Flight Safety Information December 14, 2019 - No. 257 In This Issue MIT Professor Says FAA Estimate Of 15 Catastrophic Boeing MAX Crashes Is Way Too Low American Airlines Cancels Boeing 737 Max Flights Until April Incident: TUI Nederland B763 at Curacao on Dec 9th 2019, engine anti-ice fault Incident: Budapest E120 at Pori on Dec 12th 2019, engine problem Incident: Polar B744 at Bahrain on Dec 11th 2019, engine trouble Airbus A321-231 - Fuel Leak (Japan) IATA Preliminary Data Reveal Airline Safety Improved in 2019 FAA downgrades safety rating for Venezuela to Category 2 FAA proposes to revoke Executive Air Express' Air Carrier Certificate What Aircraft Crews Know About Managing High-Pressure Situations Airplane carrying 20 people crashed at RDU 25 years ago, killing 15 Woman Arrested on Plane at Bradley Airport Saab excursion probe finds safety not considered during air service tenders FAA: Windshield Could Fail On Certain Gulfstream Jets NTSB Issues Final Report On Southwest 1380 Accident This Taiwan Airline Flew For 62 Years, But May Be Grounded Indefinitely Airbus Assembles 100th A220 Aircraft China is training its top navy pilots to fill an 'urgent need' for aircraft carrier commanders Pilot job fair Saturday at DFW Airport takes aim at shortage Ready for an action-packed week? SpaceX schedules next launch from Cape Canaveral Call for Papers - ISASI 2020 Safety Management Systems Certificate Program from SCSI IATA Safety and Flight Ops Conference - Baku, Azerbaijan 31 March - 2 April, 2020 MIT Professor Says FAA Estimate Of 15 Catastrophic Boeing MAX Crashes Is Way Too Low UNITED STATES - OCTOBER 30: Nadia Milleron, whose daughter Samya Stumo, was killed in the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, holds a picture of Boeing 737 Max jet crash victims, during the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing examining the design, development, and marketing, of the Boeing 737 Max, in Rayburn Building on Wednesday, October 30, 2019. The world is a risky place. Get in a car and you have a 1:103 chance of dying in an accident. Step into an airplane and the odds of dying are more like 1:5,000,000. If you had boarded a Boeing 737 MAX aircraft after the October 2018 crash of Lion Air 610, an FAA study conducted after that crash concluded that the odds of being in a catastrophic accident were far higher. Yet the FAA decided not to ground the MAX but to let it keep flying - subject to reminding pilots of how to handle a misfiring flight control system. It was only three days after the March 2019 crash of the second 737 MAX - Ethiopian Air 302 - that the FAA finally grounded the fleet. What's of even more concern is that an MIT Sloan School statistics professor told me that this alarming FAA accident forecast was vastly understating the MAX's risk. Here are more details. On December 11, the House Transportation Committee released a November 2018 FAA internal analysis which concluded that without FAA intervention, "the MAX could have averaged one fatal crash about every two or three years. That amounts to a substantially greater safety risk than either Boeing or the agency indicated publicly at the time," according to the Wall Street Journal. After the October 2018 and March 2019 tragedies, a passenger's risk of dying in a MAX is many times greater than that risk for the average airplane flight - due largely to the MAX's MCAS navigation system, according to my December 11 interview with MIT Statistics Professor Arnold Barnett, who has written extensively about the MAX crisis. Barnett argues that the passenger death risk for the MAX is a whopping 20 times greater than for all flights. As he said, "The worldwide passenger death risk (passenger killed/passengers carried) was one in eight million between 2008 and 2018. That covers all reasons for crashes. The corresponding statistic for the MAX to date is [at least] one death per 400,000 passengers." Moreover, Barnett says that the FAA's November 2018 forecast of 15 MAX crashes over the next 30 to 45 years was way too optimistic. As he said, "When FAA's analysts projected one crash every two to three years (15 over 30 to 45 years), they made a risk estimate that seems too low by a factor of at least 24." He questions the FAA's assumptions and logic. "Given that their calculation explicitly assumes that no changes in the system [are] implicated in the Lion Air crash, I cannot understand their reasoning. If they perhaps thought that warnings to pilots were enough to counteract erroneous MCAS deployments, then why were they projecting 15 future catastrophes?" The FAA said it was following standard procedure. According to a December 12 statement, "...The FAA's Corrective Action Review Board relied on a scientific risk-assessment tool called Transport Aircraft Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM). TARAM weighs a number of factors and is used solely for the purpose of helping us quantify risk." "The FAA used TARAM- as well as information from the ongoing investigation into the accident of a Boeing 737 MAX in Indonesia - to validate the agency's immediate decision to issue a Nov. 7, 2018, Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD)...which reminded pilots of the important procedures to promptly correct runaway stabilizer trim," the FAA explained. The FAA assumed this EAD would be effective because, as the New York Times reported, the previous crew that flew the Lion Air plane that crashed the next day was able - after a very panicky struggle - to keep the MCAS system from crashing the plane. However, the crew flying the same plane the next day - Lion Air 610 - could not handle the misfiring MCAS. The FAA concluded that the "control risk" - that a 737 MAX would crash again if it issued this EAD - was 1% (one out of 100 flights). This means, the FAA assumed that if it communicated this information to pilots, one in 100 flight crews would still get it wrong. The FAA was assuming that if Boeing was able to fix the MCAS system within 200 days with a fleet of 300 MAX aircraft still flying, the control risk would remain under 2% - the threshold level at which the FAA would have grounded the aircraft. After the March 10, 2019 Ethiopian Air crash, the FAA ran another TARAM forecast. "On March 12, the agency completed a subsequent TARAM that considered the most likely scenario for the 737 MAX accident in Ethiopia. The accident investigation team also worked overnight to collect and analyze satellite data that might corroborate the hypothesis while investigators provided additional information from the accident site. The FAA acted immediately to ground the aircraft on March 13 after verifying the satellite data, which was reinforced by evidence from the crash site," according to the spokesperson. Boeing said it shared the FAA's analysis and conclusions. According to a December 12 statement, "Based on a TARAM analysis, the FAA Corrective Action Review Board...determined that Boeing's and the FAA's actions in early November [2018] to reinforce existing pilot procedures through issuance of an Operations Manual Bulletin and Airworthiness Directive sufficed to allow continued operation of the MAX fleet until changes to the MCAS software could be implemented." Boeing said its own TARAM analysis was consistent with the FAA's conclusions and the November communication to pilots about how to promptly correct runaway stabilizer trim was "fully consistent with the FAA's analysis and established process." Barnett is not buying the FAA's analysis. "Look: during a two-year period when the number of MAX's averaged about 200. (it started at zero in early 2017 and rose to 370 by March 2019), there were two fatal MAX crashes that killed everyone on board. That's essentially one per year at a fleet size of 200. Yet the TARAM says that, with a fleet of 4,800 MAX's, crashes would average one in three years (15.4 over 45 years)." Barnett emphasized that "the existing evidence supports a far-worse risk estimate." By his math, "4,800 is 24 times 200 so [the FAA's assumption of one crash per year] at 200 translates into 24 crashes per year at 4,800, or 72 every three years, not one. It follows that the TARAM assumes that the experience to date will not remotely persist in the future." He says that the FAA was assuming that Boeing would develop a somewhat successful MCAS fix. "Rather than assuming no change to MCAS, more likely [the FAA is] assuming that some countermeasures are taken and that they are partially successful. But how could these measures be so inadequate that we lose 15 additional planes? I don't know what they are thinking, but I lack confidence that they are thinking straight." Barnett's lack of confidence makes me nervous about whether the FAA is doing enough to protect the flying public. His advice to the FAA: "It should consider why its risk estimates were far too low and think more clearly about how it should react to its risk estimates, even when they are accurate." https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2019/12/13/mit-professor-says-faa-estimate-of-15-catastrophic-boeing-max-crashes-is-way-too-low/#16b5870e5ce8 Back to Top American Airlines Cancels Boeing 737 Max Flights Until April American Airlines has removed the Boeing 737 Max plane from its schedule until at least April, the latest delay for the beleaguered aircraft, the company said in a statement Thursday. The move follows this week's release of a damning Federal Aviation Administration risk assessment of the first of two fatal crashes that eventually led to the grounding of the plane around the world. At the time, the assessment had determined that at least 15 more crashes over the next 45 years would be likely if Boeing didn't make design changes to the plane. American Airlines said in a statement it was in "continuous contact" with regulators and Boeing, but they would extend the cancellation of the plane "based on the latest guidance." The carrier estimates this will result in about 140 flights cancelled each day through April 6. Southwest Airlines and United Airlines, which both count the 737 MAX in their fleet, have cancelled flights on the troubled jet until at least March, according to Southwest's website and CBS News. The 737 MAX has been grounded since March following two fatal crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that killed a total of 346 people. Earlier this week, the FAA said it would not certify the planes as safe to fly before the end of the year, CBS News reported, an outcome Boeing had been pushing for. "When the 737 Max is returned to service, it will be because the safety issues have been addressed and pilots have received all the training they need to safely operate the aircraft," FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, according to CBS News. "This process is not guided by a calendar or a schedule." For its part, Boeing said the company met with the FAA in what they called a "productive" session, according to NPR. "Boeing reaffirmed with the FAA that safety is our top shared priority, and we committed to addressing all of the FAA's questions as they assess MAX certification and training requirements," the company told NPR. "We will work with the FAA to support their requirements and their timeline as we work to safely return the Max to service in 2020." https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/american-airlines-cancels-boeing-737-151546121.html Back to Top Incident: TUI Nederland B763 at Curacao on Dec 9th 2019, engine anti-ice fault A TUI Airlines Nederland Boeing 767-300, registration PH-OYI performing flight OR-370 from Curacao (Curacao) to Amsterdam (Netherlands), was climbing out of Curacao when the crew reported a technical issue and requested to level off at FL280 to work the related checklists. The crew subsequently indicated they needed to return and dump fuel, no assistance on the ground was needed. The aircraft dumped fuel at FL100 for about one hour, then proceeded for a safe landing on Curacao's runway 11 about 105 minutes after departure. A passenger reported the captain announced the right hand engine's (CF6) anti-ice system showed an indication. The gear was lowered and the aircraft circled for about one hour with the gear down before proceeding for a landing. The aircraft remained on the ground for about 26 hours, then departed and reached Amsterdam with a delay of 29 hours. http://avherald.com/h?article=4d08c9ca&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Budapest E120 at Pori on Dec 12th 2019, engine problem A Budapest Aircraft Service Embraer EMB-120 on behalf of Flexflight, registration HA-FAN performing flight W2-5698 from Pori to Helsinki (Finland) with 5 passengers and 3 crew, was climbing out of Pori when the right hand engine (PW118) indicated low oil pressure prompting the crew to return to Pori. The aircraft landed safely about 20 minutes after departure. A replacement EMB-120 registration HA-FAI positioned from Helsinki to Pori and resumed the flight reaching Helsinki with a delay of 90 minutes. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Pori about 26 hours after landing. http://avherald.com/h?article=4d08c78b&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Polar B744 at Bahrain on Dec 11th 2019, engine trouble A Polar Air Cargo Boeing 747-400, registration N450PA performing flight PO-769 from Bahrain (Bahrain) to Hong Kong (China), was climbing through FL230 out of Bahrain when the crew reduced the #1 engine (CF6) to idle and returned to Bahrain for a safe landing about 30 minutes after departure. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Bahrain about 30 hours after landing back. http://avherald.com/h?article=4d082b20&opt=0 Back to Top Airbus A321-231 - Fuel Leak (Japan) Date: 13-DEC-2019 Time: 15:49 LT Type: Airbus A321-231 Owner/operator: Philippine Airlines Registration: RP-C9903 C/n / msn: 5787 Fatalities: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 88 Other fatalities: 0 Aircraft damage: Minor Location: Osaka/Kansai International Airport (KIX/RJBB) - Japan Phase: Taxi Nature: International Scheduled Passenger Departure airport: Osaka/Kansai International Airport (KIX/RJBB), Japan Destination airport: Mactan-Cebu International Airport (CEB/RPVM), Philippines Narrative: Philippine Airlines' flight PAL/PR409 from Osaka/Kansai, Japan to Mactan-Cebu, Philippines, suffered fuel leak from the right wing while taxiing P-TWY for departure from runway 06R at KIX. The airplane got stuck on the taxiway near the intersection with J4 for an hour, causing the runway 06R to be closed for an hour. The plane was towed back to the spot. https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/231374 Back to Top IATA Preliminary Data Reveal Airline Safety Improved in 2019 Preliminary data from the International Air Transport Association indicate that the commercial airline industry will demonstrate a fairly solid safety performance this year, after a dismal 2018 that saw 11 fatal accidents with 523 fatalities among passengers and crew. From January 1 through December 2, six fatal accidents resulted in the deaths of 227 passengers and crew and 10 fatalities on the ground. The figure compares favorably with an average of 8.2 fatal accidents and approximately 303 fatalities per year in the previous five-year period (2014-2018). In 2017, the industry also experienced six fatal accidents, though only with 19 fatalities, which set a record low. From January 1 to June 15, a total of 20 accidents occurred worldwide, of which three resulted in jet hull losses and one turboprop hull loss. The three fatal accidents accounting for 201 onboard fatalities all involved jet aircraft. The first-half 2019 all-accident rate, which includes substantial damage and hull loss accidents for jets and turboprops measured per 1 million flights, stood at 0.91, though that figure falls to 0.68 accidents per million sectors for IATA members and rises to 1.19 for non-IATA members. "The first half of 2019 has seen the overall accident rate decrease over the full year 2018," IATA senior vice president of safety and flight operations Gilberto López Meyer said at the trade body's annual global media days event in Geneva this week. Moreover, "there is a continued reduction in accidents when considering a rolling five-year average rate." The industry-wide all-accident rate, including IATA and non-IATA members, averaged 1.58 per million sectors for 2014-2018. Most regions experienced a decline when comparing the first half of 2019 with the full-year 2018, except for Sub-Saharan Africa and North America, which saw increases to 4.45 accidents per million flights from 3.78 and to 1.11 accidents from 0.96, respectively. All regions, except North America, saw a decline in the first half compared with the 2014-2018 average. IATA Operational Safety Audit-registered airlines "consistently outperform non-IOSA airlines in every region" for the period between 2015 and the first half of 2019, noted López Meyer. The all-accident rate for IOSA-registered airlines runs more than two-times lower than that for non-IOSA-registered airlines-0.99 jet and turboprop accidents per million sectors versus 2.31-in the four-and-a-half-year time frame. The IOSA registry covers 436 airlines, of which 145 do not belong to IATA. To further improve the IOSA program, IATA earlier this year introduced a new methodology to audit the effectiveness of an IOSA standard's implementation. "[This] represents a first move from compliance-based auditing towards a maturity assessment of an operator's safety practices, rather than only assessing conformity and documentation," López Meyer explained. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2019-12-13/iata-preliminary-data-reveal-airline-safety-improved-2019 Back to Top FAA downgrades safety rating for Venezuela to Category 2 13 December 2019 The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that the Venezuelan regime does not comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) safety standards under the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program and has been assigned a Category 2 rating. A Category 2 IASA rating means the country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with minimum international standards, or its civil aviation authority is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record-keeping, inspection procedures, or resolution of safety concerns. At this time there are no flights between the United States and Venezuela. The FAA has determined the Venezuelan regime no longer complies with international aviation safety standards. The FAA recently conducted an extensive review based on safety-related information currently available, and determined that a change in the IASA category is required. Due to conditions in Venezuela flights between (PDF) the United States and Venezuela are already prohibited by the DOT and Department of Homeland Security. As part of the FAA's IASA program, the agency assesses the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that have applied to fly to the United States, currently conduct operations to the United States, or participate in code-sharing arrangements with U.S. partner airlines, and makes that information available to the public. The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety standards, not FAA regulations. A Category 1 rating means the country's civil aviation authority complies with ICAO standards. With an IASA Category 1 rating, a country's air carriers can establish service to the United States and carry the code of U.S. carriers. In order to maintain a Category 1 rating, a country must adhere to the safety standards of ICAO. https://news.aviation-safety.net/2019/12/13/faa-downgrades-safety-rating-for-venezuela-to-category-2/ Back to Top FAA proposes to revoke Executive Air Express' Air Carrier Certificate 13 December 2019 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposed to revoke the air carrier certificate of Executive Air Express of Nashville, Tenn., USA, for allegedly using unauthorized aircraft in 30 passenger-carrying flights. The FAA alleges that between Jan. 31, 2016, and Sept. 29, 2017, Executive conducted a total of 28 flights with paying passengers using a Learjet 35A corporate jet that was not on the company's FAA-issued Operations Specifications (Ops Specs). Air carriers can only conduct for-hire flights using aircraft that are on their Ops Specs. Between Jan. 31, 2016 and Oct. 24, 2016, Executive conducted 12 flights with the Learjet, the FAA alleges. On Oct. 24, 2016, the company requested that the FAA add the aircraft to its Ops Specs. Then, between Oct. 24, 2016 and May 3, 2017, Executive conducted an additional 15 flights using the Learjet, the FAA alleges. On May 3, 2017, the FAA denied Executive's request to add the Learjet to its Ops Specs, citing 49 discrepancies the company needed to address before the FAA could resume its inspection of the aircraft. On Sept. 29, 2017, Executive conducted another for-hire flight with the Learjet, the FAA alleges. The FAA also alleges Executive failed to conduct the required 25 hours of proving tests before using the Learjet in for-hire operations. Additionally, the FAA alleges Executive conducted two for-hire flights on May 2, 2018, using a Swearingen SA226-T Merlin III that was not listed in its Ops Specs. Executive's operation of the Learjet and Swearingen was careless or reckless and endangered lives and property, the FAA alleges. Executive has 15 days after receiving the FAA's proposed revocation letter to respond to the agency. https://news.aviation-safety.net/2019/12/13/faa-proposes-to-revoke-executive-air-express-air-carrier-certificate/ Back to Top What Aircraft Crews Know About Managing High-Pressure Situations On November 4, 2010, four minutes after takeoff from Changi Airport in Singapore, the number two jet engine of Qantas Airways flight QF32 exploded. On board the Airbus A380 were 440 passengers, 24 crew members in the cabin, and three captains and two copilots in the cockpit. Debris from the exploded engine hit the left wing, destroying a number of electrical and hydraulic lines. Thereafter, several essential aircraft control systems failed. Over the next harrowing two hours, the pilots flew in a holding pattern. They needed to burn enough fuel so that the plane's final weight would allow for a safe landing. All passengers and flight crew survived. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's (ATSB) 2013 report on Flight QF32 shows just how difficult the situation in the cockpit actually was and how professionally the crew responded to the emergency. In the critical 20 seconds after the engine exploded, the crew received 36 aircraft monitor system alerts. Over the next 20 minutes, another 41 were recorded. It was the unanimous opinion of the ATSB that the effective cooperation of the crew in the cockpit was crucial to the plane's safe landing. The Qantas crew's successful response to the incident was no stroke of luck, however. Crew Resource Management, first developed in 1980, is now used in civil and military aviation training worldwide. To ensure a safe flight operation, this kind of training requires two conditions and open communication is important to both: The hierarchy on the flight deck must be flattened. Crews must be actively integrated into the flight's workflows and decision making processes. This team-based approach to flight is not meant to undermine the captain's role, but rather to acknowledge that controlling a modern day aircraft is beyond the skills of a single person. In an emergency, especially, everyone on the flight deck must have the right to speak up. We argue that traditional business models who adopt this approach to decision making in high stakes situations will be more likely to succeed in their sectors. The incident described above, and how it was resolved, exemplifies why: Crises, which will inevitably arise in any field of work, demand more from us than everyday challenges. No single person can manage one alone. Collaboration and cooperation were crucial to the survival of Flight QF32, and we believe that the same ingredients can be used to help businesses overcome the most difficult obstacles and thrive. To support this theory, we have spent the past six years studying flight crew communication. Twice a year, aircraft crews around the world are required to complete trainings in full-flight simulators. The goal of these trainings is to place people in emergency situations and give them feedback on how to best handle them. They are concluded by a thorough check-flight within the simulator - the sole purpose being to test the crew. Pilots must pass this test to keep their license for another six months. In the first part of our study, we observed and recorded 11 flight crews of a major European airline participating in these sessions. In the second part of our study, we conducted interviews with a total of 61 flight crew members (pilots as well as non-pilots) in the air force. Our goal was to reveal the importance of team-driven decision making during emergencies, show that teams (not leaders) make the difference between success and failure, and identify the aviation training practices that can be best adapted for and used in the business world. In our first study, we collaborated with organizational scholars Mary Waller and Seth Kaplan to identify the benefits of Crew Resource Management rules and practices on team performance in critical situations. Over a period of 18 months, we examined how pilots and copilots interacted in the cockpit during simulator trainings, and in turn, how that interaction affected the performance of the crew as a whole. One of the simulation scenarios involved airspeed sensor failure; the other involved an unexpected loss in cabin pressure. For both, the simulator crews first had to deal with the immediate emergency and then safely complete the flight with a damaged aircraft. Resolving the immediate emergency was arguably the easier half the challenge. Crew members did not really have to "think on their feet" because the process was a standard one. They recited a series of memory items - actions all crews are required to take in emergency situations - and then select the proper checklist from the Quick Reference Handbook to guide them through the next steps. During this phase we observed no variations between the crews as all followed the correct procedures. However, when it came to safely landing the aircraft, our observations varied significantly. The captain's style of communication had a major impact on crew performance in two major ways. First, crews performed consistently better under intense time pressure when the copilot was included in the decision making process than when the captain analyzed the problem alone and simply gave orders. Second, captains who asked open-ended questions - "How do you assess the situation?"; "What options do you see?"; "What do you suggest?" - came up with better solutions than captains who asked simple yes or no questions. By contrast, the latter method resulted in the copilot affirming the captain's decision and proved worthless to problem evaluation and solving. The takeaway we gathered here is that involving colleagues as equal decision partners by asking them questions - a form of leadership that organizational development scholar Ed Schein terms "humble inquiry" - taps into the other person's expertise and aids constructive, factual information exchange. These questions are not simply for the sake of participation, but rather to gather information, opinions, and proposals for action. Teams who continuously exchanged information, analyzed the facts, evaluated options, made decisions, implemented them, and then reviewed what they had implemented, were the most successful in safely completing their flight simulations. Based on the results of the first study, we wanted to explore to what extent captains or commanders were aware of the benefits of using inquiry. To figure this out, we conducted another study examining the efficacy of Crew Resource Management training within the German and Israeli air forces. Unlike civil aviation, military pilots operate in unstable and volatile situations, and are more likely to face exceptional circumstances, particularly in war zones. We interviewed commanders, copilots, weapons system officers, and technical loadmasters to learn how they work together. Almost all respondents, both in Israel and in Germany, emphasized that cross-hierarchy cooperation was important. More than 80% of respondents underlined the need for speaking up - that is, the need for subordinate crew members to express their opinions and ideas openly. "If you speak first, your copilot will not contradict you," stated one of the Israeli commanders. "I always ask my copilot for his opinion first. I do not want him to accept my view uncritically, especially if I am wrong." A number of pilots we interviewed also observed that, in all critical situations, even the most experienced pilot may overlook something, act too hastily, or lose focus. Collaboration, thus, is vital to safety. "I invite [my copilot's] opinion," stated one of the Israeli commanders. "I say, 'Monitor me, notice if I miss anything.' If something is unsafe, I expect him to intervene and I will listen. I tell the copilot that the worst that can happen is me telling him that we are not going to take his suggestion at this time." This invitation is important because, notably, many of the copilots we spoke with in both the German and Israeli forces stated that they will not speak up without an invite in situations that do not precipitate a crisis - even though they have been taught explicitly to speak up as a part of their training. "If [the commander] asks me my opinion because he's interested in it, then I answer him," said one Israeli copilot. "But if he doesn't ask me, I won't throw it in. In my opinion, the commander is in control of the situation." However, it is not uncommon for seemingly non-critical decisions to lead to more serious outcomes. This is why open questions between crew members are needed to draw a wider range of solutions to problems - whether or not those problems are considered emergencies. Doing so helps crews go beyond what is merely feasible to produce more ideal outcomes - that is, not just a smooth landing but a smooth landing at the right airport with the right personnel, at the right time. In summary, our second study confirmed what we had found in the first - open questions are vital to effective communication in high stake situations. But we also learned something new: Open questions are vital in all decision making processes as a means to come up with the best solutions and also as preventative measures against potentially dangerous or imperfect outcomes. Through both studies, we were able to gather insights that ultimately support our idea that aviation's Crew Resource Management concept can be easily applied to businesses. Leaders simply have to use their teams as active resources. People in positions of power need to make sure that the hierarchy of decision makers on their teams does not become so steep that workers in junior positions are afraid to speak up. (We realize that it's unrealistic to expect all teams to take on an outright flat structure.) In addition, we believe that to successfully apply these principles, leaders must make a concerted effort to encourage their employees to be assertive and speak up by asking open-ended questions before posing solutions, even (and specifically) in high stakes or urgent situations. When people are under pressure, it's not uncommon for them to shut down and grow quiet as opposed to being proactive. This is why inquiry is such a valuable tool for gathering information. It is important to note that there can be exceptions, though. Inquiry is not always a silver bullet - as can be seen by the two recent Boeing 737 MAX 8 accidents. The recently published final accident report of the Lion Air crash of 2018 identified a large number of contributing factors. Apart from the widely covered technical problems of the MCAS system, the report documents pilot skill deficiencies on the part of the copilot. Therefore, the captain was lacking a crucial resource in a critical situation. The Boeing MAX 8 case may hold a lesson for management as well. It was recently reported that Boeing's test pilots had internally discussed concerns about the MCAS system back in 2016. We do not yet know if Boeing's management was aware of these concerns, but we theorize that inquiry could have been a preventative measure in this case. Had management asked the pilots for feedback earlier on, the information regarding the system would have been pushed upward and allowed management to initiate a review of the system prior to the accident. As we saw in our studies, it's important for those in positions of power to recognize that they do not lose authority when they ask questions or admit that they do not know everything. Leaders who ask questions create teams capable of handling the complexities of any business task, whether critical or non-critical. Researcher Amy Fraher, a retired US Navy commander and former commercial and military pilot, calls this type of leader the "creative problem solver." We would go a step further and describe them as a "collegiate and creative problem solver," someone who knows the issues and seeks out the team's opinion. We believe businesses that invest in creating a framework that emphasizes leading with questions, and one that trains and retains leaders with this skill, will be capable of achieving operational excellence. https://hbr.org/2019/12/what-aircraft-crews-know-about-managing-high-pressure-situations Back to Top Airplane carrying 20 people crashed at RDU 25 years ago, killing 15 RALEIGH (WTVD) -- Twenty-five years ago a passenger airplane crashed at Raleigh Durham International Airport. Flagship Airlines Flight 3379 was an American Eagle flight from Greensboro to Raleigh carrying 20 people. The airplane crashed around 6:30 p.m. on Dec. 13, 1994 about four miles from the RDU runway. The weather was foggy and sleeting at the time. Two pilots and 13 passengers died in the crash. Five passengers survived. National Transportation Safety Board investigators said the engine failure light came on. When that happened the pilot should have gone through safety procedures to make sure the engine had failed. In addition to failing to identify if the engine had failed, the pilot did not follow proper procedures for what to do if the engine did fail. NTSB said those factors are why the airplane crashed. https://abc11.com/airplane-carrying-20-people-crashed-at-rdu-25-years-ago/5752410/ ****************** Status: Final Date: Tuesday 13 December 1994 Time: 18:34 Type: British Aerospace 3201 Jetstream 32 Operated by: Flagship Airlines On behalf of: American Eagle Registration: N918AE C/n / msn: 918 First flight: 1990 Total airframe hrs: 6577 Engines: 2 Garrett TPE331-12 Crew: Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2 Passengers: Fatalities: 13 / Occupants: 18 Total: Fatalities: 15 / Occupants: 20 Aircraft damage: Destroyed Aircraft fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair) Location: 7,4 km (4.6 mls) SW of Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU) ( United States of America) Phase: Approach (APR) Nature: Domestic Scheduled Passenger Departure airport: Greensboro/High Point-Piedmont Triad International Airport, NC (GSO/KGSO), United States of America Destination airport: Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU/KRDU), United States of America Flightnumber: 3379 Narrative: Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3000t. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2100 feet for a runway 05L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the no. 1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4nm SW of the runway 5L threshold. Probable Cause: PROBABLE CAUSE: "1) The captain's improper assumption that an engine had failed and 2) the captain's subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure single-engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of AMR Eagle/Flagship management to identify, document, monitor and remedy deficiencies in pilot performance and training." Accident investigation: Investigating agency: NTSB Status: Investigation completed Duration: 11 months Accident number: NTSB/AAR-95-07 Download report: Final report Back to Top Woman Arrested on Plane at Bradley Airport State police arrested a West Hartford woman who is accused of pushing a Spirit Airlines employee at Bradley Airport and grabbing an attendant. Troopers assigned to the airport were called around 4 p.m. Thursday and told a person on a Spirit Airlines plane that was heading to Ft. Myers, Florida had pushed a Spirit employee, police said. The shift supervisor said a passenger, identified as 59-year-old Sandra Cohen, of West Hartford, was cursing, irate and grabbed an attendant and she was told that her right to fly was revoked, according to police. https://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/woman-arrested-on-plane-at-bradley-airport/2194430/ Back to Top Saab excursion probe finds safety not considered during air service tenders Finnish investigators have raised concerns that safety considerations are not given sufficient attention during competitive tender processes for air services. The country's Safety Investigation Authority has highlighted the "minor role" that safety issues play in public tendering, in its probe into a Saab 340B excursion during landing at Savonlinna in January. It is advising that an independent European assessment mechanism be established to provide an impartial indicator of carriers' safety levels. Investigators found that the Latvian RAF-Avia aircraft hit a snow bank, after drifting off the centreline during touchdown, and skidded into rough ground. Although the aircraft was badly damaged, the three occupants were uninjured. Saab 340B excursion at Savonlinna Source: Safety Investigation Authority Investigators cited safety weaknesses at Latvia's RAF-Avia The Finnish Transport Agency opened a tender for a three-year public service contract to operate the Helsinki-Savonlinna route from January 2018. Finnish ground-handling firm Maavoima secured the transport acquisition contract, solely based on the lowest offered price, and initially recruited Hungary's Budapest Aircraft Service KFT for the route. But this company was replaced, for commercial reasons, with RAF-Avia in March 2018. "No additional conditions for safe operations were stipulated in the public tender launched by the Finnish Transport Agency," says the inquiry. "The Finnish Transport Agency had a strong suspicion that the [European Union] would interpret any safety-related extra conditions as a restriction of competition." Maavoima did not have any obligation to assess the carriers' operational safety, relying simply on their valid air operator's certificates as evidence that they were suitably qualified. No independent queries on flight-safety records were run through either the European Union Aviation Safety Agency or ICAO. But the inquiry points out that RAF-Avia has experienced "shortcomings" in flight safety, with incidents demonstrating weaknesses in pilot skills and crew resource management, while its safety-reporting culture has proven insufficient. "The airline's inadequate reporting culture originates from the time when Latvia was part of the Soviet Union," it adds. "In the society which preceded Latvia's independence pilots would often avoid occurrence reporting because they could have been punished for doing so. Even though punishment is no longer a part of the airline's procedures, it has been especially challenging to mitigate the fears of the older pilots." Captains average nearly 60 years of age but typically fly only 200h per year, on flights lasting 60-90min. The inquiry suggests that such low hours, and few landings, can lead to loss of proficiency. "Operator safety was not set as a criterion in the public tender for air services because the EU's competition rules steer purchasers to carry out the process on financial grounds," says the Safety Investigation Authority. It is recommending that the Finnish transport authorities "explore and instruct" ways in which safety performance can be used in tendering for air services, taking into account EU regulations. Since there are no "universal and straightforward" indicators for assessing air carrier safety, the inquiry adds, the authority is also recommending that the European Commission works to create a process to impartially analyse operators' safety levels. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/safety-not-considered-during-air-service-tenders-investigators/135765.article Back to Top FAA: Windshield Could Fail On Certain Gulfstream Jets The FAA has issued a special airworthiness bulletin about windshield failures that have occurred on Gulfstream III, IV/IV-SP/G450, V/G550, and G650/650ER twinjets over the past six years. According to the bulletin, the FAA said it and Gulfstream are aware of at least 20 windshield failures since 2013 that resulted in arcing, cracking, smoke, and/or small fires. A new windshield with an improved heater terminal block has been designed and is now manufactured by Gulfstream, which in most cases can be used as a replacement because the same windshields are common to multiple models of Gulfstreams, according to the bulletin. Pilots are advised to assume a structural windshield ply is affected in the event of a windshield cracking event. Further, it recommends that in such an event, pilots follow the appropriate airplane flight manual emergency procedure or abnormal procedure, which includes pulling the associated windshield heat circuit breaker. Maintenance crews also are advised when replacing the windshield of affected aircraft under normal conditions to replace it with the improved windshield, which has upgraded/redesigned terminal block part numbers. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2019-12-13/faa-windshield-could-fail-certain-gulfstream-jets Back to Top NTSB Issues Final Report On Southwest 1380 Accident The NTSB has published the final report on Southwest Flight 1380, whose left-side CMF56 engine suffered a failure that led to one fatality in April 2018. While the NTSB has already called for action following the engine on this 737 Next Generation, its final report closes the investigation and emphasizes how it was a piece of the cowling, and not the failed first-stage fan blade, that penetrated the fuselage. In its analysis, it says the board determined "the probable cause of this accident was a low-cycle fatigue crack in the dovetail of fan blade No. 13, which resulted in the fan blade separating in flight and impacting the engine fan case at a location that was critical to the structural integrity and performance of the fan cowl structure. This impact led to the in-flight separation of fan cowl components, including the inboard fan cowl aft latch keeper, which struck the fuselage near a cabin window and caused the window to depart from the airplane, the cabin to rapidly depressurize, and the passenger fatality." As for the fan blade and the associated inspection process itself, the NTSB said that "metallurgical examinations of the fractured fan blade found that the crack had likely initiated before the fan blade set's last overhaul in October 2012. At that time, the overhaul process included a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) to detect cracks; however, the crack was not detected for unknown reasons. After an August 2016 FBO event involving another SWA 737-700 airplane equipped with CFM56-7B engines, which landed safely at Pensacola International Airport, Pensacola, Florida, CFM developed an eddy current inspection (ECI) procedure to be performed at overhaul (in addition to the FPI that was already required). An ECI has a higher sensitivity than an FPI and can detect cracks at or near the surface (unlike an FPI, which can only detect surface cracks)." Prior to publishing this final report, the NTSB called for Boeing to determine the critical fan-blade impact locations on the fan cowl and redesign it to better handle a blade separation and to push those changes to all new 737 Next Generation aircraft as well as retrofitting all aircraft in the field. https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/ntsb-issues-final-report-on-southwest-1380-accident/ Back to Top This Taiwan Airline Flew For 62 Years, But May Be Grounded Indefinitely Direct Flights Between China And Taiwan For Chinese New Year An airliner belonging to Far Eastern Air Transport from Taiwan is seen on the tarmac of Shanghai Far Eastern Air Transport, a six-decades-old Taiwanese airline catering to destinations within Asia, suddenly suspended its flights on December 12. The airline's website said that as of December 13 it would cease to continue running because of unspecified "operational losses." On Friday, Chang Kang-wei, Far Eastern's chairman, told a news conference that he had found new sources of investment and hoped to restart flights as soon as possible, although analysts expect more turbulence. "Airlines such as Far Eastern are stuck in the strategic position that is unsustainable," says John Grant, director of JG Aviation Consultants in the United Kingdom. "Neither a low-cost carrier nor a full service network airline, the carrier is challenged from all sides and unable to command a secure market position." The airline was founded in 1957 with domestic routes around Taiwan, where flights average just 30 minutes. But in 2008 it declared bankruptcy and flights stopped through early 2011. In 2007, Taiwan had launched a high-speed railway that reduced the demand for domestic flights. Far Eastern Air Transport has struggled too because it relies heavily on McDonnell Douglas MD-82 and MD-83 aircraft, while other airlines, including the budget carriers, are buying newer planes made by Airbus and Boeing. Its fleet has a total of six aging MD-80 family aircraft and six ATR 72 turboprops. Far Eastern Air Transport struggles too for lack of code sharing and membership in airline alliances, says Jeffrey Lowe, managing director of the Hong Kong aviation services firm Asian Sky Group. Its base at the smallish Taipei's Songshan airport further constrained business because civil aviation authorities allow flights only to a couple dozen cities outside Taiwan, mostly in China. That base made it hard to set up connecting flights, Lowe says. "FAT has a long history but has always struggled to survive," Lowe says. "It has been in a financial crisis of one form or another since 2008, the last 12 years." Neither a budget carrier nor a full-service airline Far Eastern Air Transport fails to fit into either of the two most viable types of airlines around Asia today, Grant says. The airline has just a 10% share of capacity for all Taiwanese airlines, he says. Four other Taiwanese carriers fly international routes and another, the ultra-high-end StarLux Airlines, will open three routes in January. The two dominant international carriers Eva Airways and China Airlines have newer aircraft fitted with entertainment systems, while Eva focuses intently on cabin cleanliness. Budget carriers based offshore serve throngs of young, thrifty Taiwanese tourists bound for Japan, South Korea and parts of Southeast Asia. Budget travel is so popular in Southeast Asia that Kuala Lumpur and Singapore have opened budget-only terminals. Occasionally airlines that are neither high nor low end survive because they have a "geographic niche," Grant says. Far Eastern does not, he says. The halt to flights on Friday affected 3,251 outbound group tourists, Taiwan's tourism bureau says in a statement Thursday. The airline would not say for this post how much capital its CEO had garnered but that the airline is ready to fly again if given regulatory approval. "We can't say anything about the next few years," an airline spokesperson said for this post. "We're just waiting for the official approval to fly again." https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2019/12/13/this-taiwan-airline-flew-for-62-years-but-may-be-grounded-indefinitely/#2bb5ba2228af Back to Top Airbus Assembles 100th A220 Aircraft MIRABEL, CANADA - Airbus has celebrated the 100th A220 aircraft produced for a customer during a ceremony at the aircraft program's headquarters in Mirabel, Canada.The aircraft, an A220-300, destined for Riga, Latvia-based airBaltic, features a cabin layout with 149 seats plus modernized livery. The A220 family is assembled at Airbus' main Final Assembly Line in Mirabel and more recently, also at the program's second assembly line in Mobile, Alabama. The world's first A220, formerly called the C Series) was delivered in June 2016 to A220-100 launch operator SWISS. airBaltic became the A220-300 launch operator when the Latvian airline received delivery of the first ever A220-300 three years ago, on Nov. 28, 2016. airBaltic has since re-ordered A220-300 aircraft twice - bringing its firm order to 50 aircraft - to become the current biggest European A220 customer. The airline now operates a fleet of 20 A220-300 aircraft. airBaltic has an all-A220 fleet operating to various European and Russian destinations as well as to the Middle East. It currently operates the longest flight on an A220, a 6.5-hour flight from Riga to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The A220 is purpose-built for the 100-to-150 seat market to deliver fuel efficiency and widebody passenger comfort in a single-aisle aircraft. The A220 brings together state-of-the-art aerodynamics, advanced materials and Pratt & Whitney's latest-generation PW1500G geared turbofan engines to offer at least 20 percent lower fuel burn per seat compared to previous generation aircraft, along with significantly lower emissions and a reduced noise footprint. Close to 100 A220s are flying with six operators on four continents. At the end of October 2019, the aircraft had received 530 firm orders from more than 20 customers worldwide. https://www.assemblymag.com/articles/95370-airbus-assembles-100th-a220-aircraft Back to Top China is training its top navy pilots to fill an 'urgent need' for aircraft carrier commanders J-15 fighters from China's Liaoning aircraft carrier conduct a drill in an area of South China SeaJ-15 fighters from China's Liaoning aircraft carrier conduct a drill in an area of South China Sea • The best pilots from Chinese carrier-borne squadrons are being sent to a naval academy for warship training to meet an "urgent need" for commanders. • They had to pass more than 10 assessments - from political thought to psychological testing - before they could join the program. The Chinese navy is training fighter pilots experienced in carrier-borne operations to command and manage its warships as it seeks to expand its global naval power. Its best pilots from carrier-borne squadrons - including some qualified to fly fighter jets during both daytime and at night - were sent to a naval academy for warship combat and command training late last month, PLA Daily reported on Monday. It did not say how many pilots had been selected, but all of them were required to pass more than 10 assessments - ranging from political thought to psychological testing - before they could join the training programme, the official People's Liberation Army newspaper said. Beijing-based naval expert Li Jie said the programme would focus on command and control skills for air and sea operations, and some of the pilots would ultimately be selected to command China's new aircraft carrier strike groups. J-15s aboard the Liaoning As part of its ambition to build a powerful blue-water navy that can operate globally, China plans to have four aircraft carriers in service by 2035. Its second aircraft carrier - the first built in China, known as the Type 001A - is undergoing sea trials and is expected to be operational by the end of this year. Work on the more modern Type 002 carrier started two years ago, and a naval source told the South China Morning Post that construction of a second Type 002 vessel could begin as early as 2021. But they will need suitable carrier pilots to take command. "It's quite an urgent need for the Chinese navy to have carrier group commanders - like its Western counterparts do - who are capable of commanding different warships and aircraft in modern joint-operation combat situations," Li said. "Aircraft carrier strike groups are supposed to sail on the high seas and into unfamiliar territory, so aside from having a background as naval aviators, all commanding officers should have a broad set of skills and knowledge - from foreign languages and international maritime law to air and sea operations - to help them make good decisions," he said. Other navies, such as the United States Navy, require more experience for the role - commanding officers of US aircraft carriers must be former naval aviators as well as former captains of different types of warships. For example, Captain Pat "Fin" Hannifin, commanding officer of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, has over 2,800 flight hours in 33 different aircraft under his belt. He was also executive officer on another aircraft carrier and commander of an amphibious transport dock. J-15 fighters from China's Liaoning aircraft carrier conduct a drill in an area of South China Sea, January 2, 2017. Rear Admiral Li Xiaoyan, the first captain of China's only active aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was a pilot with no experience on carrier-borne aircraft, though he did have experience on a destroyer and frigates. He was replaced by Zhang Zheng just days after the Liaoning formally joined the PLA Navy in 2012, and later by Liu Zhe - neither of whom had naval aviator backgrounds. Li Xiaoyan was one of the first group of 10 pilots selected for a training programme designed specifically for China's future aircraft carriers back in 1987. But the whole aircraft carrier plan was suspended in 1998 by premier Zhu Rongji for political and economic reasons, according to China's Carrier, a book published by China Development Press. Naval expert Li Jie said the Chinese navy now had to catch up in terms of training pilots, and especially commanding officers, for its aircraft carriers. "China resumed the aircraft carrier plan and in 2004 started refitting the hull of the Varyag. But after that first group of pilots was trained in 1987, there was no formal training in air and sea operations because there was no aircraft carrier training platform until 2012," Li said, referring to the unfinished Admiral Kuznetsov-class vessel China bought from Ukraine in 1998, which became the Liaoning. He said the latest training programme for commanding officers was a continuation of the one that began more than 30 years ago. https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-navy-trains-top-pilots-to-command-aircraft-carrier-fleet-2019-12 Back to Top Pilot job fair Saturday at DFW Airport takes aim at shortage More than 40,000 pilots in the U.S. are required to retire by 2034 Captain Bill Lusk of Southwest Airlines explains what the radar is showing to the media on a monitor during a Honeywell test flight that left out of Dallas Love Field Airport in Dallas on Wednesday, August 13, 2014. Honeywell developed new technology that helps pilots spot bad weather and then, by showing them the storm in 3-D, help them steer around it. Private airlines and regional carriers will be looking for pilots in North Texas on Saturday as the aviation industry faces a wave of retirements in the coming years. SkyWest Airlines, Republic Airlines, Air Wisconsin and Delta Air Lines subsidiary Delta Private Jets will be recruiting pilots at the job fair and forum from Future & Active Pilot Advisors starting at 9 a.m. Saturday at the Marriott DFW Airport South hotel. Commercial airlines are looking at 40,000 pilots retiring in the next 15 years, aging out because of the Federal Aviation Administration's mandatory 65-years-old retirement age, said Louis Smith, president of Nevada-based Future & Active Pilot Advisors. But charter pilots and other private carriers don't have the same limits. "There is no age restriction for these companies, and they want pilots," Smith said. Smith said hiring is strong, and regional and mainline airlines are participating in a future pilot forum aimed at student pilots and those looking to go into the industry. The job fair for pilots with more than 250 certified flying hours is from 9 a.m. to noon and the future pilot forum starts at 1 p.m. The event is free. In order to attend, participants must register at www.FAPA.aero/Jobs or FAPA.aero/FuturePilot. https://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/2019/12/13/pilot-job-fair-saturday-takes-aim-at-shortage-due-to-industry-growth-and-retirements/ Back to Top Ready for an action-packed week? SpaceX schedules next launch from Cape Canaveral Uncrewed Starliner launch also planned CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. - SpaceX is targeting no earlier than next week for the launch of a Falcon 9 rocket and communications satellite from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, according to a warning issued to pilots and mariners on Tuesday. The Air Force's 45th Space Wing issued a Launch Hazard Area, or region of the Atlantic Ocean that boats and aircraft will need to vacate, for Monday, Dec. 16. The restricted area around the Cape will be in effect from 5 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. An exact launch window within that timeframe was not made available. SpaceX is tasked with launching the JCSAT-18 / Kacific-1 commercial communications satellite from Launch Complex 40, a mission that will include a drone ship landing about eight minutes after liftoff. The Boeing-built spacecraft will provide coverage primarily for Asia and the Pacific. A launch on Monday would tee up an action-packed week for the Eastern Range: Boeing and United Launch Alliance are targeting no earlier than 6:36 a.m. that Friday for the launch of an uncrewed Starliner capsule on its maiden flight to the International Space Station. If successful, its eight-day stay at the ISS will pave the way for a crewed flight sometime next year. https://www.clickorlando.com/news/2019/12/13/ready-for-an-action-packed-week-spacex-schedules-next-launch-from-cape-canaveral/ Back to Top Call for Papers - ISASI 2020 Montreal Sheraton, Montreal PQ September 1 - 3, 2020 With "20/20 Vision for the Future" as our theme, the ISASI 2020 Committee is inviting interested individuals to submit abstracts for papers that address the future of aircraft accident investigation. Presentation topics that support the theme may include, but are not limited to: • Recent accident/incident investigations of interest. • Novel investigation techniques for aircraft, helicopter, and drone accidents. • Data investigation methods, techniques and future developments. • Airport investigation methods and techniques • Future investigator selection criteria and training needs. • Future of aircraft data capture and retrieval and protection of safety information. • Future developments in underwater wreckage recovery. • Future evolution of Family Assistance. We are also interested in papers that address the challenges surrounding the recent 737 Max accidents. While it is not our intent to discuss the accidents themselves, we are hoping to generate thought and discussion on the impact the accidents have had on to the industry as a whole and how it has affected the travelling public. Presentations must be in English and should be 25 minutes long. There will be an additional 5 minutes for questions at the end of each presentation. Abstracts should include the author's current CV [1 page only please] and be sent to isasi2020papers@shaw.ca Important dates: March 20th, 2020 - Last date for receipt of abstracts. May 8th, 2020 - Presenters informed of acceptance and provided with additional instructions. May 22nd, 2020 - Draft program for the 2019 Seminar Technical Program will be published. July 10th, 2020 - Last date for receipt of completed paper and PowerPoint presentation. Any papers not received by this date will be removed from the program and replaced by another speaker. If you have questions related to the paper topics or any other inquiries about the program, please contact the ISASI 2020 Program Chair at avsafe@shaw.ca Curt Lewis