Flight Safety Information - February 7, 2022 No. 026 In This Issue : Incident: American B738 near Norfolk on Feb 1st 2022, engine shut down in flight : Incident: SAS B738 near Trondheim on Feb 2nd 2022, loss of cabin pressure : 2022 Aircraft Cabin Air Conference : Incident: Easyjet Europe A320 at London on Feb 3rd 2022, fumes on approach, cabin pressure issues : FAA issues its millionth LAANC authorization to drone pilots The Boeing 737 Max tragedy is a cautionary tale of cost-cutting corporate hubris : GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY : ERAU Advanced Aircraft Accident Investigation - Course - May 9 – 13, 2022 - Prescott AZ ERAU Campus Accident: Sun Country B738 at Las Vegas on Feb 4th 2022, gear malfunction on departure A Sun Country Boeing 737-800, registration N817SY performing flight SY-110 from Las Vegas,NV to Minneapolis,MN (USA) with 50 passengers and 6 crew, was climbing out of Las Vegas' runway 01R when the crew stopped the climb at 9500 feet due to a problem with the right hand main gear. The crew performed troubleshooting and about 30 minutes after departure positioned for an approach to runway 26R about 40 minutes after departure. During the landing roll out sparks were seen from the right hand gear, the aircraft came to a stop on the runway and was disabled. The passengers disembarked via stairs and were bussed to the terminal. The FAA reported: "AIRCRAFT DEPARTED AND RETURNED, LANDED AND GEAR COLLAPSED, LAS VEGAS, NV." The airline reported the right hand main gear malfunctioned. http://avherald.com/h?article=4f428eeb&opt=0 Incident: SAS B738 near Trondheim on Feb 2nd 2022, loss of cabin pressure A SAS Scandinavian Airlines Boeing 737-800, registration LN-RRE performing flight SK-4112 from Oslo to Bodo (Norway), was enroute at FL370 about 40nm east of Trondheim (Norway) when the crew initiated a rapid descent due to problems with the cabin pressure. The aircraft landed safely on Trondheim's runway 09 about 23 minutes after leaving FL370. There were no injuries. A passenger reported they diverted to Trondheim due to the loss of cabin pressure. The captain subsequently announced that there had been a problem with the pressurization control. The airline reported the aircraft suffered the loss of cabin pressure, the passenger oxygen masks were released. The cause of the occurrence is not yet known. The aircraft remained on the ground in Trondheim for about 27 hours, then positioned back to Oslo. http://avherald.com/h?article=4f41c54f&opt=0 Incident: Easyjet Europe A320 at London on Feb 3rd 2022, fumes on approach, cabin pressure issues An Easyjet Europe Airbus A320-200, registration OE-ICU performing flight U2-8418 from Lyon (France) to London Gatwick,EN (UK), was on approach to Gatwick descending through about 6000 feet, the crew was slowing the aircraft and extending the first flaps, the crew noticed a very strong odour of wet socks on board, the flight crew donned their oxygen masks. Descending through about 2000 feet the cabin altitude began to rise rapidly through 5000 feet prompting the crew to perform a manual depressurization of the aircraft. The aircraft landed on Gatwick's runway 26L about 10 minutes after the first detection of the fumes. The crew remained on oxygen until after arriving at the stand as the fumes persisted, the aircraft was finally ventilated on the stand with doors and cockpit windows open and the APU shut down. The crew went for medical checks. The aircraft is still on the ground in Gatwick about 47 hours after landing. http://avherald.com/h?article=4f434250&opt=0 FAA issues its millionth LAANC authorization to drone pilots The speed and efficiency of its automated Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) authorization system has permitted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to issue its millionth permit to drone pilots in record time. The FAA said it had passed the milestone this month, less than four years after it launched LAANC to automate the process of issuing drone pilots permission to fly in restricted airspaces or in controlled circumstances. The app-based system aims to integrate UAVs into the broader world of aerial activity through an automatic link-up between the FAA, controllers, and pilots requesting LAANC flight authorization. Under Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, UAV operators must obtain FAA approval to fly in restricted areas of air traffic control – a process that, when carried out manually, often took weeks or more. After automating that in 2018 with the launch of LAANC, drone pilots have been able to almost immediately obtain permission (or refusal) to access to controlled airspaces at or below 400 feet. Last year the process was also extended to night flying in such zones. In addition to that, the FAA modified the mapping of controlled skies in LAANC, which it said was designed to provide greater liberty to drone pilots. As a result, it said, operators “have more areas they can fly in since the FAA has divided the airspace into smaller segments.” The speed of the application has been hailed by aviation participants on all sides for accelerating the effort to weave routine UAVs operations more tightly into the fabric of wider air activities. In addition to rapidly determining whether requesting drone pilots can be authorized to fly in controlled air spaces, LAANC also provides maps informing operators where they can and cannot fly, and feeds air traffic professionals with data of where permitted craft are aloft in otherwise restricted spaces. “This system has allowed drone pilots to gain timely access to busy airspace without sacrificing safety,” said Teri L. Bristol, the chief operating officer of the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization. “We are grateful to everyone who helped us reach this milestone safely.” Requests are checked against multiple airspace sources in the FAA’s UAS Data Exchange, including UAS Facility Maps, Special Use Airspace data, Airports and Airspace Classes, Temporary Flight Restrictions, and Notices to Operators. The application is used by both private and business drone pilots to seek LAANC permission in near-real time, or up to 90 days before making their flight. The system covers 542 air traffic facilities serving approximately 735 airports. https://dronedj.com/2022/02/07/faa-issues-its-millionth-laanc-authorization-to-drone-pilots/ The Boeing 737 Max tragedy is a cautionary tale of cost-cutting corporate hubris In 2018 in Indonesia and in 2019 in Ethiopia, pilots of two brand new Boeing 737 Max jet planes lost complete control of their planes and crashed, killing a total of 346 passengers and crew. The Max was to be the latest version of the 737, often the workhorse of airlines. Tragically, the new 737 Max was built to fail. An important piece of its software would override pilots’ efforts to stabilize the plane, causing the two crashes with no survivors. How could this happen to a corporation so steeped in the successful engineering and building of iconic airplanes like the 757 jumbo jet? That’s what I asked author Peter Robison recently when I interviewed him at Reader’s Corner for his book, “Flying Blind: The 737 Max Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing.” His answer: corporate hubris that blew up a culture focused on engineering excellence and replaced it with a bottom-line culture where the focus included cutting budgets on traditional Boeing priorities like pilot training, flight simulators to train pilots, an electronic checklist for pilots and research to improve safety. It started with Harry Stonecipher, the McDonnell Douglas CEO, a defense contractor expert at cutting budgets to win contracts, who took the reins at Boeing when the two companies merged. Stonecipher and CEOs who followed him from General Electric’s Jack Welch school of management applied what author Peter Robison calls Welch’s standard corporate playbook: ”anti-union, regulation-light, outsourcing heavy.” Later, Boeing decided to move its corporate headquarters to Chicago, encouraged by tax incentives from the state of Illinois and the city of Chicago. Critics claimed Boeing’s corporate chieftains place short-term profits ahead of engineering excellence as they left behind in Seattle the daily operations of Boeing and the accountability that accompanies a proximity to manufacturing. It also moved some of its manufacturing to South Carolina, a non-union state. As usual in corporate America, those in the executive suites of Boeing were spared the cutbacks that research, safety protocols and employees suffered at the hands of these modern-day Scrooges. Boeing CEOs made out like bandits, and Boeing shareholders did, as well. While engineers were forced to cut back, Boeing executives bought back its company stock, thereby increasing its price and enriching shareholders. According to Robison, Boeing spent $41.5 billion on stock buybacks from 2013 to 2018. Its CEOs walked away with millions in cash the buybacks generated. Boeing’s board members didn’t do badly either, considering that the board caught none of this steady cultural drift toward deadly blunders. Board member Caroline Kennedy, the daughter of President John F. Kennedy, made a cool $800,000 from 2017 to 2019, while Kenneth Duberstein, onetime chief of staff to President Ronald Reagan, pulled down $5.3 million. Boeing built a lobbying team in Washington second to none. According to Open Secrets, a comprehensive resource for campaign contributions, lobbying data and analysis, in 2019 alone, Boeing spent $13 million and employed more than 106 lobbyists including some of the most politically connected law firms in D.C. The passengers of those two deadly flights didn’t have a chance, given heavy lobbying by Boeing in D.C. Boeing “captured” the agency charged with regulating the company and the airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration not only loosened its rules that would ultimately impact a safety focus at the company, but it also stripped the agency of some of its regulatory authority and transferred it to Boeing personnel. (It would be like the FDA handing over its meat inspection to pork producers.) This most egregious and blatant misuse of regulation would cost loss of lives, the airline’s reputation and its bottom-line on which it was so focused. In 2020 alone, Boeing lost $11.9 billion, according to Robison. The immediate cause of the two crashes was software more powerful than what Boeing claimed in documents submitted to win the plane’s approval by the FAA. In underestimating the software’s ability to move the horizontal stabilizer, the small stabilizer on the plane’s tail, Boeing’s supposed processes to catch issues like this failed. Airlines and pilots in the industry claimed that Boeing had hidden the existence of the potentially deadly software. After the two crashes, the FAA, sometimes referred to it as the “tombstone” agency because it only acts when people are dead, delivered on its loyalty to Boeing by deferring the decision to ground the 737 Max. First, it was China that grounded the Max, followed by other nations, but the FAA took its time, waiting three days after the two crashes before ordering the 737 Max from the skies. Since these two crashes occurred in other countries, there were initial charges that foreign pilot error was to blame. When the 737 Max was finally grounded, investigations showed that pilot error was not the problem. Boeing software was! Boeing did show just how quickly it can act when its self-interest is at stake. After the Indonesian crash, agents of Boeing and Lion Air, the Indonesian carrier, were there at the Jakarta airport offering families “blood money” of $91,600 in exchange for the release of liability in any global court — a mere pittance to what could be awarded for the wrongful death of a loved one. Seventy of the victims’ families signed the settlement offer. In contrast, just last November, Boeing agreed to a settlement in a lawsuit filed against the company and its board for more than $230 million. The lawsuit accused Boeing and its board of failure to address safety warning signs before the two Max jetliners crashed. The aftermath of the crashes produced a mixed bag of results. Congress did return to the FAA the authority to regulate Boeing that those expensive lobbyists and legislators shifted to the company. The company corrected the software issues, but the 737 Max remains the only large commercial airliner without an electronic checklist in the cockpit to guide pilots. Eventually the FAA returned the 737 Max to the skies. Boeing also called a halt to those generous stock buybacks that ate up cash that could have been used to build planes, catch software errors and invest in research. Who was ultimately held responsible for the deaths of 346 passengers and crew? As is too often the case, criminal liability skated past Boeing’s executive offices and boardroom and landed down the chain of command on Boeing’s chief technical pilot who was indicted for lying about the flight control software that claimed so many lives. One lawsuit filed by shareholders against current and former Boeing directors was settled for $225M and Boeing agreed to a legal settlement with the Justice Department for $2.5 billion, thereby resolving a criminal charge that Boeing conspired to defraud the FAA. After reading Flying Blind, the reader would expect some form of criminal liability like manslaughter to be imposed on CEOs at the controls as Boeing veered off course. No such thing happened, but two months after the Indonesian crash, the Boeing board would award the CEO on duty at the time, Dennis Muilenburg, a record-breaking salary of $31M including $13M bonus for performance. The CEOs before Muilenburg who changed the culture and downplayed safety concerns also got off scot free. Robison reports on their post-Boeing lives of luxury thanks to their generous salaries and stock options. After learning of the Justice Department’s settlement of Boeing’s fraud conspiracy, Robison quotes one Boeing pilot as concluding, “Boeing got away with murder.” Bob Kustra served as president of Boise State University from 2003 to 2018. He is host of Reader’s Corner on Boise State Public Radio and is a regular columnist for the Idaho Statesman. He served two terms as Illinois lieutenant governor and 10 years as a state legislator. The Boeing 737 Max tragedy is a cautionary tale of cost-cutting corporate hubris In 2018 in Indonesia and in 2019 in Ethiopia, pilots of two brand new Boeing 737 Max jet planes lost complete control of their planes and crashed, killing a total of 346 passengers and crew. The Max was to be the latest version of the 737, often the workhorse of airlines. Tragically, the new 737 Max was built to fail. An important piece of its software would override pilots’ efforts to stabilize the plane, causing the two crashes with no survivors. How could this happen to a corporation so steeped in the successful engineering and building of iconic airplanes like the 757 jumbo jet? That’s what I asked author Peter Robison recently when I interviewed him at Reader’s Corner for his book, “Flying Blind: The 737 Max Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing.” His answer: corporate hubris that blew up a culture focused on engineering excellence and replaced it with a bottom-line culture where the focus included cutting budgets on traditional Boeing priorities like pilot training, flight simulators to train pilots, an electronic checklist for pilots and research to improve safety. It started with Harry Stonecipher, the McDonnell Douglas CEO, a defense contractor expert at cutting budgets to win contracts, who took the reins at Boeing when the two companies merged. Stonecipher and CEOs who followed him from General Electric’s Jack Welch school of management applied what author Peter Robison calls Welch’s standard corporate playbook: ”anti-union, regulation-light, outsourcing heavy.” Later, Boeing decided to move its corporate headquarters to Chicago, encouraged by tax incentives from the state of Illinois and the city of Chicago. Critics claimed Boeing’s corporate chieftains place short-term profits ahead of engineering excellence as they left behind in Seattle the daily operations of Boeing and the accountability that accompanies a proximity to manufacturing. It also moved some of its manufacturing to South Carolina, a non-union state. As usual in corporate America, those in the executive suites of Boeing were spared the cutbacks that research, safety protocols and employees suffered at the hands of these modern-day Scrooges. Boeing CEOs made out like bandits, and Boeing shareholders did, as well. While engineers were forced to cut back, Boeing executives bought back its company stock, thereby increasing its price and enriching shareholders. According to Robison, Boeing spent $41.5 billion on stock buybacks from 2013 to 2018. Its CEOs walked away with millions in cash the buybacks generated. Boeing’s board members didn’t do badly either, considering that the board caught none of this steady cultural drift toward deadly blunders. Board member Caroline Kennedy, the daughter of President John F. Kennedy, made a cool $800,000 from 2017 to 2019, while Kenneth Duberstein, onetime chief of staff to President Ronald Reagan, pulled down $5.3 million. Boeing built a lobbying team in Washington second to none. According to Open Secrets, a comprehensive resource for campaign contributions, lobbying data and analysis, in 2019 alone, Boeing spent $13 million and employed more than 106 lobbyists including some of the most politically connected law firms in D.C. The passengers of those two deadly flights didn’t have a chance, given heavy lobbying by Boeing in D.C. Boeing “captured” the agency charged with regulating the company and the airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration not only loosened its rules that would ultimately impact a safety focus at the company, but it also stripped the agency of some of its regulatory authority and transferred it to Boeing personnel. (It would be like the FDA handing over its meat inspection to pork producers.) This most egregious and blatant misuse of regulation would cost loss of lives, the airline’s reputation and its bottom-line on which it was so focused. In 2020 alone, Boeing lost $11.9 billion, according to Robison. The immediate cause of the two crashes was software more powerful than what Boeing claimed in documents submitted to win the plane’s approval by the FAA. In underestimating the software’s ability to move the horizontal stabilizer, the small stabilizer on the plane’s tail, Boeing’s supposed processes to catch issues like this failed. Airlines and pilots in the industry claimed that Boeing had hidden the existence of the potentially deadly software. After the two crashes, the FAA, sometimes referred to it as the “tombstone” agency because it only acts when people are dead, delivered on its loyalty to Boeing by deferring the decision to ground the 737 Max. First, it was China that grounded the Max, followed by other nations, but the FAA took its time, waiting three days after the two crashes before ordering the 737 Max from the skies. Since these two crashes occurred in other countries, there were initial charges that foreign pilot error was to blame. When the 737 Max was finally grounded, investigations showed that pilot error was not the problem. Boeing software was! Boeing did show just how quickly it can act when its self-interest is at stake. After the Indonesian crash, agents of Boeing and Lion Air, the Indonesian carrier, were there at the Jakarta airport offering families “blood money” of $91,600 in exchange for the release of liability in any global court — a mere pittance to what could be awarded for the wrongful death of a loved one. Seventy of the victims’ families signed the settlement offer. In contrast, just last November, Boeing agreed to a settlement in a lawsuit filed against the company and its board for more than $230 million. The lawsuit accused Boeing and its board of failure to address safety warning signs before the two Max jetliners crashed. The aftermath of the crashes produced a mixed bag of results. Congress did return to the FAA the authority to regulate Boeing that those expensive lobbyists and legislators shifted to the company. The company corrected the software issues, but the 737 Max remains the only large commercial airliner without an electronic checklist in the cockpit to guide pilots. Eventually the FAA returned the 737 Max to the skies. Boeing also called a halt to those generous stock buybacks that ate up cash that could have been used to build planes, catch software errors and invest in research. Who was ultimately held responsible for the deaths of 346 passengers and crew? As is too often the case, criminal liability skated past Boeing’s executive offices and boardroom and landed down the chain of command on Boeing’s chief technical pilot who was indicted for lying about the flight control software that claimed so many lives. One lawsuit filed by shareholders against current and former Boeing directors was settled for $225M and Boeing agreed to a legal settlement with the Justice Department for $2.5 billion, thereby resolving a criminal charge that Boeing conspired to defraud the FAA. After reading Flying Blind, the reader would expect some form of criminal liability like manslaughter to be imposed on CEOs at the controls as Boeing veered off course. No such thing happened, but two months after the Indonesian crash, the Boeing board would award the CEO on duty at the time, Dennis Muilenburg, a record-breaking salary of $31M including $13M bonus for performance. The CEOs before Muilenburg who changed the culture and downplayed safety concerns also got off scot free. Robison reports on their post-Boeing lives of luxury thanks to their generous salaries and stock options. After learning of the Justice Department’s settlement of Boeing’s fraud conspiracy, Robison quotes one Boeing pilot as concluding, “Boeing got away with murder.” Bob Kustra served as president of Boise State University from 2003 to 2018. He is host of Reader’s Corner on Boise State Public Radio and is a regular columnist for the Idaho Statesman. He served two terms as Illinois lieutenant governor and 10 years as a state legislator. https://www.yahoo.com/news/boeing-737-max-tragedy-cautionary-110000788.html GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY Calling all Part 135 Operators, are you concerned about having an effective SMS? With safety management system (SMS) regulations on the near horizon for 14 CFR 135 operators, it is important to identify barriers to having an effective SMS. A significant challenge to implementing and maintaining a robust SMS is obtaining frontline employee participation. An SMS needs that frontline information to help identify hazards, mitigate risks, and monitor risk controls. My name is Jason Starke, and I am a doctoral candidate at Northcentral University. Please help me in my research to determine if there is a relationship between servant leadership, organizational commitment, and engagement in the SMS (i.e., safety citizenship behavior). If you meet all the following criteria, I would really appreciate your participation: · 18 year of age or older; · Employed by an organization that conducts operations under 14 CFR 135; · Employed by an organization that has implemented a safety management system; and · Employed as a flight crew member (cockpit or cabin) and/or as an aircraft mechanic. The survey only takes roughly 10 minutes to complete and will ask you questions about: · Servant leadership characteristics of your immediate supervisor or manager; · Your current level of commitment to your organization; and · Your perception of the degree to which you feel certain safety behaviors and safety management activities are part of your job responsibilities. Again, please help with the research on this important topic so that we can understand how servant leadership positively influences employee engagement in the SMS. If you are interested in participating in this study, please click this link: https://ncu.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_cCJTGDxqF6wUk8m If you have questions, please contact me at J.Starke8609@o365.ncu.edu. I can’t thank you all enough for your participation! Jason Starke ARGUS International, Inc. is Growing Director of Audit Programs, Business Aviation Position Available ARGUS PROS, A division of ARGUS International, is your one-stop source for creating a superior operation within your air transportation business. We are an experienced quality and safety assurance provider and are accredited by IATA as an IOSA Audit and Training Organization. Ours is a flexible organization, committed to true team auditing for multiple standards at the domestic, regional, and international levels, as well as tailoring all the other resources and services we offer to your specific needs. ARGUS PROS is currently seeking a Director of Audit Programs, BA to join our team. This position will work in our Denver, CO location. ARGUS is an established company with an unparalleled client list and reputation. The perfect candidate will have the proven ability to work with the listed technologies in a team setting. Position Summary: This position is responsible for the day-to-day management of all audit standards for Business Aviation. The position reports to the VP Business Aviation. Responsibilities for the position will include, but not be limited to, the following: • Maintain currency and qualification as an ARGUS auditor. • Plans and conducts systematic operational safety audits of corporate flight departments and charter operators. • Communicates the results of audits via written reports to be delivered in a timely fashion. • Works under general supervision and in a variety of different work environments and/or on several projects simultaneously. • Manages Business Aviation audit programs including ARGUS, ISBAO, ACSF and BARS • Develops and maintains company policies and procedures, scheduling, supervision of contract auditors and overall oversight of the program. Minimum requirements will include: • Bachelor’s Degree in a related field and Lead Auditor Training. • Five years of experience with a major/commuter carrier or corporate flight department in the area of flight operations, flight training, maintenance, flight dispatch, or station operations. • Working knowledge of pertinent Federal Aviation Regulations (65, 91, 119, 121, 135, 830, and Special Federal Regulations as appropriate), FAA Advisory Circulars, and company OPSPECS is necessary. • Pilot certificate with turboprop/jet experience and/or Maintenance certificate required. • Auditing in relevant areas of operations previously mentioned of at least two years is also required. • Supervisory experience preferred • Proficient in the use of Microsoft Why Chose ARGUS? Full time benefits will include: 401K Match, Medical/Dental/Vision Insurance, Voluntary Coverages, Paid Short Term Disability, Paid Vacation and Holidays, Flexible Schedules, Wellness Initiatives, Gym Reimbursement, Competitive Salary with a Friendly Casual Atmosphere. The salary range for this position will be $70,000-90,000.00 per year based on skillset and years of experience. ARGUS is an equal opportunity employer. Please register to submit your cover letter and resume at: https://workforcenow.adp.com/mascsr/default/mdf/recruitment/recruitment.html?cid=3363cb93-dd75-4c54-b4a1-8f276f42c007&ccId=19000101_000001&jobId=432909&source=CC2&lang=en_US ARGUS International, Inc. is Growing Senior Vice President, Consulting Position Available ARGUS International, Inc.: Founded in 1995, ARGUS is the worldwide leader in specialized aviation services that allow organizations around the globe to improve their operational and business decision making. Our mission is to exceptionally deliver relevant and valuable information solutions to the Business Aviation, Air Carrier, Rotary Wing, UAS, and the overall Aerospace marketplace. PRISM (Professional Resources In System Management) LLC: PRISM, a wholly-owned subsidiary of ARGUS International, providing consulting and training services in the disciplines of regulatory certification/compliance, aviation safety, quality, security, and environment. PRISM is currently seeking an Senior Vice President, Consulting to join our team. This position will work at our Greenwood Village, CO location. Responsible for the leadership and direction of PRISM, this person provides revenue management, strategic leadership, supervision, and direction of the PRISM team including vice presidents and supporting staff. Responsible for managing a cadre of part-time associates who support development and delivery of customized products and services. Responsible for overall growth of PRISM having the ability to leverage associated sales team and business development team members to achieve targeted growth goals. Active member of ARGUS International executive and leadership team. Individual responsibilities will include, but not be limited to, the following: Administration and Leadership (40%) · Develops and manages an annual PRISM financial budget · Manages costs during delivery of products and services to maximize net income · Works with sales to assure margins are met and contracts executed as agreed · Works across departments to maximize company talent to meet customer needs · Provides annual performance and developmental reviews of division staff members · Provides mentoring and career development of division staff members Business Development (40%) · Anticipates industry needs in terms of products and services to ensure a consistent and competitive revenue stream · Partners with ARGUS President, Marketing & Sales to identify new lines of business (products & services) with emphasis on long term contracts to stabilize revenue stream · Partners with ARGUS President, Marketing, Sales, and PRISM division heads on client contact and sales meetings Program Management (20%) · Provide leadership and oversight for: 1. Developing safety, quality, security, and environmental systems for large commercial air carriers, regional airlines, helicopter operators, corporate operators, UAS operators, and charter enterprises to meet applicable regulatory and organizational requirements. 2. Develop a suite of technical training programs that equip aviation specialists with knowledge, tools, and skills to manage internal safety, quality, security and environmental systems. 3. Consulting services for certification services for FAA Part 121/135/139/145 applicants. 4. Provides clients with technical support to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements of ICAO and State Civil Aviation Authorities. · Establishes internal systems and processes to maintain FAA approval as a Recognized Certification Consultant Minimum requirements: · 4-year college degree, or equivalent work experience · 15 years of Aviation Industry experience consisting of Airline and Business Aviation to include operational management experience · Experience in mentoring / coaching mid-level and senior organizational management teams · Knowledge of organizational management systems to include SMS, QMS, and SeMS · Knowledge of operational and enterprise risk management systems, concepts and processes · Thorough understanding of aviation industry CFR Part 121, 135, and 145 regulations · Knowledge of aviation industry best operations practices for commercial air carrier, helicopter, business aviation, and unmanned market segments · Good working knowledge of all Microsoft Office programs, including Excel, Word, PowerPoint, and Publisher · Knowledge of Adobe Acrobat, Visio, and Project Management programs · Good working knowledge of internet and email usage · Excellent phone and organizational skills Why Chose ARGUS? Full time benefits will include: 401K Match, Medical/Dental/Vision Insurance, Voluntary Coverages, Paid Short Term Disability, Paid Vacation and Holidays, Flexible Schedules, Wellness Initiatives, Gym Reimbursement, Competitive Salary with a Friendly Casual Atmosphere. The salary range for this position will be 170-200K per year based on skillset and years of experience with bonus opportunity. ARGUS is an equal opportunity employer. Please register to submit your cover letter and resume at: https://workforcenow.adp.com/mascsr/default/mdf/recruitment/recruitment.html?cid=3363cb93-dd75-4c54-b4a1-8f276f42c007&ccId=19000101_000001&jobId=423847&source=CC2&lang=en_US Curt Lewis