Flight Safety Information July 15, 2020 - No. 142 In This Issue Accident: Buff Services F50 at Bardere on Jul 5th 2020, right main gear collapsed on landing Incident: Baltic BCS3 at Riga on Jul 13th 2020, bird strike Incident: France B773 at Reunion on Jul 11th 2020, odour on board Incident: Astral B744 at Doncaster on Jul 14th 2020, runway excursion on backtrack after landing Accident: Bluebird DH8D at Beledweyne on Jul 14th 2020, donkey crosses runway, gear collapse An Airman Died After His Chute Opened While He Was Still in the Plane, Says New Report Crash: Atlas B763 at Houston on Feb 23rd 2019, loss of control on approach FAA's Failure to Cull Bad Pilots Cited in Fatal Atlas Crash FAA: Landing gear on some aircraft built in Sandpoint can fail Fast Track: Alaska Airlines Will Join Oneworld Alliance In 2020 Boeing Loses 60 Max Jet Orders in June NASA's 2024 Moon mission is in serious trouble The USC Aviation Safety & Security Program Will Offer Online and In-Person Classes This Fall presage specializing in error prevention through proven scientific psychosocial analytics Leasing Aircraft & Engines, Return Conditions, and Transition - Course ERAU - Aircraft Crash Survival Investigation and Analysis - Course AVIATION SAFETY SURVEY GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY Accident: Buff Services F50 at Bardere on Jul 5th 2020, right main gear collapsed on landing A Buff Air Services Fokker 50, registration 5Y-WFC performing a flight from Mogadishu to Bardere (Somalia) with 5 crew and 3,974kg of humanitarian food aid, had safely landed on on Bardere's runway 15, turned around to backtrack the runway and was about to turn off the runway towards the apron when the aircraft suffered the collapse of the right hand main gear while moving at about 10 knots at about 10:30L (07:30Z), the right wing tip as well as the right hand propeller contacted the ground as result. No serious injuries are being reported. Local sources reported the right hand tyres may have deflated resulting in the gear collapse. Gedo Administration reported the aircraft arrived from Mogadishu. An investigation into the accident has been opened. Bardere Airfield (Gedo province) is located at Coordinates N2.330 E42.3119 and features a compacted sand runway 15/33 of 1300 meters/4265 feet length. On Jul 14th 2020 The Aviation Herald received a preliminary report by Somalia's Aircraft Accident Investigation Branch (SAAIB) reporting the right main gear collapsed due to metal fatigue, as result the aircraft received additional damage to the right wing, right nose wheel, all right hand propeller blades and the aircraft belly. The aircraft was flown by a captain (60, ATPL, 18,000 hours total, 8,500 hours on type) and a first officer (34, CPL, 3,800 hours total). The aircraft had accumulated 42,724 flight hours. The aircraft had received a valid certificate of airworthiness on Nov 4th 2019 valid through Nov 4th 2020. The investigator in charge wrote regarding weather: "Satellite weather information received from the Somalia meteorological station at 0730Z, indicated scattered low clouds at 2300 feet, visibility of more than 10 km and a wind direction from 2200 south west at a wind speed of 10 kts (220/10kts)." and released following preliminary conclusion: The incident was caused due to the failure and collapse of the right hand side of the main landing gear due to metal fatigue, in turn caused by cyclic loads. The contributory factors were the lack of lubrication on the bearing, wear and tear on the bearing and crack initiation on the connecting arm attachment point. https://avherald.com/h?article=4d990fc6&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: Baltic BCS3 at Riga on Jul 13th 2020, bird strike An Air Baltic Bombardier C-Series CS-300, registration YL-CSC performing flight BT-617 from Riga (Latvia) to Amsterdam (Netherlands), was in the initial climb out of Riga's runway 18 when the aircraft received a bird strike. The aircraft continued the climb and flight towards Amsterdam and was enroute at FL380 about 230nm westsouthwest of Riga when the crew decided to turn around and return to Riga, where the aircraft landed safely on runway 18 about 75 minutes after departure. A replacement BCS3 registration YL-CSM reached Amsterdam with a delay of 3 hours. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for about 14 hours, then resumed service. https://avherald.com/h?article=4d9f42c8&opt=0 Back to Top Incident: France B773 at Reunion on Jul 11th 2020, odour on board An Air France Boeing 777-300, registration F-GSQP performing flight AF-671 from Reunion (Reunion) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) with 468 passengers and 22 crew, was enroute at FL320 about 1160nm northnortheast of Reunion when the crew decided to return to Reunion. The aircraft descended to FL270 and landed safely back about 4:45 hours after departure. Local media reported the crew reported smoke in the cockpit. The airline reported the aircraft returned due to a technical problem. The flight was postponed by 24 hours. On Jul 14th 2020 The Aviation Herald received additional information that an unsual odour/smell of smoke developed in the cabin prompting the return. The smell developed into the cockpit, the crew donned their oxygen masks. On approach back to Reunion the crew requested the fire services ready for their arrival, advised they had 490 people on board and 18 dogs in the forward cargo bay. The aircraft landed on runway 14 and taxied to the apron. https://avherald.com/h?article=4d9dd31d&opt=0 Back to Top Back to Top Incident: Astral B744 at Doncaster on Jul 14th 2020, runway excursion on backtrack after landing An Astral Aviation Boeing 747-400 freighter, registration TF-AMU performing flight 8B-2601 from Nairobi (Kenya) to Doncaster,EN (UK), had landed on Doncaster's runway 02 and safely slowed to taxi speed. The aircraft proceeded to the turn pad at the end of the runway to turn around and backtrack the runway to the apron, but went off the turn pad with the nose gear, main gear remained on paved surface, and became disabled. https://avherald.com/h?article=4d9f2c1c&opt=0 Back to Top Accident: Bluebird DH8D at Beledweyne on Jul 14th 2020, donkey crosses runway, gear collapse on landing, aircraft burst into flames A Bluebird Aviation de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration 5Y-VVU performing a charter freight flight from Djibouti (Djibouti) to Beledweyne (Somalia) with 3 crew, landed in Beledweyne but apparently suffered a gear collapse and subsequently burst into flames. All three occupants were resuced, the aircraft sustained substantial damage including the fracture of the right wing. A manager of Bluebird Aviation confirmed the occurrence reporting a donkey was crossing the runway. All three crew members survived without serious injuries. Beledweyne Airport (position N4.7667 E45.2389) features a sand/gravel runway 04/22 of 2200 meters/7220 feet length. https://avherald.com/h?article=4d9f126c&opt=0 Back to Top An Airman Died After His Chute Opened While He Was Still in the Plane, Says New Report An improperly configured back-up parachute inadvertently opened into the wind during a jump training mission, pulling a special tactics airman out of an aircraft and causing his death, according to a new investigation. The Air Force on Tuesday released its months-long Accident Investigation Board report, which concluded that the unexpected deployment of a T-11R emergency reserve parachute led to the death of Staff Sgt. Cole Condiff, a Special Tactics combat controller with the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, part of the 24th Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The Nov. 5 accident led to a 17-day search for Condiff over the Gulf of Mexico. His body was never recovered. In addition to improper parachute assembly, the head of Air Force Special Operations Command said deficiencies and lapses in judgment across the community contributed to the accident. The command "prioritized operations over in-garrison training and predictable deployment scheduling, resulting in stressed units across the command and leaders accepting unnecessary risk for the sake of mission completion," according to a news release accompanying the report. Since 9/11, "we normalized a culture overly focused on mission accomplishment, causing a lapse in training rigor, strict adherence to standards, and vigorous oversight of high-risk activities at all command echelons," said AFSOC commander Lt. Gen. Jim Slife. The command noted that, like the overall Special Operations Command community, "mission execution was prioritized to the detriment of leadership, discipline, and accountability practices." On the day of the accident, Condiff, 29, was assigned to one of six teams participating in a training event known as a rodeo competition to test aircrews and special operators on how quickly and accurately they can get to their target location. The teams were conducting a static-line jump out of an MC-130H Combat Talon II and had already completed a few jumps earlier in the training. The tasks for Nov. 5 included the jump operations, an obstacle course and land navigation, with teams landing at the "Air Commando" drop zone at Hurlburt, which is specifically designated for personnel parachute operations, according to the report. Condiff was the designated jumpmaster, scouting ahead from the right paratroop door of the aircraft for the drop zone below. Three teams had already jumped; Condiff's team was slated to jump next. At around 11:14 a.m. local time, Condiff looked out the door of the MC-130, which was flying at an altitude of 1,012 feet above mean sea level at roughly 150 miles per hour. Witnesses testified that Condiff's top and bottom tuck tab inserts, which help hold the parachute securely in place, were "not flush with the green pockets on his T-11R parachute ripcord assembly" even before his first jump earlier in the day, the report states. A photo in the report shows Condiff's bottom tuck tab insert sticking out "approximately one inch from the edge of its pocket," and a loose left side tuck tab showed two seams on the parachute pack, making the ripcord assembly vulnerable to wind gusts outside the aircraft. As the MC-130 turned toward the jump location, airmen on board saw Condiff's reserve parachute inflate outside the right door, pulling at him. Condiff "impacted the aft door frame 'violently'" before his legs were airborne outside the frame. "Several witnesses heard a second loud noise that could have been [Condiff] impacting the exterior of the aircraft," the report states. "The evidence indicated he likely sustained fatal injuries upon being pulled from the aircraft." An immediate search and rescue began for Condiff, who descended under fully inflated reserve and main parachute canopies into the water, approximately two-and-a-half nautical miles south of the coast. Multiple agencies, including the Navy and Coast Guard, were involved in the search, which included aircraft, underwater drones and scuba divers. Troops and support personnel canvassed 700 square miles of the Gulf stretching between Fort Walton Beach and Pensacola, Florida. The search was suspended Nov. 22. The convening authority, Maj. Gen. L. Kip Clark, found a number of training and procedural issues within the wing that contributed to the fatal mishap. For example, the designated jumpmaster personnel inspectors "did not check the proper configuration of the T-11R inserts and side tuck tabs" for the flights that day. Furthermore, "the technical order management process failed to effectively distribute and communicate sister-service guidance on the proper configuration and storage of T-11R parachute systems, resulting in incomplete knowledge of the standards throughout the special tactics community," Clark said. The Army studied the effectiveness of tuck tabs, which led to updated safety procedures for that service, as well as the Air Force and Navy, in 2015, he said. Life Preserver Units, or LPUs, should also have been present, given the training was near or over water. Planning officials could not agree whether to use lifeboats on standby as well, Clark said. "Inadequate organizational leadership led to insufficient command oversight of this event," he said. "I find by a preponderance of the evidence that event planners, safety personnel, numerous jumpmasters, and jumpers did not understand regulatory requirements for safe static-line jump operations. I view this widespread misunderstanding to be a training issue within the 24 SOW." AFSOC ordered a suspension in December for its parachute, dive and mountaineering training to allow officials to inspect equipment and review safety procedures. The move followed the deaths of Condiff and Tech. Sgt. Peter Kraines, a pararescueman with the 24th Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt. The suspension was lifted in May. Last month, officials revealed through a separate investigation that Kraines' death was due to a rock-climbing anchor system that unexpectedly failed, causing him to fall to his death. He and his team were participating in a routine, six-day mountain rescue training event at the Black Cliffs near Boise, Idaho, in October when the accident occurred. "It is apparent that these losses are a tragic consequence of a culture shaped by the demands of the last 20 years," said Slife, speaking to both Condiff and Kraines' deaths. "Our people truly are our greatest asset," he said. "We owe it to them to continually evaluate how we operate and how we can be more effective." https://www.yahoo.com/news/airman-died-chute-opened-while-204610190.html Back to Top Crash: Atlas B763 at Houston on Feb 23rd 2019, loss of control on approach On Jun 11th 2020 the NTSB announced a (virtual) board meeting on Jul 14th 2020 to determine the probable causes of the crash. The board meeting was webcast on schedule and has concluded by now. The chair reported opening the meeting: "The first officer was the pilot flying at the flight had its initial descent there was nothing unusual at that point but as it encountered black turbulence a go around was activated it was an aborted landing. It was unusual to be activated so far from the airport or initial descent in addition neither pilot made the call around and manual over rode the pilot and put it in a dive where the crew did not recover The airplane crashed into a shallow marshy area at Trinity Bay. The captain the first officer and a non-revenue pilot riding on the jump seat lost their lives." The chair continued to say: "The crew-related issues we will discuss today are not to highlight individual deficiencies, but rather, to raise attention to a possibly systemic issue that needs to be addressed so that others do not have to go through what these family members have experienced." The first officer had a display issue and temporarily transferred control to the captain until he sorted the problem using the EFI switch. The speedbrakes were extended for the descent, it was procedure to guard the speed brake handle for speed brake retraction upon reaching the target altitude. The hand of the first officer was very close to the go-around switches while guarding the speed brake handle. The aircraft pitched up, the engines spooled up and the speed brakes retracted which can only be done manually. Bill English, investigator in charge said (most likely referring to the first officer and not the captain as he spoke): "The captain responded to the call and pushed forward and made an expression of speed and said we're stalling. There was no indication that the airplane was stalling. He was experiencing disorientation because of somatogravic illusion." The aircraft reached a nose down attitude, at about 3 thousand feet it broke out of the clouds, full nose up input occurred but were too late to prevent impact in the bay. The human factors expert stated: "When he was using the speed brakes standard operating procedures (SOP) require his hand require on the speed brake handle to retract the speed brakes at selected altitude and increase in thrust. Holding the thrust close to the left go around switch so that very little upward arm movement would be needed to make contact with the switch. The go around mode was unintended. The first officer was not effected in scanning these instruments he had sensations to incorrectly concludes the airplane was stalling. It was not in a stalled condition. First officer provided nose down input and failed to disengage the autopilot. The first officer should have disconnected the automation and recovered the airplane. His inputs however overrode the autopilot and forced the aircraft into a steep dive that was unrecoverable. The first officer during training actions at multiple employers showed an inability to remain calm during stressful situations." The captain was busy setting up the approach and communicating with ATC causing him to detect the airplane status with delay. Although the first officer's motions caught the attention of the captain the captain did not intervene. Delays are normal due to startle effect and surprise, the captain pulled on the control column but did not announce a control transfer. The first officer's training record was "terrible". The board members currently discuss the hiring processes and how information flow between former employer(s) and hiring employer is at the current and what improvements could be made. The captain never really acknowledged anything was out of the ordinary. About 35 seconds after the onset of the upset the captain provided first control inputs on his column, the aircraft was already in steep high speed dive. There was a split of the elevators. The left elevator (which is the only one recorded on the FDR) was pulled while it was reasonable to assume the right hand control column still was pushed forward causing left and right elevators to move differently. Left and right elevator are connected via a spring load, so it there is no control force on the left column, both elevators follow the right column (and vice versa). A short time later the right elevator joined the movement of the left control column so it can be assumed the first officer ceased his nose down control input (when the aircraft broke out of clouds). There never was a transfer of control called, which could have made a difference to the outcome of the event. The chair stated in summary to the discussion about the hiring processes: "I intend to offer an amendment to add the FAA as a contributing factor. That the FAA's failure to implement the pilots record database in timely manner when we get to that point. ... The FAA has dragged their feet on implementing a sufficient pilot record database." The vice chair rose this question: "I think we're starting to find that mf as the flight was approaching the area of turbulence the first officer called for mrap flap extension it lowers the aircraft and Boeing and Atlas remind that they not be extended until you are closer to the airport. Had the flaps not been extended my understanding that the go around modes woo not have been able to be activated is that correct?" which received an affirmative reply by the aircraft systems expert. Stick shaker and stick pusher never operated, the pitch angles were never indicative of a stall. The human factors expert responded to a related question by the vice chair, initially when the go around mode was activated it triggered the thrust to increase over a couple of seconds. The preceiption of the changing inertia and the force of gravity causes the perceived angle to shift and that caused the first officer feeling like the plane was pitching up more than 4 to 5 degrees." Check airmen at Air Wisconsin, Mesa and Atlas reported that when the first officer was presented with an unexpected scenario, he would get flustered and could not respond to the system, he would become extremely anxious and push buttons without thinking about what he was doing just to be doing things. This pattern, observed by three check airmen, also surfaced during the accident flight in the sense "in an inconsistency in a stressful situation do anything." The first officer could have disconnected the automation by pushing two buttons, one for the autopilot and another one for the autothrust, then he could have flown the aircraft conventionally in manual control and returned it onto the intended profile. The captain should have, in response to the invalid responses by the first officer, also disconnected the automation, announced "I have control" and return the aircraft back onto the intended profile. The captain would have had about 20 seconds to notice the mode changes before the aircraft significantly began to deviate from the intended profile, he may have had even some more seconds to recover the aircraft. The chair inquired whether it was correct the first officer perceived something like an 80 degrees pitch up as result of the unintended go around activation and how the somatogravic illusion could be overcome. The expert stated: "Well I think it is helpful that pilots know when to be on their guard like during an intentional go around and if they have practice with instrument flying. In this case I think the thing that was tricky they would not have expected a rapid acceleration at this time and they were unaware of the mode change and at a bit of disadvantage." The topic of video surveillance in the cockpit was brought up, the relevant expert stated: "it would be tremendously helpful for the air carriers and the training environment to actually see how pilots are operating within the cockpit and this is not intended to be something you see on the evening news. We have been careful in the use of CVR to my knowledge there has never been an accidental release of internal cockpit recordings. We do transcripts but that's about it. And I'm a little disappointed in terms of people saying it is privacy in other modes of transportation in trucking and buses and railroad cabs they are all using image recorders to help to manage the safety aspect. So I guess I'm having difficulty in understanding and I've heard concerns it could be used in some area for criminal use and I think there could be way that's could be managed but I'm curious if there are any other objections besides we don't want people to see what is going on in the cockpit." The NTSB is not aware of any training regarding somatogravic illusions provided to the first officer. The FAA does not require any physical type of sensory illusions, there is only a theoretic lesson very early into the instrument rating. In summary there is no requirement for a specific training to sensory illusions like black hole, somatogravic illusion etc. The FAA database of 10 years (2009-2018) contain 219 accidents with 400 fatalities caused by spatial disorientation (though most of them happened in general aviation). 23 findings were adopted by the investigation (subject to publication in writing by NTSB). The NTSB board concludes the probable cause of the accident was (subject to publication in writing by NTSB): The probable cause of this accident was the inappropriate response by the first officer as a pilot flying to inadvertently activating the go around mode which led to spatial disorientation and nose down input that placed the airplane in a deep dive which the crew did not recover from. Contributing to the accident were: - the captain's failure to adequately monitor the flight path and assume a control of the aircraft to intervene and - systemic deficiencies in the aviation select and performance measurement practices which failed to address the first officer's aptitude related deficiencies in maladaptive stress response - the federal aviation administrations dragging failure to administer the pilot database in a sufficient robust timely manner. The chair concludes: "I think we're on target if the FAA had done their job this pilot would not have been employed by Atlas Airlines and therefore this crash would not have happened." The investigation proposes 6 safety recommendations and reiterated a number of safety recommendations that were issued 15 years ago. The actual final report will be released in due time (a couple of weeks estimated). Later Jul 14th 2020 the NTSB released an abstract stating following findings and probable causes in writing: Findings 1. None of the following were factors in this accident: (1) the captain's and the first officer's certifications and qualifications; (2) air traffic control services; (3) the condition and maintenance of airplane structures, powerplants, and systems; and (4) airplane weight and balance. 2. There was insufficient information to determine whether the flight crewmembers were fatigued at the time of the accident, and no available evidence suggested impairment due to any medical condition, alcohol, or other impairing drugs. 3. Whatever electronic flight instrument system display anomaly the first officer (FO) experienced was resolved to both crewmembers' satisfaction (by the FO's cycling of the electronic flight instrument switch) before the events related to the accident sequence occurred. 4. The activation of the airplane's go-around mode was unintended and unexpected by the pilots and occurred when the flight was encountering light turbulence and likely instrument meteorological conditions associated with its penetration of the leading edge of a cold front. 5. Presuming that the first officer (FO) was holding the speedbrake lever as expected in accordance with Atlas Air Inc.'s procedure, the inadvertent activation of the goaround mode likely resulted from unintended contact between the FO's left wrist or watch and the left go-around switch due to turbulence-induced loads that moved his arm. 6. Despite the presence of the go-around mode indications on the flight mode annunciator and other cues that indicated that the airplane had transitioned to an automated flight path that differed from what the crew had been expecting, neither the first officer nor the captain were aware that the airplane's automated flight mode had changed. 7. Given that the first officer (FO) was the pilot flying and had not verbalized any problem to the captain or initiated a positive transfer of airplane control, the manual forward elevator control column inputs that were applied seconds after the inadvertent activation of the go-around mode were likely made by the FO. 8. The first officer likely experienced a pitch-up somatogravic illusion as the airplane accelerated due to the inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which prompted him to push forward on the elevator control column. 9. Although compelling sensory illusions, stress, and startle response can adversely affect the performance of any pilot, the first officer had fundamental weaknesses in his flying aptitude and stress response that further degraded his ability to accurately assess the airplane's state and respond with appropriate procedures after the inadvertent activation of the go-around mode. 10. Had the Federal Aviation Administration met the deadline and complied with the requirements for implementing the pilot records database (PRD) as stated in Section 203 of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, the PRD would have provided hiring employers relevant information about the first officer's employment history and training performance deficiencies. 11. The first officer's long history of training performance difficulties and his tendency to respond impulsively and inappropriately when faced with an unexpected event during training scenarios at multiple employers suggest an inability to remain calm during stressful situations-a tendency that may have exacerbated his aptituderelated performance difficulties. 12. While the captain was setting up the approach and communicating with air traffic control, his attention was diverted from monitoring the airplane's state and verifying that the flight was proceeding as planned, which delayed his recognition of and response to the first officer's unexpected actions that placed the airplane in a dive. 13. The captain's failure to command a positive transfer of control of the airplane as soon as he attempted to intervene on the controls enabled the first officer to continue to force the airplane into a steepening dive. 14. The captain's degraded performance, which included his failure to assume positive control of the airplane and effectively arrest the airplane's descent, resulted from the ambiguity, high stress, and short timeframe of the situation. 15. The first officer's repeated uses of incomplete and inaccurate information about his employment history on resumes and applications were deliberate attempts to conceal his history of performance deficiencies and deprived Atlas Air Inc. and at least one other former employer of the opportunity to fully evaluate his aptitude and competency as a pilot. 16. Atlas Air Inc.'s human resources personnel's reliance on designated agents to review pilot background records and flag significant items of concern was inappropriate and resulted in the company's failure to evaluate the first officer's unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain at his previous employer. 17. Operators that rely on designated agents or human resources personnel for initial review of records obtained under the Pilot Records Improvement Act should include flight operations subject matter experts early in the records review process. 18. The manual process by which Pilot Records Improvement Act records are obtained could preclude a hiring operator from obtaining all background records for a pilot applicant who fails to disclose a previous employer due to either deception or having resigned before being considered fully employed, such as after starting but not completing initial training. 19. The establishment of a confidential voluntary data clearinghouse to share deidentified pilot selection data among airlines about the utility of different methods for predicting pilot success in training and on the job would benefit the safety of the flying public. 20. All pilots of Boeing 767- and 757-series airplanes (which share a similar go-around switch design) could benefit from an awareness of the circumstances of this accident that likely led to the inadvertent activation of the go-around mode. 21. The Department of Defense has developed approaches to automatic ground collision avoidance system technology for fighter airplanes that, if successfully adapted for use in lower-performance, less-maneuverable airplanes, could serve as a model for the development of similar installations in civil transport-category airplanes that could dramatically reduce terrain collision accidents involving pilot spatial disorientation. 22. An expanded data recorder that records the position of various knobs, switches, flight controls, and information from electronic displays, as specified in amendment 43 to the recorder standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization, would not have provided pertinent information about the flight crew's actions. 23. A flight deck image recording system compliant with Technical Standard Order TSO-C176a, "Cockpit Image Recorder Equipment," would have provided relevant information about the data available to the flight crew and the flight crew's actions during the accident flight. Probable Cause The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover. Contributing to the accident was the captain's failure to adequately monitor the airplane's flightpath and assume positive control of the airplane to effectively intervene. Also contributing were systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry's selection and performance measurement practices, which failed to address the first officer's aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to implement the Pilot Records Database in a sufficiently robust and timely manner. https://avherald.com/h?article=4c497c3c/0001&opt=0 Back to Top FAA's Failure to Cull Bad Pilots Cited in Fatal Atlas Crash By Alan Levin • Pilot in fatal cargo crash had repeated failures, NTSB says • Airline didn't know of pilot's prior issues in training The fatal crash of a cargo plane last year was caused in part by the failure of the U.S. federal government to establish a reliable system of weeding out unqualified airline pilots, investigators concluded. The Federal Aviation Administration came under heavy criticism Tuesday as the National Transportation Safety Board issued its findings in the fatal crash of a cargo jet carrying Amazon.com Inc. packages near Houston. The lack of an improved system for tracking pilot records -- despite a decade-long congressional mandate -- has created "holes in the safety net," NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt said at a video hearing. "The FAA has dragged their feet on implementing a sufficiently robust pilot-records database." The copilot of an Atlas Air cargo plane who inadvertently added full power during a routine approach to land in Houston became disoriented and pushed the Boeing Co. 767-300 into a steep dive, NTSB found. He had repeatedly panicked during training exercises and shown other deficiencies and those systemic issued hadn't been addressed, NTSB found. Flawed System His failures while training with at least two prior airlines weren't known to Atlas, a division of Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings Inc., because he hadn't disclosed that and there was no FAA system for checking. He died in the crash. While the Feb. 23, 2019, flight that crashed was only carrying packages, the issue is an industrywide problem because passenger carriers rely on the same flawed system, according to the NTSB. "This could happen to anyone," NTSB member Jennifer Homendy said. "It could happen anywhere." All five board members criticized the FAA for its slow pace adopting a better system for checking pilot records and voted unanimously to toughen the findings to specifically include the regulator's inaction as a contributing factor in the accident. There have been 10 airline accidents over the past 30 years in which pilots with prior performance issues were identified as part of the reasons for the crash, Sumwalt said. Buffalo Crash The FAA expects to finalize its new system by next January, it said in an emailed statement. "The rule includes the requirement that industry provide pilot records" to the new database so they can be shared among carriers, the agency said. Carriers can now voluntarily access the database for some agency records, FAA said. The airline has made several enhancements to hiring, training and pilot reviews since the accident, John Dietrich, president and chief executive officer of Atlas Air Worldwide, said in an emailed statement. "The NTSB's report provides valuable findings that will help our company and the aviation community as a whole as we continue to improve safety across our industry," Dietrich said. Congress ordered the agency to create a new system in 2010 following a 2009 crash near Buffalo, New York, that killed 50 people. The Colgan Air captain on the flight with a lengthy history of training failures caused the plane to go down, NTSB found. Lawmakers later imposed a 2017 deadline after the agency didn't respond fast enough. The Atlas Air plane reached speeds of about 500 miles (805 kilometers) per hour during its abrupt dive, according to NTSB data. It had been approaching Houston's George Bush Intercontinental Airport on a flight from Miami. All three aboard the plane died: Captain Ricky Blakely, copilot Conrad Jules Aska -- who was at the controls -- and a third pilot for another airline, Sean Archuleta, who was sitting at the rear of the cockpit. The impact littered a bay near Houston with packages and debris. While the captain attempted to pull the plane out of its dive, the safety board faulted him as well for acting too late. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-14/faa-s-failure-to-weed-out-unqualified-pilots-cited-in-crash Back to Top FAA: Landing gear on some aircraft built in Sandpoint can fail BOISE - U.S. officials say the nose landing gear on some aircraft built in Idaho and flown all over the world could fail and cause the 10-seat aircraft to overturn on landings or takeoffs. The Federal Aviation Administration on Monday said owners of the $2.3 million Kodiak 100 airplanes built in Sandpoint will have to do an inspection beginning in mid-August. The FAA in the airworthiness directive said that if problem parts are found, they have to be replaced or regularly inspected going forward. Aircraft not meeting requirements in the directive would be grounded. The FAA issued the airworthiness directive, a legally enforceable regulation, following a public comment period that started last spring. "Whenever there is an AD (airworthiness directive) issued that's a super-serious matter," said Robert Clifford, an aviation expert and senior partner at Clifford Law Offices in Chicago. The FAA estimates there are 116 Kodiak aircraft with possible problems registered in the U.S. It's not clear how many are owned and operated outside the U.S. The cost to replace the affected parts is about $7,500, federal officials estimate. The aircraft was built by Quest Aircraft Design from 2007 until that company in 2019 was acquired by Daher Group, an industrial conglomerate based in Marseille, France, which continues to produce the plane. Jason Eddy, vice president of operations at Daher's Sandpoint facility, didn't return a message left by the Associated Press. The airworthiness directive does not have a set deadline. Instead, beginning on Aug. 17, owners have 25 hours of flying time with the aircraft before it must be inspected to see if it has the affected parts in the nose landing gear. If affected parts are found, owners can replace them or set up a regular inspection of the parts to check for cracks not to exceed 200 hours of flying time. The Kodiak 100 is designed to land on unpaved airstrips in remote areas, and so has specially designed landing gear. The aircraft can also carry more than 3,000 pounds and land and take off on short runways. It can also be configured to carry passengers or cargo, and land and take off on water. Daher Group on its website said the aircraft is used by outfitters working in remote areas, parachute clubs, as an air taxi, aerial surveillance for parks and police, assisting in wildlife management and delivering humanitarian aid. The company said the aircraft is also flown in Europe, South America, Africa, Asia and Australia. The FAA said it received reports last year about problems with some parts of the nose landing gear becoming loose and causing shimmying, potentially leading to cracks. The FAA said that if the nose landing gear fails on unimproved surfaces, the risk of the gear "digging in and the airplane overturning on the ground increases." Wade Sullivan of the FAA in Seattle didn't return a phone message left by the AP. The Bonner County Daily Bee reported earlier this summer that some of the company's Idaho workforce had been laid off, with the company citing a drop in sales due to the coronavirus pandemic. The company didn't say how many of about 250 workers at its Idaho facilities were let go. https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2020/jul/14/faa-landing-gear-on-some-aircraft-built-in-sandpoi/ Back to Top Fast Track: Alaska Airlines Will Join Oneworld Alliance In 2020 In February 2020, many of us were caught off guard when it was announced that Alaska Airlines would be joining the oneworld alliance by the summer of 2021. Well, it looks like the timeframe for that is now being moved forward significantly. I guess one benefit of the current pandemic is that airlines can use this opportunity to expedite any adjustments they've been planning. Alaska Airlines CEO Brad Tilden has indicated that Alaska Airlines intends to join the oneworld alliance earlier than initially expected. The Seattle-based airline is hoping for a formal invite to join oneworld this month, and then hopes to be an alliance member before the end of the year. As he describes it, this process is on a fast track, which is made easier by the fact that Alaska Airlines already has partnerships with several oneworld airlines, including American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Japan Airlines, and Qantas. Alaska hopes to join the oneworld alliance in 2020 Tilden says that oneworld was the obvious choice for the airline, as he thinks this will help build more loyalty in Alaska's more markets. All of this comes as American Airlines continues to build up its presence in Seattle, with the airline planning on launching flights to Bangalore, London, and Shanghai. The two airlines have had a partnership for years, which was recently strengthened. American is launching three long haul routes from Seattle Questions remain about Alaska's participation in oneworld When it comes to the awesome Mileage Plan loyalty program, there are a lot of questions remaining about the implications of Alaska Airlines joining oneworld. We don't have answers to these questions yet, though I know some of the things that I'm wondering about: • How will Alaska status map over to oneworld? Presumably MVP will get oneworld Ruby and MVP Gold will get oneworld Sapphire, but will MVP Gold 75K get oneworld Emerald? • Will Alaska lose any non-oneworld partners as the airline joins oneworld? • Alaska currently has a separate award chart for every partner airline, so will that continue, or will the airline simplify its award chart structure, which could be both a blessing and a curse? • With Alaska belonging to a more unified alliance, could we see the airline start to allow multiple partners on a single award ticket? • If a new award chart is introduced, will Alaska continue with its generous policies of allowing stopovers even on one way awards? • Will MVP Gold 75K status come with oneworld Emerald? Alaska has historically done a phenomenal job with its Mileage Plan loyalty program, and I don't think the airline is looking to lose any loyalty with this move. At the same time, I have a hard time imagining that everything will work in our favor. Of course it would be awesome if there were a unified award chart with really low award pricing, with stopovers on one way awards, and with multiple airlines allowed on each award, but that also seems too good to be true. I guess we'll get the answers to many of these questions sooner rather than later. How will Mileage Plan redemtpion rates change? Bottom line Alaska Airlines now intends to join the oneworld alliance before the end of 2020. That sure is a fast tracked membership process. I'm excited about Alaska joining oneworld, though also have a lot of questions, and am a bit worried about the implications of this for the unique value proposition of Mileage Plan. Personally I'm hoping - and even anticipate - that Mileage Plan will become one of the most lucrative oneworld airline loyalty programs. https://onemileatatime.com/alaska-airlines-oneworld-alliance-fast-track/ Back to Top Boeing Loses 60 Max Jet Orders in June With Virus Crimping Buyers Boeing Co.'s order stockpile shrank further last month as airlines and lessors backed out of commitments for the grounded 737 Max jetliner in a market devastated by the coronavirus pandemic. The planemaker recorded 60 Max cancellations in June, including 47 that already had been announced, according to data posted on the company's website July 14. The tally didn't include Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA's move to scrap all 97 of its remaining Boeing jets on order, since those deals haven't yet officially been terminated. Boeing's orders in peril from customers in poor financial health and those intent on revising contracts rose by 123 last month. The unprecedented collapse in travel demand has complicated Boeing's efforts to shore up the Max, a critical source of cash. The Chicago-based planemaker faces a long, slow comeback for the best-selling plane once regulators end a flying ban imposed in March 2019 after two fatal crashes. So far, about 2,480 deliveries of the Max have been postponed by at least a year due to disrupted production, according to Bank of America Corp. analyst Ron Epstein. "Once the aircraft is cleared to fly, the demand outlook for the product is uncertain," Epstein said in a July 9 report, noting that the Max is "strategically disadvantaged" compared with its Airbus SE counterpart, the A320neo. "When demand returns to commercial aerospace, we expect operators to choose the untainted program first, before opting to order a Max," Epstein said. Lessor Cancellations Aircraft lessors have been working with Boeing to pare speculative orders, spurring a big chunk of recent Max cancellations. Avolon Holdings Ltd. dropped 17 aircraft, while BOC Aviation scrubbed a deal for 30. "We have and will continue to work with our customers on specific timing and adjustment to deliveries," Boeing Chief Financial Officer Greg Smith said in a statement. The order revisions will help dictate current and future production rates to balance supply and demand. Net sales for all commercial aircraft have dropped by 323 planes this year - or 784 after including the accounting adjustment for customers in poor financial health and those intent on revising contracts. Still, there were faint glimmers of good news for Boeing. The company delivered 10 aircraft in June, including three of its 787 Dreamliners. That's a slight improvement from the four total shipments Boeing recorded in May, when none of its marquee wide-body jets was sold or delivered. And while the U.S. planemaker recorded just one gross aircraft order in June - a 767 freighter for FedEx Corp. - Airbus was shut out of new sales for a second consecutive month. "We continue to closely monitor the commercial marketplace by staying very engaged with our customers around the globe to fully understand short-term and long-term requirements," Smith said. https://www.ttnews.com/articles/boeing-loses-60-max-jet-orders-june-virus-crimping-buyers Back to Top NASA's 2024 Moon mission is in serious trouble • NASA needs a lot of money if it hopes to achieve a crewed mission to the Moon by 2024, but lawmakers aren't giving in. • A budget proposal for NASA asked for nearly $5 billion but was cleared for just over $1.5 billion, making a Moon return impossible • NASA is hopeful that the Senate will be more willing to boost its budget, but that remains to be seen. The Trump administration gambled in a big way when it mandated that NASA find a way to return humans to the Moon by 2024. The decision was decried by many scientists and analysts as short-sighted, as it was an incredibly short timeline that would require not only a huge effort on the part of NASA and its commercial partners but also an incredible investment on the part of the US government. Securing a large enough budget has proven difficult for NASA, and despite the order to return to the Moon coming straight from the top, lawmakers who decide how much money NASA should receive for its efforts have clearly not seen the value in a return to the Moon. Now, as The Hill reports, a new bill detailing NASA's funding falls well short of the cash the space agency will need in order to fulfill the Moon 2024 promise. The administration had initially requested a whopping $4.7 billion for NASA's efforts to explore space. That amount would have helped the progress of the Artemis missions which would include crewed missions to the lunar surface. Lawmakers in the House decided that was a bit too high, and sliced things down to just $1.56 billion, which is well, well below the amount that is needed to make it to the Moon by 2024. NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine offered a statement on the decision, and while his wording initially appears complimentary, you don't have to read too far into it to realize what he's really saying. "I want to thank the House Commerce-Justice-Science subcommittee for the bipartisan support for NASA's Artemis program," Bridenstine said. "The $628.2 million in funding for the human landing system (HLS) is an important first step in this year's appropriations process. We still have more to do and I look forward to working with the Senate to ensure America has the resources the first woman and next man on the moon need in 2024." Put simply, Bridenstine is hoping that lawmakers in the Senate will be more supportive of the Artemis mission plans and, as a result, kick a whole lot more cash in NASA's direction. Budgets are complicated and go through many revisions, and it's possible (or even likely) that the Senate will come up with additional funding for NASA's Moon exploration efforts despite the meager allowance offered by the House. It's also worth noting that the timeline of NASA's Moon 2024 efforts is already a crunch, and any delays could lead to a dramatic delay in the date of missions that would actually send humans back to the Moon. With a lack of cash, an incredibly short deadline, and a global health crisis working against the space agency, it's looking increasingly likely that it'll take a near miracle for NASA to pull it off. https://bgr.com/2020/07/13/moon-2024-mission-nasa-budget/ Back to Top TheUSC Aviation Safety & Security ProgramWill Offer Online and In-Person Classes This Fall The following upcoming courses, including NEW Safety Performance Indicators course, will take place in Los Angeles and in our virtual Webex classrooms. Software Safety Philosophies and methods of developing software, analyzing software, and managing a software safety program. Online Course August 17-20, 2020 4 Days Tuition: $2250 SeMS Aviation Security Management Systems Managing and implementing aviation security measures at medium to small size aircraft operators, all airports, and Indirect Air Carriers, with emphasis on risk assessment and cyber security. Online and In-Person Course August 17-21, 2020 4.5 Days Tuition: $2650 Accident/Incident Response Preparedness This course is designed for individuals who are involved in either preparing emergency response plans or responding to incidents and accidents as a representative of their organization. This updated course has been extended to four full days to integrate communications in the digital age. Online and In-Person Course August 24-27, 2020 4 Days Tuition: $2250 Human Factors in Aviation Safety This course presents human factors in a manner that can be readily understood and applied by aviation practitioners in all phases of aviation operations. Emphasis is placed on identifying the causes of human error, predicting how human error can affect performance, and applying countermeasures to reduce or eliminate its effects. Online and In-Person Course August 24-28, 2020 4.5 Days Tuition: $2650 Aviation Law & Aviation Dispute Resolution This course provides information on the legal risks inherent in aviation operations and an overview of the legal system as it relates to aviation safety. The course also provides an understanding of the various legal processes relating to aviation and discusses ways to engage aviation authorities in a responsible and successful manner. The judicial process, current litigation trends, legal definitions, and procedures are also covered. Online Course August 31-September 3, 2020 4 Days Tuition: $2250 Safety Management for Aviation Maintenance This course provides supervisors with aviation safety principles and practices needed to manage the problems associated with aircraft maintenance operations. In addition, it prepares attendees to assume safety responsibilities in their areas of operation. Online and In-Person Course August 31-September 4, 2020 4.5 Days Tuition: $2650 Threat and Error Managment This course provides students with sufficient knowledge to develop a TEM program and a LOSA program within their organizations. Online and In-Person Course September 9-11, 2020 2.5 Days Tuition: $1375 Digital Photography for Aircraft Accident Investigation This specialized course in accident investigation is designed to assist the investigator to improve photographic documentation of an accident site. Course participants will take photographs of components and critique them as a class. This course assumes that the investigator is not a professional photographer. In-Person Course September 10-11, 2020 2 Days Tuition: $1200 Aviation Safety Management Systems Providing the skills and practical methods to plan, manage, and maintain an effective Aviation Safety Management System. Special emphasis for safety managers, training, flight department and maintenance managers and supervisors, pilots, air traffic controllers, dispatchers, and schedulers. Online and In-Person Course September 14-25, 2020 9.5 Days Tuition: $3750 Hazard Effects and Control Strategies This course focuses on underlying physical, chemical, and biological characteristics and effects, and hazard control strategies. The following hazards are specifically addressed: electrical hazards, electrostatic discharge, toxicity, kinetic hazards, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, thermal hazards, noise, fire and explosion, high pressure, etc. Online and In-Person Course September 14-15, 2020 2 Days Tuition: $1200 Damage Assessment for System Safety Sophisticated mathematical models and methods have been developed to estimate the level of impact of a hazardous condition. This course provides an overall understanding of these methods to help managers and system safety analysis reviewers understand the analysis conducted and results obtained by the experts in the field. Specifically, methods for modeling the impact of fire and explosion, debris distribution from an explosion, and toxic gas dispersion are discussed. Online and In-Person Course September 16-18, 2020 3 Days Tuition: $1625 Safety Management Systems for Ground Operation Safety This course provides airport, air carrier and ground service company supervisors and managers with practices that will reduce ground operation mishaps to personnel and equipment. It provides an understanding of how ground operations safety management is an essential part or an airport's or air carrier's SMS. Online and In-Person Course September 21-23, 2020 2.5 Days Tuition: $1375 Safety Performance Indicators This course teaches how SPI's are developed, monitored, analyzed and modified in order for an organization to correctly know its safety performance. The course utilizes guidance provided in ICAO Annex 19 and the ICAO Safety Management Manual Doc. 9859. Online and In-Person Course September 24-25, 2020 2 Days Tuition: $1200 Earn Credit for FlightSafety International Master Technician-Management Program Students taking the following USC courses will earn elective credits towards FlightSafety International's Master Technician-Management Program • Human Factors in Aviation Safety • Gas Turbine Accident Investigation • Helicopter Accident Investigation • Safety Management for Aviation Maintenance • Safety Management for Ground Operations Safety • Accident/Incident Response Preparedness Earn Credit for National Business Aviation Association Certified Aviation Manager Exam Students taking the following USC courses will earn two points toward completing the application for the National Business Aviation Association Certified Aviation Manager Exam. • Aviation Safety Management Systems • Accident/Incident Response Preparedness • Human Factors in Aviation Safety • Aircraft Accident Investigation • SeMS Aviation Security Management Systems For further details, please visit our website or use the contact information below. Email: aviation@usc.edu Telephone: +1 (310) 342-1345 Photo Credit: PFC Brendan King, USM Leasing Aircraft & Engines, Return Conditions, and Transition - Course Date(s): Tuesday & Wednesday, 4 & 5 August 2020 Register: Email registration form to training@aais.org.sg Time: 9.30am - 1pm Closing Date: One week before course date. Venue: Virtual training via MS Team Fees: AAIS Member: S$763/pax Public: S$913/pax (excl. prevailing GST) About the Course: Whether you are a lessor/lessee or in a lease management company, this unique and interesting course is designed for personnel wanting to enhance their understanding of the complicated maintenance aspects for aircraft lessors and lessee. The attendees will be more knowledgeable of what lease clauses require, what banking and financial institutions should know, what airlines/MROs and lessors must know when managing or returning the aircraft, and what regulators really require in order to issue import/export and airworthiness certificates. Handling of the transition of aircraft from one lessee and regulatory authority to another, including contract negotiation, modification implementation and new aircraft lease initiation will also be discussed. In 1980, airlines leased three percent of all aircraft and owned 97 percent. By 2014, airlines leased approximately 40 percent of all aircraft (by operating lease). This number is projected to increase to 50 percent in the next few years (Reed Business Information Ltd, 2014). Learn the best ways to manage aircraft lease return so there is no disruption in airline operation and no penalties. Aircraft lessors usually require that the aircraft undergo heavy maintenance at an EASA or FAA certified MRO.What are the consequences to look out for, especially in terms of clauses pertaining to maintenance and lease return conditions? At the conclusion of this course, participants will: * Determine the specific regulations, directives, advisory circulars, orders, and/or technical information needed for companies seeking a better understanding of Aircraft Leasing processes in an international context. * Be able to apply ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices * Have a much deeper understanding of aircraft leasing clauses in particular the do's and don'ts Who Should Attend? Persons involved with aircraft/engine leasing or leasing management, MROs involved with aircraft leasing, Industry, finance institutions, and airline personnel involved with contract negotiations and development would significantly benefit. Course Content: This packed one-day training will include a focus on the following key topics: * Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) * Basic Principles of International Aviation Airworthiness Standards * Aircraft Registration - the state of registration * Aircraft Operation - the state of the operator * National Regulatory Bodies * Review of various Aircraft Lease/Maintenance Agreements * 3 Most Relevant clauses: Delivery, Redelivery and Maintenance. * Aircraft Configuration and Control * Airline Reliability Programs and MPD Adjustments * Contract Maintenance Management and Supply Chain Preparation * Maintenance and Airworthiness, including Skin mapping, Dents and Buckles Reports - Modifications and Alterations - Aircraft Records Documentation - Major and Minor Repairs/Alterations, Modifications Including STCs Repair Data * Instruction for Continued Airworthiness, Ageing Aircraft and EWIS Requirements * Successful Lease Returns and Transitions and Avoiding Delays - Top 10 Tips About the Instructor: Mr Michael Daniel, Member, AAIS Panel of Experts Mike is an International Aviation Safety consultant with over 33 years with the FAA as a Senior Manager, ISO 9001 / AS 9100 / AS 9110 Principal / Lead and Internal Auditor, Credentialed Supervisory Safety Inspector and Accident Investigator, and FAA Academy Instructor. With several FAA overseas postings, he project managed the first FAA Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements (BASA MIP) with Germany and France. He has also considerable experience with managing various regulatory requirements, FAA & EASA Certification and Maintenance (MRO & AMO), Part 121 Air Operators, Part 135 Business Aviation Air Operators, and Aircraft Certification. Mike graduated from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (B.Sc. Aeronautics), a holder of FAA Maintenance Licenses with Inspection Authorization, and is a licensed pilot. He is a member of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI), Flight Safety Foundation, SAE International, Chartered Quality Institute, and the Project Management Institute as an accredited Project Management Professional. He had previously served in the United States Marine Corps. *Note: AAIS reserves the right to adjust the course pricing and to re-schedule or cancel any course due to unforeseen circumstances, course commencement is subject to minimum class size requirements. https://aais.org.sg/virtual_leasing_ac_engines/ TO ALL PROFESSIONAL PILOTS, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, members of their Management, Regulators and related organizations (airplane, helicopter, civil or military) WE REQUEST YOUR SUPPORT FOR A JOINT AVIATION SAFETY SURVEY (JASS) ON: "AERONAUTICAL DECISION-MAKING, INCL. MONITORING & INTERVENTION IN PRACTICE" Dear aviation colleague, you are invited to participate in a research project conducted by the department of Psychology at City, University of London, which aims to elicit your views and thoughts on Aeronautical Decision-Making, including Monitoring and Intervention in normal operation,by which we mean routine line flights without any incidents or technical malfunctions. The questions deal with teamwork and decision-making issues in various Pilot-roles, e.g. the role of the Pilot Monitoring (PM), Pilot Flying (PF), Pilot in Command (PIC) and Co-Pilot, and respectively in the Air Traffic Controller (ATCO)-roles of the coordinating and radioing/radar ATCO as well as pilot's and controller's training and occupational picture. This survey is completely anonymous - no identifying information will be requested or collected - and all responses will be treated as strictly confidential. The survey is approved by City's research and ethics committee (Approval Code: ETH 1920-1414). The introductory section of the survey will provide you with further information and the informed consent. Please click here to access the survey or copy the survey-link below into your browser. https://cityunilondon.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6n7cxeunMyfy0fz By completing the questionnaire, you can - in addition to supporting aviation safety research - even do more good as we will donate a minimum of €2 for the first 1000 fully completed responses to the UNICEF COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund which helps to care for vulnerable children and communities all over the world. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us via email: aviationsafety@city.ac.uk or tom.becker.1@city.ac.uk or via phone: +49 172 7178780. We thank you very much in advance. Your support is truly appreciated. Best regards, Capt. Tom Becker Prof. Peter Ayton Back to Top GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY Dear Participants, You are being asked to participate in a research study of your opinions and attitudes about stress and mental health. This research started almost two years ago. The purpose of this study is to examine mental health issues in aviation, specifically Part 121 airline pilots. During this study, you will be asked to complete a brief online survey about your opinions on various life circumstances, stress, and mental health topics. This study is expected to take approximately 15 minutes of your time. In order to participate, you must possess an FAA issued Airline Transport Certificate (ATP) and you must also be currently working as a pilot for a Part 121 air carrier that is headquartered within the United States. Participation in this study is voluntary and data will be collected anonymously, stored confidentially, and you may choose to opt out of the study at any time. We sincerely appreciate your consideration and time to complete our study, as it is another small but important step towards increasing safety in aviation. Please click on the link below to complete the survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/7ZG6M6L For more information, please contact: Tanya Gatlin - Student Researcher Gatlint1@my.erau.edu 281-924-1336 Dr. Scott Winter - Faculty Advisor winte25e@erau.edu 386-226-6491 Curt Lewis