Flight Safety Information July 29, 2019 - No. 151 In This Issue The Roots of Boeing's 737 Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight Boeing warns it may stop 737 Max production Incident: Eurowings B738 at Nuremburg on Jul 27th 2019, trim problem Incident: Transavia France B738 near Porto Santo on Jul 28th 2019, cabin pressure problems Incident: Bangkok A320 at Bangkok on Jul 27th 2019, rejected takeoff Incident: Lufthansa A388 near Prague on Jul 26th 2019, engine problem Incident: BA Cityflyer E170 near Southend on Jul 27th 2019, bleed air and air conditioning problem Incident: Easyjet A319 at Faro on Jul 25th 2019, bird strike Incident: Azerbaijan A319 near Baku on Jul 26th 2019, cargo smoke indication Incident: United B752 at San Francisco on Jul 26th 2019, engine shut down in flight Incident: Red Wings A320 at Simferopol on Jul 25th 2019, could not retract gear Incident: Hong Kong Express A321 near Da Nang on Jul 26th 2019, engine shut down in flight Seair Seaplanes Cessna 208 Caravan 675 accident: 4 dead American Airlines plane headed to London makes unexpected landing in Boston Boeing reportedly kept the FAA in the dark about big changes it made to the 737 Max's flight-control Ryanair boss warns Boeing 737 Max crisis could lead to job cuts United Airlines taking stake in Clear, a biometric clearance company Used SpaceX Dragon Cargo Ship Arrives at Space Station for Record 3rd Time RESEARCH STUDY REQUEST Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance from SCSI ISASI - 2019 Upcoming USC Aviation Safety & Security Program Courses The Roots of Boeing's 737 Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight After the first fatal crash of the 737 Max, in October 2018, federal regulators realized they didn't fully understand the software system that sent the plane into a nosedive. SEATTLE - In the days after the first crash of Boeing's 737 Max, engineers at the Federal Aviation Administration came to a troubling realization: They didn't fully understand the automated system that helped send the plane into a nose-dive, killing everyone on board. Engineers at the agency scoured their files for information about the system designed to help avoid stalls. They didn't find much. Regulators had never independently assessed the risks of the dangerous software known as MCAS when they approved the plane in 2017. More than a dozen current and former employees at the F.A.A. and Boeing who spoke with The New York Times described a broken regulatory process that effectively neutered the oversight authority of the agency. The regulator had been passing off routine tasks to manufacturers for years, with the goal of freeing up specialists to focus on the most important safety concerns. But on the Max, the regulator handed nearly complete control to Boeing, leaving some key agency officials in the dark about important systems like MCAS, according to the current and former employees. While the agency's flawed oversight of the Boeing 737 Max has attracted much scrutiny since the first crash in October and a second one in March, a Times investigation revealed previously unreported details about weaknesses in the regulatory process that compromised the safety of the plane. The company performed its own assessments of the system, which were not stress-tested by the regulator. Turnover at the agency left two relatively inexperienced engineers overseeing Boeing's early work on the system. The F.A.A. eventually handed over responsibility for approval of MCAS to the manufacturer. After that, Boeing didn't have to share the details of the system with the two agency engineers. They weren't aware of its intricacies, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. Late in the development of the Max, Boeing decided to expand the use of MCAS, to ensure the plane flew smoothly. The new, riskier version relied on a single sensor and could push down the nose of the plane by a much larger amount. Boeing did not submit a formal review of MCAS after the overhaul. It wasn't required by F.A.A. rules. An engineering test pilot at the regulator knew about the changes, according to an agency official. But his job was to evaluate the way the plane flew, not to determine the safety of the system. The agency ultimately certified the jet as safe, required little training for pilots and allowed the plane to keep flying until a second deadly Max crash, less than five months after the first. The plane remains grounded as regulators await a fix from Boeing. If the ban persists much longer, Boeing said this past week that it could be forced to halt production. The F.A.A. and Boeing have defended the plane's certification, saying they followed proper procedures and adhered to the highest standards. "The agency's certification processes are well-established and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs," the regulator said in a statement Friday. "The 737 Max certification program involved 110,000 hours of work on the part of F.A.A. personnel, including flying or supporting 297 test flights." Boeing said "the F.A.A.'s rigor and regulatory leadership has driven ever-increasing levels of safety over the decades," adding that "the 737 Max met the F.A.A.'s stringent standards and requirements as it was certified through the F.A.A.'s processes." [If you have worked at Boeing or the F.A.A. and want to discuss your experience, contact The Times confidentially here.] While Ali Bahrami was the Federal Aviation Administration’s top official in Seattle, some engineers believed that he had installed managers who would be deferential to Boeing. Federal prosecutors and lawmakers are now investigating whether the regulatory process is fundamentally flawed. As planes become more technologically advanced, the rules, even when they are followed, may not be enough to ensure safety. The new software played a role in both disasters, involving Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines, which together killed 346 people. "Did MCAS get the attention it needed? That's one of the things we're looking at," said Chris Hart, the former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, who is now leading a multiagency task force investigating how the Max was approved. "As it evolved from a less robust system to a more powerful system, were the certifiers aware of the changes?" Boeing needed the approval process on the Max to go swiftly. Months behind its rival Airbus, the company was racing to finish the plane, a more fuel-efficient version of its best-selling 737. The regulator's hands-off approach was pivotal. At crucial moments in the Max's development, the agency operated in the background, mainly monitoring Boeing's progress and checking paperwork. The nation's largest aerospace manufacturer, Boeing was treated as a client, with F.A.A. officials making decisions based on the company's deadlines and budget. It has long been a cozy relationship. Top agency officials have shuffled between the government and the industry. During the Max certification, senior leaders at the F.A.A. sometimes overruled their own staff members' recommendations after Boeing pushed back. For safety reasons, many agency engineers wanted Boeing to redesign a pair of cables, part of a major system unrelated to MCAS. The company resisted, and F.A.A. managers took Boeing's side, according to internal agency documents. After the crash of the Lion Air plane last October, F.A.A. engineers were shocked to discover they didn't have a complete analysis of MCAS. The safety review in their files didn't mention that the system could aggressively push down the nose of the plane and trigger repeatedly, making it difficult to regain control of the aircraft, as it did on the doomed Lion Air flight. Despite their hazy understanding of the system, F.A.A. officials decided against grounding the 737 Max. Instead, they published a notice reminding pilots of existing emergency procedures. The notice didn't describe how MCAS worked. At the last minute, an F.A.A. manager told agency engineers to remove the only mention of the system, according to internal agency documents and two people with knowledge of the matter. Instead, airlines learned about it from Boeing. 'He really wanted abdication.' The F.A.A. department that oversaw the Max development had such a singular focus that it was named after the company: The Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office. Many F.A.A. veterans came to see the department, created in 2009, as a symbol of the agency's close relationship with the manufacturer. The top official in Seattle at the time, Ali Bahrami, had a tough time persuading employees to join, according to three current and former employees. Some engineers believed that Mr. Bahrami had installed managers in the office who would defer to Boeing. "He didn't put enough checks and balances in the system," Mike McRae, a former F.A.A. engineer, said of Mr. Bahrami. "He really wanted abdication. He didn't want delegation." Before the certification of the Max began, Mr. Bahrami called a group of F.A.A. engineers into his office, the current and former employees said, and asked some of them to join the group. Many didn't want to change jobs, according to a complaint filed by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the union representing F.A.A. engineers. "I got dragged kicking and screaming," said Richard Reed, a former systems engineer at the F.A.A. Mr. Reed said he had just left surgery when agency officials called to ask whether he would work in the office. "I always claimed that I was on drugs when I said 'yes.'" The F.A.A. said in a statement that Mr. Bahrami "dedicated his career to the advancement of aviation safety in both the private and public sectors." F.A.A. offices in Des Moines, Wash. The way the agency dealt with Boeing left engineers at the agency demoralized, two employees said. For decades, the F.A.A. relied on engineers inside Boeing to help certify aircraft. But after intense lobbying to Congress by industry, the agency adopted rules in 2005 that would give manufacturers like Boeing even more control. Previously, the agency selected the company engineers to work on its behalf; under the new regulations, Boeing could choose them, though the F.A.A. has veto power. Many of the agency's top leaders embraced the approach. It would allow the F.A.A. to certify planes more efficiently and stretch its limited resources. The regulator had also been finding it harder to compete for talented engineers, their government salaries unable to keep up with the going rates in the industry. For Boeing, the changes meant shedding a layer of bureaucracy. "The process was working well," said Tom Heineman, a retired Boeing engineer who worked on the Max. "The F.A.A. was delegating more of the work and the review and the oversight to the manufacturers than it used to." But some F.A.A. engineers were concerned that they were no longer able to effectively monitor what was happening inside Boeing. In a PowerPoint presentation to agency managers in 2016, union representatives raised concerns about a "brain drain" and the "inability to hire and retain qualified personnel." By 2018, the F.A.A. was letting the company certify 96 percent of its own work, according to an agency official. Nicole Potter, an F.A.A. propulsion and fuel systems engineer who worked on the Max, said supervisors repeatedly asked her to give up the right to approve safety documents. She often had to fight to keep the work. "Leadership was targeting a high level of delegation," Ms. Potter said. When F.A.A. employees didn't have time to approve a critical document, she said, "managers could delegate it back to Boeing." It was a process Mr. Bahrami championed to lawmakers. After spending more than two decades at the F.A.A., he left the agency in 2013 and took a job at the Aerospace Industries Association, a trade group that represents Boeing and other manufacturers. "We urge the F.A.A. to allow maximum use of delegation," Mr. Bahrami told Congress in his new lobbying role, arguing it would help American manufacturers compete. In 2017, Mr. Bahrami returned to the F.A.A. as the head of safety. An internal battle at the F.A.A. With Boeing taking more control, F.A.A. engineers found they had little power, even when they did raise concerns. Early on, engineers at the F.A.A. discovered a problem with one of the most important new features of the Max: its engines. The Max, the latest version of the 50-year-old 737, featured more fuel-efficient engines, with a larger fan and a high-pressure turbine. But the bigger, more complex engines could do more damage if they broke apart midair. The F.A.A. engineers were particularly concerned about pieces hitting the cables that control the rudder, according to five people with knowledge of the matter and internal agency documents. A cable severed during takeoff would make it difficult for pilots to regain control, potentially bringing down the jet. The F.A.A. engineers suggested a couple solutions, three of the people said. The company could add a second set of cables or install a computerized system for controlling the rudder. Boeing did not want to make a change, according to internal F.A.A. documents reviewed by The Times. A redesign could have caused delays. Company engineers argued that it was unlikely that an engine would break apart and shrapnel would hit the rudder cable. Most of the F.A.A. engineers working on the issue insisted the change was necessary for safety reasons, according to internal agency emails and documents. But their supervisors balked. In a July 2015 meeting, Jeff Duven, who replaced Mr. Bahrami as the head of the F.A.A.'s Seattle operation, sided with Boeing, said two current employees at the agency. Boeing Max planes in Renton, Wash. The company downplayed the risks of the software, MCAS, to federal officials. F.A.A. managers conceded that the Max "does not meet" agency guidelines "for protecting flight controls," according to an agency document. But in another document, they added that they had to consider whether any requested changes would interfere with Boeing's timeline. The managers wrote that it would be "impractical at this late point in the program," for the company to resolve the issue. Mr. Duven at the F.A.A. also said the decision was based on the safety record of the plane. Engineers at the agency were demoralized, the two agency employees said. One engineer submitted an anonymous complaint to an internal F.A.A. safety board, which was reviewed by The Times. "During meetings regarding this issue the cost to Boeing to upgrade the design was discussed," the engineer wrote. "The comment was made that there may be better places for Boeing to spend their safety dollars." An F.A.A. panel investigated the complaint. It found managers siding with Boeing had created "an environment of mistrust that hampers the ability of the agency to work effectively," the panel said in a 2017 report, which was reviewed by The Times. The panel cautioned against allowing Boeing to handle this kind of approval, saying "the company has a vested interest in minimizing costs and schedule impact." By then, the panel's findings were moot. Managers at the agency had already given Boeing the right to approve the cables, and they were installed on the Max. Playing down risks In the middle of the Max's development, two of the most seasoned engineers in the F.A.A.'s Boeing office left. The engineers, who had a combined 50 years of experience, had joined the office at its creation, taking on responsibility for flight control systems, including MCAS. But they both grew frustrated with the work, which they saw as mostly paper pushing, according to two people with knowledge of the staff changes. In their place, the F.A.A. appointed an engineer who had little experience in flight controls, and a new hire who had gotten his master's degree three years earlier. People who worked with the two engineers said they seemed ill-equipped to identify any problems in a complex system like MCAS. And Boeing played down the importance of MCAS from the outset. An early review by the company didn't consider the system risky, and it didn't prompt additional scrutiny from the F.A.A. engineers, according to two agency officials. The review described a system that would activate only in rare situations, when a plane was making a sharp turn at high speeds. The F.A.A. engineers who had been overseeing MCAS never received another safety assessment. As Boeing raced to finish the Max in 2016, agency managers gave the company the power to approve a batch of safety assessments - some of the most important documents in any certification. They believed the issues were low risk. One of the managers, Julie Alger, delegated the review of MCAS. Previously, the F.A.A. had the final say over the system. The F.A.A. said that decision reflected the consensus of the team. Boeing was in the middle of overhauling MCAS. To help pilots control the plane and avoid a stall, the company allowed MCAS to trigger at low speeds, rather than just at high speeds. The overhauled version would move the stabilizer by as much as 2.5 degrees each time it triggered, significantly pushing down the nose of the plane. The earlier version moved the stabilizer by 0.6 degrees. When company engineers analyzed the change, they figured that the system had not become any riskier, according to two people familiar with Boeing's discussions on the matter. They assumed that pilots would respond to a malfunction in three seconds, quickly bringing the nose of the plane back up. In their view, any problems would be less dangerous at low speeds. So the company never submitted an updated safety assessment of those changes to the agency. In several briefings in 2016, an F.A.A. test pilot learned the details of the system from Boeing. But the two F.A.A. engineers didn't understand that MCAS could move the tail as much as 2.5 degrees, according to two people familiar with their thinking. Under the impression the system was insignificant, officials didn't require Boeing to tell pilots about MCAS. When the company asked to remove mention of MCAS from the pilot's manual, the agency agreed. The F.A.A. also did not mention the software in 30 pages of detailed descriptions noting differences between the Max and the previous iteration of the 737. Days after the Lion Air crash, the agency invited Boeing executives to the F.A.A.'s Seattle headquarters, according to two people with knowledge of the matter. The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that they didn't know. In the middle of the conversation, an F.A.A. employee, one of the people said, interrupted to ask a question on the minds of several agency engineers: Why hadn't Boeing updated the safety analysis of a system that had become so dangerous? https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html Back to Top Boeing warns it may stop 737 Max production Boeing is warning that it might have to halt production of the 737 Max if grounding continues much longer. The company reported its largest-ever quarterly loss of $3.4bn (£2.7bn) on Wednesday due to the troubled plane. If hurdles with regulators worldwide continue, Boeing said it would consider reducing or shutting down production of the 737 Max entirely. However, Boeing boss Dennis Muilenburg is confident the plane will be back in the air by October. "As our efforts to support the 737 Max's safe return to service continue, we will continue to assess our production plans," Mr Muilenburg told investors in a conference call. "Should our estimate of the anticipated return to service change, we might need to consider possible further rate reductions or other options, including a temporary shutdown of the Max production." Boeing's entire fleet of flagship 737 Max planes was grounded in March after issues with the model were linked to an Ethiopian Airlines flight crash that killed 157 people. Five months earlier, 189 people were killed when a Boeing 737 Max operated by Lion Air crashed. Awaiting approval As investigations into the two crashes continue, Boeing has been working on fixes for its Mcas anti-stall flight control software, as well as other issues identified by regulators, including the US Federal Aviation Administration. Boeing, which has customers in 150 countries, is still waiting for approval from regulators. Mr Muilenberg said the planemaker had been holding weekly technical calls with operators of the 737 Max, while the modified software had so far been tested in 225 flight simulator sessions. "These are challenging times, first and foremost, for the families and loved ones who are affected by these recent events, and also for our dedicated people, who work tirelessly to deliver on our mission to connect, protect, explore and inspire the world, all with a relentless focus on quality and safety and doing so with the utmost integrity," he stressed. "This is a defining moment for Boeing and we're committed to coming through this challenging time better and stronger as a company." Spiralling costs After the two crashes, production of the 737 Max was reduced from 52 to 42 aircraft per month, Mr Muilenburg said. The knock-on effect of this move is that Boeing has to pay more for plane parts than before, which are priced according to the volume purchased by the planemaker. Having to suspend deliveries of new 737 Max planes to airlines has also hit Boeing's cash flow and profit margins. Further reducing production of the plane would compound these problems, which could lead Boeing to halt production of the 737 Max completely - a move the company has not taken since it halted production of the 747 for 20 days in 1997, when demand outstripped supply of parts. The grounding of the 737 Max and the cuts in production have both affected Boeing's customers and are likely to continue to cause plane delivery delays in the future, Mr Muilenberg acknowledged. "I want to personally thank everyone who continues to be our partner in this journey; from our airline customers and their pilots, flight attendants and others who have been impacted by these groundings, representatives from all levels of government who share our commitment to safety for the flying public and everyone in the aviation community impacted by these events," he said. "We are grateful for your support and we will continue striving to earn and re-earn your trust." https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49108807 Back to Top Incident: Eurowings B738 at Nuremburg on Jul 27th 2019, trim problem An Eurowings Boeing 737-800, registration D-ABKN performing flight EW-4172 from Nuremburg (Germany) to Palma Mallorca,SP (Spain) with 172 passengers and 6 crew, was in the initial climb out of Nuremberg's runway 28 when the crew stopped the climb at 6000 feet MSL suspecting problems with the electrical trim. The aircraft returned to Nuremburg for a safe landing on runway 10 about 30 minutes after departure. A replacement Boeing 737-800 registration D-ABKM reached Palma Mallorca the following day with a delay of about 16 hours. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground in Nuremburg for about 6 hours, then resumed service. The airline reported the crew suspected a problem with the electrical trim and returned to Nuremburg as a precaution. Passengers were rebooked onto alternative flights and were offered hotel accommodation. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cae6bee&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Transavia France B738 near Porto Santo on Jul 28th 2019, cabin pressure problems A Transavia France Boeing 737-800, registration F-GZHS performing flight TO-3281 from Tenerife South,CI (Spain) to Paris Orly (France) with 140 people on board, was enroute at FL380 about 100nm south of Porto Santo (Portugal) on Madeira Islands when the crew initiated an emergency descent to FL100 due to problems with the cabin pressure, the passenger oxygen masks were released. The aircraft diverted to Porto Santo for a safe landing about 40 minutes after leaving FL380. A replacement Boeing 737-800 registration F-GZHA reached Paris with a delay of 8.5 hours. The airline reported the aircraft suffered a malfunction in the cabin pressurization. The occurence aircraft is still on the ground in Porto Santo about 17 hours after landing. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cae682b&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Bangkok A320 at Bangkok on Jul 27th 2019, rejected takeoff A Bangkok Airways Airbus A320-200, registration HS-PPH performing flight PG-217 from Bangkok to Chiang Mai (Thailand), was accelerating for takeoff from Bangkok's runway 19L when the crew rejected takeoff at low speed (about 39 knots over ground). The aircraft vacated the runway and returned to the apron. The aircraft departed about 80 minutes after the rejected takeoff and reached Chiang Mai with a delay of 72 minutes. A passenger reported the captain announced while the aircraft taxied back to the apron, that an "unsafe condition" had prompted the rejected takeoff. http://avherald.com/h?article=4caddaa7&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Lufthansa A388 near Prague on Jul 26th 2019, engine problem A Lufthansa Airbus A380-800, registration D-AIMB performing flight LH-730 from Munich (Germany) to Hong Kong (China), stopped the climb out of Munich at FL260 but continued in the general direction of Hong Kong. While enroute at FL260 about 90nm eastsoutheast of Prague (Czech Republic) the crew decided to return to Munich advising ATC of a problem with one of the engines (Trent 970). The aircraft maintained FL260, the crew requested to dump fuel, and landed safely back in Munich about 105 minutes after departure. On Jul 27th 2019 The Aviation Herald learned engine #4 (outboard right hand) was having trouble. A replacement A380-800 D-AIMD departed Munich with a delay of 18 hours. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cadd86b&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: BA Cityflyer E170 near Southend on Jul 27th 2019, bleed air and air conditioning problem A British Airways Cityflyer Embraer ERJ-170, registration G-LCYG performing flight BA-4450 from Rotterdam (Netherlands) to London City,EN (UK), was enroute at FL170 about 80nm eastnortheast of Southend,EN (UK) when the crew initiated a rapid descent to FL090 due to problems with bleed air and air conditioning. The aircraft diverted to Southend for a safe landing on runway 23 about 30 minutes later. A passenger reported the captain indicated a bleed air and air conditioning problem, they entered a hold over the North Sea before landing into Southend. On approach to Southend the aircraft received a bird strike in addition. The passengers were bussed to London City Airport. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Southend about 13 hours after landing. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cadd3ab&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Easyjet A319 at Faro on Jul 25th 2019, bird strike An Easyjet Airbus A319-100, registration G-EZBU performing flight U2-6844 from Faro (Portugal) to Glasgow,SC (UK), was in the initial climb out of Faro's runway 28 when an engine (CFM56) ingested a bird prompting the crew to stop the climb at 3000 feet and return to Faro for a safe landing on runway 28 about 20 minutes after departure. The engine received extensive damage to the fan blades. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Faro about 49 hours after landing back. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cadcf09&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Azerbaijan A319 near Baku on Jul 26th 2019, cargo smoke indication An Azerbaijan Airlines Airbus A319-100, registration 4K-AZ04 performing flight J2-15 from Baku (Azerbaijan) to Dubai (United Arab Emirates) with 113 people on board, was climbing through FL300 out of Baku when the crew received a cargo smoke indication and decided to return to Baku. The aircraft landed safely back in Baku about 45 minutes after departure. Emergency services did not find any trace of fire, heat or smoke. A replacement A319-100 registration 4K-AZ05 reached Dubai with a delay of 3 hours. The occurrence aircraft returned to service after 13 hours on the ground in Baku. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cadc3f2&opt=0 Back to Top Back to Top Incident: United B752 at San Francisco on Jul 26th 2019, engine shut down in flight A United Boeing 757-200, registration N595UA performing flight UA-1255 from San Francisco,CA to Newark,NJ (USA) with 146 people on board, was climbing out of San Francisco's runway 01R when the crew stopped the climb at 12,000 feet and declared emergency reporting the right hand engine (PW2037) had overheated, they were on one engine. The crew requested to remain close to the airport and maintain 12,000 feet while working their checklists. The aircraft returned to San Francisco for a safe landing on runway 28L about 45 minutes after departure. A replacement Boeing 757-200 registration N597UA reached Newark with a delay of 7 hours. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/UAL1255/history/20190726/0812Z/KSFO/KEWR http://avherald.com/h?article=4cad26f4&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Red Wings A320 at Simferopol on Jul 25th 2019, could not retract gear A Red Wings Airlines Airbus A320-200, registration VP-BWZ performing flight WZ-786 from Simferopol (Ukraine) to St. Petersburg (Russia), was climbing out of Simferopol's runway 01 when the crew stopped the climb at FL070 due to being unable to retract the landing gear. The aircraft returned to Simferopol, performed a low approach and subsequently a safe landing on runway 01 about 45 minutes after departure. A replacement Airbus A321-200 registration VP-BAN reached St. Petersburg with a delay of about 16.5 hours. The status of Crimea and Simferopol is disputed. According to international law and United Nations the Crimea belong to the Ukraine although Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cad24aa&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Hong Kong Express A321 near Da Nang on Jul 26th 2019, engine shut down in flight A Hong Kong Express Airways Airbus A321-200, registration B-LEH performing flight UO-763 from Hong Kong (China) to Phuket (Thailand), was enroute at 8800 meters (FL288) about 180nm northeast of Da Nang (Vietnam) when the crew needed to shut an engine (V2533) down, drifted down to FL200 and diverted to Da Nang for a safe landing on runway 35R about one hour after leaving 8800 meters. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Da Nang about 5 hours after landing. http://avherald.com/h?article=4cad21c5&opt=0 Back to Top Seair Seaplanes Cessna 208 Caravan 675 accident: 4 dead Date: Friday 26 July 2019 Time: 11:04 Type: Cessna 208 Caravan 675 Operator: Seair Seaplanes Registration: C-GURL C/n / msn: 20800501 First flight: 2008 Engines: 1 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-114A Crew: Fatalities: / Occupants: Passengers: Fatalities: / Occupants: Total: Fatalities: 4 / Occupants: 9 Aircraft damage: Damaged beyond repair Location: Addenbroke Island, BC ( Canada) Phase: En route (ENR) Nature: Domestic Non Scheduled Passenger Departure airport: Vancouver International Water Airport, BC, Canada Destination airport: Hakai Pass Seaplane Base, BC (YHC), Canada Narrative: A Cessna 208 Caravan 675 float plane was presumably destroyed when it crashed at Addenbroke Island, approximately 82 kilometres off Vancouver Island, Canada. Four occupants from the nine onboard are confirmed dead. The remaining five occupants received unknown injures. The plane operated on a flight from the Vancouver International Water Airport to a remote fishing lodge at Calvert Island. Weather conditions at the time consisted of heavy cloud cover, moderate winds and light rain. https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20190726-0 Back to Top American Airlines plane headed to London makes unexpected landing in Boston BOSTON (WHDH) - An American Airlines plane heading to London from Philadelphia made an unexpected landing at Boston's Logan International Airport due to a possible odor reported in the cabin late Sunday night. Flight 728 carrying 154 passengers and 12 crew members landed safely just before 11:50 p.m. Ten of the 12 crew members asked to be transported to a local hospital for evaluation, according to an American Airlines spokesperson. No passengers experienced any issues. American Airlines says they provided their passengers with overnight accommodations in Boston before continuing their journey to London on Monday. The cause of the reported odor remains under investigation. https://whdh.com/news/american-airlines-plane-headed-to-london-makes-unexpected-landing-in-boston/ Back to Top Boeing reportedly kept the FAA in the dark about big changes it made to the 737 Max's flight-control software late in its development Boeing's 737 Max airplane has been grounded since a fatal crash in March, the second in five months. AP Photo/Elaine Thompson • The Federal Aviation Administration didn't understand the risks of the flight-control system in Boeing's 737 Max before the first of its fatal accidents last October, according to a new report in The New York Times. • The engineers charged with overseeing the safety of the automated software had little experience with such systems, according to the report. • The FAA allowed Boeing to assess the safety of the system itself, The Times reported. Boeing largely kept the agency in the dark about the importance and risks of the system and didn't give the FAA an updated safety assessment after making a significant change to the software late in the plane's development, the report said. The Federal Aviation Administration was poorly positioned to oversee the safety of the automated flight system that was to blame for the two deadly crashes of Boeing's 737 Max plane over the last year, The New York Times reported Saturday. The agency engineers in charge of keeping a watch on the airplane's flight control systems through the latter part of its development had little experience with such software, according to The Times report. And Boeing largely kept them in the dark about the importance of the flight-control system on the 737 Max and a crucial change they made to the software soon before releasing the plane commercially, The Times reported. The Times did not name the engineers in its report. In a statement emailed to Business Insider, Boeing spokesman Peter Pedraza said the company actually had informed the FAA about changes it made to the flight-control system, dubbed MCAS, during the 737 Max's development. "The 737 MAX met the FAA's stringent standards and requirements as it was certified through the FAA's processes," Pedraza said in the statement. "The FAA," he continued, "considered the final configuration and operating parameters for MCAS and concluded it met all certification and regulatory requirements." FAA spokesman Lynn Lunsford declined to comment on The Times' report. The agency's certification process for the 737 Max is the subject of multiple investigations and reviews, he said in an emailed statement. "While the agency's certification processes are well-established and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs, we welcome the scrutiny from these experts and look forward to their findings," he said in the statement. The 737 Max's flight control system, dubbed MCAS, has been at the center of the investigation into the safety of the plane. In certain circumstances, that system can take control of the plane and tilt its nose sharply downward. The software is believed to have played a role in both of fatal crashes, which together killed 346 people. The FAA grounded the plane after the second crash in March. Read more: Boeing says it could suspend 737 Max production if grounding continues, putting tens of thousands of jobs at risk According to The Times report, FAA had two highly experienced engineers overseeing the safety of the Boeing's flight control systems in the agency's Seattle office. But both engineers left the FAA midway through the development of the 737 Max, The Times reported. One of the engineers the FAA named in their place had little flight control experience. The other was a newly hired engineer who graduated from graduate school just three years earlier. The two "seemed ill-equipped" to be in charge of the safety of the MCAS software, The Times reported, citing unnamed people who had worked with them. Boeing largely kept the FAA in the dark about the MCAS software Even if the engineers had been more experienced, they might not have caught the problems with the system, The Times suggested. Early reviews of the plane's development provided by Boeing to the engineers played down the system's importance and the safety risks it might entail, according to the report. An FAA manager later delegated a safety review of the system to Boeing itself - an increasingly common, albeit controversial, practice by the agency, The Times reported. As the plane got closer to production, Boeing made a big change to the MCAS system, allowing it to turn on at low speeds and to move the tail stabilizer by as much as 2.5 degrees each time it turned on, according to the report. Previously, the system could only activate at high speeds and could only move the stabilizer by 0.6 degrees a time. Boeing didn't provide the FAA with an updated safety assessment of the flight-control system after making the changes and the two new agency engineers were unaware that the software could move the tail by 2.5 degrees, according to the report. After the first crash of the 737 Max last October, FAA officials found they didn't understand and had little documentation about the workings of the MCAS system, The Times reported. https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-flight-system-faa-oversight-2019-7 Back to Top Ryanair boss warns Boeing 737 Max crisis could lead to job cuts Michael O'Leary also says airline could axe UK domestic routes if there is a no-deal Brexit The Ryanair boss, Michael O'Leary, has said he cannot rule out making redundancies if the Boeing 737 Max stays grounded for longer than expected while investigations continue into two fatal crashes involving the aircraft. He also warned that Ryanair could scrap UK domestic routes in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Speaking as the budget airline's first-quarter profits slumped by 24%, O'Leary bemoaned the impact of delays in the return to service of the 737 Max, a key component of Ryanair's strategy to arrest the recent decline in its financial performance. Ryanair has 135 of the 737 Max models on order, the first five of which are due for delivery in the autumn, but they will not be able to fly until regulators have declared the plane safe. O'Leary warned that Ryanair may not have any of the planes ready by next summer unless Boeing "gets its shit together" in making upgrades required for regulators to allow the plane to fly. The grounding of the global fleet of 737 Max aircraft has already taken its toll on Ryanair, forcing the airline to halve its growth targets for next year as it scrapped 30,000 planned flights and warned it could close bases at airports. O'Leary warned that redundancies could not be ruled out as a result. At least one Boeing 737 Max that was due to be delivered to Ryanair has had the name Max dropped from the livery, fuelling speculation that the manufacturer and airlines will seek to rebrand the troubled plane. O'Leary issued his warning on jobs as the airline reported a 24% drop in quarterly profits, with its 737 woes compounded by price wars in several European markets. Average summer fares at Europe's largest low-cost carrier will likely fall by 6% compared with last year, as airlines cut prices to stimulate demand, particularly in Germany and the United Kingdom, the airline said. That helped push pretax profit down to €262m (£236m) for the three months to June 30. But the company stuck to its annual profit target of between €750m and €950m as passengers continued to spend on onboard extras, which include food, perfume and scratchcards. Shares in the airline were up 1.5% by mid-morning, having almost halved in value in two years as it grappled with overcapacity, pilot strikes, Brexit uncertainty and the 737 delays. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/29/ryanair-boeing-737-max-job-cuts-michael-oleary-brexit Back to Top United Airlines taking stake in Clear, a biometric clearance company Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents help travelers place their bags through the 3-D scanner at the Miami International Airport on May 21, 2019 in Miami, Florida. United Airlines Holdings Inc. wants to help its passengers get through security faster. United UAL, -0.61% said on Monday that it is taking an equity stake in Clear, a technology company that uses fingerprints and iris scans to verify a traveler's identity at security checks. Clear operates at 31 airports in addition to stadiums, arenas and some Hertz Global Holdings Inc. rental car locations. United's investment will help Clear expand into some of the airline's largest hubs. Clear will launch at Newark Liberty International Airport and expand at Houston's George Bush Intercontinental Airport later this summer. The company also is seeking approval from the city of Chicago to open lanes at O'Hare International Airport. Clear charges most members $179 annually, but United said it would enroll its top-tier frequent fliers free of charge and offer a discount to other members of its loyalty program. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/united-airlines-taking-stake-in-clear-a-biometric-clearance-company-2019-07-29 Back to Top Used SpaceX Dragon Cargo Ship Arrives at Space Station for Record 3rd Time The craft is delivering more than 5,000 lbs. of science gear and supplies. SpaceX's robotic Dragon cargo capsule arrived at the International Space Station today (July 27), ending a two-day orbital chase and setting a new record for SpaceX's reusable spacecraft. The Dragon, which launched Thursday (July 25) from Florida's Cape Canaveral Air Force Station atop a two-stage Falcon 9 rocket, was captured by the space station's huge robotic arm at 9:11 a.m. EDT (1311 GMT) as both spacecraft sailed 267 miles (430 kilometers) above the coast of southern Chile in South America. "We want to congratulate the team spread across the globe that makes delivering a vehicle like this. It's pretty looking at it out the window," astronaut Nick Hague radioed to NASA's Mission Control in Houston after capturing Dragon with the station's robotic arm. "It's full of science and cargo and things to keep us busy. So, the mission continues." This is the record third cargo delivery mission to the International Space Station (ISS) for this particular Dragon, which also ferried cargo to the station in April 2015 and December 2017. The Falcon 9 was preflown as well; the rocket's first stage had one mission under its belt before Thursday's launch. Such reuse is key to SpaceX's quest to slash the cost of spaceflight, thereby making ambitious exploration feats such as Mars colonization achievable. Dragon is carrying more than 5,000 lbs. (2,268 kilograms) of supplies and equipment up to the ISS on this trip, including 2,500 lbs. (1,135 kg) of science gear that will enable dozens of experiments aboard the orbiting lab. Later today, flight controllers on Earth will attach Dragon to an open berthing port on the space station by remotely controlling the outpost's robotic arm. Astronauts will then be able to open the spacecraft and begin unloading its bounty. Big science aboard One of those experiments will study how microbes interact with rocks in a low-gravity environment, possibly paving the way for space "biomining" down the road. Another will attempt to fabricate human tissue using a 3D printer, and another will gauge how microgravity affects the processes of healing and tissue regeneration. Yet another experiment will use Nickelodeon's famous green slime to study the behavior of fluids in microgravity. ISS crewmembers will also play "slime pong" and do other fun things with the stuff, and film the activities for our viewing pleasure down here on Earth. Dragon also toted up another International Docking Adapter (IDA), which is designed to allow a variety of spacecraft to link up with the ISS. Such visitors will include the crew version of Dragon and Boeing's CST-100 Starliner capsule, both of which are scheduled to start carrying astronauts in the next year or so. The ISS already has one IDA, which a different Dragon brought up in 2016. Dragon is scheduled to remain attached to the ISS for about a month, NASA officials said. It will then return to Earth for a Pacific Ocean splashdown, bearing a variety of science samples for researchers to study. The current cargo mission is the 18th that SpaceX has flown under a contract with NASA. https://www.space.com/spacex-dragon-cargo-ship-crs-18-arrives-space-station.html Back to Top RESEARCH STUDY REQUEST Participants Needed for Pilot Simulator Experiment Iowa State University is conducting a study to examine pilot performance while using an enhanced flight vision system for approach and landing phases. The study is being led by Dr. Michael Dorneich and is funded by the Federal Aviation Administration. We are looking for pilots to participate in the study. As a participant of this study, you'll be asked to use flight simulator to complete tasks, and to answer questions. To participate this study, you must be over 18 years old, have at least 10- hour flight experience. You will be compensated $50 for about 2 hours of your time. The study is being conducted in Ames, IA. If you are interested, please contact Ramanathan Annamalai at P24experiment@iastate.edu . Back to Top Back to Top ISASI 2019 Future Safety: has the past become irrelevant? The Hague Marriott Hotel & World Forum The Hague September 3 - 5, 2019 *** Early Bird registration ending soon *** ISASI 2019 is pleased to announce that the Preliminary Program is now available. The Seminar's agenda includes a wide range of topics including accident case studies, airport and airline operations, human factors and commercial space accident investigations. Presentations will be given by industry experts, accident investigators, manufacturers and academics. To find out more about the program and how to register, please visit the seminar website at - www.ISASI2019.org Questions about registration can be sent to Barb Dunn at avsafe@shaw.ca As a reminder - Early Bird registration ends at midnight on July 28, 2019 MST (GMT-7). In order to receive the seminar rate at the hotel, reservations must be made by July 28. On Monday 2nd September, the day before the start of the ISASI Seminar, there is also a choice of three Tutorials: Monday (Tutorial) program: Tutorial 1 - Hosted by the Dutch Safety Board A. Aviation Safety versus Medical Confidentiality (morning) B. Communications with Victims and Relatives (afternoon) Tutorial 2 - Military accident investigation. Hosted by the Military Air Safety Investigators (MASI) - a subset of ISASI - this tutorial is the forum for International Military Accident Investigators to share knowledge on their respective capabilities, experiences, processes and procedures with a view to the development of future relationships and common practices. ****************** Fellow ISASI members: The dnata Haarlemmermeer Run will be held on Sunday September 1 in the community of Hooffddorp near Amsterdam and Schiphol. Three distances are offered; five and 10 kilometers and half marathon. Entry fee is between 11 and 17 Euros. Race shirts are available as well. This is a timed run. The race starts and ends at the Hoofddorp Pioneers Baseball Stadium. Attendees of ISASI and their companions who want to arrive early in order to participate in the race can contact me at christine.negroni@gmail.com and I will coordinate a group entry. Registration closes on August 19th. Christine Negroni author of The Crash Detectives Investigating the World's Most Mysterious Air Disasters Published by Penguin Books ================================================ 203 637-8441 landline 203 952-8441 mobile christine.negroni - skype @cnegroni - Twitter christinenegroni - Instagram Back to Top Photo Credit: Glen Grossman, Los Angeles Police Department Air Support Division Upcoming USC Aviation Safety & Security Program Courses Safety Management for Aviation Maintenance Safety principles and practices needed to manage the problems associated with aircraft maintenance operations. August 5-9, 2019 4.5 Days Tuition: $2575 Data for Safety Management Collection and analysis of flight data to contribute to safety management and improve safety performance. August 5-9, 2019 4.5 Days Tuition: $2575 Aviation Law & Dispute Resolution Legal processes, trends, and practices affecting aviation safety, accident investigation, and aviation regulation. This is the successor to the previous Legal Aspects of Aviation Safety & Role of the Technical Witness in Litigation courses. August 19-22, 2019 4 Days Tuition: $2125 Safety Management Systems for Ground Operation Safety Practices and methodologies for the identification and mitigation of hazards in all phases of airport ground operations. August 19-21, 2019 2.5 Days Tuition: $1300 Accident/Incident Response Preparedness Planning for the complex, challenging, and stressful investigation, legal, family response, and communcations situations after an accident. August 26-29, 2019 4 Days Tuition: $2125 Human Factors in Aviation Safety Theoretical and practical knowledge of Human Factors in aviation operations. August 26-30, 2019 4.5 Days Tuition: $2575 Earn Credit for FlightSafety Master Technician-Management Program Students taking the following USC courses will earn elective credits towards FlightSafety International's Master Technician-Management Program • Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance • Human Factors in Aviation Safety • Gas Turbine Accident Investigation • Helicopter Accident Investigation • Safety Management for Aviation Maintenance • Safety Management for Ground Operations Safety • Accident/Incident Response Preparedness Earn Points Toward NBAA Certified Aviation Manager Program Students taking the following USC courses will earn two points toward completing the application for the National Business Aviation Certified Aviation Manager Exam. • Aviation Safety Management Systems • Accident/Incident Response Preparedness • Human Factors in Aviation Safety • Aircraft Accident Investigation • SeMS Aviation Security Management Systems For further details, please visit our website or use the contact information below. Email: aviation@usc.edu Telephone: +1 (310) 342-1345 Curt Lewis