Flight Safety Information - February 1, 2023 No. 023 In This Issue : Incident: Canada A321 near Montreal on Jan 12th 2023, hydraulic problems : Incident: Argentinas A332 enroute on Jan 30th 2023, engine vibrations : Incident: Endeavor CRJ9 at Montreal on Jan 19th 2023, electrical burning odour in cockpit : Incident: THY B739 at Kayseri on Jan 30th 2023, burst tyre on landing : Belgium records ‘excellent’ air safety figures : Air India to Implement Coruson Safety Management Software : Regulator not investigating Toronto-bound Air Canada flight that returned to YVR : Lax Procedures, Oversight Surface in Yute Crash Investigation : Eastern Airlines is Now Hiring Flight Attendants In Philadelphia : Norwegian airline Flyr files for bankruptcy : Airlines must 'use or lose' UK airport slots in return to pre-COVID rules : What Were TWA's Most Important Aircraft Types? : Emirates Successfully Tests Flying Boeing 777 Plane on Sustainable Jet Fuel : RESEARCH SURVEY Incident: Canada A321 near Montreal on Jan 12th 2023, hydraulic problems An Air Canada Airbus A321-200, registration C-FLKX performing flight AC-418 from Toronto,ON to Montreal,QC (Canada), was enroute when the crew declared PAN PAN reporting a problem with a hydraulic system. The aircraft continued to Montreal for a safe landing. The aircraft stopped on the runway for an inspection by emergency services before continuing to the apron. On Jan 31st 2023 the Canadian TSB reported the green hydraulic system failed. After landing no nosewheel steering was available as result. After landing hydraulic fluid was found running down both sides of the tail, the green hydraulic reservoir was found just above minimum level. The left yaw damper actuator was replaced. https://avherald.com/h?article=504368bb&opt=0 Incident: Argentinas A332 enroute on Jan 30th 2023, engine vibrations An Aerolineas Argentinas Airbus A330-200, registration LV-FVI performing flight AR-1132 (sched. Jan 29th, actual dep Jan 30th) from Buenos Aires,BA (Argentina) to Madrid,SP (Spain), was enroute at FL350 about 580nm northeast of Buenos Aires when the crew decided to return to Buenos Aires due to N1 vibrations of the left hand engine (CF6). The aircraft descended to FL050 near Buenos Aires and entered a hold to burn off fuel for about 3:15 hours. The aircraft subsequently landed safely on Ezeiza Airport's runway 11 about 6:20 hours after departure. Passengers reported the captain announced a "maintenance problem". A replacement A330-200 registration LV-GIF reached Madrid with a delay of 12.5 hours. The occurrence aircraft returned to service about 22 hours after landing back. https://avherald.com/h?article=504848e7&opt=0 Incident: Endeavor CRJ9 at Montreal on Jan 19th 2023, electrical burning odour in cockpit An Endeavor Canadair CRJ-900 on behalf of Delta Airlines, registration N315EV performing flight DL-4742 from Atlanta,GA to Montreal,QC (Canada), was descending towards Montreal when the crew noticed an electrical burning odour in the cockpit, no smoke was visible, and declared emergency. The aircraft continued for a safe landing on Montreal's runway 06R. The Canadian TSB reported maintenance found a terminal on the windshield heating system improperly connected causing an electrical arc. The terminal was tightened. The aircraft returned to service after about 11 hours on the ground. https://avherald.com/h?article=50484c51&opt=0 Incident: THY B739 at Kayseri on Jan 30th 2023, burst tyre on landing A THY Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-900, registration TC-JYD performing flight TK-2014 from Istanbul to Kayseri (Turkey), landed on Kayseri's runway 25 but burst the outboard left main tyre. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron. The return flight TK-2015 was cancelled. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Kayseri about 24 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=504838f8&opt=0 Belgium records ‘excellent’ air safety figures Belgium recorded ‘excellent’ air safety statistics in 2022, reported by aviation authority Skeyes (Belgocontrol) on 10 January. In total, Skeyes managed nearly 900,000 flights in Belgian airspace and at the country’s airports. Air traffic has picked up again after years of reduced numbers due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite this uptick in flights flying above the country, Skeyes reported no severe incidents and only one major incident, one of the “best results in its history”, the authority reports. According to Skeyes, a major incident relates to an aircraft or airport not assuring the safety, leading to a “crew avoidance manoeuvre”, an Air Traffic Control (ATC) instruction to reduce risk, or a “loss of separation” when aircraft do not keep a safe distance from each other or from structures. A severe incident, of which there were none, involves near-collisions, narrowly avoiding terrain or aborted take-offs from closed or busy runways. “Our employees are constantly undergoing training to keep up to date and further improve their professional qualities. Every day, they succeed in putting these qualities into practice for the benefit of the safety of aircraft, crews, passengers and cargo. We also invest intensively in the modernization, and updating, of systems and procedures,” said Johan Decuyper, CEO of Skeyes. The official says that the 2022 results, the second best in the authority’s history, are evidence that Skeyes’ “efforts are paying off.” The company did not provide any information about the one major incident which took place in Belgium. The improved safety results represent a significant recovery from previous years. In 2017, the Belgian Cockpit Association urged Skeyes to immediately take measures to improve Belgian air safety after the air traffic control agency suffered a technical breakdown. This was the third outage in two years. Air traffic controllers accidentally unplugged a cable, cutting all primary and backup systems for ten minutes, effectively leaving air traffic controllers blind. Fortunately, this accident lead to no major incidents. Back to 2019 levels Traffic in Belgian airspace increased again last year, Skeyes reports, up 46% compared to 2021. Traffic at airports equally increased, with traffic at Brussels International Airport rising by 51% between 2021 and 2022. Air traffic above Belgium is now getting increasingly closer to pre-Covid levels, despite disruptions caused by the Omicron variant at the start of 2022, as well as Russia’s war in Ukraine. Traffic in 2022 reached 81% of that recorded in 2019, in line with the European average of 83%. At some Belgian airports, air traffic has already surpassed 2019 levels. Traffic at Charleroi airport increased by 2%, and by 13% at Antwerp airport. Traffic at other airports is also approaching 2019 levels. Kortrijk airport is now just 3% shy of pre-Covid levels, 4% less in Ostend, 6% in Liège, and 24% less at Brussels International Airport. It is now estimated that there will be a total return to pre-Covid air traffic levels in Europe by 2025. European aviation is still weighed down by the impacts of inflation, high fuel costs, and the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine. https://www.brusselstimes.com/belgium/362241/belgium-records-excellent-air-safety-figures Air India to Implement Coruson Safety Management Software DALLAS — India’s FSC, led by TATA Group, Air India (AI), has selected Ideagen’s Coruson enterprise cloud software to enhance safety management on flights. The Star Alliance member, with the help of Coruson, will be able to get real-time intelligence, reporting, and status on in-flight incidents. In a statement, AI said that they have selected a UK-based Ideagen enterprise for the installation of safety data software for inflight safety with effect from May , . AI will roll out the requirement for paperwork to large extent and to key personnel and authorities without delay. Apart from these Indian carrier is also procuring iPads for pilots and crew members and once available they will add Coruson to it. With the help of Coruson, AI will be able to get full visibility of safety data from the maintenance of the plane to the cabin crew onboard checks. Subsequently, enabling it to access the most delinquent data and utilize this to spot and mitigate probable risks, thereby improving the safety of operations. Air India’s Head of Safety, Security, and Quality, Mr. Henry Donohoe While commenting on the development said, “We are going for a significant and substantial upgrade of our existing systems and processes to ensure seamless flow of intelligence and data on a realtime basis. Coruson is trusted by the aviation industry globally for risk mitigation, auditing, and training. Its induction will go a long way in enhancing our capabilities for the safety and well-being of our passengers and crew, particularly at a time when Air India is rapidly expanding its network on both national and international routes.” Ideagen Enterprise CEO Ben Dorks said, “We are honored to be supporting Air India (AI) to continue to assure the safety of their passengers, crew, and highly skilled workforce. Air India, like Ideagen, is in an exciting period of growth, adding more routes to connect India with the rest of the world, and we are delighted to be with them on that journey.” The CEO added, “As an expert in software solutions within regulated and high-compliance industries, we have a strong pedigree in quality management, health and safety, risk mitigation, auditing, training, and collaboration software. Air India customers can be assured that they are in safe hands.” About Ideagen Ideagen’s technologies are trusted by the aviation industry globally for risk alleviation, auditing, and training. Around aviation and aerospace organizations across the globe use Ideagen to support them with their quality and safety operations. The company’s tech enhances airlines’ capabilities for the safety and well-being of their passengers and crew. This is particularly important at a time when AI is rapidly growing its network on both domestic and international routes. https://airwaysmag.com/air-india-coruson-managment-software/ Regulator not investigating Toronto-bound Air Canada flight that returned to YVR The airline's media relations office blamed the incident on a door indication signal; a corroborated passenger account noted the cargo door opened The Transportation Safety Board said it is monitoring, but not investigating, an incident aboard an Air Canada flight that occurred early Monday afternoon. Flight 114 from Vancouver to Toronto safely returned to YVR after air pressure suddenly changed. The pilot announced to passengers that a cargo door was open and reassured them that the situation was under control. According to Flightaware.com, AC114 departed 35 minutes late at 12:30 p.m. and returned at 1:08 p.m. after flying a figure-eight pattern. The jet took off towards Blaine, Wash., then took a sharp turn toward Tsawwassen and headed west over Gabriola Island, before another sharp turn south over Nanaimo and a turn east over Galiano Island back to YVR. “Someone didn’t fasten the cargo door properly and it opened during takeoff,” tweeted passenger Randy Govang. “Flight was depressurized and we had to circle to lighten the fuel load to land back in Vancouver.” Air Canada’s media relations office denied that the door was open. It blamed the incident on a door indication signal that the pilots received. “At no time was any door open when the airplane was in the air,” said a statement from the airline. “Passengers were rebooked to other flights with everyone re-departing yesterday. The aircraft was taken offline for technicians to complete a sensor change, it returned to service after final checks were complete.” Transportation Safety Board (TSB) spokesperson Liam MacDonald said the independent agency has not deployed investigators, because it is not obliged to probe all reported incidents. “The TSB may launch an investigation if there is likelihood of identifying new safety lessons to advance transportation safety,” MacDonald said. “Mechanical issues that do not result in a crash, injury or fatality are typically classified as class 5 occurrences.” Under the TSB’s occurrence classification policy, incidents ranked fifth on its six-step scale are not subject to comprehensive investigations and reports. However, data is gathered and recorded for statistical reporting and future analysis. https://biv.com/article/2023/01/regulator-not-investigating-toronto-bound-air-canada-flight-returned-yvr Lax Procedures, Oversight Surface in Yute Crash Investigation On September 7, two-and-a-half years after the crash of a Yute Commuter Service single-engine Piper PA-32 near Tuntutuliak, Alaska, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its probable cause finding on the five-fatality accident, citing a pilot’s decision to fly into potentially whiteout conditions. But a lengthy investigation also pointed to systemic safety issues and lax procedures that enabled the decision-making. The PA-32 departed under a special VFR on the morning of Feb. 6, 2020, for the village of Kipnuk, less than 100 miles from the company base in Bethel. It crashed about 30 minutes later, at approximately 11:10 a.m. local time. Investigators determined the decision of the pilot, Tony Matthews, to continue VFR into “reduced visibility, including likely flat light and/or whiteout conditions,” was the probable cause. Matthews had 645 hours of total time; the Kipnuk flight was only his fourth revenue trip for the company. As a contributory factor, the NTSB also found Yute’s operational control procedures were inadequate and “permitted” the pilot to depart below company minimums. Yute is a VFR-only Part 135 commuter and air taxi. It primarily serves the southwestern Alaska region known as the Yukon-Kuskokwim (YK) Delta. The area is notorious for challenging winter weather conditions, with snow, fog, and winds prevalent throughout the season. Flat light is a common hazard. When an investigator asked to describe what it was like, Yute’s chief pilot Byron Paul was blunt: “…the ground’s the sky and the sky’s the ground,” he said, “[that] is the only way I can tell you.” The Kipnuk flight departed Bethel at 10:42 a.m. Twelve minutes earlier, as Matthews was taxiing out, the weather was 600 feet overcast with four miles of visibility in mist. At 10:43 a.m. there was a special observation with the ceiling still at 600 feet overcast but visibility down to one and one-quarter miles. A special issued two minutes later reported the ceiling at 800 feet overcast and five miles visibility, then at 11:05 a.m., it was back down to 500 feet overcast and three miles. In Kipnuk, 40 miles from the accident site, conditions were 600 feet overcast with nine miles of visibility in light snow at 10:56 a.m. In the next hour, both Bethel and Kipnuk had worsening conditions. Visibility went down to one-half mile, and the ceiling measured as low as 400 feet with light snow, mist, and freezing fog. Many of the villages in the YK possess limited weather reporting options. Some have no weather reportage at all, some have no certified weather available, and others suffer from technical difficulties including chronic telecommunication outages rendering the equipment useless. The 2021 FAA Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative found that, “most rural airports do not have weather reporting systems. Without certified weather reporting, or an approved alternative with adequate fidelity, by regulation, Part 135 operators cannot conduct IFR operations into these airports.” Attempts to reach Yute Commuter Service for comment on the decision to dispatch the flight were unsuccessful. While the forecast weather for the 83-nm flight from Bethel to Kipnuk was mostly marginal VFR, the actual weather was much worse, with IFR ceilings and visibilities, some nearly low-IFR. Operational Control and Risk Assessment The NTSB interviewed eight Yute employees in the course of its investigation. In all of these interviews, Wade Renfro, the company owner, president, and general manager was present and permitted to ask questions of the interviewees. The investigation largely focused on three things: lack of coherent policy establishing company minimums and individual pilot limitations, the flight’s missing risk assessment form, and the manner in which daily operational control functioned. The two individuals who commonly held operational control were often physically absent from the office. Renfro lived part of the year 360 miles away, in the town of Soldotna, and director of operations (DO) Tony Spangler resided part of the year in Las Vegas. The other two individuals who could be delegated with the authority, chief pilot Paul and Ernie Turrentine, a senior pilot and former chief pilot, both flew the line and rarely exercised the responsibility. On the morning of the accident, Renfro held operational control and phoned in at about 7 a.m. from Soldotna. Spangler was in Las Vegas; Turrentine and Paul were scheduled to fly. Regardless of management presence, daily flight planning and dispatch were handled by a flight follower and flight coordinator. The flight coordinator on duty the morning of February 6 had been with the company for one year and had been promoted from her position of flight follower six months earlier. The flight follower had been with Yute for nine months. Before their employment with Yute, they were both customer service agents for other operators; neither had any formal aviation education or knowledge other than what they obtained on the job. For example, the flight follower could not correctly define special VFR when asked by investigators. He was also unfamiliar with common aviation weather terms including sigmet, airmet, VMC, and IMC. The flight follower was primarily responsible for obtaining the weather each morning, by viewing FAA weather camera websites and phoning village agents. Meanwhile, the flight coordinator checked with agents about daily passenger “traffic” and created load manifests, including mail and freight. No pilots were officially assigned to flights prior to arriving at work. The DO assigned pilots to aircraft following their checkrides, and the aircraft were assigned to routes by the flight coordinator. Upon arriving at work, pilots learned the routes for their aircraft and discussed the weather with dispatch. (Yute had about 12 pilots total at the time of the accident, but they worked in rotations with about six in Bethel at any one time.) Dispatch spoke with the person holding operational control before the early departures and any concerns that might result in delay or cancellation were addressed then. (Both Spangler and Renfro said they also checked weather from their homes.) Before a flight was dispatched, the risk assessment form, as required by the general operations manual, was completed by the pilot. It was checked for accuracy by either the follower or coordinator and if it did not reach a risk figure meriting management attention, it was signed by one of them, then the pilot, and filed. After the accident, the risk assessment form for the Kipnuk flight could not be found. In her interview, the flight coordinator initially insisted the flight follower reviewed and signed Matthews’s form and had final possession of it. However, under increased questioning, she changed her mind and said she did not remember seeing the form at all that morning. For his part, the flight follower admitted the risk assessment form was required before a flight could be released but did not remember signing it, did not remember seeing Matthews complete it, and did not know where it might have ended up. Every member of Yute management who was asked about the missing form professed to have no idea how it could have disappeared or why no one recalled filling it out. As to how or why Matthews would depart without one, that was another mystery. Company Minimums and Pilot Limitations In discussing risk assessment, Matthews’s status as a new pilot, and how that would affect his flight risk calculation, was addressed extensively by investigators. Interviewees mostly agreed that crosswind limits of 15 knots were placed on all new pilots and remained in effect until lifted by the DO. From there, the question of how pilots were individually limited became murky. Spangler said there were restrictions only for low-time new hires in the Cessna 172 and dismissed the general crosswind limitation, while Turrentine said there were individual limitations as set by Paul or Spangler for every new pilot “until he flew a couple of shifts.” (In this context, shifts refer to scheduled pilot rotations.) According to Spangler, the company’s overall weather minimums were 500 feet and two miles of visibility. Paul stated they were 1,000 feet and two miles for new pilots and 500 feet and two miles for himself. The flight coordinator said they were 500 feet and three miles, while the flight follower said they were 1,000 feet and two miles. Renfro avowed that they were 500 feet and two miles but the company did not launch pilots in those conditions. He acknowledged an experienced pilot like Turrentine might depart at 500 feet and three miles for a short flight, but otherwise, “500 and 2 is not a condition that we want to be flying around in.” Everyone who was asked told investigators they had no knowledge of the limitations placed on Tony Matthews. For a new pilot, Renfro said, “usually 1,000 and five or somewhere in that neighborhood would be more appropriate,” while Paul said new pilots could depart only with a 1,000-foot ceiling and two miles visibility and were never dispatched under a special VFR unless he or Spangler flew with them. (Spangler never flew with Matthews and Paul only flew an evaluation flight in the Cessna 172.) The flight coordinator said the only limitations for new pilots were those that were told to her on the day of a flight, by whoever had operational control. Spangler, when asked to assess the conditions Matthews departed under, told investigators it was “a typical operation.” “…In the wintertime,” Spangler said, “if you’re going to fly out here, you normally have to be able to handle some, you know, instrument-type conditions getting in and out of Bethel, usually getting into the point that you can keep the airplane…I mean, this has been something for years and years out here…so no, there were no restrictions.” The DO also confirmed that none of Yute’s aircraft were IFR certified, and the ability to fly approaches on instruments was “limited because of the equipment in the airplane.” Paul, the chief pilot, said the company provided only about two hours of annual instrument training, under the hood, during initial training and the checkride. (This was also part of recurrent training.) Turrentine, who taught the ground school Matthews attended, said if IMC was encountered while flying, “you should go on your instruments and you do a 180 to get out…” In his opinion, the accident happened because Matthews “fixated outside and quit looking at the instruments for too long.” Multiple Safety Issues In addition to Yute, Renfro owned and operated a charter-only company, Renfro’s Alaskan Adventures, also based in Bethel. (That company was involved in four accidents in the previous five years, most recently in September 2019.) He purchased Yute (a dba of Paklook Air Service) in 2017 and relocated it from Kodiak to Bethel. Spangler served as the company’s DO and Turrentine was initially the chief pilot. Prior to the Kipnuk flight, the company crashed five times under their oversight, including one accident in 2018 when the pilot—who had over 21,000 hours—permitted a cargo handler with no flight experience to sit in the left seat. During takeoff, the pilot lost rudder control and the aircraft veered off the runway and hit a small ridge. The FAA later characterized this accident as allowing a “non-company unqualified pilot to attempt takeoff.” There were other events and occurrences at Yute following Renfro’s purchase that drew the attention of the FAA. These included multiple issues with not grounding the aircraft during refuel, failure to secure baggage doors during preflight, the failure of a nose gear actuator on approach, collapsed gear resulting in a prop strike, failure of a pilot to maintain control on landing in Nightmute, and, in April 2019, failure of a pilot to maintain control when landing in Bethel, which resulted in the wing and propeller contacting the runway. The company did not initially report this event to the FAA. Yute accident Alaska On April 23, 2019, Yute’s principal operations inspector (POI) sent Spangler a letter noting the “large number of reported incidents” over the previous few months. The DO was charged with developing a plan to “correct deviations from company procedures” within the next two weeks. One month later, in response to a request for a conformity inspection to add another PA-32 to the company certificate, the FAA informed Yute a risk analysis had determined that “due to the poor safety record exhibited by the company,” the agency would not permit the addition of other aircraft at that time. While these issues were ongoing, there was also another problem with Yute’s operation that captured FAA attention: the abilities and professionalism of chief pilot Ernie Turrentine. Prior to his position at Yute, Turrentine developed an extensive aviation history in Alaska, logging more than 30,000 hours and employment with several Part 135 operators. But in July 2018, during an FAA-observed checkride, he permitted a pilot to land at a controlled airport without clearance and then recorded that check flight as satisfactory. Because of this event, in January 2019 the FAA formally notified Renfro that Turrentine’s check pilot approval was withdrawn. Two subsequent observed rides to return that authority were also “recorded as failures.” In May 2019, the FAA notified Renfro that a review of Yute’s pilot training records found multiple violations. In a subsequent letter, the agency noted that three recently hired pilots did not meet the minimum regulatory qualifications to serve as pilot-in-command. Combined with his check airman authority issues, the FAA determined Turrentine “failed to exercise his duties and responsibilities with the highest level of public interest.” Absent effective arguments from Yute, he was to be removed as chief pilot in 30 days. Records obtained via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) show that Paul did not obtain chief pilot approval until the end of September and that according to the FAA, Yute “did not operate with a Chief Pilot in the summer of 2019.” In the interim, according to a company pilot who spoke with AIN on the condition of anonymity, there were several failed attempts to have other pilots approved as chief pilot. When asked how Yute was permitted to operate so long with the position unfilled, the FAA stated it “was aware of the vacancy and continued to conduct heightened oversight over the carrier’s operations during the hiring process.” On August 5, six months before the Kipnuk flight crashed, a Yute pilot made an anonymous hotline complaint alleging the “chief pilot” departed Bethel the day before with visibility under two miles due to fog. This pilot further alleged the chief pilot bragged about landing at a village with three-quarters of a mile visibility, that a senior pilot encouraged other pilots to depart in conditions below minimums for several days previously, and that on August 3, when the complainant refused to fly below the minimum of 500 feet and two miles, another pilot was dispatched instead. Upon investigation, the FAA determined that all of the allegations were unsubstantiated. Specifically, it found that while eight flights on August 3 were dispatched at either 500 feet and/or two miles visibility, with one departing only six minutes before the ceiling dropped to 400 feet, none officially occurred at conditions under two miles. The FAA also found the lowest published weather when Turrentine was flying on August 5 was 600 feet overcast and two miles visibility. “Through interview,” the agency concluded that other claims could not be substantiated. The complaint was discussed with Spangler, and he was told that “every flight released must have a reasonable expectation of being able to maintain the required VFR minimums…” It was recommended he review risk assessment procedures and make sure “these operations have adequate management oversight.” A memorandum from Yute’s POI summarizing the complaint was provided to the Anchorage FSDO frontline manager on November 5. On November 10, Yute crashed a PA-32 shortly after takeoff from the village of Goodnews Bay. The subsequent investigation revealed the pilot suffered spatial disorientation while operating in night marginal VFR. On November 14, another letter was sent to Renfro immediately revoking approval of Yute’s training program based on multiple issues, including the unsatisfactory performance of a check pilot candidate on November 8, the observed failures of multiple pilots to perform checklist procedures during a recent inspection, the failure of a pilot to maintain VFR clearance of clouds in an observed flight, and the company’s failure to provide, as requested, proper notice of training. (To date, no notice had been provided.) The FAA then removed Yute’s approval for all check pilot activities and required the company to resubmit a training program. Tony Matthews participated in the company’s next ground school, in January. Taught by Turrentine, it was not observed by the FAA. After the Crash According to Yute’s former assistant business manager, who was interviewed by the NTSB one month after the accident, pressure on company pilots extended beyond regulatory and flight safety issues. The manager left Yute in June 2020 but was present in the office on the day of the Kipnuk accident (and took notes at the time of what happened). He spoke to the NTSB of “a constant push to keep the airplanes flying because they did not make money if the airplanes were not flying.” He said Renfro talked often “about how they have to ‘fly, fly, fly.’” Pilots complained about flying aircraft that were not airworthy and returned to base for mechanical issues. Turrentine, he noted, “would fly in anything.” Soon after the Kipnuk flight was reported overdue, he told investigators a Renfro Alaskan Adventures pilot came into the office, noted the weather at the time the flight was dispatched, said it should not have gone, and then destroyed his own risk assessment form. Meanwhile, Turrentine “spent time working” on Matthews’s training records before they were reviewed by the NTSB. (Renfro was not present for this interview.) In March, the FAA cited the Kipnuk accident, among other accidents, incidents, and occurrences, in a letter proposing the removal of Tony Spangler from his position as DO. “Based on this pattern of increasingly severe aircraft mishaps and events that culminated in the February 6th fatal accident,” the FAA certificate management office aviation safety manager wrote to Renfro, “it appears Mr. Spangler did not enact the necessary controls to prevent further aircraft mishap events or effectively restrict operations in light of them, and by failing to do so he has not exercised the standard of care expected…” Renfro responded with a list of specific actions to prevent future accidents including a promise to work with the FAA to ensure the DO and the company’s flight and training programs aligned “with their recommendations to promote flight safety and awareness.” He further advised there would be more “focus on training and developing our new Chief Pilot” and that a previous company co-owner with extensive Alaskan aviation experience, Terry Cratty had been hired as vice president of safety and compliance. In light of all this, Renfro asked that Spangler be permitted to remain as DO and the company be given 120 days to “put our actions in motion.” A page from the operations specifications dated Sept. 8, 2021 was provided to AIN following a record request, and it listed Terry Cratty as DO and Tony Spangler as chief pilot. Cratty also identified as DO prior to this, in public filings with the Department of Transportation and interviews given to the press following an inflight fire on a Yute aircraft in November 2020. (That fire was due to wiring issues with the aircraft’s FAA-sponsored Capstone equipment and prompted a letter from the agency to all airlines that owned aircraft that were part of the program.) It is unclear when Spangler assumed the position of chief pilot from Paul. Throughout this investigation, one person the NTSB did not interview was the company’s POI. (In fact, no one from the FAA was seemingly interviewed.) When asked about this omission by AIN, a board representative stated that in the course of an investigation, the investigator-in-charge makes “judgment calls” about how best to utilize their “limited resources.” In this case, it was believed that the investigator on the Kipnuk flight likely decided she needed no further documentation to complete the factual record. As the investigator left the NTSB in June 2021 however, the representative could not “definitely determine” if that was the case. There is no reference to any of the FAA’s documented concerns about Yute’s operational control, corporate safety culture, and pilot training in the accident record. It is unclear if the NTSB’s investigators were aware that they even existed. Former Pilots Came Forward Three weeks after the accident, a former pilot sought federal whistleblower protection to provide information on Yute. The pilot, who maintained anonymity in his interactions with the FAA, submitted a report to inspectors detailing how he witnessed the falsification of training records, attended ground school under Turrentine where participants were told to teach the class on their own, and experienced flight training in altitudes at less than 50 feet. He stated that pilots were instructed to change aircraft altimeter settings so passengers were unaware when they were flying below 500 feet and were instructed to fly in the clouds when they were alone, and purposely build up ice on the wings, so they could learn how the aircraft handled it. In communications with AIN, this pilot noted that Paul especially pushed pilots to fly in bad weather, recalling, “they tell the new pilots, we don’t know the [effing] weather and you fly when we tell you.” When the FAA counsel refused to extend whistleblower protections to the pilot, a safety inspector attempted to corroborate his account from other Yute pilots but stated he was unsuccessful; the investigation was closed. But one week earlier another former pilot, who left Yute in 2019, gave an on-record interview to the NTSB making similar allegations. He told investigators pilots were provided the answers to test questions during ground training and described a harrowing checkride with Turrentine during which they departed with only two hours of fuel into a ceiling that never rose above 600 feet throughout the four-leg trip. One destination airport, he said, was at 200 feet and visibility was less than a mile. When he asked if they should wait on the ground for the weather to improve, Turrentine took off into IMC, handed over the controls, and told him to continue to the next destination. At that village, Toksook Bay, they broke out at 150 feet. By the time they returned to Bethel, they had less than 10 gallons of fuel. This pilot complained that there was little guidance or limitations for new pilots and they were encouraged to hold under poor weather until a special VFR clearance could be obtained out of Bethel, regardless of weather conditions elsewhere. “They want you to go no matter what,” he told investigators, and flying at low altitudes in low weather was common; some pilots would go as low as 50 feet. He estimated the company “lost seven airframes” in accidents during the year he was employed there. To his knowledge, most of them were not reported. (Renfro was not present for this interview.) In the hours surrounding the Kipnuk accident, weather at Bethel shifted from marginal VFR to IFR conditions. There were overcast and low ceilings in the morning and visibility was restricted “in mist, with snow and unknown freezing precipitation” right before the flight’s departure. In Kipnuk, the conditions were VFR to marginal VFR in the early morning, with IFR developing at the time Tony Matthews departed. IFR prevailed in the hours after the crash, with “low ceilings and visibility restricted in snow and mist” into the evening. When Renfro sat for his own interview with the NTSB three days after the accident, he said he believed Matthews was flying at 1,000 feet when he left Bethel. He said he spoke with a controller at the Bethel tower after the aircraft was reported overdue who told him the weather was 1,000 feet and ten miles visibility when the aircraft departed. This information was counter to all published weather reports but fit his narrative about the company’s minimums and safety. “…we don’t launch people at 500 and 2 from this business,” he told investigators. “We don’t want you out there flying at 500 and 2.” The responsibility for making sure those flight minimums were maintained was, according to Renfro, found only in the cockpit. When they left Bethel, Tony Matthews and his passengers had been delayed for an hour and a half. There was no one present in the building with operational control authority, and the two employees in dispatch had limited aviation knowledge and experience. Matthews was required to complete a risk assessment form prior to departure but it could not be found and neither the flight follower nor the coordinator admitted to signing it with him. He needed a special VFR clearance to take off, even though company management asserted after he died that this was not common practice. The area forecast around the accident site included an airmet for IFR conditions in light snow and mist. Matthews was a VFR-only pilot in a VFR-only aircraft with 645 hours who completed his initial operating experience requirements for Yute only one week earlier. In discussing the crash that killed him, Renfro told investigators, “The pilot ultimately checks his own weather and makes sure it’s good. It doesn’t matter what he’s handed. He is still to check the weather for himself and make sure the flight is good because he is the final authority as to whether the flight goes.” AIN was unable to obtain confirmation from the FAA or Yute as to whether Renfro, Byron Paul, or Ernie Turrentine are currently approved to hold operational control with the company. On Nov. 20, 2022, Yute crashed again following a Cessna 207 engine failure minutes after taking off from Bethel. The pilot and passengers were uninjured, but the aircraft suffered substantial damage. The investigation into that accident is ongoing. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2023-02-01/lax-procedures-oversight-surface-yute-crash-investigation Eastern Airlines is Now Hiring Flight Attendants In Philadelphia Fancy becoming a flight attendant with this unique airline? Find out more here. As it prepares to welcome additional Boeing aircraft to its fleet, Eastern Airlines is ramping up its recruitment drive. The carrier has revealed it will be holding a series of open events for prospective flight attendants at its headquarters in Philadelphia on February 7th and February 9th. Eastern Airlines states that the benefits of working for the airline as a flight attendant include an above-average hourly rate of $34.97, paid training, and no limitation on flying hours. For comparison, American Airlines offers freshly graduated flight attendants a starting pay of just over $30 per hour, although this can rise substantially with service. Eastern Airlines took to Twitter to advertise the vacancy earlier today The job requirements No previous flying experience is needed for the role. The only requirements are to be over 21 years of age, be authorized to work in the US, and be based within two hours of Philadelphia International Airport (PHL). Those attending the open events in Philadelphia must wear formal business attire and take a copy of their resume. A varied fleet of vintage Boeing widebodies If successful in the recruitment process, which aircraft can flight attendants expect to operate on? According to data from ch-aviation.com, Eastern Airlines’ fleet is made up entirely of Boeing widebody aircraft, with an average age of 27.3 years. As such, flight attendants will have the opportunity to fly on a variety of older, classic aircraft, such as the Boeing 767-200ER. Earlier this month, the carrier received its first Boeing 777-200ER, which carries 380 passengers in an all-economy configuration. As part of its ongoing fleet expansion plans, Eastern Airlines is awaiting delivery of an additional seven Boeing 777-200ERs, two Boeing 777-300s, and one Boeing 777-300ER. With so many aircraft joining the fleet, it is no surprise the airline is on the hunt for flight attendants. Increased focus on charter operations While Eastern Airlines previously operated flights across the Americas, reaching destinations such as Guayaquil (GYE), Montevideo (MVD), and Managua (MGA), since the peak of the pandemic the airline has significantly scaled back its scheduled operation, choosing to concentrate instead on charter flights. A charter-focused operation of this type means that no two days will be the same for flight attendants at Eastern Airlines. Today, the carrier’s only scheduled route is between Miami International Airport (MIA) and Las Américas International Airport (SDQ) in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, which began just last month and is flown by the Boeing 767-200ER aircraft. https://simpleflying.com/eastern-airlines-hiring-flight-attendants-philadelphia/ Norwegian airline Flyr files for bankruptcy OSLO, Jan 31 (Reuters) - Loss-making Norwegian airline Flyr (FLYR.OL) said on Tuesday it would file for bankruptcy after failing to raise the cash it needed for its operations. "There is no longer a realistic opportunity to achieve a solution for the short-term liquidity situation," the company said in a statement, adding the board's decision was unanimous. "All departures and ticket sales have as a consequence been cancelled." More than 400 employees will lose their jobs as a result of the bankruptcy, Flyr founder and board Chair Erik Braathen told Norwegian daily Dagbladet. Flyr, which launched operations in mid-2021 to serve domestic destinations in Norway as well as in Europe, said on Monday weak financial markets and uncertainty over demand for air travel had prevented it from raising more cash. In November, Flyr said securing more funds was vital to survive the winter season and prepare for the spring and summer of 2023, but it was only able to raise about half the required cash at the time. The carrier has operated a leased fleet of 12 Boeing 737 aircraft, including six 737 MAX planes on contract from Air Lease Corp (AL.N). The company said on Monday it had tried and failed in recent days to secure 330 million Norwegian crowns ($33 million) of funding, triggering a 78% drop in its share price. Further trade in the stock will be suspended, Flyr said on Tuesday. The company, whose rivals include Norwegian Air (NAS.OL) and Scandinavian carrier SAS (SAS.ST), said on Oct. 4 it would make heavy spending cuts to preserve cash during the winter, including furloughs, and put non-profitable routes on hold. Flyr is the latest Nordic carrier to hit financial difficulties in recent years as the pandemic, soaring energy costs and falling consumer confidence dented demand. SAS is itself undergoing a reorganisation under U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection proceedings, while Norwegian Air in 2021 underwent restructuring supervised by an Irish court, emerging as a slimmed-down regional airline. ($1 = 9.9939 Norwegian crowns) https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/norwegian-airline-flyr-files-bankruptcy-2023-01-31/ Airlines must 'use or lose' UK airport slots in return to pre-COVID rules LONDON, Jan 31 (Reuters) - Airlines operating at British airports will have to use 80% of their take-off and landing slots in order to keep them, the government said on Tuesday, as it brings the industry back in line with pre-pandemic rules. The so-called "use it or lose it" 80:20 rule, which was waived when COVID-19 led to a drop in passenger numbers, will return from March 26 as demand for international travel soars, Britain's Department for Transport said in a statement. "Slots rules will return to normal this summer," British Transport Secretary Mark Harper is due to say in a speech at the Airport Operators' Association's annual conference, according to advance extracts released by the department. "Now we're able to start a new, more optimistic, conversation about the future." Airport slots are limited and highly valuable, providing airlines permission to use airport infrastructure like runways and terminals at a specific date and time. A safety net for airlines introduced during the pandemic will remain in place, allowing carriers such as British Airways, Easyjet (EZJ.L) and Ryanair (RYA.I), to hand back 5% of their slots before the start of the season to help avoid last-minute cancellations. There will also be flexibility over when airlines are justified not to use their slots, such as where either end of a route is affected by coronavirus restrictions, the government added. Industry body Airlines UK said it welcomed this flexibility so that airlines aren't punished by travel restrictions. "Airlines recognise that as passenger demand returns and we approach another busy summer then the slot rules must follow suit. Global recovery is still bumpy though and we’re not yet fully back to normal," a spokesperson said. The government said its decision followed a consultation with the industry on how best to support its recovery from the pandemic. By October 2022, passenger numbers at UK airports had reached 85% of the equivalent 2019 levels, it added. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/airlines-must-use-or-lose-uk-airport-slots-return-pre-covid-rules-2023-01-31/ What Were TWA's Most Important Aircraft Types? The carrier flew more than 1,000 aircraft during its 71-year history. Today marks 31 years since Trans World Airlines filed for bankruptcy for the first time, on January 31st, 1992. On the anniversary of this key turning point in the legendary carrier's history, we thought we'd take a look back at which aircraft types were most important to TWA. With data from ATDB.aero showing that, overall, it flew some 1,195 aircraft between 1930 and 2001, there are lots to choose from! Getting started While TWA went on to operate a huge variety of some of the 20th century's most iconic commercial aircraft, it all had to start somewhere. As such, the aircraft that made up its early fleet can certainly be considered to have been among the most important to have served the carrier. Planes from Douglas were especially formative. Indeed, in the 1930s, when TWA still stood for Transcontinental & Western Air, the airline operated the manufacturer's DC-1, DC-2, and DC-3 models. The onset of the Second World War meant that, in the following decade, ex-military Douglas aircraft such as the C-47 Skytrain/Dakota also came onboard at TWA. Following the conclusion of the conflict, TWA stayed loyal to Douglas by also flying the DC-4 and its ex-military counterpart, the C-54 Skymaster. Other propeller-powered designs that played a key role in growing the airline in the 1940s and 1950s included the Boeing 307 Stratoliner, the Martin 2-0-2 and 4-0-4, and the Lockheed Constellation series. However, jet aircraft would soon take over. The jet age The postwar era was a time of transition at TWA, exemplified by the fact that, in May 1950, it changed its name to Trans World Airlines. Its fleet was also in a state of transition, thanks to the advent of jet engine technology. Among the first jet-powered designs to enter the TWA fleet were the Boeing 707 and the Convair 880. Other Boeing designs came onboard in the 1960s, such as the 720 and the 727. By 1967, the retirement of TWA's last Lockheed Constellation had seen it become an all-jet operator, and another key milestone was reached in 1970. This was namely the introduction of the famous Boeing 747 'jumbo jet' in 1970. Other widebodies followed in the 747's footsteps at TWA, such as the 767 and Lockheed's L-1011 TriStar. On the narrowbody front, the airline flew McDonnell Douglas DC-9s from 1966 to 1980, and again from 1986 (when it merged with Ozark Airlines) until 2001. TWA never flew any Airbus jets, although it did have an order for 50 A318s when it merged with American Airlines. However, AA canceled this order. The most numerous designs Having established the sorts of aircraft that played the most important role at TWA in terms of its history and growth, let's conclude by seeing which were the most important in terms of raw numbers. According to data from ATDB.aero, the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 series is a frontrunner in this regard, with 112 examples. Meanwhile, 124 aircraft from the Boeing 707 family are listed, including those from the short-fuselage Boeing 720 sub-series. The count for the Boeing 727 also hits three figures, with 112 listed across three variants. In terms of widebodies, the Lockheed TriStar leads the way with 57 examples, although the Boeing 747 wasn't far behind, with 40. All of this, and more, underlines TWA's rich history. https://simpleflying.com/twa-most-important-aircraft-types/ Emirates Successfully Tests Flying Boeing 777 Plane on Sustainable Jet Fuel The airline Emirates has successfully tested flying a Boeing 777-300ER airplane with one of its two engines using sustainable fuel. The flight flew from Dubai International Airport along the United Arab Emirates coastline for about an hour. According to the airline, the demonstration flight, commanded by Captain Fali Vajifdar and Captain Khalid Nasser Akram, is part of the aviation industry’s larger goal to reduce carbon emissions. The demonstration could also help future certification to approve 100% drop-in sustainable aviation fuel, which is currently available for all aircrafts to use but only in 50% blends with conventional jet fuel. Emirates and partners GE Aerospace, Boeing, Honeywell, Neste and Virent created the fuel blend. The sustainable aviation fuel blend included hydro processed esters and fatty acids and synthetic paraffinic kerosene (HEFA-SPK) from Finnish firm Neste and hydro deoxygenated synthetic aromatic kerosene (HDO-SAK) from Wisconsin-based Virent. The plane’s second engine was fueled with conventional aviation fuel as a safety precaution, The Associated Press reported. “Virent’s technology converts widely available, plant-based sugars into the compounds that make 100% sustainable aviation fuel possible, without the need to blend with traditional jet fuel,” Dave Kettner, president and general counsel of Virent, Inc., said in a statement. Neste’s fuel is derived from vegetable oils and animal fats. Together, with Virent’s fuel blend, the fuels reduce the carbon emissions released from engines during flight. The flight is the first of its kind in the Middle East and North Africa, where it was the first flight to be powered by 100% sustainable aviation fuel in an engine. Emirates’ first flight using a sustainable aviation fuel blend was in 2017 from Chicago, also on a Boeing 777 aircraft, as reported by Business Traveller. While aircraft and engine manufacturers have been redesigning models to be more fuel-efficient, there is still a push for more sustainable fuel. But sustainable aviation fuel is more expensive than conventional fuel. “We hope that landmark demonstrations flights like this one, will help open the door to scale up the SAF supply chain and make it more available and accessible across geographies, and most importantly, affordable for broader industry adoption in the future,” said Adel Al Redha, chief operating officer of Emirates Airline. Scaling up sustainable aviation fuel and making it more affordable could further help the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and industry commitment of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050. “Sustainable aviation fuel plays a crucial role in reducing the emissions of air travel but to fully leverage its decarbonization potential we need to enable 100% SAF use,” said Jonathan Wood, vice president of EMEA, Renewable Aviation at Neste. “Test flights like this Emirates flight with Neste MY Sustainable Aviation Fuel are an important step towards 100% SAF certification.” https://www.ecowatch.com/sustainable-airplane-fuel-emirates.html RESEARCH SURVEY Greetings, My name is Nurettin Dinler, Research Scholar and PhD student at Department of Aviation Science, Saint Louis University working with Nithil Bollock Kumar, PhD Candidate, Gajapriya Tamilselvan, PhD, and Stephen Belt, PhD. We are working on a research project titled “Low-Cost Airline Pilots on Exercising Fuel-Loading Policies during Flight: A Phenomenological Exploration Study.” I am writing this e-mail to invite you to participate in a research study that we are conducting at Saint Louis University. Your participation in this study will involve taking a semi-structured interview that lasts for about 30 minutes. During the interview, you will be questioned about your experiences with Low-Cost Airlines’ fuel-loading policies developed to minimize pilot discretionary (extra) fuel. There is no compensation provided for your participation in the study. However, your participation will be a valuable addition to our research and your findings could lead to greater understanding of risk management for pilots and the sources of stressors in commercial aviation. Participation is completely voluntary, and your participation will remain confidential throughout the process of research. If you are interested in participating in this research, please take a moment to complete the survey at the following link: https://slu.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0l9Awl5UkXDiKRo If you have any questions, please contact me at 321-245-8628 or nurettin.dinler@slu.edu Thank you for your time and consideration. Regards, Nurettin Dinler, M.S. Research Scholar Oliver L. Parks Department of Aviation Science School of Science and Engineering McDonnell Douglas Hall, Lab 1046 3450 Lindell Blvd., St Louis, MO 63103 nurettin.dinler@slu.edu (321) 245-8628 Curt Lewis