Flight Safety Information - April 11, 2023 No. 069 In This Issue : Report recommends allowing “learning period” for commercial human spaceflight safety regulations to expire : What Happened In The Plane Crash In 1975? Eastern Airlines Flight 66 Read Next Article for Updated Analysis : Accident Overview, History of Flight: Eastern Airlines Flight 66 :_13 Infamous Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation Forever : The 5 airplane near crashes under investigation : Timeline: Nepal air crashes since 2010 : NTSB Unveils Graphic Data Tool for Genav Accidents : USC - Gas Turbine Engine Accident Investigation : ISASI ANZSASI2023 Surfers Paradise - Early Bird Reminder : Call for Nominations For 2023 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award : Call for Papers is now open for 2023 CHC Safety & Quality Summit. Report recommends allowing “learning period” for commercial human spaceflight safety regulations to expire Jeff Foust April 10, 2023 Virgin Galactic's second SpaceShipTwo, VSS Unity, during a powered test flight. Credit: MarsScientific.com & Trumbull Studios WASHINGTON — A new report recommends that current restrictions on the Federal Aviation Administration’s ability to regulate safety for people flying on commercial spacecraft be allowed to expire later this year. The report by the RAND Corporation, prepared for Congress and released April 3, concluded that despite limited progress on establishing voluntary industry safety standards, the FAA and industry were now ready to start the process of developing formal safety standards for those participating in commercial spaceflight. A provision in the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 established a moratorium, often called a “learning period” in industry, on the FAA’s ability to enact safety regulations for spaceflight participants. That limits the ability of the FAA to enact safety regulations except in cases of accidents that caused deaths or serious injuries, or events that posed a high risk of deaths or serious injuries. That learning period was originally intended to expire in 2012 but was extended in subsequent legislation because of a lack of commercial human spaceflight activity that could serve as an experience base upon which to build regulations. The most recent extension, in 2015, moved the expiration of the learning period to Oct. 1. It also called on the FAA to hire an independent organization to produce a report on the progress the industry was making on voluntary standards as well as “key industry metrics” to assess the readiness of the industry for regulations. The RAND report, developed to meet that requirement in the 2015 law, recommended no further extensions of the learning period. “This is to say that we recommend that the moratorium set to expire on October 1, 2023, should expire on that date, but it will be important to ensure that the FAA is appropriately resourced to engage in these activities,” the report stated. That recommendation came despite a lack of progress on voluntary standards and key industry metrics. While standards development organizations like ASTM International and ISO have published 20 standards related to commercial spaceflight, the RAND report noted that “companies have yet to clearly or consistently adopt them in a manner that can be confirmed or verified publicly.” A diversity of technical approaches also hinders the development and implementation of standards. The report also found that while the FAA had developed key industry indicators to assess readiness for adopting safety regulations, there were no goals for those indicators to determine when it was time to implement regulations. “It is, therefore, difficult to assess whether there has been progress toward meeting key industry metrics when there are not clear targets that could be met,” the report concluded. Despite that lack of progress on standards or metrics, the RAND report nonetheless concluded that allowing the learning period to expire this year was the best approach. Doing so, it argued, would allow FAA and industry to start the process of developing safety regulations in a gradual manner and avoid a rush to regulate imposed by Congress should a high-profile accident take place while the learning period is still in effect. It also recommended additional resources for the FAA to support that regulatory process, but did not quantify an increase in the budget for or personnel assigned to its Office of Commercial Space Transportation, or AST. The report noted that it’s unlikely that AST would immediately publish regulations once the learning period expires, something that agency officials have emphasized. “We are now in what we call a regulatory preparation period where we’re trying to prepare ourselves for the eventuality of having further oversight of the industry,” Kelvin Coleman, associate administrator for commercial space transportation, said in a speech at the recent Next-Generation Suborbital Researchers Conference in Colorado. He said after the speech that those efforts were along several lines, including preparing to establish a formal aerospace rulemaking committee as well as encouraging further development of industry standards. “We don’t have, ready to go in a file cabinet somewhere, a volume of recommendations we’re ready to roll out,” he said. The preparations, he said, are intended to shorten a rulemaking process that can take, on average, about five years. Industry is more cautious about regulations. “I don’t feel like anyone is really ready to understand what regulations are going to look like,” said Karina Drees, president of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, at the same conference. She said she expected to work with both AST and Congress “on what we would want to provide as a solution.” A potential extension or modification of the learning period could be considered as part of an overall reauthorization for the FAA this year. Some in the field expect some kind of learning period extension. “It’s my expectation, based on looking at the world, that this moratorium will be extended,” said Chris Gerace, manager of NASA’s Suborbital Crew (SubC) program that is considering flying civil servants on commercial suborbital vehicles, during a panel later at the conference. He noted NASA held no position on the learning period and that any extension was up to Congress. Tim Bulk, chief technical officer of Special Aerospace Services, a company supporting NASA on the SubC program, held a similar view based on the limited resources at the FAA. “They’re definitely going to be resource constrained,” he said, impairing its ability to develop regulations. “The moratorium is going to be extended, I believe.” Report recommends allowing “learning period” for commercial human spaceflight safety regulations to expire What Happened In The Plane Crash In 1975? Eastern Airlines Flight 66 April 10, 2023 What happened in the plane crash in 1975? Eastern Airlines Flight 66 Flight 66 JFK Airport airplane crash…. – RareNewspapers.com Eastern Airlines Flight 66 was a scheduled flight from Boston to Miami on June 24, 1975, operated by a Boeing 727-225 aircraft. The flight was carrying 124 passengers and 7 crew members. As the plane was descending towards its destination, it encountered severe weather conditions, including thunderstorms and heavy rain. The captain, Robert Loft, attempted to navigate around the storms, but the plane was struck by lightning and lost all power in two of its three engines. Why did Eastern Airlines Flight 401 Crash? The crew managed to restart one of the engines, but the plane’s autopilot system failed and the aircraft began to lose altitude rapidly. The captain attempted to land the plane at Logan International Airport in Boston, but due to the loss of power and control, the plane crashed into a wooded area in Swampscott, Massachusetts, approximately 10 miles northeast of the airport. Of the 131 people on board, 101 were killed in the crash and 30 survived. The investigation into the crash revealed that the lightning strike caused damage to the aircraft’s electrical system. As a result, ultimately led to the loss of power and control. The crash prompted changes in aviation regulations regarding the design. In addition, testing of aircraft electrical systems. Furthermore, improvements in weather forecasting and communication between air traffic controllers and pilots. Lastly, the crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 66 remains one of the deadliest aviation accidents in the history of the United States. Photo of wreckage of Flight 66 on Rockaway Boulevard, just north of runway 22L. For further reading: ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 727-225 N8845E New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK) (aviation-safety.net) What Happened In The Plane Crash In 1975? Eastern Airlines Flight 66 Accident Overview [Eastern Airlines Flight 66] Note: Please see many important photographs and graphics in the original article. History of Flight Eastern Airlines Flight 66 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight between New Orleans, Louisiana and New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. The flight, a Boeing 727 with 116 passengers and a crew of 8 aboard departed New Orleans at 1319 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) with a planned arrival around 1600. The National Weather Service (NWS) forecast for JFK called for thunderstorms and rain showers after 1800. The forecast was amended at 1430 to include thunderstorms and moderate rain showers after 1515. At 1545, the forecast was further amended to call for thunderstorms, heavy rain showers with visibilities as low as ½ mile, and winds from 270 degrees at 30 knots with gusts to 50 knots after 1615. However, there is no evidence that the flight crew of Eastern 66 received any of these forecasts. The Eastern Air Lines weather forecast, which was issued at 1208, and was valid from 1215 to 2000, predicted widely scattered thunderstorms with tops from 30,000 to 40,000 feet in New York and eastern New Jersey. The terminal forecast for New York City predicted scattered clouds until 2000; thereafter, thunderstorms were possible with light rain showers. The flight crew of Eastern 66 received this forecast before departing New Orleans. LaGuardia airport, near to JFK was filed as the flight's alternate destination. A significant feature of the weather at JFK on the day of the accident was the presence of a stationary sea-breeze front which held for over an hour near the approach end of runway 22L. This front did not effect the growth of the thunderstorms that were in the area, which were already violent, but was significant in that the airport wind sensor used by air traffic control was located near the opposite end of the runway (almost 15,000 feet away from the thunderstorm) and was influenced by the onshore sea-breeze. It therefore gave information that called for landings to the southwest on runway 22L. However, just to the north, at the approach end of runway 22L, high winds were beginning to occur as a result of the rapidly deteriorating weather. Due to the localized nature of the downbursts that were occurring, the airport wind sensor did not detect the high winds associated with the weather that caused the accident. The flight was uneventful until arriving in the New York City terminal area. Beginning at 1535 EDT, Kennedy approach control (Southgate arrival controller) provided radar vectors to sequence the flight with other traffic, and to position the aircraft for an ILS approach to runway 22L. The flight had received the Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) which stated: "Kennedy weather, VFR, sky partially obscured, estimated ceiling 4,000 broken. 5 miles with haze… …wind 210 degrees at 10, altimeter 30.15. Expect vectors to an ILS runway 22L, landing runway 22L, departures are off 22R..." Traffic concentration into JFK was high, with aircraft landing on runway 22L every 1-2 minutes. As Eastern 66 approached the Long Island area from the south, a violent thunderstorm was starting to affect landing traffic at JFK. For 4 minutes, between 1544 and 1548, a strong downdraft, which is now understood to be the first downburst cell at the approach end of the arrival runway, caused three aircraft to experience slight difficulties in landing related to wind shear, heavy rain and deviations below the glideslope. Departures were unaffected and no mention of the severe weather was broadcast to arriving traffic. Subsequent landings were accomplished with no difficulty. At 1552, the Southgate arrival controller broadcast that the field was VFR with a 5-mile visibility, light, very light rain shower and haze. Within a minute this broadcast was updated with the information that the field had just gone IFR with 2 miles visibility, very light rain showers and haze. Control transmitted; "…the runway visual range is---not available, and Eastern 66 descend and maintain four thousand, Kennedy radar one three two four." Eastern 66 acknowledged the transmission. Eastern 66 was one of a number of aircraft that were being vectored to intercept the ILS localizer course for runway 22L. At 1553, the flight contacted the Kennedy final vector controller who continued to provide radar vectors around thunderstorms in the area, sequencing the flight with other traffic, and positioning the flight on the localizer course. Between 1552 and 1600 a second, more severe, downburst affected arriving traffic. A 747, which landed at 1552, experienced some wind shear, but, according to the accident report, did not warrant reporting. This aircraft was followed by a 707, which landed at 1554, and experienced a drift to the left at 200 feet which required ~8 degrees of heading change to correct. After this, two aircraft experienced major difficulties. Flying Tiger Flight 161, a DC-8, flew into heavy rain at 1000 feet and then experienced a strong downdraft, severe changes of wind direction, turbulence, airspeed fluctuations of 15 to 30 knots, and a strong crosswind which pushed the airplane to the left. The captain had to apply 25 to 30 degrees of heading change to correct this deviation. At 300 feet, this pilot applied almost maximum thrust to arrest the descent and to maintain approach speed. The aircraft touched down at approximately 1556. Flight 161 reported problems to the local controller after clearing the runway landing at 1557:30; "I just highly recommend that you change the runways and land northwest, you have such a tremendous wind shear down near the ground on final." To which the local controller responded; "Okay, we're indicating wind right down the runway at 15 knots when you landed." The captain of Flight 161 retorted; "I don't care what you're indicating; I'm just telling you that there's such a wind shear on the final on that runway you should change it to the northwest." In post-accident interviews, the Flying Tiger captain stated he believed that the conditions were so severe that he would not have been able to abandon the approach after he had applied maximum thrust and therefore he landed. Post-accident analysis of the DC-8's drift to the left indicated that, in addition to the downdraft, the aircraft experienced a 60-70 knot crosswind close to the ground. Eastern 902, an L-1011, abandoned its approach at 1558 after experiencing major difficulties. This flight flew into heavy rain at 400 feet, experienced a rapid drop in airspeed from 150 knots indicated to 120 knots, and the rate of descent increased significantly. Unlike the preceding Flying Tiger flight, this aircraft moved to the right of the localizer course and the captain elected to abandon the approach. He was unable to arrest the aircraft's descent until he had established a high nose up attitude and had applied near maximum thrust. He thought the aircraft had descended to about 100 feet before it began to climb. Post-accident analysis showed that Eastern 902, despite applying power at 250 feet, did not start recovering altitude until it was just 60 feet above the ground. At 1557:55, the local controller transmitted missed approach directions to Eastern 902 and asked "…was wind a problem?" Eastern 902 answered, "Affirmative." Finnair 105, a DC-8 then landed normally without difficulties at 1559. Around 1557, while Eastern 902 was on approach, the Eastern 66 flight crew discussed problems associated with carrying minimum fuel loads when confronted with delays in terminal areas. One of the crewmembers stated that he was going to check weather at the alternate airport, which was essentially "next door" at LaGuardia airport, and affected by the same weather patterns. Less than a minute later one of the crewmembers remarked, "…one more hour and we'd come down whether we wanted to or not." At 1559, the final vector controller transmitted a message to all aircraft on his frequency that "a severe wind shift" had been reported on the final approach to runway 22L, and that he would report more information shortly. At 1559:40, Eastern 902 re-established radio communications with the JFK final vector controller and reported; "…we had… a pretty good shear pulling us to the right and… down and visibility was nil, nil out over the marker.. .correction.. at 200 feet it was.. .nothing.". The final vector controller responded; "Okay, the shear you say pulled you right and down?". Eastern 902 replied; "Yeah, we were on course and down to about 250 feet. The airspeed dropped to about 10 knots below the bug and our rate of descent was up to 1,500 feet a minute, so we put takeoff power on and we went around at a hundred feet." When queried by control if Eastern 66 had heard Eastern 902's report. Eastern 66 replied, "…affirmative,"… At this point the controller established Flight 66's position as being 5 miles from the outer marker and cleared the flight for an ILS approach to runway 22L. Eastern acknowledged the clearance just prior to 1601 with the statement; "Okay, we'll let you know about the conditions?" The first officer, who was flying the aircraft, called for completion of the final checklist and while completing this checklist the captain stated that the radar was, "Up and off… .standby." At 1602:20 the captain said, "…I have the radar on standby in case I need it, I can get it off later." indicating that the flight crew anticipated a go-around as a possibility. At 1602:42, the final vector controller asked Eastern 902; "..would you classify that as a severe wind shift, correction, shear?" The flight responded; "Affirmative." At 1602:50, the first officer of Eastern 66 said; "Gonna keep a pretty healthy margin on this one." An unidentified crewmember said; "I… would suggest that you do." The first officer responded; "In case he's right." Eastern reported over the outer marker and the flight was cleared to contact Kennedy tower. The Kennedy tower controller cleared Eastern 66 to land. The captain acknowledged the clearance and asked; "Got any reports on braking action…?" The local controller did not respond until the query was repeated. At 1604:14, the local controller replied; "No, none, approach end of runway is wet.. .but I'd say about the first half is wet – we've had no adverse reports." His query and the comment to "…keep a pretty healthy margin…" by the Eastern flight crew appears to be in line with the, then current, Eastern Airlines Administrative Bulletins on low-level wind shear associated with both thunderstorms and frontal-zone weather. The bulletins implied that higher approach speeds should be used when shear is anticipated, but cautioned that when runways are wet excessive landing speeds should be avoided because of hydroplaning. Accident Sequence Eastern 66 continued the approach into what is now known to be a classic downburst/microburst encounter. The flight initially experienced this downburst as light rain while centered on the glideslope with airspeed oscillating between 140 and 145 knots. At approximately 500 feet, Flight 66 experienced heavy rain and an increasing headwind "shear" with gusts of 10-20 knots, which resulted in a deviation above glideslope. The resultant pilot reaction was to retard throttles to re-stabilize the approach speed and a relaxation of pitch to re-acquire glideslope. Around this time, the aircraft transited the initial outflow front and then experienced the center of the microburst which yielded a severe downdraft with vertical winds of 1000-1500 feet per minute and a cessation of the previous headwind, leaving the aircraft in a low energy state and with a large downward inertia. Flight 66 descended rapidly below the glideslope with a descent rate of approximately 1500 fpm, and the airspeed decreased from 138 knots to 123 knots in 2.5 seconds. When the aircraft was at 150 feet, the captain called "runway in sight." The first officer, who was flying the aircraft, acknowledged the runway about a second later. Three seconds later, the first officer called for takeoff thrust, but the aircraft impacted the "non-frangible" approach lights approximately 2300 feet short of the runway threshold, caught fire and disintegrated. The wreckage ultimately came to rest on Rockaway Boulevard located north of runway 22L. In the course of the investigation, airline crews were interviewed on their decision-making process with regard to ascertaining whether an approach was hazardous. Crews reported that when they conducted instrument approaches to airports affected by weather hazards, they relied substantially on the experience of preceding flights as to whether to make the approach themselves or to choose a different course of action. Eastern 66 would not have heard the conversation between the tower controller and the Flying Tiger flight crew about their experience on landing. Approach control had only reported the Flying Tiger experience as a "severe wind shift" on final. Eastern 66 did hear the detailed report of Eastern 902's missed approach but then would have been aware that two more aircraft had landed with no reported problems. Eyewitness Accounts The aircraft transited a severe downpour with high winds, lightning, and thunder (classic wet microburst). Witnesses located at the outer marker reported heavy rain and very high winds. Witnesses at the airport, who were just over ½ mile south of Rockaway Boulevard stated that no rain was falling at their location when they saw the crash. They further stated that the visibility to the northeast was good, but that visibility to the north was reduced. Witnesses who were located approximately 1½ miles north of Rockaway Boulevard described the weather conditions when Eastern 66 passed overhead as; Heavy rain, lightning and thunder, and the wind blowing hard from directions ranging from north through east. An animation of the accident sequence, and the associated weather phenomena is available at the following link: (Eastern Flight 66 Accident Animation.) Weather in the Vicinity of JFK Airport The weather at JFK on the day of the Flight 66 accident was influenced by a slow moving cold front that ran from the southwest to the northeast. This front was moving into the area and was spurring the development of scattered thunderstorms in Northern Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the New York City area. In addition, for over an hour prior to the accident, a stationary "sea-breeze front" had formed near the approach end of the active runway, 22L. While this front did not influence the growth of the thunderstorms, which were already violent by the time they arrived north of JFK, it did affect the wind direction that was being reported to the tower controller. The airport wind sensor was located near the opposite end of the runway, and therefore was measuring the gentle sea breeze, which continued to show gentle winds straight down the runway, effectively masking the severity of the weather through which approaches were being flown. Based on this information, air traffic controllers continued to direct approaches from the north, through stormy weather. Evident in the post accident analysis of the weather patterns on the day of the accident was the dramatic changes in the weather that occurred in the hour before the accident. The JFK thunderstorm, which ultimately created the family of downbursts that crossed the approach end of runway 22L, moved rapidly toward the western tip of Long Island. The cold sea-breeze front would hold back the southern outflow of the forerunner storms. In addition, the squall-line activity in eastern Pennsylvania and northern New Jersey was intensifying rapidly, resulting in a surge of northwesterly winds that fed warm air into the area north of JFK airport, creating tremendous instability just north of the approach end of the runway. This sequence of events, along with the convergence of the JFK thunderstorm with the forerunner storms, focused the energy of the storms leading to the development of the JFK downbursts. At the time of the accident, there was no SIGMET in effect for the New York City terminal area. Investigators determined that Eastern 66 had only been supplied with their company weather forecast, predicting widely scattered thunderstorms in New York and eastern New Jersey, and the terminal forecast predicting scattered clouds until 2000, with thunderstorms possible with light rain showers thereafter. The National Weather Service Forecast Office located in midtown Manhattan did issue a strong wind warning at 1526 which was valid from 1600 to 2000, calling for gusty surface winds to 50 knots from the west in thunderstorms in the New York City terminal area. This warning was distributed to the JFK airport but there was no evidence Eastern 66 received this warning. Investigators determined that the primary weather indicators to Eastern 66 were the preceding aircraft on the approach path. The controller was only able to report a "severe wind shift" which had been reported on final approach by a previous aircraft (the Flying Tigers DC-8), and then Eastern 66 overheard the report of Eastern 902 after flight 902 had accomplished a go-around. Investigators concluded that there was a deficiency in the ability to discern hazardous weather conditions, and the Eastern 66 accident investigation correctly acknowledged the need for reliable windshear detection equipment at commercial airports, along with the dissemination of severe weather information to the air traffic control system. The investigators identified a contributing factor as the fact that prior to Flight 66, Eastern Airlines flight crews had received advisory information on how to "cope" with windshear hazards on final approach. The technique taught was to increase the approach speed in order to provide an additional airspeed margin above the aircraft's stall speed, thereby allowing a performance capability for safe transit of the expected windshear by sacrificing airspeed for altitude if severe downdrafts or tailwinds were experienced. The main caution to the crews who were taught this technique was to check for braking conditions to ensure that this added speed did not significantly degrade the landing performance. Having obtained a report that there were no braking difficulties, the Eastern 66 flight crew decided to continue the approach, planning to execute a go-around if necessary. Although the accident report discerned that Eastern 66 had, in fact, added 10-15 knots airspeed to the normal approach speed, the NTSB, as a result of piloted simulations accomplished using assumptions about the wind conditions on the day of the accident, was uncertain as to whether the accident could have been avoided by quicker recognition and correction of the high descent rate caused by the "adverse winds" from the thunderstorm. Transition from instruments to visual indications would likely have been difficult due to the heavy rain that the flight was penetrating on short final. It was unclear whether the downdraft that Eastern 66 encountered was too severe for a successful approach and landing even if they had relied upon, and responded rapidly to, the indications of the flight instruments. Cold front schematic This accident, became the catalyst for extensive meteorological investigation that would lead to the discovery of the downburst/microburst phenomenon. The Windshear hazard Low Level Windshear associated with both thunderstorms and frontal-zone weather had been identified as a flight hazard prior to Flight 66. Thunderstorms were generally understood to contain severe vertical currents, downdrafts, and outflows which could create "gust fronts.” These storms were often accompanied by heavy rain. In a generic sense, the wind conditions that are typically present with thunderstorms and convective weather fit the Windshear definition (e.g., a change in wind direction and/or speed in a very short distance in the atmosphere). At the time of this accident, the presence of thunderstorms in the vicinity of an airport, while cause for concern, did not constitute a level of hazard that would prompt air traffic control personnel to take an action to change the active runway or traffic flow unless the weather was affecting landing visibility or surface conditions at the airport itself. Air traffic control was primarily concerned with the separation of aircraft from other aircraft, as opposed to separation of aircraft from adverse weather. The National Weather Service could give general reporting and forecasting of significant weather, but at the time was not equipped with the tools that could give a reliable prediction of storm movements or hazardous winds in the terminal area. The characteristics of downbursts and microbursts are such that they are highly dynamic, localized, and relatively transient in nature. One or more aircraft can transit an area safely, while a following aircraft, such as Eastern 66, can encounter the severe effects of the downburst while passing through the same airspace. A following aircraft could subsequently transit the same area, and also experience no adverse effects. A video acquired from KSHB (NBC) TV in Kansas City illustrates the rapid and transient nature of downbursts and microbursts how rapidly they can occur: (KSHB video). As noted in the video, the rapidly descending air mass associated with a microburst can be referred to as an “atmospheric bomb,” in that it can descend suddenly through a larger air mass, and if atmospheric conditions are conducive, will descend until impacting the ground. A downburst is a negatively buoyant parcel of air specified as having a downward speed of at least 12 feet per second (~20 knots) when measured at an altitude of 300 feet above the ground (which is comparable to the speed of a jet transport following the usual 3 degree glideslope on final approach). The downburst has a spatial extent of 0.8 kilometers (0.5 miles) or larger, which makes it large enough to have a noticeable effect on an aircraft (a smaller spatial extent is experienced by the aircraft as turbulence). Although the term "microburst" and "downburst" are sometimes used interchangeably, the term "microburst" was actually created to specifically distinguish a hazard to aviation where the energy of the downburst is focused within a spatial extent less than 4 kilometers (2.5 miles), which is on the order of a typical jet transport runway length. Although falling precipitation can contribute to a downdraft, the primary forcing mechanism of the microburst is evaporation. There is no correlation between rain rate and microburst intensity. In a microburst, evaporation cools the air. The rain-cooled air can be significantly colder, and more dense, than its environment, creating negative buoyancy. The rate of sinking depends on the temperature difference. Several degrees of temperature differential can cause downward speeds of 35-50 knots. If there is a temperature differential between the cold parcel of air and its environment all the way to the ground, the microburst will accelerate until it hits the ground causing strong horizontal wind gusts. Microbursts can occur with and without precipitation reaching the ground, and can cause damage at and around the impact point. A Video of an experiment illustrating the formation of a downburst is available at the following link: (Educational ice simulation of microburst phenomena) A high speed video of an actual microburst, the result of the processes described in the previous video, is available at the following link: (Tucson Microburst Video). This copyrighted video was provided by Mr. Bryan Snider, a Phoenix, Arizona professional photographer, and is used here with his permission. In the decade after Eastern 66, downburst diameters would be observed to range from as little as 0.5 mile to 10's of miles in diameter. The specific hazard to aviation continued to be extensively researched and analyzed to be related to the scale of the downburst. The smaller spatial scale of a small, intense downburst was found to result in tighter windshear gradients that are experienced by penetrating aircraft as more rapid changes in wind vectors, perhaps well in excess of the performance capabilities of the airplane. In order to identify and differentiate the various downdraft phenomena and to draw attention to the serious hazard posed to aircraft, the term microburst was later defined by Dr. Theodore Fujita of the University of Chicago describing a downburst with a diameter less than four km (2.2 nautical miles), roughly equivalent to a typical transport airplane runway length. A high speed video of an actual microburst, the result of the processes described in the previous video, is available at the following link: (Tucson Microburst Video). This copyrighted video was provided by Mr. Bryan Snider, a Phoenix, Arizona professional photographer, and is used here with his permission. In August, 1983, the strongest microburst recorded at an airport was observed at Andrews Air Force Base in Washington DC. The peak horizontal winds speeds were recorded at greater than 130 knots in this microburst. The peak gust was recorded 7 minutes after Air Force One, with U.S. President Ronald Reagan on board, landed on the same runway as the microburst was recorded. Meteorology course lecture material can be accessed at the following links. The lecture material discuss both downburst and microburst phenomena, courtesy of Dr. Matthew Eastin of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (Downbursts), and Dr. Haiyan Jiang of Florida International University, (Microbursts). Many of Dr. Jiang's lecture slides are extracted from the textbook Severe & Hazardous Weather-- An introduction to high impact meteorology" by Rauber et al,. and published by Kendall Hunt. Both presentations provide separate overviews of downburst and Microburst phenomena. Advances in Windshear Detection Technology As a result of the Flight 66 accident investigation, a study was conducted to better understand the weather phenomena associated with this accident. The resulting report, "Spearhead Echo and Downburst in the Crash of an Airliner", authored by T. Theodore Fujita and Horace R. Byers would use a detailed meteorological study to discover the presence of a severe downdraft phenomenon that was not previously understood. This downdraft phenomenon would be designated as a "downburst." In this report, the downburst was described as a localized, intense downdraft with vertical currents exceeding a downward speed of 12 feet per second (approximately 720 feet per minute) at 300 feet above the surface. This value corresponded with the approximate downward speed of a typical transport aircraft flying a stabilized 3 degree glideslope, thus capable of doubling the descent rate of the affected aircraft. Ground based Doppler LIDAR system installed at Tokyo's Haneda airport Fujita theorized that since an aircraft may fly into a downburst cell abruptly and unexpectedly, immediate recognition and quick action by the pilot would be necessary to overcome its effects. Of equal importance in this report, was the realization that the atmospheric conditions that spurred development of this phenomenon could result in a "family" of downburst cells that could affect some aircraft approaching a runway while others would remain relatively unaffected. It would be several years before the Joint Airport Weather Study (JAWS, 1982) measurements, and high profile windshear crashes in New Orleans (Pan American Flight 759, 1982) and Dallas-Fort Worth (Delta Flight 191, 1985) would lead to the acceptance of Fujita’s theories within the aviation meteorology community. Around the same time that Dr. Fujita was completing this research, and in direct response to the Eastern 66 accident, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1976 developed and began deployment of the Low Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS). The initial implementation, LLWAS Phase I, was in response to the belief that the Eastern 66 accident was a result of a gust front encounter. This early form of LLWAS had only six anemometers and was designed to detect a gust front. It had no downburst/microburst detection capabilities and, due to the early alert logic, it had the potential to provide misleading information or false alerts. It was not until the analysis of anemometer data obtained from studies subsequent to the Eastern 66 accident, and several high-profile accidents, notably Delta Flight 191 in 1985, that LLWAS Phase 2 was developed and fielded which utilized an improved algorithm that provided some microburst detection capability and reduced the number of false windshear alerts. Phase 2 LLWAS was a stand-alone system which had drawbacks in that the time required to recognize and then transmit the information to interested airplanes reduced it’s capabilities to provide timely warnings. Today the Phase 2 LLWAS is obsolete, having been replaced by high-quality microburst detection algorithms, so-called Phase 3 LLWAS. This latest LLWAS provides detailed windshear alerts to air traffic controllers, and is effective for wet- and dry- climate microbursts. Windshear is also detected with Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) which were designed specifically for the detection of microbursts in the terminal areas of high density airports. TDWR is highly effective when windshear is accompanied by precipitation, but is not as effective in dry climates. Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) Doppler systems, which "see" aerosols to detect windshear, are now finding their way into use. LIDAR Doppler systems are capable of detecting microbursts in dry climates. In conjunction with all these ground-based windshear detection sensors has been an effort to meld these weather systems, and others into the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) which now yields one display with consistent terminology for Air Traffic Control to report weather information including windshear alerts to arriving or departing traffic. Similarly, the information from each of these systems is used in the Windshear and Turbulence Warning System (WTWS), which makes the source of the information and alerts transparent to Air Traffic Control personnel. Windshear alerts now use a standard phraseology, providing the flight crew with Runway, Alert type (wind shift, microburst, etc.), Loss or Gain, and Location of first windshear encounter with relation to the Runway. Operators typically have specific operating procedures when certain alerts are received. In 1982, the FAA, The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), and the University of Chicago collaborated to better understand the microburst threat to aviation. Research involved Doppler Radar, anemometers, and sounding systems located in eastern Colorado. During the summer of 1982, approximately 99 microburst events were detected within 10 nautical miles of Denver's Stapleton Airport. This research was identified as “Joint Airport Weather Studies Project (JAWS)” An overview of the JAWS Program can be found in a paper titled “Windshear Hazards to Aviation Operations”, prepared by NCAR, dated July 2012 is available at the following link: (JAWS Overview) Two high profile accidents, Flight 759, a Boeing 727 attempting to take off from New Orleans in 1982, and Flight 191, a Lockheed L-1011 attempting to land at Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) in 1985 would punctuate the fact that there was a need to detect and "escape" low level windshear, not just "cope" with the hazard. These accidents would lead to the development and widespread deployment of ground-based and airborne windshear detection equipment. Accident Overview, History of Flight: Eastern Airlines Flight 66 13 Infamous Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation Forever These tragedies triggered major technological advances that keep us flying safe today. BY DAVID NOLAND and BARBARA PETERSON PUBLISHED: JUL 28, 2022 Please go directly to this extensive article: 13 Infamous Plane Crashes That Changed Aviation Forever The 5 airplane near crashes under investigation By Gregory Wallace, Pete Muntean and Jordan Valinsky, CNN Updated 11:46 AM ET, Wed March 1, 2023 New York (CNN)Phil Washington, the White House's pick to lead the Federal Aviation Administration, is going to face tough questions in his confirmation hearing about his ability to lead an agency facing the challenges the agency faces. Among those challenges: a series of close-call plane accidents in the United States. Washington is expected to get grilled by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Wednesday on a slew of aviation issues that have emerged since he was nominated last summer. It's been nearly a year since the FAA has operated with a permanent administrator — and in that time, the agency has contended with several problems that have plagued travelers and the airline industry, such as recent near-collisions involving airliners, crucial staffing shortages and malfunctions of aging technology that have cause major air travel disruption. Five recent near-collisions on US runways, including one more this week in Boston, have prompted federal safety investigators to open multiple inquiries and a sweeping review. Boston Air traffic controllers stopped JetBlue flight from running into a departing private jet as it was coming in to land on the evening of February 27 night in Boston. The FAA is investigating the incident. The two planes involved in the apparent close call at Boston Logan International Airport came within 565 feet (172 meters) of colliding, according to Flightradar24's preliminary review of its data. According to a preliminary review, the pilot of a Learjet 60 took off without clearance while JetBlue Flight 206 was preparing to land on an intersecting runway," the FAA said in a statement. "JetBlue 206, go around," said the controller in Boston Logan's tower, according to recordings archived by LiveATC.net. The FAA says its air traffic controller told the crew of the Learjet to "line up and wait" on Runway 9 as the JetBlue Embraer 190 approached the intersecting Runway 4 Right. "The Learjet pilot read back the instructions clearly but began a takeoff roll instead," the FAA said in a statement. "The pilot of the JetBlue aircraft took evasive action and initiated a climb-out as the Learjet crossed the intersection." Burbank Last week, the National Transportation Safety Board said that a crew of a landing Mesa Airlines CRJ900 "executed a pilot-initiated go-around" as a SkyWest Embraer E175 was taking off from the same runway. A go-around is a routine measure to abort a landing on the approach. The NTSB says neither airplane was damaged and nobody on board was hurt. LiveATC.net recordings from the time of the incident chronicle confusion over whether the SkyWest flight was off the runway at Bob Hope Burbank Airport in California. It's unclear how close the two planes came to a collision. "Is he off the runway yet?" asked one unidentified voice. "We're going around," responded the crew of the Mesa flight. "The Mesa pilot discontinued the landing and initiated a climb out," said a FAA statement, which is also investigating the incident. "Meanwhile, the SkyWest aircraft continued with its departure, which prompted an automated alert to sound on the flight deck of the Mesa aircraft," the FAA said. The controller instructed the Mesa crew to turn to a course that took it away from the other aircraft." Austin A Southwest passenger jet and a FedEx cargo plane came as close as 100 feet from colliding on February 5 at the main airport in Texas' capital, and it was a pilot -- not air traffic controllers -- who averted disaster, a top federal investigator says. Controllers at Austin's airport had cleared the arriving FedEx Boeing 767 and a departing Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 jet to use the same runway, and the FedEx crew "realized that they were overflying the Southwest plane," Jennifer Homendy, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, told CNN. The FedEx pilot told the Southwest crew to abort taking off, she said. The FedEx plane, meanwhile, climbed as its crew aborted their landing to help avoid a collision, the FAA said. Honolulu On January 23, there was an incident at Daniel K. Inouye International Airport involving a United Airlines 777 jet and a smaller, single-engine cargo plane at the Hawaii airport. The United jet improperly crossed a runway, while the cargo aircraft was landing, the FAA said. At the closest point, the aircraft were separated by 1,170 feet. The cargo aircraft involved in the incident is a smaller Cessna 206 turboprop operated by Kamaka Air, which ferries goods between the Hawaiian islands. The airline did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The NTSB announced the investigation the day after Billy Nolen, the acting FAA administrator, directed his agency in a memo to "mine the data to see whether there are other incidents that resemble ones we have seen in recent weeks." New York - JFK On January 13, a close call between an American Airlines and Delta Air Lines flights sparked alarm. The crew of a Delta Boeing 737 aborted its takeoff, ultimately stopping within 1,000 feet of the taxiing AA's Boeing 777, the FAA said. No one was hurt in the incident, which took place around on a Friday evening. Air traffic controllers had "noticed another aircraft crossing the runway in front of the departing jetliner," the FAA said in a statement. "According to a preliminary analysis, Delta Air Lines Flight 1943 stopped its takeoff roll approximately 1,000 feet before reaching the point where American Airlines Flight 106, a Boeing 777, had crossed from an adjacent taxiway." According to Delta, its flight -- a 737-900 bound for Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic -- had 145 customers and six crew members on board. Audio recordings detail swift action by an air traffic controller kept the airplanes from colliding as they drew closer. "S--t!" exclaimed the controller from the tower of John F. Kennedy International Airport on Friday night. "Delta 1943 cancel takeoff clearance!" The NTSB is investigating the incident. The 5 airplane near crashes under investigation Timeline: Nepal air crashes since 2010 A timeline of major air disasters to hit the country since 2010. Note: See many photographs in the original article. Published On 15 Jan 2023 15 Jan 2023 An aircraft with 72 people on board has crashed in Nepal, killing at least 16 people in the latest aviation disaster to hit the Himalayan nation. Nepal’s air transport sector has been plagued by accidents. The country also has some of the world’s trickiest and most remote runways, with approaches flanked by towering mountains that challenge even accomplished pilots. Here is a timeline of major air disasters to hit the country since 2010: May 29, 2022 A Twin Otter plane operated by Nepali carrier Tara Air crashes shortly after takeoff from Pokhara in western Nepal, killing 22 people. April 14, 2019 A small plane veers off the runway while taking off near Mount Everest, hitting a parked helicopter and killing three people and injuring four. March 12, 2018 A flight from the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka crash-lands at Kathmandu airport, skidding into a football field where it bursts into flames. Fifty-one people are killed in what was the deadliest aviation accident in the country for decades. February 24, 2016 A Twin Otter aircraft operated by Tara Air crashes into a hillside in Myagdi district, killing all 23 people on board. Eighteen people are killed when a Nepal Airlines flight crashes in the Arghakhanchi district. September 28, 2012 A plane flying 19 people towards Mount Everest goes down in flames on the outskirts of the Nepali capital, killing everyone on board. May 14, 2012 Fifteen people die when an Agni Air plane carrying Indian pilgrims crashes near the treacherous high-altitude airport of Jomsom in northern Nepal, while six make a miraculous escape. September 25, 2011 A small plane taking tourists on a sightseeing trip around Mount Everest crashes into a hillside near Kathmandu, killing all 19 people on board. December 15, 2010 All 22 passengers and crew on board a passenger plane that crashed in eastern Nepal are killed. Most of the victims are pilgrims from Bhutan. August 24, 2010 A small Agni Air plane crashes in bad weather near Kathmandu, killing all 14 people on board. Timeline: Nepal air crashes since 2010 NTSB Unveils Graphic Data Tool for Genav Accidents by Gordon Gilbert - February 21, 2023, 11:39 AM The NTSB has introduced an interactive graphic tool enabling researchers to visualize data about general aviation accidents. (Photo: NTSB) The NTSB has introduced an interactive graphic tool enabling researchers to visualize data about general aviation (GA) accident investigations over a 10-year period. The general aviation accident dashboard provides summary statistics, investigative findings, and safety recommendations for 12,368 completed and ongoing GA accident investigations from 2012 through 2021. Dashboard users can obtain accident reports and statistics by selecting filters for year of accident, location, phase of flight, defining event (such as CFIT or runway excursion), and type of flight, including selections for accidents involving personal and business aircraft and corporate/executive aircraft. There are also preset filters for commonly sought-after findings such as those dealing with aircraft control, engine issues, and weather. The dashboard contains a spreadsheet that lists the finished accident investigations and those for which a preliminary report has been published over the 10-year span, showing report number, date and location of occurrence, aircraft make and model, level of injuries, the extent of aircraft damage, phase of flight, and circumstances. Also shown are recommendations that evolved from the investigations and the probable cause/factors of concluded investigations. Data is covered for accidents involving GA aircraft flown under FAR Parts 91, 133, and 137, but not Part 135 air-taxi operations. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2023-02-21/ntsb-unveils-graphic-data-tool-genav-accidents Gas Turbine Engine Accident Investigation May 8-10, 2023 USC LAX Campus This specialized accident investigation course is directed to fixed wing turbojet and turboprop as well as turbine powered rotary wing aircraft. The course examines specific turbine engine investigation methods and provides technical information in the related area of material factors and metallurgical failure investigation. Individuals with responsibility for the post-accident examination of gas turbine engines and individuals responsible for integration of engine information into the total accident investigation should attend this course. Instructors Doug Pridemore retired with over 35 years of experience in gas turbine engine failure analysis with GE Aviation and Rolls-Royce. Mr. Pridemore has led numerous high-profile metallurgical investigations, including many uncontained engine events and military Class I mishaps while working with domestic and foreign government agencies, including the NTSB, Canadian TSB, French BEA, and military boards. Mark Taylor worked as an engineer and accident investigator for GE Aviation for 41 years. Mr. Taylor was responsible for investigating incidents and accidents involving any GE small commercial engine. He investigated accidents and incidents involving S-61, UH-60, S-70, and V-107 helicopters; Canadair Challenger, Canadair Regional Jet, Learjet 25, SAAB 340, Aerocommander 1121, Falcon 20, Sabreliner, Falcon 2000, and DC10 fixed-wing aircraft. He worked with government agencies in the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Taiwan, Argentina, France, China, Mexico, and England. Register Here Earn Credit for FlightSafety International Master Technician-Management Program Students taking the following USC courses will earn elective credits towards FlightSafety International's Master Technician-Management Program • Human Factors in Aviation Safety • Gas Turbine Accident Investigation • Helicopter Accident Investigation • Safety Management for Aviation Maintenance • Safety Management for Ground Operations Safety • Accident/Incident Response Preparedness Earn Credit for National Business Aviation Association Certified Aviation Manager Exam Students taking the following USC courses will earn two points toward completing the application for the National Business Aviation Association Certified Aviation Manager Exam. • Aviation Safety Management Systems • Accident/Incident Response Preparedness • Human Factors in Aviation Safety • Aircraft Accident Investigation • SeMS Aviation Security Management Systems For further details, please visit our website or use the contact information below. Email: aviation@usc.edu Telephone: +1 (310) 342-1345 Interested in a USC Aviation Safety and Security Program Newsletter? Please tell us here. Photo Credit: Glenn Beltz (CC BY 2.0) USC - Gas Turbine Engine Accident Investigation International Society of Air Safety Investigators https://www.isasi.org/ Ladies and Gentlemen, ANZSASI2023 Surfers Paradise Please see the important information attached about registering for this year's Australian and New Zealand Safety Conference ANZSASI Registration Reminder.pdf ASASI Executive ISASI ANZSASI2023 Surfers Paradise - Early Bird Reminder Call for Nominations For 2023 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award ALEXANDRIA, Va. -- The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation is now accepting nominations for the 2023 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award, honoring a leader in global aviation safety. The Award will be presented during the 76th Annual International Air Safety Summit, taking place November 6-8 in Paris, France. Presented annually since 1956, the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award recognizes notable achievement in the field of civil or military aviation safety in method, design, invention, study, or other improvement. The Award's recipient is selected for a "significant individual or group effort contributing to improving aviation safety, with emphasis on original contributions," and a "significant individual or group effort performed above and beyond normal responsibilities." Mechanics, engineers, and others outside of top administrative or research positions should be especially considered. The contribution need not be recent, especially if the nominee has not received adequate recognition. Nominations that were not selected as past winners may be resubmitted for consideration in subsequent years. Please note that self-nominations will not be considered. The Award Committee, composed of leaders in the field of aviation, meets each year to conduct a final review of nominees and selection of the current year's recipient. Please help us identify and honor this year's most deserving recipient. Nominations, including a 1-to-2-page narrative, can be submitted via the Laura Taber Barbour Foundation website at http://ltbaward.org/the-award/nomination-form/. Nominations will be accepted through June 2, 2023. For more information, including a complete history of Award recipients, see www.ltbaward.org. About the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation and Award The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award's story dates back more than 75 years. On April 14, 1945, after visiting family in Pittsburgh, Laura Taber Barbour was aboard a Pennsylvania Central Airlines DC-3 when it crashed into the rugged terrain of Cheat Mountain near Morgantown, West Virginia. All passengers and crew were killed. In 1956 her husband, Dr. Clifford E. Barbour and son, Clifford E. Barbour, Jr., in close association with The Flight Safety Foundation, established the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award in her honor. For the past 65 years, this distinguished award recognizing outstanding achievements in aviation safety worldwide has been presented at Flight Safety Foundation’s International Aviation Safety Summit. In 2013, The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation was formed as an independent non-profit charitable organization composed of members of the Award Board, the aviation community, and the Barbour family. In addition to the annual presentation of the award, in 2019 the Foundation initiated a scholarship program that supports worthy students pursuing professional aviation studies. As the Foundation broadens its scope, the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award will continue to recognize those who significantly contributed to aviation safety. For more information on the Foundation, the award, and past winners, visit http://LTBAward.org Share your knowledge and experience at 2023 CHC Safety & Quality Summit. Call for Papers is now open for 2023 CHC Safety & Quality Summit. Theme: Reset 2024: Developing New Safety Mindsets Submission Deadline: May 21, 2023 Much has changed in the past five years. Energy prices have collapsed, then spiked; customers have deferred, then ramped, production. We have grappled with global pandemic and now war in Ukraine. We have welcomed new market entrants in response to a changing environment and changing importance of sustainability. The offshore helicopter industry has had to adapt – quickly - to meet changing demands. As the pace of change has accelerated, it has sparked a state of permacrisis with little time to regroup. Simultaneously, the accident rate has accelerated, from an all-time low in 2019/20, to 12 fatal accidents and 18 lives lost in 2022. Were we distracted, complacent, without the focus and resources? How do we enhance safety, succession and sustainability in a dynamic industry? The CHC Safety & Quality Summit 2023 now calls for papers to address these challenges. Please submit abstracts for consideration on the following topics: 1. New safety performance mindsets. A persistent safety management challenge is the changing human habit. Understanding safety relies on understanding the brains and behaviours at the heart of the flight system. We know the value of a safety management system lies in the willingness and openness of our teams to reflect, learn and change, time and time again. What new insights can we draw from human neurology and psychology to keep the person at the centre of safety, resilience and safety management practice? 2. New talent requirements and the next generation. There are numerous dynamics that stymie recruitment and retention: an experienced but ageing employee population, remuneration limitations, entrants’ skills gaps, changing workplace expectations and persistent poor performance in regard to diversity and inclusion. Are our organisations fit for purpose? What is our succession plan to ensure the safety and quality of our industry in 2024 and beyond? The CHC Safety &Quality Summit will take place in Vancouver, BC, Canada on 14 - 16 November, 2023. Most sessions during the three-day conference will be for 90 minutes. Individual sessions typically attract between 20 to 60 people. Submissions should include proposed session titles, descriptions or outlines, objectives and audience benefits, presenter bibliographies, and contact details. Please send your submission online via links on this page. We look forward to hearing from you by 21 May 2023. Note: Any type of vendor promotions or marketing pitch will not be accepted. Reminder: A valid passport & visa (if applicable) are required to enter Canada and attend the CHC Safety & Quality Summit. Don’t delay – apply or renew your passport & visa today. To submit an abstract, click on the project link below: SUBMIT ABSTRACT Submit Ab Sincerely, CHC Safety & Quality Summit Committee summit@CHCheli.com If you no longer want to receive emails from CHC Safety & Quality Summit Committee, please choose to Opt-Out. Curt Lewis