Flight Safety Information - January 22, 2021 No. 017 In This Issue : Incident: JAL B738 near Tokyo on Jan 20th 2021, cracked windshield : Incident: LATAM Brasil A320 at Sao Paulo on Jan 19th 2021, rejected takeoff due to engine failure : Incident: American A320 at Charlotte on Jan 19th 2021, hydraulic failure : Incident: Inuit DH8A at Kuujjuaq on Jan 12th 2021, unsafe gear : Engine Failure, Aircrew Error Led to Fatal E-11A Crash in Afghanistan, Air Force Says : Indonesia probing whether faulty system contributed to Sriwijaya Air crash : FAA Solicits Input on Aircraft Noise Research : Biden signs order requiring travelers wear masks on planes and at airports as pandemic rages : FAA Files Reveal a Surprising Threat to Airline Safety: the U.S. Military's GPS Tests : 6 Things to Know About NASA’s Mars Helicopter on Its Way to Mars : 2021 Aircraft Cabin Air Conference Incident: JAL B738 near Tokyo on Jan 20th 2021, cracked windshield A JAL Japan Airlines Boeing 737-800, registration JA345J performing flight JL-141 from Tokyo Haneda to Aomori (Japan) with 55 passengers and 7 crew, was enroute at FL290 about 160nm north of Tokyo when the left hand windshield cracked prompting the crew to descend to FL160 and to turn around and return to Tokyo Haneda. The aircraft landed safely back on Haneda's runway 34L about 70 minutes after departure and taxied to the apron. A replacement Boeing 737-800 registration JA330J reached Aomori with a delay of 4 hours. http://avherald.com/h?article=4e1f8d20&opt=0 Incident: LATAM Brasil A320 at Sao Paulo on Jan 19th 2021, rejected takeoff due to engine failure A LATAM Brasil Airbus A320-200, registration PR-TYA performing flight JJ-3142 from Sao Paulo Congonhas,SP to Vitoria,ES (Brazil) with 144 passengers and 6 crew, was accelerating for takeoff from Congonhas' runway 17L when the crew heard an abnormal noise from the left hand engine (CFM56) and received an "ENG 1 FAIL" ECAM indication. The crew rejected takeoff at low speed (about 20 knots over ground), taxied the aircraft along the runway to the first available exit about 965 meters/3150 feet down the runway and returned the aircraft to the apron. Brazil's CENIPA reported the left engine was shut down following the failure and the aircraft returned to the apron. The aircraft received minor damage. The occurrence was rated an incident without investigation. http://avherald.com/h?article=4e1f7c01&opt=0 Incident: American A320 at Charlotte on Jan 19th 2021, hydraulic failure An American Airlines Airbus A320-200, registration N119US performing flight AA-813 from Charlotte,NC (USA) to Cozumel (Mexico), was climbing out of Charlotte'S runway 36R when the crew requested to stop climb at 8000 feet reporting they had a number of lights. The aircraft levelled off at 8000 feet, the crew worked the checklists and after about 20 minutes indicated, they wanted to continue on their flight plan. Departure cleared them to climb to 16,000 feet a second time now, the aircraft climbed but about 2 minutes later reported they had a second problem and levelled off again at 10,000 feet. The crew subsequently declared emergency reporting they had lost a hydraulic system, they needed to work a couple of checklists and would then return to Charlotte. About 30 minutes after levelling off at 10,000 feet the crew positioned for the approach to Charlotte's runway 36C and landed safely. The aircraft was towed to the apron. According to information The Aviation Herald received the green hydraulic system had failed. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAL813/history/20210119/1450Z/KCLT/MMCZ http://avherald.com/h?article=4e1f5a3b&opt=0 Incident: Inuit DH8A at Kuujjuaq on Jan 12th 2021, unsafe gear An Air Inuit de Havilland Dash 8-100, registration C-FDLG performing flight 3H-858 from Kangirsuk,QC to Kuujjuaq,QC (Canada) with 7 passengers and 3 crew, was on final approach to Kuujjuaq when the crew lowered the landing gear but received an unsafe indication for the nose gear. The crew went around, worked the related checklists and landed safely on Kuujjuaq's runway 25. The Canadian TSB reproted the crew declared emergency with Kuujjuaq Flight Service Station and entered a hold while the crew worked the related checklists. The crew was able to successfully extend the landing gear and landed safely on runway 25. http://avherald.com/h?article=4e1f725d&opt=0 Engine Failure, Aircrew Error Led to Fatal E-11A Crash in Afghanistan, Air Force Says As an Air Force E-11A battlefield communications aircraft conducted missions over Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, on Jan. 27, 2020, a fan blade broke inside the left engine. Efforts to address the problem led to a series of missteps that caused the aircraft to crash, killing the two pilots, according to a new Accident Investigation Board report. The report, released Thursday by Air Combat Command, concluded that the broken blade caused the left engine to shut down automatically. But the pilots improperly assessed "that the right engine had failed or been damaged" and initiated right engine shutdown procedures, it adds. With the right engine shut down, the pilots were in a "dual engine out emergency." They were unable to restart the right engine, though the report does not explain why. It's possible they attempted to restart the left instead, it states. Lt. Col. Paul K. Voss, 46, and Capt. Ryan S. Phaneuf, 30, were killed in the crash. They were both assigned to the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron at Kandahar Airfield, and were on a qualification flight while conducting a combat sortie, the report states. The redacted investigation does not cite names, but Air Force Magazine identified Voss as the flight commander, with Phaneuf presumably the copilot. The aircraft, tail number 11-9358, was being used as a Battlefield Airborne Communications Node, or BACN, acting as a "Wi-Fi in the sky" to boost other pilots' situational awareness of beyond-line-of-sight activity. BACN-equipped E-11 aircraft began operating in Afghanistan in 2011, according to the Air Force. The engine fan malfunction occurred just before 1 p.m. local time, about an hour and 45 minutes into the flight, the report states. The plane was in range to glide to and land at either Kabul International Airport in eastern Afghanistan, 17 nautical miles away, or Bagram Airfield, 38 nautical miles away, it adds. At one point, the pilots could have glided to Forward Operating Base Shank -- 28 nautical miles away -- but had only an eight-minute window to begin that maneuver, the report states. Instead, the crew, flying at about 41,000 feet, decided to initiate an airstart on the right engine and head toward Kandahar Airfield -- 230 nautical miles southwest from their position. An airstart uses the aircraft's airspeed to turn the engine turbines, a move that would require the aircraft to travel at 258 knots per hour. The aircraft, a modified Bombardier Global Express BD-700, can reach a max speed of about 505 knots. "... Mayday, Mayday, Mayday … it looks like we have an engine failure on both motors. We are proceeding direct to Kandahar at this time," one of the pilots is heard radioing to Air Traffic Control, per the report. However, the aircraft was outside of the gliding distance to reach Kandahar; instead, the pilots tried maneuvering toward Forward Operating Base Sharana, about 217 nautical miles to the east of Kandahar. But it crashed in a field 21 nautical miles short of Sharana. There is limited data on how the pilots reacted during the events, officials said. The harsh vibrations caused by the left engine malfunction stopped the Cockpit Voice Recorder, or CVR. "Without the CVR, it is difficult to fully assess the human factors and understand why certain decisions were made," the report states. Another key instrument, the digital flight data recorder, stopped recording because of the dual engine generator loss. While investigators could not confirm that an engine airstart was attempted, there were signs that suggested the pilots did try the reset, they said. Because there was no digital flight recorder data to make clear the pilots' steps, it is possible they attempted to restart the left engine, thinking the right engine was the one malfunctioning, the report states. The pilots "may have concluded that the right engine suffered damage and therefore only elected to airstart the left engine," it says. Following the E-11A single engine procedures checklist, the crew would have delayed starting the Auxiliary Power Unit, or APU, which would have offered electrical power to the engine. But according to photographs taken of the crash site wreckage, the APU intake door was open, meaning that the crew "likely later used [it] in an attempted [auto turbine]-assisted airstart." On first approach, search-and-rescue aircraft were unable to reach the crash site due to weather. Crews that were able to reach the wreckage the next day and were able to recover Voss and Phaneuf’s remains and some equipment, including the CVR and flight data recorder. The remaining wreckage was ultimately destroyed by U.S. forces, officials said at the time. Ghazni Province has been under majority Taliban control since 2015, shortly after U.S. combat forces began drawing down in Afghanistan, but U.S. officials determined early on that the crash was not the result of enemy action. It was not immediately clear how the crew misidentified the problem engine. In the first few moments, the crew alert system "did not directly indicate the left engine failure," the report states. The Accident Investigation Board president, Brig. Gen. Craig Baker, found that the pilots had roughly a minute to deduce what was going on, but reacted just 24 seconds from the start of the violent vibrations to shut down the right engine. Based on the information available, Baker concluded that the crew misidentified which engine suffered the failure, resulting in them shutting down the wrong one. "I also find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [crew's] failure to airstart the right engine and their decision to recover the [aircraft] to [Kandahar] substantially contributed to the mishap," he said. The aircraft, a Bombardier Global Express, was maintained by Northrop Grumman, which developed the BACN equipment. Northrop conducted the plane's last major inspection on Jan. 13, just two weeks before the accident. A final inspection was conducted one day prior to the flight, but "no aircraft discrepancies [were] identified," the Accident Investigation Board report states. The report did not give a reason for the blade damage in the left engine, which was manufactured by Rolls-Royce. The loss of the plane and its equipment was estimated at $120 million, the Air Force said in an accompanying release. https://www.yahoo.com/news/engine-failure-aircrew-error-led-232637726.html Indonesia probing whether faulty system contributed to Sriwijaya Air crash JAKARTA, Jan 22 (Reuters) - Indonesia's air accident investigator is probing whether a problem with the autothrottle system, that controls engine power automatically, contributed to the Sriwijaya Air crash on Jan. 9 that killed all 62 people on board, an official said on Friday. National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT) investigator Nurcayho Utomo said a problem with the Boeing 737-500's autothrottle system was reported after a flight a few days earlier. "There was a report of malfunction on the autothrottle a couple of days before to the technician in the maintenance log, but we do not know what kind of problem," he told Reuters. "If we find the CVR (cockpit voice recorder) we can hear the discussion between the pilots, what they talked about and we will know what is the problem." It remains unclear whether a problem with the autothrottle system contributed to the crash, Utomo said, adding he could not recall any other issues raised in the maintenance log. It is acceptable for a plane to fly with an autothrottle system that is not working because pilots can control it manually instead, he said. Sriwijaya said he was unable to comment on technical matters involving the investigation before an official statement was made by KNKT. A preliminary report is expected to be issued within 30 days of the crash, in line with international standards. The plane's flight data recorder (FDR) has been recovered and read by investigators but an underwater search for the CVR's memory unit at the crash site in the Java Sea is continuing. Citing sources close to the investigation, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on Thursday reported the FDR data showed the autothrottle system was not operating properly on one of the plane's engines as it climbed on departure from Jakarta. Instead of shutting off the system, the FDR indicated the pilots tried to get the stuck throttle to function, the WSJ said. That could create significant differences in power between engines, making the jet harder to control. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/indonesia-probing-whether-faulty-system-034308215.html FAA Solicits Input on Aircraft Noise Research The FAA is seeking comment on a number of noise research projects that the agency has undertaken and has released results of one such study, the Neighborhood Environmental Survey, which found an increased level of annoyance from aircraft noise. These projects could be used to help shape future noise policy, such as a revised use of the Day-Night Average Sound Level (DNL), but the agency said it would not make any determinations until it has considered public and stakeholder input and completed any additional necessary research. This research comes as the FAA has recognized that aircraft noise is a chief concern for stakeholders. “With the vision of removing environmental constraints on aviation growth by achieving quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air transportation, the FAA has worked closely with a number of industry, academic, and governmental stakeholders to assemble a comprehensive portfolio of research activities (including leveraging research undertaken by others) aimed at guiding investments in scientific studies, analytical tools, and innovative technologies to better understand and manage aircraft noise,” the agency said. However, the FAA stressed that aircraft noise is complex and so no single set of findings or perspectives can fully guide decisions. Broadly speaking the research is exploring three main themes: effects on individuals and communities; noise modeling, metrics, and environmental data; and, reduction, abatement, and mitigations. Research on the effects on individuals and communities includes efforts to explore sleep disturbance, interference in children learning, and impacts to cardiovascular, among other areas. The multi-year Neighborhood Environmental Survey (NES), which came in response to a congressional directive, also falls in this category. That study accumulated survey responses from more than 10,000 people living near 20 “statistically representative” airports across the country. In contrast to earlier surveys, the NES results “show a substantially higher percentage of people highly annoyed over the entire range of aircraft noise levels (i.e., from DNL 50 to 75 dB),” the agency said. “This includes an increase in annoyance at lower noise levels.” However, the agency added more work needs to be done to assess reasons for this, particularly in factors that can include changes where people choose to live, how they work and live, social media influences, and other societal responses. In addition, the FAA has noted that recent research has shown “that aircraft noise often results in higher levels of annoyance compared to the same level of noise from ground transportation sources.” The findings come as the FAA notes that the number of people exposed to significant levels of aircraft noise in the U.S. has continuously declined since the mid-1970s, from roughly seven million to just more than 400,000 today. But at the same time, commercial enplanements have grown from 200 million in 1975 to 930 million in 2018. The agency credited quieter aircraft to the reduction in noise footprints around aircraft, a phase-out of noisier aircraft, noise compatibility and mitigation plans, and collaboration. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2021-01-21/faa-solicits-input-aircraft-noise-research Biden signs order requiring travelers wear masks on planes and at airports as pandemic rages • Airline unions have pushed for a federal mask mandate to help back up carriers’ policies. • All major U.S. airlines require masks on board and carriers have banned more than 2,500 passengers for refusing to follow the policy. • President Biden also said travelers entering the U.S. must self-quarantine upon arrival. President Joe Biden on Thursday signed an executive order requiring masks to be worn on airplanes, trains, buses and at airports as coronavirus infections continue to climb. The Trump administration declined to mandate masks for air travel and other modes of transportation, leaving it to private companies to set their own polices, though the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has repeatedly recommended their use. That has left flight attendants and other employees to enforce the rules. Labor unions that pushed for a federal mask mandate cheered Biden’s order. “What a difference leadership makes! We welcome President Biden’s nationwide approach to crushing the virus and lifting us out of this pandemic,” Sara Nelson, president of the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, the country’s largest flight attendant labor union, said in a statement. “Today’s, executive action on a mask mandate for interstate travel, including airports and planes, will provide much needed back up for Flight Attendants and aviation workers on the frontlines. Julie Hedrick, president of the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, which represents American Airlines’ cabin crews also applauded the move. “As passengers travel on different airlines and through various airports, they deserve to have clear expectations on what the rules are. We thank President Biden for seeing to this immediately,” she said in a statement. All major U.S. airlines require travelers to wear masks on board — a policy that extends to airports. Airline executives say the vast majority of customers follow the rule, but they have vowed to take a hard line against those who refuse. Through last week, airlines have barred more than 2,500 people from flying for refusing to wear face coverings. The FAA noted that some rare cases have even turned violent. The FAA this month warned it will crack down on unruly behavior and on travelers who don’t follow crew instructions, fining those travelers up to $35,000. Air travelers, including citizens, will also have to show a recent, negative Covid-19 test result before flying to the U.S. from abroad, Biden ordered, reiterating a CDC policy unveiled from last week. That rule takes effect Tuesday. Biden said travelers must self-quarantine upon arrival. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/21/biden-mandates-masks-for-interstate-travel-airplanes-airports.html FAA Files Reveal a Surprising Threat to Airline Safety: the U.S. Military's GPS Tests Military tests that jam and spoof GPS signals are an accident waiting to happen Early one morning last May, a commercial airliner was approaching El Paso International Airport, in West Texas, when a warning popped up in the cockpit: “GPS Position Lost.” The pilot contacted the airline’s operations center and received a report that the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range, in South Central New Mexico, was disrupting the GPS signal. “We knew then that it was not an aircraft GPS fault,” the pilot wrote later. The pilot missed an approach on one runway due to high winds, then came around to try again. “We were forced to Runway 04 with a predawn landing with no access to [an instrument landing] with vertical guidance,” the pilot wrote. “Runway 04…has a high CFIT threat due to the climbing terrain in the local area.” CFIT stands for “controlled flight into terrain,” and it is exactly as serious as it sounds. The pilot considered diverting to Albuquerque, 370 kilometers away, but eventually bit the bullet and tackled Runway 04 using only visual aids. The plane made it safely to the ground, but the pilot later logged the experience on NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System, a forum where pilots can anonymously share near misses and safety tips. This is far from the most worrying ASRS report involving GPS jamming. In August 2018, a passenger aircraft in Idaho, flying in smoky conditions, reportedly suffered GPS interference from military tests and was saved from crashing into a mountain only by the last-minute intervention of an air traffic controller. “Loss of life can happen because air traffic control and a flight crew believe their equipment are working as intended, but are in fact leading them into the side of the mountain,” wrote the controller. “Had [we] not noticed, that flight crew and the passengers would be dead. I have no doubt.” There are some 90 ASRS reports detailing GPS interference in the United States over the past eight years, the majority of which were filed in 2019 and 2020. Now IEEE Spectrum has new evidence that GPS disruption to commercial aviation is much more common than even the ASRS database suggests. Previously undisclosed Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data for a few months in 2017 and 2018 detail hundreds of aircraft losing GPS reception in the vicinity of military tests. On a single day in March 2018, 21 aircraft reported GPS problems to air traffic controllers near Los Angeles. These included a medevac helicopter, several private planes, and a dozen commercial passenger jets. Some managed to keep flying normally; others required help from air traffic controllers. Five aircraft reported making unexpected turns or navigating off course. In all likelihood, there are many hundreds, possibly thousands, of such incidents each year nationwide, each one a potential accident. The vast majority of this disruption can be traced back to the U.S. military, which now routinely jams GPS signals over wide areas on an almost daily basis somewhere in the country. How to access reports on NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System 1: To investigate a report, go to the ASRS database: https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/ 2: On the top ribbon, click “Search ASRS Database,” and then choose “Search ASRS Online.” Click on “Start Search.” 3: Follow the steps under “How to Search” at the top. Then, under 7 “Text: Narrative/Synopsis,” click on “[words].” Then click on “Text contains Click Here.” 4: In the pop-up window, enter some of the text that is quoted in this story. In the “Fields to search” field at the bottom, click “Narrative” (but you can also try “Synopsis”). 5: If you’re searching on more than one word, you need to format it inside parentheses, thus: (GPS JAMMING). 6: Click “Save.” The pop-up will disappear. 7: Click “Run Search” at the bottom right. 8: Under “Display your results,” click “View all reports.” The military is jamming GPS signals to develop its own defenses against GPS jamming. Ironically, though, the Pentagon’s efforts to safeguard its own troops and systems are putting the lives of civilian pilots, passengers, and crew at risk. In 2013, the military essentially admitted as much in a report, saying that “planned EA [electronic attack] testing occasionally causes interference to GPS based flight operations, and impacts the efficiency and economy of some aviation operations.” In the early days of aviation, pilots would navigate using road maps in daylight and follow bonfires or searchlights after dark. By World War II, radio beacons had become common. From the late 1940s, ground stations began broadcasting omnidirectional VHF signals that planes could lock on to, while shorter-range systems indicated safe glide slopes to help pilots land. At their peak, in 2000, there were more than a thousand very high frequency (VHF) navigation stations in the United States. However, in areas with widely spaced stations, pilots were forced to take zigzag routes from one station to the next, and reception of the VHF signals could be hampered by nearby buildings and hills. Everything changed with the advent of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), first devised by the U.S. military in the 1960s. The arrival in the mid-1990s of the civilian version of the technology, called the Global Positioning System, meant that aircraft could navigate by satellite and take direct routes from point to point; GPS location and altitude data was also accurate enough to help them land. The FAA is about halfway through its NextGen effort, which is intended to make flying safer and more efficient through a wholesale switch from ground-based navigation aids like radio beacons to a primarily satellite-enabled navigation system. Along with that switch, the agency began decommissioning VHF navigation stations a decade ago. The United States is now well on its way to having a minimal backup network of fewer than 600 ground stations. Meanwhile, the reliance on GPS is changing the practice of flying and the habits of pilots. As GPS receivers have become cheaper, smaller, and more capable, they have become more common and more widely integrated. Most airplanes must now carry Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders, which use GPS to calculate and broadcast their altitude, heading, and speed. Private pilots use digital charts on tablet computers, while GPS data underpins autopilot and flight-management computers. Pilots should theoretically still be able to navigate, fly, and land without any GPS assistance at all, using legacy radio systems and visual aids. Commercial airlines, in particular, have a range of backup technologies at their disposal. But because GPS is so widespread and reliable, pilots are in danger of forgetting these manual techniques. When an Airbus passenger jet suddenly lost GPS near Salt Lake City in June 2019, its pilot suffered “a fair amount of confusion,” according to the pilot’s ASRS report. “To say that my raw data navigation skills were lacking is an understatement! I’ve never done it on the Airbus and can’t remember having done it in 25 years or more.” “I don’t blame pilots for getting a little addicted to GPS,” says Todd E. ¬Humphreys, director of the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin. “When something works well 99.99 percent of the time, humans don’t do well in being vigilant for that 0.01 percent of the time that it doesn’t.” Losing GPS completely is not the worst that can happen. It is far more dangerous when accurate GPS data is quietly replaced by misleading information. The ASRS database contains many accounts of pilots belatedly realizing that GPS-enabled autopilots had taken them many kilometers in the wrong direction, into forbidden military areas, or dangerously close to other aircraft. In December 2012, an air traffic controller noticed that a westbound passenger jet near Reno, Nev., had veered 16 kilometers (10 miles) off course. The controller confirmed that military GPS jamming was to blame and gave new directions, but later noted: “If the pilot would have noticed they were off course before I did and corrected the course, it would have caused [the] aircraft to turn right into [an] opposite direction, eastbound [jet].” So why is the military interfering so regularly with such a safety-critical system? Although most GPS receivers today are found in consumer smartphones, GPS was designed by the U.S. military, for the U.S. military. The Pentagon depends heavily on GPS to locate and navigate its aircraft, ships, tanks, and troops. The U.S. military routinely jams GPS signals over wide areas on an almost daily basis For such a vital resource, GPS is exceedingly vulnerable to attack. By the time GPS signals reach the ground, they are so faint they can be easily drowned out by interference, whether accidental or malicious. Building a basic electronic warfare setup to disrupt these weak signals is trivially easy, says Humphreys: “Detune the oscillator in a microwave oven and you’ve got a superpowerful jammer that works over many kilometers.” Illegal GPS jamming devices are widely available on the black market, some of them marketed to professional drivers who may want to avoid being tracked while working. Other GNSS systems, such as Russia’s GLONASS, China’s BeiDou, and Europe's Galileo constellations, use slightly different frequencies but have similar vulnerabilities, depending on exactly who is conducting the test or attack. In China, mysterious attacks have successfully “spoofed” ships with GPS receivers toward fake locations, while vessels relying on BeiDou reportedly remain unaffected. Similarly, GPS signals are regularly jammed in the eastern Mediterranean, Norway, and Finland, while the Galileo system is untargeted in the same attacks. The Pentagon uses its more remote military bases, many in the American West, to test how its forces operate under GPS denial, and presumably to develop its own electronic warfare systems and countermeasures. The United States has carried out experiments in spoofing GPS signals on at least one occasion, during which it was reported to have taken great care not to affect civilian aircraft. Despite this, many ASRS reports record GPS units delivering incorrect positions rather than failing altogether, but this can also happen when the satellite signals are degraded. Whatever the nature of its tests, the military’s GPS jamming can end up disrupting service for civilian users, particularly high-altitude commercial aircraft, even at a considerable distance. The military issues Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) to warn pilots of upcoming tests. Many of these notices cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers. There have been notices that warn of GPS disruption over all of Texas or even the entire American Southwest. Such a notice doesn’t mean that GPS service will be disrupted throughout the area, only that it might be disrupted. And that uncertainty creates its own problems. In 2017, the FAA commissioned the nonprofit Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics to look into the effects of intentional GPS interference on civilian aircraft. Its report, issued the following year by the RTCA’s GPS Interference Task Group, found that the number of military GPS tests had almost tripled from 2012 to 2017. Unsurprisingly, ASRS safety reports referencing GPS jamming are also on the rise. There were 38 such ASRS narratives in 2019—nearly a tenfold increase over 2018. Chart describing GPS Problems. New internal FAA materials obtained by Spectrum from a member of the task group and not previously made public indicate that the ASRS accounts represent only the tip of the iceberg. The FAA data consists of pilots’ reports of GPS interference to the Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center, one of 22 air traffic control centers in the United States. Controllers there oversee air traffic across central and Southern California, southern Nevada, southwestern Utah, western Arizona, and portions of the Pacific Ocean—areas heavily affected by military GPS testing. This data includes 173 instances of lost or intermittent GPS during a six-month period of 2017 and another 60 over two months in early 2018. These reports are less detailed than those in the ASRS database, but they show aircraft flying off course, accidentally entering military airspace, being unable to maneuver, and losing their ability to navigate when close to other aircraft. Many pilots required the assistance of air traffic control to continue their flights. The affected aircraft included a pet rescue shuttle, a hot-air balloon, multiple medical flights, and many private planes and passenger jets. In at least a handful of episodes, the loss of GPS was deemed an emergency. Pilots of five aircraft, including a Southwest Airlines flight from Las Vegas to Chicago, invoked the “stop buzzer,” a request routed through air traffic control for the military to immediately cease jamming. According to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, pilots must use this phrase only when a safety-of-flight issue is encountered. To be sure, many other instances in the FAA data were benign. In early March 2017, for example, Jim Yoder was flying a Cessna jet owned by entrepreneur and space tourist Dennis Tito between Las Vegas and Palm Springs, Calif., when both onboard GPS devices were jammed. “This is the only time I’ve ever had GPS go out, and it was interesting because I hadn’t thought about it really much,” Yoder told Spectrum. “I asked air traffic control what was going on and they were like, ‘I don’t really know.’ But we didn’t lose our ability to navigate, and I don’t think we ever got off course.” Indeed, one of the RTCA task group’s conclusions was that the Notice to Airmen system was part of the problem: Most pilots who fly through affected areas experience no ill effects, causing some to simply ignore such warnings in the future. “We call the NOTAMs ‘Chicken Little,’ ” says Rune Duke, who was cochair of the RTCA’s task group. “They say the sky is falling over large areas…and it’s not realistic. There are mountains and all kinds of things that would prevent GPS interference from making it 500 nautical miles [926 km] from where it is initiated.” GPS interference can be affected by the terrain, aircraft altitude and attitude, direction of flight, angle to and distance from the center of the interference, equipment aboard the plane, and many other factors, concluded the task group, which included representatives of the FAA, airlines, pilots, aircraft manufacturers, and the U.S. military. One aircraft could lose all GPS reception, even as another one nearby is completely unaffected. One military test might pass unnoticed while another causes chaos in the skies. This unreliability has consequences. In 2014, a passenger plane approaching El Paso had to abort its landing after losing GPS reception. “This is the first time in my flying career that I have experienced or even heard of GPS signal jamming,” wrote the pilot in an ASRS report. “Although it was in the NOTAMs, it still caught us by surprise as we really did not expect to lose all GPS signals at any point. It was a good thing the weather was good or this could have become a real issue.” Sometimes air traffic controllers are as much in the dark as pilots. “They are the last line of defense,” the FAA’s Duke told Spectrum. “And in many cases, air traffic control was not even aware of the GPS interference taking place.” The RTCA report made many recommendations. The Department of Defense could improve coordination with the FAA, and it could refrain from testing GPS during periods of high air traffic. The FAA could overhaul its data collection and analysis, match anecdotal reports with digital data, and improve documentation of adverse events. The NOTAM system could be made easier to interpret, with warnings that more accurately match the experiences of pilots and controllers. One aircraft could lose all GPS reception, even as another one nearby is completely unaffected. Remarkably, until the report came out, the FAA had been instructing pilots to report GPS anomalies only when they needed assistance from air traffic control. “The data has been somewhat of a challenge because we’ve somewhat discouraged reporting,” says Duke. “This has led the FAA to believe it’s not been such a problem.” NOTAMs now encourage pilots to report all GPS interference, but many of the RTCA’s other recommendations are languishing within the Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention at the FAA. New developments are making the problem worse. The NextGen project is accelerating the move of commercial aviation to satellite-enabled navigation. Emerging autonomous air systems, such as drones and air taxis, will put even more weight on GPS’s shaky shoulders. When any new aircraft is adopted, it risks posing new challenges to the system. The Embraer EMB-505 Phenom 300, for instance, entered service in 2009 and has since become the world’s best-selling light jet. In 2016, the FAA warned that if the Phenom 300 encountered an unreliable or unavailable GPS signal, it could enter a Dutch roll (named for a Dutch skating technique), a dangerous combination of wagging and rocking that could cause pilots to lose control. The FAA instructed Phenom 300 owners to avoid all areas of GPS interference. As GPS assumes an ever more prominent role, the military is naturally taking a stronger interest in it. “Year over year, the military’s need for GPS interference-event testing has increased,” says Duke. “There was an increase again in 2019, partly because of counter-UAS [drone] activity. And they’re now doing GPS interference where they previously had not, like Michigan, Wisconsin, and the Dakotas, because it adds to the realism of any type of military training.” So there are ever more GPS-jamming tests, more aircraft navigating by satellite, and more pilots utterly reliant on GPS. It is a feedback loop, and it constantly raises the chances that one of these near misses and stop buzzers will end in catastrophe. When asked to comment, the FAA said it has established a resilient navigation and surveillance infrastructure to enable aircraft to continue safe operations during a GPS outage, including radio beacons and radars. It also noted that it and other agencies are working to create a long-term GPS backup solution that will provide position, navigation, and ¬timing—again, to minimize the effects of a loss of GPS. However, in a report to Congress in April 2020, the agency coordinating this effort, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, wrote: “DHS recommends that responsibility for mitigating temporary GPS outages be the responsibility of the individual user and not the responsibility of the Federal Government.” In short, the problem of GPS interference is not going away. In September 2019, the pilot of a small business jet reported experienced jamming on a flight into New Mexico. He could hear that aircraft all around him were also affected, with some being forced to descend for safety. “Since the FAA is deprecating [ground-based radio aids], we are becoming dependent upon an unreliable navigation system,” wrote the pilot upon landing. “This extremely frequent [interference with] critical GPS navigation is a significant threat to aviation safety. This jamming has to end.” The same pilot was jammed again on his way home. https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/faa-files-reveal-a-surprising-threat-to-airline-safety-the-us-militarys-gps-tests 6 Things to Know About NASA’s Mars Helicopter on Its Way to Mars Ingenuity, a technology experiment, is preparing to attempt the first powered, controlled flight on the Red Planet. When NASA’s Perseverance rover lands on Mars on Feb. 18, 2021, it will be carrying a small but mighty passenger: Ingenuity, the Mars Helicopter. The helicopter, which weighs about 4 pounds (1.8 kilograms) on Earth and has a fuselage about the size of a tissue box, started out six years ago as an implausible prospect. Engineers at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Southern California knew it was theoretically possible to fly in Mars’ thin atmosphere, but no one was sure whether they could build a vehicle powerful enough to fly, communicate, and survive autonomously with the extreme restrictions on its mass. Then the team had to prove in Earthbound tests that it could fly in a Mars-like environment. Now that they’ve checked off those objectives, the team is preparing to test Ingenuity in the actual environment of Mars. “Our Mars Helicopter team has been doing things that have never been done before – that no one at the outset could be sure could even be done,” said MiMi Aung, the Ingenuity project manager at JPL “We faced many challenges along the way that could have stopped us in our tracks. We are thrilled that we are now so close to demonstrating – on Mars – what Ingenuity can really do.” In this illustration, NASA's Ingenuity Mars Helicopter stands on the Red Planet's surface as NASA's Perseverance rover (partially visible on the left) rolls away. In this illustration, NASA's Ingenuity Mars Helicopter stands on the Red Planet's surface as NASA's Perseverance rover (partially visible on the left) rolls away. Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech Full Image Details Ingenuity survived the intense vibrations of launch on July 30, 2020, and has passed its health checks as it waits to plunge with Perseverance through the Martian atmosphere. But the helicopter won’t attempt its first flight for more than a month after landing: Engineers for the rover and helicopter need time to make sure both robots are ready. Here are the key things to know about Ingenuity as the anticipation builds: 1. Ingenuity is an experimental flight test. The Mars Helicopter is what is known as a technology demonstration – a narrowly focused project that seeks to test a new capability for the first time. Previous groundbreaking technology demonstrations include the first Mars rover, Sojourner, and the Mars Cube One (MarCO) CubeSats that flew by Mars. The helicopter doesn’t carry science instruments and isn’t part of Perseverance’s science mission. Ingenuity’s objective is an engineering one: to demonstrate rotorcraft flight in Mars’ the extremely thin atmosphere, which has just around 1% of the density of our atmosphere on Earth. Ingenuity will attempt up to five test flights within a 30-Martian-day (31-Earth-day) demonstration window. Its pioneering aspirations are similar to those of the Wright brothers' Flyer, which achieved the first powered, controlled flight on Earth. VIDEO 2. Mars won’t make it easy for Ingenuity to attempt the first powered, controlled flight on another planet. Because the Mars atmosphere is so thin, Ingenuity is designed to be light, with rotor blades that are much larger and spin much faster than what would be required for a helicopter of Ingenuity’s mass on Earth. The Red Planet also has beyond bone-chilling temperatures, with nights as cold as minus 130 degrees Fahrenheit (minus 90 degrees Celsius) at Jezero Crater, the rover and helicopter’s landing site. These temperatures will push the original design limits of the off-the-shelf parts used in Ingenuity. Tests on Earth at the predicted temperatures indicate Ingenuity’s parts should work as designed, but the team is looking forward to the real test on Mars. “Mars isn’t exactly pulling out the welcome mat,” said Tim Canham, Ingenuity’s operations lead at JPL. “One of the first things Ingenuity has to do when it gets to Mars is just survive its first night.” 3. Ingenuity relies on the Mars 2020 Perseverance mission for safe passage to Mars and for operations on the Red Planet’s surface. Ingenuity is nestled sideways under the belly of the Perseverance rover with a cover to protect it from debris kicked up during landing. Both the rover and the helicopter are safely ensconced inside a clamshell-like spacecraft entry capsule during the 293-million-mile (471-million-kilometer) journey to Mars. The power system on the Mars 2020 spacecraft periodically charges Ingenuity’s batteries on the way there. To reach the Martian surface, Ingenuity rides along with Perseverance as it lands. The rover’s entry, descent, and landing system features a supersonic parachute, new “brains” for avoiding hazards autonomously, and components for the sky crane maneuver, which lowers the rover onto Mars from a descent vehicle. Only about 50% of the attempts to land on Mars, by any space agency, have been successful. Once a suitable site to deploy the helicopter is found, the rover’s Mars Helicopter Delivery System will shed the landing cover, rotate the helicopter to a legs-down configuration, and gently drop Ingenuity on the surface in the first few months after landing. Throughout the helicopter’s commissioning and flight test campaign, the rover will assist with the communications back-and-forth from Earth. The rover team also plans to collect images of Ingenuity. 4. Ingenuity is smart for a small robot. Delays are an inherent part of communicating with spacecraft across interplanetary distances, which means Ingenuity’s flight controllers at JPL won’t be able to control the helicopter with a joystick. In fact, they won’t be able to look at engineering data or images from each flight until well after the flight takes place. So Ingenuity will make some of its own decisions based on parameters set by its engineers on Earth. The helicopter has a kind of programmable thermostat, for instance, that will keep it warm on Mars. During flight, Ingenuity will analyze sensor data and images of the terrain to ensure it stays on the flight path designed by project engineers. 5. The Ingenuity team counts success one step at a time. Given Ingenuity’s experimental nature, the team has a long list of milestones the helicopter must reach before it can take off and land in the spring of 2021. The team will celebrate each milestone: • Surviving the cruise to Mars and landing on the Red Planet • Safely deploying to the surface from Perseverance’s belly • Autonomously keeping warm through the intensely cold Martian nights • Autonomously charging itself with the solar panel atop its rotors • Successfully communicating to and from the helicopter via a subsystem known as the Mars Helicopter Base Station on the rover If the first experimental flight test on another planet succeeds, the Ingenuity team will attempt more test flights. 6. If Ingenuity succeeds, future Mars exploration could include an ambitious aerial dimension. Ingenuity is intended to demonstrate technologies and first-of-its-kind operations needed for flying in the Martian atmosphere. If successful, these technologies and the experience with flying a helicopter on another planet could enable other advanced robotic flying vehicles that might be part of future robotic and human missions to Mars. Possible uses of a future helicopter on Mars include offering a unique viewpoint not provided by current orbiters high overhead or by rovers and landers on the ground; high-definition images and reconnaissance for robots or humans; and access to terrain that is difficult for rovers to reach. A future helicopter could even help carry light but vital payloads from one site to another. More About the Project JPL, a division of Caltech in Pasadena, California, manages the Ingenuity Mars Helicopter technology demonstration for NASA. JPL also manages the Mars 2020 Perseverance project for NASA. More on Ingenuity can be found in its online press kit: go.nasa.gov/ingenuity-press-kit A landing press kit for Perseverance can be found at: go.nasa.gov/perseverance-landing-press-kit https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/6-things-to-know-about-nasas-mars-helicopter-on-its-way-to-mars/ 2021 Aircraft Cabin Air Conference Registration Now Open ** Thanks to our generous sponsors, registration is currently free, so book today! ** 2021 Aircraft Cabin Air Conference 15 to 18 March 2021 1500 to 2000 GMT daily via Zoom (0700 to 1200 PST) Four online days of powerful talks given by industry and subject matter experts. Registration is open and currently FREE, so book today! https://www.aircraftcabinair.com/ Following on from the success of the 2017 and 2019 Aircraft Cabin Air Conferences, the 2021 conference will be an essential four-day free modular online event via Zoom. Providing an in-depth overview or update for all those seeking to understand the subject of contaminated air, the flight safety implications, the latest scientific and medical evidence investigating the contaminated air debate and the emerging solutions available to airlines and aircraft operators. The 2021 conference will be the biggest conference ever held on the issue. Who should participate? Airline Management - Aircraft Manufacturers - Safety equipment providers - Health & Safety Regulators - Maintenance Companies - Airline Safety Departments - Air Accident Investigators- Crew & Unions - Policy Makers- Press & Media - Aircraft Insurers - Leasing Companies - Scientists - Occupational Health Professionals - Academics & Researchers - Engineers Register Curt Lewis