An FAA database reveals 122 strikes on the AOA vanes since 1995. The 737 Max has two angle of attack sensors, one mounted on each side of the aircraft, near the nose of the plane, below the cockpit windows. The sensor on the left of the aircraft is used for the MCAS software. A counter-clockwise rotation of the wind vane relative to the aircraft indicates that the aircraft is nose up and may be heading toward a stall. MCAS sends a signal to turn the horizontal stabilizer clockwise to level the aircraft. (Image courtesy of Boeing.) Aviation engineers are baffled about why Boeing relied on only the left angle of attack (AOA) sensor when the 737 Max is equipped with an identical sensor on the other side. If the sensors are giving vastly different readings, it's a safe bet that one is malfunctioning and MCAS should not kick in. "A single point of failure is an absolute no-no," said one former Boeing engineer who worked on the MAX and is anonymously quoted in The Seattle Times. "That is just a huge system engineering oversight. To just have missed it, I can't imagine how." Mike Sinnett, Boeing vice president, insisted that single sensor is not a single point of failure because the pilot acts as a backup. Sinnett was called to answer "tough questions" from American Airline (AA) pilots in a meeting of the pilots union near AA's North Texas headquarters a few weeks after the Lion Air crash. American Airlines was flying more 737 Max aircraft than any other domestic carrier and the pilots were upset at learning a flight control system had been installed without their knowledge. He did not know he was being recorded and the recording would be leaked to The Dallas Morning News. Sinnett downplayed the role of MCAS: "In a million miles, you're going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you're going to see this, ever." There was no reason to burden the pilots with that information about MCAS, he added: "We try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary." Rising to Boeing's defense was Captain Todd Insler, chairman of the United branch of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) union, who defended MCAS as one of many systems on an airplane that work in the background without pilots' knowledge. It's like watching television, he said in an interview, "I don't need to know how it works." Same Plane-Only Different Despite selling the 737 Max as a vastly improved aircraft, with more powerful yet more efficient engines, Boeing was telling the FAA and pilots that the 737 Max was essentially the same plane as the previous version. Minimal retraining was required - "roughly 30- minute training program on a computer" and certainly no expensive simulator time, according to three former Boeing employees. Not having to retrain pilots with a new aircraft saved the airlines millions of dollars, says the NYT. It was also in Boeing's interest to not have to certify a new aircraft. The Max was being sold as its new, more efficient single-aisle aircraft and was competing head- on with Airbus SE, whose A320neo is on a path to take the lead from Boeing in the single-aisle passenger category. Warning Indication a $80K Option Boeing 737 Max flight deck includes an AOA disagree indicator. (Image courtesy of Ainonline.com and Boeing.) Boeing had a warning indication on the instrument panel for the 737 Max that could have alerted pilots to an AOA sensor failure. The warning came with an AOA Disagree alert software program that relies on an optional AOA sensor. The AOA Disagree alert was sold by Boeing as an $80,000 option and neither the Lion Air or the Ethiopian Airlines flight ordered this option. Even if they had, the system may not have worked. Boeing had known of the AOA Disagree alert not working as intended since November of 2017 - not long after the 737 Max began commercial flights and before both crashes - but did not alert airlines of this until a year afterward. Upon questioning by U.S. lawmakers, Boeing revealed that it had not been planning to fix the warning light until 2020. If Only They Had Known Had pilots been informed of MCAS, could both the Lion Air and the Ethiopian Airlines disasters have been avoided? As is pointed out on Eng-Tips, on the center console of the Max cockpit are two toggle switches under protective guards. Either pilot or copilot could flip up the guard and turn off the switch cutting off all electricity to the stabilizer, effectively neutralizing MCAS. Handwheels the size of dinner plates on the sides of the console connect to cables that turn a screw that trims the stabilizers. That's the theory. Simplified diagram of the elevator control on the 737NG shown for reference. (Image courtesy of Peter Lemme's blog.) In the Lion Air crash, evidence suggests that the pilots did not realize MCAS had taken over- or even that they knew about MCAS. They kept fighting MCAS which was convinced the plane was nose up (it wasn't) and was bent in, "correcting" it. It ended up putting the aircraft into a dive. Had they only known that a similar incident occurred on Indonesia's full-service airline only a day before on a flight from Bali to Jakarta- and it was saved by a heroic, lightning-fast reaction of an off-duty pilot who just happened to be hitching a ride back home. The pilot, unidentified in the Indonesian investigation, had leapt out of his jump seat in the cockpit and flicked off the stabilizer power switches, cutting off MCAS, returning manual control to the flight crew. However, the pilots reported the incident only to maintenance staff. A mechanical check failed to find any malfunctioning equipment. And life went on. Except when it didn't. Like the next day when the Lion Air crashed, and 89 people died. Ethiopian Airline's pilots were able to turn off power to the MCAS aboutthree3 minutes into the flight which allowed them to ascend to 7,000 ft, but then returned power to the MCAS. The aircraft went into a fatal dive. (Image is an artist's depiction of Wall Street Journal graphs.) Flying the Ethiopian Airline flight was a captain that had logged over 8,000 flight hours, over 1,400 hours in 737s and 103 hours in a 737 Max. From that fateful day, according to flight data, it looks as if he had succeeded in cutting off the power to the MCAS system when he encountered a problem. A chart from the Wall Street Journal shows the MCAS signal received no input for almost three minutes which gave him back control of the aircraft and allowed him to ascend to a height of 7,000 ft. But at almost six minutes into the flight, the MCAS system was turned back on. If the sensor was indeed stuck and giving erroneous signals indicating the plane was nose up and in potential stall condition, MCAS may have acted swiftly flatten the plane out, but, in reality, sending it to an nosedive. It's possible the pilots may have been struggling to control the stabilizers via handwheels and succumbing to exhaustion, the forces against the overturned stabilizer too powerful to overcome. A nosedive from 7,000 feet made the aircraft hit the ground at 575 mph and left a crater 32-feet deep. All 157 on board perished. Where Are We Now? Despite multiple cases of MCAS incidents in the FAA database, protests by airline pilots who were not informed about MCAS, Boeing showed little sense of urgency and little admission of culpability. Subsequent to the first crash in October of last year, after Indonesia's investigation blamed the faulty sensor, Boeing promised that a software upgrade for all 737 Max aircraft would not be completed until six months later. In the meantime, the Ethiopian Airline flight crashed. Even after every 737 Max was grounded, Boeing continued to claim the aircraft was safe, saying it had passed every test. All airlines using the Boeing 737 Max for passenger flights have withdrawn the aircraft from service. Boeing will be applying a fix that involves an angle of attack disagree indicator, incorporating input from a second sensor, reducing the force that MCAS can apply to less than the force the pilot can apply in a manual takeover, as well as additional training. No timeline for getting the 737 Max return to the skies has been approved by the FAA. https://www.engineering.com/Hardware/ArticleID/19269/Boeing-Didnt-Want-Pilots-to- Know-about-Flight-Control-System-on-737-Max-Says-NYT.aspx Back to Top American Airlines plans to use its execs as guinea pigs to convince people that the Boeing 737 Max won't crash again A passenger in front of an American Airlines jet. AP * American Airlines says it will fly its senior executives on the Boeing 737 Max before passengers to show the aircraft is safe. * The plane is grounded worldwide but is due to return to the skies once US regulators approve a software upgrade. * A recent poll found that 41% of Americans said they would not consider flying on the plane until it had been back in service for six months - an obvious problem for airlines trying to sell seats. * Southwest and United Airlines say passengers will be able to change flights free if they object to flying on a 737 Max. American Airlines plans to fly its senior executives on the Boeing 737 Max aircraft before any regular passengers in an attempt to reassure the public that the aircraft is safe. Doug Parker, the CEO of American Airlines Group, told investors at the company's annual shareholders meeting on Wednesday that executives and staff would take test flights on the plane once the US Federal Aviation Administration approved it to fly again, Bloomberg reported. The plane has been grounded worldwide since an Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max 8 crashed in March, killing 157 people, five months after 189 people were killed in a crash of a 737 Max operated by the Indonesian carrier Lion Air. Boeing has completed a software update to the plane intended to address a system that misfired in both crashed jets. Airlines are waiting for FAA approval to put the planes back in service. Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302 An investigator with the US National Transportation and Safety Board at the crash site of Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 302 on March 12 in Bishoftu, Ethiopia. Jemal Countess/Getty Images But in the US, many people have seemed reluctant to trust the plane safe even after is cleared to fly. A poll by the investment bank UBS in early June found that 41% of Americans said they wouldn't consider flying on a 737 Max until it had been back in service for six months. In the meantime, airlines are losing money from not using their 737 Max jets and are eager to find ways to make full use of them when they can. Southwest's chief marketing officer, Ryan Green, said in May that passengers who didn't want to fly in a 737 Max would be able to change flights free. "If they're uneasy about flying on a Max aircraft, we'll be flexible with them," Green told CNBC. FILE PHOTO: American Airlines Boeing 737 MAX jets sit parked at a facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, U.S., May 10, 2019. American Airlines/Handout via REUTERS/File Photo United Airlines also said it would offer free rebookings for passengers who do not want to fly on the Max planes. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Europe's aviation regulator, said it has its own requirements for certifying the plane to return, which could mean that it could fly again in the US before it returns in Europe. Boeing says that the plane design is safe and that it is working closely with regulators. It has repeatedly pledged that when the plane returns it will be one of the safest "ever to fly." Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg said Boeing will "earn and re-earn" the public's trust. He also said that he will be on one of the first flights when the plane returns, calling it a "really important part of showing our confidence" in the Max. There is no set date for the 737 Max to return. However, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) official said this week that the plane will likely be back by December. Ali Bahrami, the FAA's associate administrator for aviation safety, said in Germany that the FAA is under a lot "lot of pressure" and that the plane will return to the skies "when we believe it is safe." Parker said on Wednesday that it is "highly likely" that the plane will be flying again by mid-August, Reuters reported. American Airlines has cancelled flights which relied on the 737 Max- around 115 a day - until September 3. Airlines are asking for compensation from Boeing over the grounded jets, though most have continued to express confidence in Boeing and in the 737 Max planes. https://www.businessinsider.com/american-airlines-executives-to-fly-boeing-737-max- before-passengers-2019-6 Back to Top Incident: Mesa CRJ9 at Bismarck on Jun 12th 2019, brakes problem A Mesa Airlines Canadair CRJ-900 on behalf of American Airlines, registration N932LR performing YV- 5997/AA-5997 from Dallas Ft. Worth,TX to Bismarck,ND (USA) with 60 people on board, was on final approach to Bismarck's runway 03 (length 6600 feet/2012 meters) when the crew went around and decided to divert to Fargo,ND (USA) due to a brakes indication for the left main gear. The aircraft landed safely on Fargo's runway 36 (length 9000 feet/2740 meters) about one hour after the go around in Bismarck. A passenger reported the crew indicated a problem with the left hand brakes, they needed the longer runway in Fargo. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ASH5997/history/20190612/0205Z/KDFW/KFAR http://avherald.com/h?article=4c921025&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: American A321 near Shreveport on Jun 12th 2019, smoke in cockpit An American Airlines Airbus A321-200, registration N180US performing flight AA-832 from Phoenix,AZ to Charlotte,NC (USA), was enroute at FL310 about 60nm west of Shreveport,LA (USA) when the crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert to Shreveport. The aircraft landed safely on Shreveport's runway 32 about 20 minutes later. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Shreveport about 8 hours after landing. The remainder of the flight was cancelled, the passengers were rebooked onto other flights. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAL832/history/20190612/1210Z/KPHX/KCLT http://avherald.com/h?article=4c920de9&opt=0 Back to Top Back to Top Incident: Canada B789 over Atlantic on Jun 5th 2019, hydraulic fault An Air Canada Boeing 787-9, registration C-FKSV performing flight AC-875 from Frankfurt/Main (Germany) to Montreal,QC (Canada) with 243 passengers and 10 crew, was enroute at FL380 near N57 W25 about 440nm south of Keflavik (Iceland), when the right hand hydraulic system lost pressure. The flight crew declared PAN PAN and prepared to turn around and divert to London Heathrow, but discovered that the right hand hydraulic pressure as well as quantity could be maintained with the electric driven pump, thus neither safety of flight nor ETOPS critera were affected. The crew cancelled PAN PAN and continued the flight to Montreal for a safe landing. The Canadian TSB reported maintenance found the engine driven hydraulic pump was leaking and replaced the pump. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ACA875/history/20190605/0805Z/EDDF/CYUL http://avherald.com/h?article=4c920b6c&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Spicejet B738 at Dubai and Jaipur on Jun 12th 2019, burst tyre on departure A Spicejet Boeing 737-800, registration VT-SLI performing flight SG-58 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Jaipur (India) with 189 people on board, departed Dubai's runway 30R but burst the inboard right main tyre. The aircraft continued to Jaipur, performed a low approach to Jaipur's runway 27 about 2:55 hours after departure and landed safely on runway 27 about 15 minutes after the low approach. The aircraft vacated the runway and stopped on the adjacent taxiway. The tyre damage (Photo: Tarun Shukla): http://avherald.com/h?article=4c91feb7&opt=0 Back to Top FAA proposes $715,438 civil penalty against Allegiant Air The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes a $715,438 civil penalty against Allegiant Air for allegedly operating an aircraft on more than two dozen flights following improper engine maintenance. In October 2017, Allegiant asked the FAA if it could deactivate an MD-80's functioning automatic reverse thrust system when the aircraft engine's exhaust gas temperature exceeds normal limits. The FAA in December 2017 responded that deactivating that system would be improper unless the system caused the excess temperature, because the temperature exceedance could have other causes. The FAA alleges that on April 13, 2018, the exhaust gas temperature of an Allegiant MD-88 engine exceeded normal limits while the plane was taking off from Roanoke Blacksburg Regional Airport in Virginia for Orlando Sanford International Airport in Florida. When this occurs, the MD-80 maintenance manual calls for turning off the automatic reverse thrust system, finding the cause of the excess temperature, and correcting the cause before turning the system on again. Allegiant, however, did not determine the cause of the excess temperature, the FAA alleges. Instead, the carrier deactivated the system on April 14, 2018, and installed an inoperative placard on it. Between April 14, 2018, and April 22, 2018, Allegiant operated the MD-88 on 28 passenger-carrying flights without determining the cause of the excessive engine exhaust gas temperature, the FAA alleges. As a result, Allegiant violated the terms of its FAA-issued operations specifications, the agency alleges. Allegiant has 30 days after receiving the FAA's enforcement letter to respond to the agency. https://news.aviation-safety.net/2019/06/12/faa-proposes-715438-civil-penalty- against-allegiant-air/ Back to Top Pilots at MIA's biggest cargo airline warned execs a crash was coming. Then a plane went down. Cargo airline Atlas Air pilots pressure the company after recent close calls due to pilot error Cargo airline Atlas Air is under pressure from its pilots after several close calls due to pilot error that have happened recently. A plane, the pilot warned, was going to crash. Experience at Atlas Air had become so insufficient that a catastrophe seemed unavoidable, he told company executives at Atlas's 2017 annual meeting in Miami. "There's a certain level where when the experience goes down and the challenges keep rising that we're going to have more close calls. And they might not all end as well as they have. And that has to be addressed," the captain told Chief Executive Officer William Flynn and Chief Operating Officer John Dietrich, according to a recording of the meeting obtained by the Miami Herald. Two years later, on Feb. 23, 2019, an Atlas Boeing 767 full of Amazon packages left Miami International Airport and crashed 40 miles outside of Houston, killing all three pilots on board. A Cargo Airline Atlas Air plane crashed in a marsh 40 miles outside of Houston, killing all three pilots on board, on Feb. 23, 2019. By Chambers County Sheriff's Office The National Transportation Safety Board has cited pilot error as the likely cause of the crash, according to the Wall Street Journal. But some pilots at the company claim that the true cause lies elsewhere. As online shopping has boomed, so has business for cargo airlines. The global air cargo industry for U.S. carriers has grown by more than 20 percent in the last five years, measured in revenue ton-miles by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. In that same time frame, Atlas grew its fleet by 90 percent from 60 planes to 114. The business boost has come with a dark side, according to several Atlas pilots. New recruits have less-than-optimal flying experience. Training standards for new pilots are low, and refreshers for seasoned aviators are inadequate. Turnover is high. Pilots are promoted to captain hastily, before they have the experience to counter unexpected problems. The Federal Aviation Administration is more hands-off than it should be, they claim. For years, pilots say they have been complaining to the management of MIA's largest cargo carrier about "an erosion of level of experience in the cockpit," in the words of a veteran captain. (The captain, who has been with the company for more than two decades, could not be reach for comment.) At the 2017 meeting, Senior Vice President of Flight Operations Jeff Carlson agreed with the captain's assessment. "I worry about quotas on the flight deck," he said, according to the recording obtained by the Miami Herald. "I'm not oblivious to any of that...We know experience level decreases over time. That's a challenge for this group...Regardless of the experience, the bar never changes. And I just want to make sure that sticks in the back of your mind." PILOT ERROR When Carlson referred to a decrease in experience, he was talking about an industry- wide challenge that's been acknowledged by the Federal Aviation Administration. It's different than the issue plaguing the Boeing Max, which includes training deficiencies related to manufacturer changes to the plane and its software. As more military veteran pilots retire, cargo carriers have struggled to replace them with equally trained candidates. In 2013, the FAA increased the minimum hours of flying experience for certification from 250 hours to 1,500 hours. In 2016, the Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General found that the agency was not providing enough oversight of airline training to ensure pilots maintain manual flying skills. The FAA has since urged pilots to fly without autopilot regularly to hone their skills. Safety and pilot training are the highest priority for Atlas Air, said company spokesperson Debbie Coffey. "We are constantly evaluating and updating our procedures to ensure the safety of our crews and passengers," Coffey said in a statement. "Our training facilities are widely recognized as some of the best in the aviation industry. The managers of our training department include highly experienced pilots with long military and commercial aviation experience." Pilot complaints about training are part of an effort to gain leverage in an ongoing contract negotiation, according to a company statement. Atlas pilots quoted in this story hold leadership positions with the union, the Airline Professionals Assocation Teamsters Local 1224. But Atlas pilots say despite the Atlas executive's shared concerns about safety in 2017, the tweaks made by the FAA and the company have not been enough to change the safety culture at the airline. A spokesperson for the FAA said the agency has not seen an increase in complaints from Atlas pilots in the past 12 months. After the January 2017 meeting, Atlas planes experienced several close calls. In July 2017, an Atlas plane struggled to get airborne during a takeoff in Tokyo. Two months later, another narrowly avoided crashing into a mountain in Hong Kong. In July 2018, another landed so hard in Portsmouth, N.H., that the plane nearly split in half. Two of those incidents were blamed on pilot error. The cause of the other has not been officially determined. Former FAA inspector David Lithgow, who oversaw Atlas Air Boeing 747 training for 17 years before retiring in January 2017, said he can understand pilot concerns. "Before I retired from the FAA, I had oversight responsibility for 100-plus flight instructors and check pilots at Atlas Air," he said in a statement to the Herald. "While this cohort of training and checking personnel was the best I had worked with during my 50 years in aviation at several US Air Force units and six airlines, I was concerned about their increasing level of stress due to the pace of their activities. "I urged my FAA managers to initiate a Risk Management Program in order to provide more resources for surveillance of and support for the Atlas training program but failed to make it happen. I confess that my frustration with lack of FAA support for my program facilitated my decision to retire." Others in the industry say that blaming pilot error just touches the surface of underlying issues. "Part of the idea is that human error is the problem. It isn't," said Shem Malmquist, a Boeing 777 captain at a different cargo airline and professor of advanced aircraft operations at the Florida Institute of Technology's College of Aeronautics. "We're putting people in situations where we expect them to fill the gaps we couldn't envision. They don't have the ability to do it. When they can't, we just say human error. That's a simple way of looking at it that doesn't solve the problems." 'SELLING AND SELLING' Atlas Air was founded in 1992 in Golden, Colorado, with just one Boeing 747 plane. By 1998, it was the largest cargo carrier at Miami International Airport transporting 230,000 tons. Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, formed in 2001, is now the parent company of four cargo airlines - Atlas Air, Polar Air, Titan Aviation Leasing and Southern Air. Since 2010, the company's fleet has grown from 29 planes to 114, including 51 Boeing 747s, making it the world's largest 747 carrier. The company, which trades on the NASDAQ exchange under the symbol AAWW, made $270 million in profit in 2018. It is based in Purchase, New York. Among its chief clients is Amazon, which inked a deal earlier this year for the rights to acquire almost 40 percent of the company. Top shareholders are Blackrock, which holds 14 percent, and Vanguard Group, which holds 9.5 percent. Nine of 11 Marketwatch analysts rate it a "buy." As Atlas quickly expanded, its seasoned pilots reached retirement age of 65, and the airline struggled to attract experienced aviators to take their place, pilots say. From September 2015 to September 2017, the percentage of pilots employed by Atlas with less than three years of experience increased from 36 percent to 51 percent of all its pilots, according to data from Atlas's pilot union presented in federal court in a recent lawsuit. An Atlas Air cargo jet taxis on the runway at Miami International Airport on Wednesday, May 5, 2019. Pilots at MIA's biggest cargo carrier warned executives as far back as 2016 that the company was going to crash a plane. In February, an Atlas flight for Amazon crashed outside of Houston after departing MIA, killing all three pilots on board. Decreased pilot experience isn't limited to Atlas. The problem most acutely affects cargo airlines outside the top tier of Fed Ex and UPS, which offer more attractive salaries and benefits. For instance, first-year captains at Atlas on the Boeing 767 make half of what first year captains at Fed Ex do on the same plane, according to data from Airline Pilot Central, an online database for airline industry employment statistics. Qualified pilots who start at Atlas now quickly move on to the top airlines, which are more insulated from safety risks because they have "better maintenance equipment, better dispatch, tighter policies and procedures," said Malmquist. "When I started, to send your resume [a candidate had to have] 5,000 hours of flying," said Atlas pilot Dan Wells, who has been with the company for 24 years. "Now it's the minimum of 1,500 hours. We have folks coming in with the bare minimum." Southern Air's recruitment website says qualifications for the 737 are 1,000 flying hours, 1,500 for the 777. In a statement, the company said that new pilots start with flying hours well above the FAA minimum of 1,500: an average of 5,738 for new Atlas pilots and 5,391, for new Southern pilots. "There is simply no correlation between the number of new hires and safety incidents," said a spokesperson for the company. But pilots and aviation experts interviewed for this story say it's not just about the number of hours, but the quality of flying time. Industry training focuses on manuals from the airline manufacturer and is geared to pilots who have a solid flying foundation. It has not evolved to address the new dearth of experience, Wells and others said. Quite the opposite is true, said Atlas Air pilot Bob Kirchner, who has been with the company for nearly 20 years. The bar has lowered so that new pilots with less experience are able to re-train until they pass. "They can't afford to lose a single pilot," he said. "So when they get one, they retrain and retrain them. In the old days it was cut and dry. They'd cut you loose." Even annual re-training for seasoned pilots has become more scripted and less effective, said Malmquist. "[Airlines] develop a training curriculum for the year. it's leaked to the pilots; the pilots know exactly what to expect in training," he said. "The company is fine with the pilots knowing what to expect because they have a better pass rate. they can say they are training enough or can reduce training. Everyone is happy with the facade that training is." Atlas has also shortened its promotion path, pilots say. "It took me 9 years to become a captain here," said Michael Russo, an Atlas captain who said he started at Atlas with 9,000 flying hours in 2004. "Now we see upgrade times as low as two years." Even for young fliers, he said, the Atlas approach is "throw them the keys to the airplane and say 'don't break anything.'" In a statement Atlas said captain promotions now happen after an average of four years because the company is in a period of growth. But that rapid growth, say pilots, has exacerbated the problem. Atlas has continued to win cargo and military contracts, adding new, complex routes to the workload, all while attempting to merge pilots and company cultures from its three different main airlines. In 2016, Atlas acquired Southern Air for $107 million. The merger required longtime pilots at Atlas, Polar and Southern airlines to learn new procedures. During mergers, cohesion among the ranks can deteriorate, adding stress and heightening safety concerns, said retired FAA inspector Paul Dolza who was in charge of overseeing Atlas's merger with Southern. Those stresses can be especially acute between captains and first officers who are meant to act as constant checks on one another. "The major problem is blending disparate groups into a cohesive whole that uses the best parts of the procedures that the airlines already have in place. That isn't always the case," said Dolza. All the while, the company has continued to book additional business. Since 2016, the U.S. government has awarded Atlas World Wide Holdings 247 contracts totaling $96 million, mostly to ferry U.S. soldiers and supplies around the world. In 2016, Atlas agreed to dedicate 20 of its planes to Amazon shipments by the end of 2018 and give Amazon the right to acquire 30 percent of the company's common shares. Earlier this year Amazon increased its stake in Atlas by acquiring another five Atlas planes and upping its rights to reach 40 percent of common shares. A spokesperson for Amazon said the company is disappointed by the current relationship between Atlas and its pilot union. Since 2016, Atlas pilots and executives have been trying to negotiate a new contract. "The continued inability of Atlas and their pilot union to resolve these negotiations could result in a change to the allocation of our current and future aircraft. We have an obligation to deliver to our customers, and so do they," the spokesperson said in a statement. The result of more and more contracts, pilots say, is an extremely high-stress environment. A review of dozens of recent internal flight crew reports obtained by the Miami Herald that were filed to management by Atlas pilots shows they have reported being pressured to work when fatigued and pressured by maintenance crews to depart despite safety concerns. "Things have become more contentious, more burdensome," said Russo. "The marketing department is very aggressive. They keep selling and selling and selling, and we wonder how we're going to service all these customers." An FAA spokesperson said Atlas shares information with the agency and the FAA "independently assesses and monitors Atlas' risk mitigations to ensure they are effective." The FAA has not seen an increase in complaints from Atlas Air pilots on its hotline in the last 12 months. Atlas pilots said they hoped that by bringing safety concerns to executives, the company would overhaul its procedures and training program. But that's not what happened. NEAR MISSES The January 2017 company meeting was not the first time pilots raised concerns. Russo said he warned the company a year earlier that the training program needed to change. In his view, pilots need to be trained in a classroom rather than remotely via computer. And he wants to see Atlas exceed the FAA minimum standard of 25 hours of instructor-monitored flying time post-certification. The training headquarters for MIA's largest cargo airline Atlas Air is near the airport. At a meeting here in 2017, a pilot warned executives that unless they recruited more experienced pilots, a plane crash was imminent. "There's been a lot of incidents that could have been full-blown aircraft disasters like what happened in Texas," said Russo. "I was concerned. Summer of 2016 I told the chief pilot personally that I was concerned about the fact that we may be heading toward an accident and that the training program wasn't up to the task of training our new pilots. I'm not the only one." On July 15, 2017, the first of a series of recent close calls happened on a runway in Tokyo, Japan. At Narita International Airport, a Polar Air plane barely made it off the ground during takeoff. The pilots had failed to re-program the Boeing 747 with the required thrust after the airport changed the flight to a shorter runway prior to takeoff, according to a Japanese government report. When the plane crossed the end of the runway, it was just 16 feet off the ground - about 200 feet lower than required. The Japanese Transportation Safety Board cited pilot error as the root cause of the "serious incident." The captain of the plane had nearly 15,000 total hours of flying experience, with about 5,100 on the Boeing 747. The first officer had 13,500 hours of flying experience, with 408 on the 747. A spokesperson for Atlas said the company responded by expanding its runway change checklist. Two months later, on Sept. 24, 2017, an Atlas Boeing 747 took off from Hong Kong International Airport headed to Alaska with four pilots on board. Shortly after takeoff, the plane veered to the right off the flight path, pointed toward one of Hong Kong's largest mountains. Air traffic control told the pilots the plane was off track and instructed them to turn left to get back on track. Then, air traffic control warned the pilots of the mountain to their right and told them to bring the airplane to 5,000 feet as fast as possible to avoid it. At 2,000 feet, the plane's automatic warning system kicked in: the message "Terrain, terrain. Pull Up" blared and flashed in the cockpit. The pilot turned left, missing the mountain by just 670 feet. The Hong Kong Transportation and Housing Bureau is still investigating the "serious incident." The pilot flying at the time had nearly 32,000 hours of experience, with 1,100 hours on the Boeing 747. An initial report from the Hong Kong government did not include information about the flying experience of the other three pilots on board. A spokesperson for Atlas said the company changed the recommended use of navigation displays and the way certain departures are handled. On July 27, 2018, an Atlas Boeing 767 carrying 240 soldiers and 10 crew from Germany to the Portsmouth, N.H., International Airport landed so hard that the body of the plane broke; no injuries were reported. The first officer, who was flying at the time, was "operating the aircraft during the second leg of his initial operating experience following completion of initial training," according to FAA records obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. The FAA recommended the company retrain the pilot. A spokesperson for Atlas said the company has retrained the check airman who was on board at the time. The NTSB is still investigating and recently classified the landing as an accident. In a statement Atlas said that the recent close calls make up a very small fraction of the 180,000 take offs and landings on its airlines in the same time frame. On Feb. 23, 2019, Atlas Air flight 3591 left Miami International Airport headed for Houston on a freighter route. Forty miles from George Bush Intercontinental Airport at around 12:40 p.m., the 767 plane pushed to full thrust - the same thrust used during takeoff - and nose dived 6,000 feet down into Trinity Bay. Three people died: captain Ricky Blakely, 60, of Indiana; first officer Conrad Jules Aska, 44, of Miami; and Mesa Air pilot Sean Archuleta, 36, of Texas, who was riding as a passenger on the flight. Blakely had worked for Atlas since September 2015 and had 11,000 hours of flying time, 1,250 hours on the 767. Aska had worked for Atlas since July 2017 and had 5,000 hours of flying time, 520 hours on the 767. "We are heartbroken by the loss of Flight 3591 that claimed the lives of three of our friends and colleagues," Atlas said in a statement. "The root cause of the accident has not yet been determined, however, we are working closely with the NTSB and the FAA to learn what happened, why it happened and what needs to be done to prevent a recurrence. If Union Leaders or any pilot knows something about the cause of the accident that would allow for remedial action, we encourage them to contact the NTSB." REVAMP NEEDED The multiple expressions of concern and the series of close calls should have been a wake-up call for executives, pilots say. In a statement, Atlas said the issues raised by pilots in this story are part of their union's "negative publicity effort in an attempt to gain leverage in ongoing contract negotiations." In November, a federal judge in Washington, D.C., found that pilots were purposefully slowing down their work and ordered them to stop. A federal appeals court is currently weighing the case. While the only Atlas pilots who would speak on the record for this story hold leadership positions with the union, two other pilots confirmed the safety concerns but said they feared retribution from the company for speaking publicly. One cited a recent case in which Atlas fired a pilot from his job as an instructor after he criticized the company during a legal deposition. That pilot sued in federal court, and Atlas settled the case this year. Other airlines have overhauled training after incidents. After a United Airlines passenger plane came within 100 feet of striking a hill near San Francisco in 1998, United revamped its training protocols. "United treated it as a catastrophe, made changes to their culture," said Russo. "We've had several near misses and we've gotten more procedures and checklists out of it, but the training hasn't responded in a proportionate way. What they need is a total revamp." Karlene Petitt, a pilot for a passenger airline who recently completed her Ph.D. in Aviation specializing in safety culture and training at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in South Florida, said even experienced pilots can be at risk if they get complacent and lose touch with the deeper understanding of basic manual flying or are under stress. "How we're training is the key," she said. "We've changed training to shorten the [economic] footprint. Lack of understanding is why all these are going to happen." In May, the widow of Archuleta, the pilot who was a passenger on the fatal flight in February, sued Atlas Air and Amazon in federal court, alleging the companies failed to adequately train its pilots and prevent the crash. Atlas pilots say the company has not made any significant changes to operations since the crash and worry they are still at risk. "One might argue, well, we don't know what happened so why should we change anything?" said Russo. "But my concern is that nothing has changed, we're just continuing on like we did before the accident." ATLAS AIR President / CEO: William Flynn Chairman: Robert F. Agnew Employees: 3,275 Fleet: 114 planes Major clients: Amazon, DHL, U.S. Department of Defense Trading symbol: AAWW on the NASDAQ exchange Annual revenues: $270 million net income in 2018 https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article230569724.html Back to Top After spate of incidents, Japan increases punishments for pilots who drink and fly The Diet enacted a revised aviation law Thursday that increases punishments for pilots found to have flown under the influence of alcohol or drugs following a series of drinking-related incidents involving Japanese airlines. Under the legislation, which will take effect in stages within one year of its official announcement, the penalty for drinking and flying has been raised from a maximum one-year jail term or ¥300,000 fine to a sentence of up to three years or a ¥500,000 fine. Japanese airlines have already tightened drinking rules, introducing mandatory Breathalyzer tests and relieving pilots of their duties if even a very low level of alcohol is detected. Those flying private planes, however, are not subject to the same checks. The legislation also seeks to improve aviation safety ahead of the intended mid-2020 delivery of the Mitsubishi Regional Jet, Japan's first homegrown commercial passenger jet. The law requires aircraft manufacturers to notify the government of malfunctions, with the compulsory reporting seen as a way to ensure that repairs are carried out quickly. The legislation also outlined broad new requirements around preflight inspections of drones. Additionally, the law allows the government to conduct on-site inspections at residences or offices of drone operators who have caused accidents. Operating drones under the influence of alcohol will be banned under the revised law. A jail term of up to one year or a fine of up to ¥300,000 will be imposed on those who fly drones weighing 200 grams or more under the influence of alcohol or in other conditions in which normal operations of such unmanned aerial vehicles cannot be guaranteed. Failure to conduct proper preflight inspections, and dangerous drone operations such as making a sudden descent, will be subject to a fine of up to ¥500,000. Flight rules for drones have already been put in place by the transport ministry. They include restricting their operation to daytime and requiring pilots to maintain visual contact and ensure the drone flies at least 30 meters above structures, vehicles and people. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/06/13/national/spate-incidents-japan- increases-punishments-pilots-drink-fly/#.XQIzPRZKjIU Back to Top Flames: Passenger carry-on bag ignites at airport checkpoint yesterday CHARLESTON, W.Va. (AP) - Authorities at a West Virginia airport say a passenger's carry-on bag ignited as it was going through a security checkpoint. The Yeager Airport in Charleston says two lithium batteries attached to a charger in the bag caused a small explosion Wednesday. Airport police extinguished the flames, and the airport said there were no injuries or flight delays. The passenger continued on to the flight. Airport Director Terry Sayre said passengers should review Transportation Security Administration regulations regarding prohibited and regulated items before flying. The airport says in a news release that lithium batteries with more than 100 watt hours may be allowed in carry-on bags with airline approval but are limited to two spare batteries per passenger. Loose lithium batteries are prohibited in checked bags. Battery regulations are available online. https://www.apnews.com/b738af7510ab4f9d993f3fa7b8c5809b Back to Top Slithering stowaway takes flight from Fort Lauderdale to Hawaii Wildlife officials detained animal because snakes are banned on islands FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla. - A small snake managed to stow away Monday on a flight from Fort Lauderdale to Hawaii, slithering out of a tourist's backpack when he arrived at his vacation rental in Maui. The little snake managed to get through airport security and remained undiscovered for the more than eight-hour flight. The owners of the property immediately reported the non-venomous southern black racer to local police because snakes are prohibited on the island. An official with Hawaii's Department of Land and Natural Resources was called to the property and detained the snake. Snakes have no natural predators on the islands, making them a serious threat to Hawaii's environment, wildlife officials said. The snake is about the size of a ballpoint pen and appears to be a newborn, wildlife official said. However, Southern black racers, which are mainly found in Florida, can grow up to 6 feet long. The tourist -- a 20-year-old man from Virginia -- was unaware the snake had hitched a ride to Maui and did not bring the animal on purpose, wildlife officials said. "Visitors to our islands may not fully understand the threat that snakes pose to our community and our unique environment. It takes all of us to protect Hawaii," said Phyllis Shimabukuro-Geiser, chairperson of the Hawaii Board of Agriculture. https://www.local10.com/news/local/fort-lauderdale/slithering-stowaway-takes-flight- from-south-florida-to-hawaii Back to Top FlightAware Rolls Out Premium Flight-data Service FlightAware is rolling out a premium version of its professional, private flight-tracking service, FlightAware Global, that will be offered to owners and operators of business jets through select partners, including launch participant Textron Aviation. Under the agreement with Textron Aviation, FlightAware will offer buyers of new or preowned Textron Aviation aircraft a complimentary one-year subscription to FlightAware Global. "This program makes it easy for new aircraft owners to enroll in our service for no charge," said FlightAware CEO Daniel Baker. "We will set up and configure their global coverage so that owners and operators can begin using it the moment they take delivery of their new Textron Aviation aircraft." Users of the service will have unlimited web or mobile access to information derived from thousands of data sources. A key feature of FlightAware Global includes datalink integration with FlightAware terrestrial ADS-B, Aireon space-based ADS-B, and air traffic control radar and flight plan information. Other features include selective unblocking of friends, family, and business associates; aircraft activity notification, including flight plans, route changes, delays, departures, and arrivals; and FBO scheduling at any of the more than 1,000 FBOs participating in the service. In addition to Aireon's space-based ADS-B global coverage, premium features include "Ready to Taxi," which offers live updates for aircraft activity on the ground, and DTN weather maps. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2019-06-12/flightaware- rolls-out-premium-flight-data-service Back to Top Jet Linx Voluntarily Grounds Fleet for Annual Safety Summit Jet Linx, the third largest aircraft management company in the United States (Part 135), further established its position today as the leading company in private aviation by dedicating the entire day to advancing the private aviation industry's most rigorous safety standards during its annual Safety Summit. Jet Linx is reinforcing its unwavering pledge to delivering the highest standard of safety by voluntarily grounding its fleet of over 100 aircraft to bring together all of its more than 500 employees to focus on safety. This is the third consecutive year for the Summit and Jet Linx remains the only air carrier in the United States to implement such a standard. The focus of Jet Linx's third annual Safety Summit is safety culture, safety management, and how to identify potential hazards. The day includes a special keynote session from Jim Hall, former National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chairman, on organizational contributing factors in aviation safety. "Since the inception of Jet Linx 20 years ago, safety has been the cornerstone of our company. Our annual Safety Summit allows us to continue advancing best safety practices and standards of excellence across the entire organization," said Jamie Walker, President & CEO of Jet Linx. "As a leader in the industry, it is our responsibility to hold ourselves accountable and further the highest safety standards. We are proud to invest considerable time, energy and financial resources in order to deliver our aircraft owners and Jet Card members with the confidence that they are flying with the industry's best." "Jet Linx has taken all the right steps in setting the precedent of making safety the number one priority. While there is no perfect way to implement a safety management system, Jet Linx is moving in the right direction, and perhaps most importantly, calling on others to do the same," said Hall. "For Jet Linx to reach out and encourage the prioritization of passenger and employee safety at the highest level in their effort to improve operations across this industry is impressive." The Safety Summit is co-led this year by Sheryl Clarke, Jet Linx's newly appointed Director of Safety & Security, who is responsible for leading the Safety Department and the continued enhancement of Jet Linx's safety programs to ensure that every measure is taken to meet and exceed government regulations. Clarke joins Jet Linx from United Airlines, where she was Managing Director of Airport Operations Safety and Compliance, managing all safety efforts for the 337 airports served by the airline. As a rated Airline Transport Pilot, B-707, B-720 and EMB-145, and a United States Air Force (USAF) Academy graduate, Clarke has logged 7,500 Pilot-in- Command (PIC) hours commercially and 1,800 PIC hours in the USAF, with additional certifications from the NTSB, Department of Transportation (DOT), Safety Management Systems (SMS) and Human Factors Analysis (HFACS). "I am thrilled to be joining Jet Linx at such a significant moment to help the company continue to transform the private aviation industry," said Clarke. "Jet Linx has managed to pursue a nationwide expansion while demonstrating an unwavering commitment to ensuring the safety of their clients, pilots and team. I am proud to be working with Jet Linx to continue to drive the industry standards for safety and security." Clarke's executive appointment comes as Jet Linx celebrates its continued expansion into new markets, including Austin, Boston, Chicago, and New York, and planned future locations in Florida and California. For more information, please visit www.jetlinx.com. https://www.aviationpros.com/airlines/press-release/21084563/jet-linx-aviation-jet- linx-voluntarily-grounds-fleet-for-annual-safety-summit Back to Top Comac gets going with home grown aircraft programmes Comac appears to be hitting its aircraft development stride, with the ARJ21, C919 and CR929 all making progress. But there are strong doubts about how well China's national airframer can execute all three programmes. It has been a busy 11 years for the company, which was originally launched to build the C919, but soon inherited the ARJ21 regional jet programme from AVIC Aircraft. The logic was, and still appears to be, that the regional jet would be a bridge to the bigger prize of the C919, which would compete with the Airbus A320 family and Boeing 737 series. But the manufacturer's scope increased again in June 2016 when it signed an agreement with Russia's United Aircraft to jointly develop the widebody CR929 under the China-Russia Aircraft Company (CRAIC) joint venture. As CR929's programme director Xie Canjun told FlightGlobal: "The ARJ21 is an explorer, opening the path for China's civil aviation development. The C919 we hope will be a successful aircraft type. For the CR929, we want it to be a commercially competitive aircraft of international standard". Critics note that Comac now has its hands full, with three programmes now in different stages of development and production - a challenge that has taken Western OEMs decades to successfully manage in the past. Rob Morris, the global head of consultancy at Ascend by Cirium, notes that "the track record of Comac and other emerging OEMs suggests that the certification and entry into service could be challenged". FINISHING ARJ21 The ARJ21, which has been in service for nearly four years while still having aspects of its design refined, is the main reason why those doubts exist. When it was launched in 2002, the General Electric CF34-10A powered regional jet was scheduled to enter service in 2006. However, its first flight only occurred in 2008, and it would take six more years to obtain type certification. It was then a further three years before a production certificate from the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) was secured in 2017, allowing batch production to move forward. That didn't stop the jet from entering service in November 2015 with launch customer Chengdu Airlines - a carrier partially owned by Comac. Since then, however, a series of problems have emerged, and further development work has been undertaken ARJ21 programme office director, Wang Xingwei, told FlightGlobal in February that efforts are being made to reduce the aircraft's weight by using lighter materials, optimising systems, installing lighter seats and making some wiring changes. Improvements are being made to the cockpit with the adoption of a "dark cockpit concept", which makes alerts more pronounced to the crew, while changes are also being made to the flight control layout. Comac is also looking to raise the ARJ21's seat count by adding up to seven seats, taking its capacity up to 89 in a dual-class layout, or 97 in a single-class. At mid-May, Chengdu Airlines had six ARJ21s in service, while start-up carrier Genghis Khan Airlines had taken delivery of its first of 25 aircraft ordered in August 2018. Urumqi Air is set to become the third operator, with its first aircraft due for delivery around August. One of Comac's challenges is the limited capacity of its Shanghai manufacturing facility, which only has the capacity to build 15 ARJ21s per year. To clear that bottleneck, the manufacturer plans to construct a new facility near Shanghai Pudong International airport that can assemble 30 aircraft a year. Assuming that capacity is realised, production could theoretically stretch on for a decade, with Cirium's Fleets Analyzer showing that the ARJ21 has 237 firm orders, and options and letters of intent for a further 476 - almost all from Chinese carriers and leasing companies. But there are doubts over how many of those aircraft will be produced. Cirium's Fleets Forecast predicts that only 79 ARJ21s will be delivered before Comac switches its focus to production of the larger C919. C919 PRIORITY Development is progressing on the narrowbody C919, following its first flight in May 2017. Service entry is targeted for 2020 or 2021 with launch operator China Eastern Airlines. Three prototype aircraft, all powered by CFM International Leap-1C engines, are now involved in a series of tests from Comac's base in Xian, mostly focused on flutter, airspeed calibrations, loading, stability, and general performance. During a February visit to Comac's facility, the manufacturer told FlightGlobal it hopes to have three more C919 prototypes flying this year. The aim is to add one flight test aircraft in each of the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2019, and these jets are now in various stages of assembly. Comac states that the aircraft will have a capacity of between 158 to 168 seats, and a range of between 2,200nm (4,075km) and 3,000nm. That puts it at a disadvantage to the A320neo and Boeing 737 Max, which both offer more range and capacity. Fleets Analyzer shows that Comac has orders for 305 C919s, options for 45 additional aircraft, and letters of intent for 658 more. Like the ARJ21, Chinese airlines and leasing companies dominate the orderbook. The Cirium Fleet Forecast predicts that that Comac will deliver around 1,209 C919s by 2037. WIDEBODY NEXT At the same time, Comac is working with UAC under the CRAIC joint venture that is developing the widebody CR929. Comac will take responsibility for producing the CR929's fuselage and completing final assembly in Shanghai. The aircraft's composite wings, empennage, and tail section will be produced in Russia. Xie says the programme is scheduled to complete the concept design phase by the end of this year or early 2020, before moving into a definition phase expected to last until the first half of 2022. It has set aside 18 to 24 months for flight tests, with a target of certification in 2027. Two variants will be developed. The baseline CR929-600 is designed to carry 280 passengers in a three-class configuration, with a range of 6,500nm and a maximum take-off weight of 242t. The stretched -700 will carry 320 seats with a range of 5,400nm. A shorter -500 variant is also being proposed, capable of seating 250 passengers with a range of 7,570nm. The -600 is similar in size and capability to the A330-900 and Boeing 787-8 and -9, says Ray Jaworowski of Forecast International. He adds that the CR929 will replace the Ilyushin Il-96 in UAC's product line "if not immediately, then almost certainly eventually". One of the larger items expected to be checked off this year is selecting a powerplant for the programme. Xie told FlightGlobal in February that it was "very close" to selecting between proposals from Rolls-Royce and GE Aviation, before moving to a joint definition phase. While the CR929 will initially use a Western engine, Russian and Chinese alternatives are also expected to be offered. Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC) is working to develop the AEF 3500 high-bypass engine, while United Engine and Aviadvigatel were awarded a $1.13 billion contract to develop the PD-35-1 demonstrator powerplant by 2023. That engine is expected to produce over 70,000lb (321kN) of thrust. CRAIC has yet to secure a launch order for the CR929, although Comac is confident that one is imminent - again likely to be from a Chinese carrier. But it is hardly expected to shake up the market. The Cirium Fleet Forecast prediction for the baseline -600 variant is delivery of around 224 aircraft, primarily to customers in China, Russia and the CIS countries, along with small, politically-linked export sales. With one jet in service, the next on the way, and a widebody in the offing, Comac is not standing still. But having made some missteps in its past, it now faces the challenge of executing each of them well. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/comac-gets-going-with-home-grown- aircraft-programmes-458176/ Back to Top Mitsubishi revamps its regional jet as it aims for a U.S. market breakthrough Mitsubishi, the Japanese industrial giant, announced Thursday that is is developing Spacejet, a smaller, reconfigured regional model that will offer a more spacious... (Mitsubishi) More While the first variant of Mitsubishi's new regional jet is currently being flight tested at Moses Lake in Central Washington, the Japanese industrial giant announced Thursday a smaller, reconfigured and rebranded model designed to hit a sweet spot for U.S. airlines. Goodbye to the Mitsubishi Regional Jet (MRJ) and hello to the SpaceJet, a name intended to convey to passengers that its spacious cabin offers as much room and comfort as any mainline jet. A mock-up of the proposed new interior will be on display next week at the Paris Air Show. More significant than the new name, Mitsubishi has stretched the fuselage of this second member of its regional jet (RJ) family to provide the maximum passenger capacity allowed within U.S. restrictions on RJs. That transforms a jet that wasn't selling into one that's the ideal size for U.S. airlines. The global business of producing regional jets - those small, often uncomfortable, sub- 100-seat airplanes that major airlines typically fly domestically on less popular routes - has rapidly consolidated as Bombardier of Canada is leaving the business and Boeing is buying the RJ business of Embraer of Brazil. Mitsubishi is seizing the moment by developing this new model while simultaneously making a bid for Bombardier's regional jet business to provide a ready-made sales and support infrastructure in North America. That looks likely to produce an unexpected twist. In the coming years, Mitsubishi may find itself in a position it always said it would avoid: head-to-head competition with Boeing. And there's even a whispered chance that the new model SpaceJet for the American market could be built in the U.S., perhaps in Washington state. Overcoming restrictions The first MRJ model, a 90-seat airplane previously called the MRJ90 and now renamed the SpaceJet M90, is completing flight tests in Moses Lake. It's scheduled to enter commercial service with All Nippon Airways (ANA) of Japan by the middle of next year - fully seven years late. But that plane is too large to sell in the U.S., by far the biggest regional jet market, because American carriers work under "scope clause" restrictions with their pilot unions that limit the size of these secondary planes that are flown by lower-paid pilots. The newly configured second variant will exactly meet the scope-clause weight restriction of 86,000 pounds and will carry the full U.S. limit of 76 passengers in three classes. In other countries without such restrictions, it will seat up to 88 passengers in a single class. Mitsubishi designed the original MRJ with the faulty expectation that the U.S. scope restrictions would be adjusted upward. They were not, and aren't likely to be for years. Mitsubishi seemed stuck, excluded from the market that represents 40 percent of global regional jet sales. Thursday's announcement means scrapping the previously planned MRJ-70, which could fit 76 passengers only in a single-class layout and proved too small for the U.S. carriers. It's now replaced by the SpaceJet M100, the slightly stretched model. The old MRJ70 had the same wing as an MRJ90. But the new M100 version will have a smaller wing, reducing its wingspan by 4.5 feet, so while it can carry more passengers it won't be any heavier than the MRJ70. Mitsubishi promises "the widest and tallest cabin in its class, the roomiest economy seat and the most overhead bin capacity" of any regional jet. For airlines, its main appeal is that unlike the other scope-compliant jets on offer, it's an all-new design with highly fuel-efficient Pratt & Whitney geared turbofan engines. Buying a support network Separately, this month it was disclosed that Mitsubishi is bidding to buy out Bombardier's RJ business. If that goes through, Mitsubishi will acquire a fleet support and sales network to back its clean-design airplane. It will have the people, the contracts and the relationships Bombardier has developed across North America and will be well positioned to replace the more than 500 older Bombardier RJs in the current U.S. fleet. "We now have the best product at the right timing," Alex Bellamy, chief development officer for Mitsubishi Aircraft, said in an interview. "We think we will fundamentally change this sector." Bjorn Fehrm of Leeham.net is impressed with the MRJ's possible transformation from "Ugly Duckling, the airplane that didn't fit anywhere," to a potential swan. "The MRJ is the only regional jet with a new engine that fits in the U.S. system," he said. "It's the big news of the Paris Air Show." Embraer has a new line of E2 jets that feature similar Pratt & Whitney engines, but all are heavier than the 86,000-pound U.S. weight limit, and so don't comply with the scope-clause restrictions. With Bombardier gone and Boeing buying Embraer's RJ business, Mitsubishi will be up against Boeing in the U.S. market - where Boeing will be able to sell only the older model E-Jets, not the fuel-efficient E2s. With two deft strokes, said Fehrm, Mitsubishi is suddenly in a position "to be a viable competitor to Boeing." In Paris next week, Mitsubishi will promote its new model and try to convince industry experts that after years of delays it now finally has its act together. Teal Group analyst Richard Aboulafia said "the SpaceJet is theoretical," still a paper airplane. Mitsubishi said the SpaceJet M100 program won't be formally launched until later this year. And Mitsubishi's execution on the MRJ program has not been good up to now. "It's been a very long time that they've had an MRJ in gestation, and they are still years away from actually delivering a jet to the U.S. market," Aboulafia said. We need your support In-depth journalism takes time and effort to produce, and it depends on paying subscribers. If you value these kinds of stories, consider subscribing. Bellamy insisted that Mitsubishi has learned from its mistakes. "We have already started design work (on the Space jet) and we've brought additional partners onto the program," he said. He said he's not worried about competing with Boeing because the under-100-seat RJ market is estimated at 5,000 aircraft globally over the next two decades, a size that's "sustainable for two parties to operate ... and for both to have a healthy business." Instead, he said, the problem will be to meet the expected demand. "We've been talking with many, many airlines. We see very strong market demand," he said. "How do we get enough of them into the marketplace? It will more than likely require an expansion of production." While the main MRJ production site will be Nagoya, Japan, Bellamy said Mitsubishi "will not rule out building production facilities in the U.S." if American carriers prove eager. Mitsubishi Aircraft last month moved its headquarters from Texas to Renton. So if such a U.S. plant is needed, might it be located in Washington state? "That's far down the road yet," Bellamy said. "But it has to be a good option." https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/mitsubishi-revamps-its- regional-jet-as-it-aims-for-a-u-s-market-breakthrough/ Back to Top CFM wins blockbuster jet engine order from IndiGo: sources PARIS (Reuters) - Engine maker CFM International is poised to announce one of the world's largest jet engine orders with a deal for more than 600 engines from India's IndiGo, industry sources said. The French-U.S. engine maker, owned by General Electric and France's Safran, has been competing with the airline's existing engine supplier, Pratt & Whitney, to provide the power for 280 twin-engine A320-family jetliners already on order from Airbus by the Delhi-based budget carrier. The airline has selected CFM for the order, which is expected to rise above 600 engines including spares, the sources said. It was unclear if this includes previous options. The two sides are putting finishing touches to the deal in time for an announcement at next week's Paris Airshow, they added. CFM International and IndiGo declined to comment. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/cfm-wins-blockbuster-jet-engine- 222229567.html Back to Top India unveils spacecraft for moon-landing mission India on Wednesday unveiled a spacecraft which is expected to take off for the moon next month, making the country only the fourth to achieve the feat. The mission is India's second to the moon, and if successful it will put the nation in the league of the US, the former Soviet Union and China. Named Chandrayaan-2, the craft is made up of an orbiter, a lander and a rover developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). It will be launched from Sriharikota space centre on July 15 and is expected to land near the lunar South Pole on September 6. Once it touches down, the rover will carry out experiments while being controlled remotely by ISRO scientists. "It is going to be the most complex mission ever undertaken by ISRO," chairman K. Sivan was quoted as saying by local media. "The aim is to use space technology for the benefit of the common man." India has made giant strides in its space journey in recent years. It launched a record 104 satellites in a single mission in 2017, and has also built a reputation for low-cost space exploration and science missions. In March, the country said it had destroyed a low-orbiting satellite in a missile test to prove the nation was among the world's most advanced space powers. https://www.yahoo.com/news/india-unveils-spacecraft-moon-landing-mission- 095504930.html Back to Top GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY Dear Participants, You are being asked to participate in a research study to develop a trust in air traffic controllers scale. This study is expected to take approximately 5 minutes of your time. In order to participate, you must be a resident of the United States, at least 18 years old, and a certified pilot. Participation in this study is voluntary, and you may choose to opt out of the study at any time. If you choose to opt out, your data will be immediately destroyed. We appreciate your consideration and time to complete our study. Please click on or copy and paste the URL below: https://forms.gle/DmMB9fXSupVa5oTGA For more information, please contact: Brad Baugh, Ph.D. in Aviation Student baughfd0@my.erau.edu We appreciate your interest and participation! Back to Top Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection and Investigation Course presented by N. Albert Moussa, PhD, PE July 9 to 11, 2019 BlazeTech Corporation 29 B Montvale Ave, Woburn MA 01801 USA. Dear Colleague, While commercial air transport is very safe, the advent of new technologies poses fire safety challenges that will be treated in this course. This offering draws upon Dr. Moussa's work in this area since 1971 as well as related courses that BlazeTech has been teaching since 1998. Lectures will include Li and Li-ion battery fires, flammability of carbon fiber and glass fiber composites, emerging aviation fluids, engine fires, fuel tank fire/explosion, fire extinguishment methods, protection methods, aircraft accident investigation, and fire/explosion pattern recognition. Recent accidents are continuously added to the course. For each type of fire, this course will provide a cohesive integrated presentation of fundamentals, small- and large-scale testing, computer modeling, standards and specifications, and real accident investigation - as outlined in the course brochure. This integrated approach will enable you to address safety issues related to current and new systems and circumstances, and to investigate one of a kind fire and explosion accidents. The course will benefit professionals who are responsible for commercial aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles including design, equipment selection, test, operation, maintenance, safety management system, hazard/risk assessment, and accident investigation. View Brochure for course content and registration form (also embedded below). View Testmonials of previous attendees and their Companies. View some of the technical references discussed in this course. We also offer this course at the client site as well as customized courses on fire and explosion in other areas. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us. Albert Moussa, Ph.D., P.E. BlazeTech Corporation 29B Montvale Ave. Woburn, MA 01801-7021 781-759-0700 x200 781-759-0703 fax www.blazetech.com firecourse@blazetech.com LinkedIn Back to Top Join us in Washington, D.C., on July 15-18 for ALPA's annual Air Safety Forum Curt Lewis