January 24, 2024- No. 04 In This Issue : FAA Moves to Allow 737 MAX 9s to Return to Service : Federal investigator hasn’t determined whether bolts were installed on the 737 Max part that blew off an Alaska flight : Flashlight damages $14 million F-35 fighter engine beyond repair at Luke AFB : HondaJet: The Pinnacle of Light Jet Innovation : GAMA Has Issues With MOSAIC; Plans To Issue Comments To FAA : Ural Airlines Scraps Plan To Fly A320 From Field : FAA Faces Tough Choice On Latest 737-7 Exemption Request : B-21 production is a go, Pentagon says : Boeing Whistleblower: Production Line Has “Enormous Volume Of Defects” Bolts On MAX 9 Weren’t Installed : Compact, shape-shifting robot by Transformers' inventors lands on Moon FAA Moves to Allow 737 MAX 9s to Return to Service A new Airworthiness Directive will allow airlines to fly 737 MAX 9s after completing additional maintenance January 19, 2024 1:33 pm ET By John McDermott The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued a new Airworthiness Directive (AD) that will allow most Boeing 737 MAX 9s to return to service, Aero Crew News reports. The directive comes soon after the FAA completed inspections of 40 737 MAX 9s belonging to Alaska Airlines and United Airlines in order to determine what action must be taken to address the failure of a plug door on an Alaska aircraft earlier this month. What Are Airworthiness Directives? Airworthiness Directives are mandatory maintenance orders issued by the FAA that instruct the operators of a certain type of aircraft to complete specific maintenance. ADs are issued to resolve potential safety issues and can dictate that the mandated maintenance occurs either once or on a specified recurring timeline defined by either flight time or calendar periods (months, years, etc). When an AD is issued or its inspection window comes up, an aircraft must receive the maintenance specified in the AD before flying without special, case-by-case permission from the FAA. It was exactly one of these Airworthiness Directives that grounded the MAX 9 in the first place. Since the original AD did not issue specific maintenance items to complete, operators could not specifically complete any required maintenance to return aircraft to service. But when an AD with specific items is issued, aircraft will be able to begin inspections and return to service upon their completion. Reports are spreading that some of the bolts holding down the plug door on Alaska 1282 may have been completely missing. Whether this would occur because they were never placed at all or because they came completely loose due to other factors is unclear. The ongoing NTSB investigation will undoubtedly uncover clues regarding this rumor; the plug door’s transfer from initial production in Malaysia to Kansas for delivery to a Boeing contractor for installation will be of particular interest. The FAA’s Inspections This new AD comes just days after the FAA inspected 40 Boeing 737 MAX 9s to follow tips on loose bolts around the same plug door that blew out on Alaska 1282. The FAA used these 40 inspections in order to collect data on the type and review data on whether, when, and how the MAX 9 should be allowed to fly again. The agency convened a Corrective Action Review board to determine how to move forward with the type. The FAA and the NTSB have also briefed federal Senators on the status of their investigations. The data will also surely be used to define inspections completed during the 737 MAX 10 certification process, as the MAX 10 also has a plug door on lower-capacity jets. “We’re going to get better, not because the two of us are talking, but because (of) the engineers at Boeing, the mechanics at Boeing, the inspectors at Boeing, the engineers at Spirit [Aerospace], the mechanics at Spirit, the inspectors at Spirit,” said David Calhoun, the CEO of Boeing. Both Boeing and Spirit Aerospace, which builds the fuselage for the 737 MAX family, are opening their production facilities to airline customers who want to observe production firsthand. Boeing is also holding quality management sessions for employees and bringing in a third party to conduct an independent review of the production process. The manufacturer may also allow an independent entity to take over certain aircraft certification responsibilities the FAA previously assigned to Boeing. The FAA is inspecting Boeing’s quality control practices. Federal investigator hasn’t determined whether bolts were installed on the 737 Max part that blew off an Alaska flight GREGORY WALLACE, PETE MUNTEAN AND CURT DEVINE, CNN January 17, 2024 at 12:46 PM Investigators probing why part of a Boeing 737 Max 9 blew open mid-flight earlier this month have not yet determined if bolts were installed on that piece of the aircraft. National Transportation Safety Board Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy told reporters after a closed-door briefing for lawmakers Wednesday that the investigation into is ongoing. Investigators are determining why a door plug, which is supposed to cover up a space left by a removed emergency exit door in the side of the plane, blew off Alaska Airlines flight 1282 on January 5 and left a gaping hole in the side of the plane. She said the investigation is not solely focused on the bolts, and her teams are currently collecting extensive records on the assembly of the door plug and its journey from Malaysia, where it was first built, to factories in Wichita, Kansas and Renton, Washington. It was unclear, she said, whether Boeing employees removed the plug from the airplane fuselage when it arrived in Renton from its subcontractor, Spirit Areosystems. Scientists in the NTSB’s lab are currently scrutinizing the plug but have not yet started disassembling it, she said. “They have very bright lighting. They’re doing targeted photography,” Homendy said. “They might take some metal shavings and put them under the electron microscope.” Then next week, NTSB officials will begin pulling the door plug apart to further examine its construction. Homendy said she and the head of the Federal Aviation Administration, who participated in the Senate Commerce Committee briefing virtually, have been talking once or twice most days. Expanded probe The FAA announced Wednesday that it is expanding its probe into Boeing 737 Max 9 quality control following this month’s in-flight blowout. In a new statement, the FAA says it is now investigating contractor Spirit AeroSystems, which builds the fuselage of the Boeing 737 Max 9. The FAA last week opened an investigation into Boeing’s quality control after the Alaska Airlines incident. The FAA says the investigation will focus on whether Boeing “failed to ensure completed products conformed to its approved design and were in a condition for safe operation in compliance with FAA regulations.” Boeing said it “will cooperate fully and transparently with the FAA and the NTSB on their investigations” in a statement last Thursday. Spirit Aerosystems did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The FAA says all 171 Boeing 737 Max 9s in the United States remain grounded, the agency has received new data from preliminary inspections of 40 of those airplanes. “The first 40 inspections that are part of that process are now complete, and the FAA will thoroughly review the data from them,” the FAA said in a statement. “Once the FAA approves an inspection and maintenance process, it will be required on every grounded 737-9 Max prior to future operation.” To help restore confidence in its manufacturing, Boeing said Monday it will allow airlines into Boeing factories and those of Spirit AeroSystems. Spirit Aerosystems’ history of trouble Shareholders of Spirit AeroSystems last year filed a federal lawsuit against the company, accusing it of “widespread and sustained quality failures” in its products. The suit states that quality failures, which have allegedly ranged from debris in products to missing fasteners and peeling paint, led Boeing to place Spirit on probation from around 2018 to at least 2021. The suit, which was previously reported by the publication The Lever, does not specifically mention door plugs. The suit claims that “constant quality failures resulted in part from Spirit’s culture which prioritized production numbers and short-term financial outcomes over product quality, and Spirit’s related failure to hire sufficient personnel to deliver quality products at the rates demanded by Spirit and its customers including Boeing.” The suit further states that a former Spirit AeroSystems employee who worked as a quality manager and inspector and who was not named in the suit wrote an ethics complaint to the company in 2022 that described an “excessive amount of defects” in products. The former employee believes “Spirit treats moving products down the line as more important than quality,” according to the suit. A spokesperson for Spirit AeroSystems, Joe Buccino, said in a statement last week that “Spirit strongly disagrees with the assertions made by plaintiffs in the amended complaint and intends to vigorously defend against the claims. Spirit will not comment further as to the pending litigation.” In April, Spirit AeroSystems identified a production issue on the aft fuselage section of certain 737 models. “This is not an immediate safety of flight issue. We have processes in place to address these of types of production issues upon identification, which we are following,” the company then said in a statement. In August, the company disclosed improper holes drilled on the “aft pressure bulkhead” on some models of the 737 fuselage. Both Spirit and Boeing said in statements that the issue was determined not to be an immediate flight-safety concern. Flashlight damages $14 million F-35 fighter engine beyond repair at Luke AFB Published: Jan. 18, 2024 at 6:31 PM CST| Updated: Jan. 19, 2024 at 1:33 PM CST GLENDALE, ARIZ. (3TV/CBS 5) - A flashlight is responsible for causing irreparable damage to the $14 million engine of an F-35 based at Luke Air Force Base in Glendale. A report by the Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board showed the incident happened on March 15, 2023, while the jet was undergoing some maintenance work. The report states a three-member maintenance team removed a panel and inserted a metering plug into an engine fuel line. They prepared the aircraft for an engine run to test the installed metering plug for fuel leaks. The engine run was completed with no visual indications that would indicate an abnormal engine run. The damage was found after the engine was shut down following the engine test. The Air Force says each member of the maintenance team was current and qualified to accomplish all the tasks. The Board President found by a preponderance of the evidence that a handheld flashlight caused damage to the aircraft. An incomplete tool kit inventory and failure to comply with Joint-Service Technical Data guidance prior to engine start resulted in the damage. HondaJet: The Pinnacle of Light Jet Innovation by Leokadia 9 January 2024 Note: See YOUTUBE video. Summary: The HondaJet stands out as a state-of-the-art embodiment of efficiency, luxury, and advanced aeronautical engineering within the light jet market. Developed by Honda Aircraft Company, a subsidiary of the renowned automotive giant, Honda Motor Co., Ltd., the HondaJet is acclaimed for its unique over-the-wing engine mount (OTWEM) design, speed, fuel efficiency, and spacious cabin. The aircraft revolutionizes light business travel by integrating cutting-edge technology with a keen understanding of passenger comfort and environmental considerations. Introduction to HondaJet The HondaJet is an outcome of decades of meticulous research and development initiated under the vision of Honda’s founder, Soichiro Honda, and realized through the leadership of the project’s chief engineer, Michimasa Fujino. The light business jet first took to the skies in 2003 and subsequently entered the market in 2015 after earning its Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) type certification. Defining the HondaJet: The HondaJet is defined by several novel features. Among them: – Over-The-Wing Engine Mount (OTWEM): This unique configuration improves performance and fuel efficiency while reducing cabin noise and vibration. – Advanced Aerodynamics: The aircraft has a natural-laminar flow wing and nose design, which contributes to its high-speed capabilities and efficiency. – Composite Fuselage: The use of lightweight composite materials enhances flight performance and fuel efficiency. Technological Innovations and Performance HondaJet adopts various innovative technologies to set high-performance standards. The light jet can reach speeds of up to 483 miles per hour (422 knots), with a maximum cruising altitude of 43,000 feet. It boasts a range of 1,223 nautical miles, making it suitable for efficient regional travel. The integration of the Garmin G3000 avionics suite provides pilots with state-of-the-art touch screen interfaces, enhancing situational awareness and flight safety. The cockpit is designed ergonomically, reducing pilot workload and contributing to the overall flight experience. Sustainability and Efficiency Eco-friendliness is a cornerstone of the HondaJet philosophy. Its advanced design leads to a 20% greater fuel efficiency compared to other jets in its class. The focus on sustainability aligns with Honda’s broader commitment to reducing environmental impact, a principle that pervades the company’s diverse product range, from motorcycles to automobiles to aviation. Interior Comfort and Design The cabin of the HondaJet is known for its exceptional comfort and luxury. It features a fully-private lavatory, executive seating that can be configured for productivity or relaxation, and large windows that flood the interior with natural light. The attention to detail in the cabin’s design enhances the overall flight experience for both passengers and crew. Market Impact and Industry Recognition The introduction of the HondaJet has had a significant impact on the light jet market, offering a combination of luxury, efficiency, and performance that has been well-received by customers and industry experts alike. Its innovations have earned it several awards and recognitions, reinforcing the Honda Aircraft Company’s position as a leader in aviation technology. FAQ About HondaJet What is the price of a HondaJet? The price of a HondaJet depends on various factors, including customization options and market demand. Prospective buyers should contact Honda Aircraft Company for the latest pricing information. What is the HondaJet’s seating capacity? The HondaJet typically accommodates up to six passengers and one or two pilots, depending on configuration. Can the HondaJet be flown by a single pilot? Yes, the HondaJet is certified for single-pilot operation, which offers flexibility and cost savings for owners and operators. Where are HondaJets manufactured? HondaJets are manufactured in Greensboro, North Carolina, at the Honda Aircraft Company headquarters. How does the HondaJet compare to other light jets in terms of range and speed? The HondaJet competes favorably with other light jets, offering one of the best ranges and speed performances in its class due to its advanced aerodynamics and engine efficiency. For further information about the HondaJet, interested parties can visit the Honda Aircraft Company’s official website at hondajet.com GAMA Has Issues With MOSAIC; Plans To Issue Comments To FAA By Russ Niles Published: January 11, 2024 Updated: January 12, 2024 The world’s largest group representing aircraft manufacturers says it has issues with the Modernization Of Special Airworthiness Certification (MOSAIC) proposed rulemaking and will specify those reservations in comments to the FAA. General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) spokesman Andre Castro told AVweb Thursday (Jan. 11) that the trade group will not fully endorse the MOSAIC rule as currently written because the plans “go beyond what was expected and require additional clarification and justification from the FAA.” AVweb‘s sources said the main issue for GAMA is allowing Light Sport pilots to fly four-place aircraft. Holders of Light Sport certificate holders would, however, be limited to a single passenger. MOSAIC is intended to broaden the scope of eligible aircraft while expanding performance and weight-based limits on the category. It’s considered a safety move by its proponents because it allows more margins of safety in aircraft available to those with so-called “driver’s license medicals” and more flexibility for creating new designs of light aircraft. The comment period for the NPRM ends Jan. 22. GAMA’s full statement to AVweb follows: “The GAMA team is currently working across our broader membership to develop collective comments and recommendations in response to the FAA’s MOSAIC proposed rule which are due on January 22nd. Overall, GAMA supports the direction of key aspects of the proposal to increase the size, performance and scope of aircraft that can be flown by sport pilots and be issued a special airworthiness certificate with the objective of improving safety, functionality, innovation, and availability of small general aviation aircraft. However, there are areas of the proposal which go beyond what was expected and require additional clarification and justification from the FAA. In addition, GAMA believes the FAA misses a significantly important opportunity to fully realize the intended objectives and benefits of this proposal by not applying a consistent approach across all small aircraft airworthiness and certification processes. Our submission will go into further detail on these issues.” Ural Airlines Scraps Plan To Fly A320 From Field By Russ Niles Published: January 17, 2024 Ural Airlines has scrapped plans to fly an A320 out of a Siberian field because it’s worth too much in parts. The airline was forthcoming in its assessment of the risk/reward balance of the venture and last week went with the least risky of the two. The airline will start cannabalizing the plane next summer when weather will make it more comfortable. Russian airlines are scrambling for parts due to Western sanctions imposed because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Whatever Ural doesn’t keep for its own use will find a ready market. The carrier captured world headlines when the crew of the fuel-short airliner put it down in a wheat field just east of Omsk in Siberia. During a go-around prompted by high winds, a hydraulic issue prevented the front gear doors from closing and the crew decided to divert to the larger and better-equipped airport at Novosibirsk about 400 miles east. A headwind and the open door caused the plane to use more fuel than expected and they put it down in the field with no injuries or damage to the plane. The plan was to wait until the field froze and to fly it out. The weather has definitely cooperated. It was -10 F on Tuesday. FAA Faces Tough Choice On Latest 737-7 Exemption Request Sean Broderick January 19, 2024 Without an exemption, 737-7 certification could be pushed into 2026. Boeing’s marathon-like push to earn approval for its 737-7 likely no longer hinges on demonstrating that the model meets all required regulatory standards but instead on convincing the agency that a known noncompliance should be permitted for a few years while the OEM develops a permanent fix. At issue is 737 MAX engine inlet durability. Boeing in mid-2023 discovered that operating the aircraft’s engine anti-ice (EAI) system in certain conditions could cause the composite inlets to heat to the point at which they were at risk of breaking apart under operational loads. The failure’s potential ramifications—shedding pieces of engine inlet and nacelle assembly—are enough to “jeopardize the safe operation of the airplane,” in the FAA’s words. Add it up, and the 737 MAX EAI/composite inlet combination fails to comply with parts of six regulations. • Boeing wants the FAA to certify the 737-7 with a known engine nacelle risk • The issue requires a work-around on in-service 737 MAXs • The scenario spotlights increased reliance on exemptions The FAA in August 2023 ordered a temporary operational work-around for in-service 737 MAXs. The “direct final” airworthiness directive (AD)—signifying the agency deemed it important enough to bypass inviting public input on a draft—required operators to modify flight manuals with language prohibiting pilots from using the EAI “when not in actual or anticipated icing conditions.” Operating the EAI in dry air and at certain altitudes and thrust settings for more than 5 min. could cause nacelle damage, the agency explained. Among the worst-case scenarios, shedding of inlet pieces “may cause fuselage and/or window damage, potentially resulting in decompression and hazard to window-seated passengers aft of the wing,” the FAA noted. A similar scenario led to a passenger fatality onboard a Southwest Airlines 737-700 in April 2018 when parts of the nacelle broke apart following a fan blade failure. That helped jump-start a review of airframe and engine certification rules (AW&ST March 22-April 4, 2021, p. 24), leading Boeing to redesign its 737 Next Generation (NG) nacelles. A fleet-wide retrofit is to be completed by the end of the decade. The FAA rule noted that Boeing, which designs and manufactures the 737 MAX inlets, is working on a modification that will eliminate the hazard. The rule addressed the problem for the in-service fleet. In late November, Boeing asked the FAA for 18 months to wrap up design and certification of the modification. In the meantime, it wants the agency to grant an exemption so the 737-7—which first flew in March 2018 and completed formal FAA flight testing in late 2021 (AW&ST April 18-May 1, 2022, p. 14)—can be certified and enter service with the same hazard and operational work-around as the 737-8, 737-8200 and 737-9. Boeing 737 MAX nacelle inlets must be redesigned because they can overheat when an anti-ice system is used. “Subsequent to the development of the engine nacelle inlet structure and EAI system, analysis and engineering flight testing showed there is a potential for structural damage to the engine nacelle inlet structure due to overheating with the EAI system active during specific operational and environmental conditions,” Boeing explains in its request for a time-limited exemption (TLE) until May 31, 2026. “During this time, Boeing will complete certification of necessary design changes for the EAI system and associated structure. These changes will be applied to all 737 MAX models, including the 737-7.” Neither the rule nor Boeing’s exemption request explain why problems with the composite inlets, added as part of the 737 MAX derivative changes, were not flagged during certification. Both underscore that the hazard has never led to an in-service incident, and the risk of one occurring is low. “The 737 MAX has been in service since 2017 and has accumulated over 6.5 million flight hours,” Boeing writes in its exemption request. “In that time, there have been no reported cases of parts departing aircraft . . . due to overheating of the engine nacelle inlet structure, indicating that a TLE [from two of the six regulations at issue] will have no adverse affect on safety.” The other four rules the design fails to meet deal with “multiple, independent system failures during specific operational and environmental conditions,” the company said. “Boeing’s quantitative risk assessment evaluated this scenario to be extremely improbable and to have no adverse effect on safety.” Both the 737-7 and the 737-10, the last two variants of the 737 MAX family, have multiple TLEs that will allow Boeing to develop changes after each model is certified. Several of them stem from lessons learned in the aftermath of the two 737-8 fatal accidents in 2018 and 2019, which prompted the OEM and regulators to reevaluate elements of the baseline 737 MAX design and how it was approved. But the composite nacelle issue and an unrelated yaw damper software problem (AW&ST July 17-30, 2023, p. 18) were regulatory noncompliances all along that went undetected by Boeing and the FAA during the baseline 737-8’s certification. The nacelle issue stands out as an identified unsafe condition in the in-service fleet that required immediate attention with pilot manual changes and anti-icing limitations. This technical wrinkle, combined with a mounting list of unrelated but relevant organizational problems within Boeing’s Commercial Airplanes division (AW&ST Oct. 30-Nov. 12, 2023, p. 25), is causing some within the FAA to question whether granting the OEM’s request is prudent. One FAA manager involved in evaluating the request who has signed off on other 737 MAX exemptions opposes the latest one, sources with knowledge of the issue tell Aviation Week. While one technical expert’s opposition is not enough to deny an exemption request, the EAI hazard’s potential consequences—remote but documented in an AD as meeting the agency’s “catastrophic” probability threshold—are generating additional scrutiny. “How in the world could we justify granting an exemption on something like this that we know could have catastrophic consequences?” asks one agency safety expert not directly involved in the exemption’s review. Beyond the documented issue of granting a temporary pass to a known safety-of-flight issue, comments compiled by a coalition of industry veterans, including former Boeing engineers, FAA experts and several experienced pilots, poke holes in the petition. The hazard is not linked to multiple problems but rather a single failure—specifically, pilots forgetting to abide by the new EAI restrictions—the Foundation for Aviation Safety (FAS) argues in formal comments to the FAA on Boeing’s petition. “Compliance with” Part 25.901(c), which prohibits single failures from causing accidents and is one of the six regulations at issue, “requires the failure is assumed to have happened, and [that] a fail-safe feature will prevent an accident,” the FAS states. “Clearly, the flight crew forgetting to turn off the anti-ice system is a foreseeable single failure,” it continues, noting that the 737’s lack of a modern flight crew alerting system thanks to other regulatory exceptions granted years ago only adds to the probability of pilots not realizing the system is on when it should not be. “The probability of single failures is assumed to be one,” the FAS states. “Boeing is petitioning to allow the use of a probability analysis to circumvent the fail-safe requirements, which are the foundation of the aviation industry.” The FAS also says Boeing’s claim that adding nonconforming 737-7s to the in-service fleet will have “no adverse effect on safety” runs counter to the FAA’s justification for the August 2023 directive. “Clearly, the configuration Boeing is petitioning to be approved does not provide equivalent safety to the regulations from which they are seeking an exemption, and there is an adverse effect on safety, or the FAA would not mandate a design change as terminating action for the interim limitation and procedure mandated by the AD,” the FAS writes. The foundation also notes that the 737 MAX’s operating history without an inlet failure linked to EAI operation offers little proof that the fleet is safe. “Catastrophic accidents have occurred many times after a fleet of aircraft has accrued millions of flight hours,” the FAS says, pointing to the 2019 Southwest accident as a recent example. “Since the flight crew does not get a warning that crew action is required, the flight crew inadvertently leaving the anti-ice system on for 5 min. is a likely outcome.” The FAS’ objections go beyond the 737 MAX. The prevalence of exemptions during aircraft certification programs and following major rule changes is another key concern. Manufacturers’ confidence in exemptions—which have become commonplace in the last two decades—means they do not have to abide by certification rules meant to ensure designs are safe, the foundation argues. Once granted, exemptions can too easily be extended, taking pressure off of companies to fix the problem. One example is the 767-300F’s compliance with new flammability reduction rules put in place following the 1996 inflight explosion of TWA Flight 800 (AW&ST Nov. 21, 2005, p. 46). In 2012, Boeing asked the FAA to exempt 767s from new wiring separation rules meant to prevent ignition sources. While design improvements were incorporated, they fell short of the FAA’s newest rules introduced in 2008. Among Boeing’s justifications: The required changes to the fuel quantity indication system would require the company to pause deliveries for three years while production for the model was nearing its end. The FAA gave Boeing three years to develop a compliant system and said deliveries could continue in the interim. In 2014, with no new design in sight, Boeing asked for a new TLE—this time for just the 767-300 and 767-300ER and only until 2019, when 767 commercial production was expected to cease. Meanwhile, Boeing designed the tanker variant, which became the KC-46, to be fully compliant. The FAA granted Boeing’s request. But in 2017, with the 767-300F still selling, Boeing asked for another exemption—this time pegging Dec. 31, 2027, well past the widebody freighter’s revised production end date. Annual deliveries were forecast at “about” 11 per year, the OEM added, equivalent to a final batch of about 90 aircraft. One FAA senior aviation safety engineer had seen enough. Mike Dostert, one of the experts tasked with evaluating Boeing’s request, voiced his opposition. When the agency decided to grant the petition anyway, Dostert, as an engineer represented by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, followed union protocol and documented his point of view. “Co-routing of high-power wiring and lack of separation in [parts of the fuel system] between the high-power and in-tank circuits has been identified as a noncompliant and an unsafe condition since the TWA 800 accident,” Dostert, now retired from the FAA and a member of the FAS advisory board, wrote in a June 2018 “difference in professional opinion” letter. He also questioned whether the company ever intended to fix the problem. “After three years of production of noncompliant airplanes under the provisions of the original exemption, Boeing requested extension of the original exemption from 2016 to 2019 based upon the cost of upgrading the design and their stated low production rate and end of production in 2019,” he wrote. “It should be noted that in that same time frame Boeing developed the 767 tanker airplanes . . . produced on the same production line [that] are fully compliant.” Dostert said Boeing’s FAA-granted Organization Designation Authorization status requires it to “correct noncompliant design features in newly produced airplanes.” Granting the 2018 exemption “not only reduces the level of fuel tank safety of the newly produced 767-300F airplanes, it rewards Boeing for not producing compliant designs and likely will influence their actions regarding bringing other known noncompliant designs back into a compliant configuration.” Since the 2019 exemption went into effect, Boeing has upped annual 767-300F production to satisfy demand. It delivered 94 of the freighters in 2019-23—nearly 19 per year. Counting another 27 in the backlog as of Dec. 31, Boeing is on pace to deliver 121 under the 2019 exemption—or about two more years’ worth of production than it anticipated in the rates and time frame detailed in its application. Photo: A test variant of the B-21 Raider was unveiled to the public at a ceremony December 2, 2022, in Palmdale, Calif. AIRMAN 1ST CLASS JOSHUA CARROLL / U.S AIR FORCE B-21 production is a go, Pentagon says; Defense undersecretary confirms Northrop Grumman has approval to start making non-test variants of the stealth bomber. AUDREY DECKER ANUARY 22, 2024 06:54 PM ET Northrop Grumman has the greenlight to begin producing the Pentagon’s newest bomber. “Production of the B-21 ‘Raider’ stealth bomber is moving forward. This past fall, based on the results of ground and flight tests and the team’s mature plans for manufacturing, I gave the go-ahead to begin producing B-21s at a low rate,” William LaPlante, defense undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, said in a Monday evening statement. “One of the key attributes of this program has been designing for production from the start – and at scale – to provide a credible deterrent to adversaries. If you don’t produce and field to warfighters at scale, the capability doesn’t really matter.” The start of B-21 production was first reported by Bloomberg. The stealth bomber, which made its first flight in November, had to fly in order for Northrop to receive the low-rate initial production contract for the B-21. The company will hold its earnings call for the final quarter of 2023 on Thursday and likely give updates about the program for investors. Just last week, the Air Force confirmed that one of its six B-21 test aircraft flew a test sortie from Edwards Air Force Base, the bomber’s second publicly acknowledged flight. The aircraft will replace the B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit and is expected to enter service in the mid-2020s. The Air Force plans to buy at least 100. Boeing Whistleblower: Production Line Has “Enormous Volume Of Defects” Bolts On MAX 9 Weren’t Installed by Gary Leff January 22, 2024 A reader at respected airline industry site Leeham News offered a comment that suggests they have access to Boeing’s internal quality control systems, and shares details of what they saw regarding the Boeing 737 MAX 9 flown by Alaska Airlines that had a door plug detach inflight, causing rapid decompression of the aircraft. The takeaway appears to be that outsourced plane components have so many problems when they show up at the production line that Boeing’s quality control staff can’t keep up with them all. Current Boeing employee here – I will save you waiting two years for the NTSB report to come out and give it to you for free: the reason the door blew off is stated in black and white in Boeings own records. It is also very, very stupid and speaks volumes about the quality culture at certain portions of the business. …With that out of the way… why did the left hand (LH) mid-exit door plug blow off of the 737-9 registered as N704AL? Simple- as has been covered in a number of articles and videos across aviation channels, there are 4 bolts that prevent the mid-exit door plug from sliding up off of the door stop fittings that take the actual pressurization loads in flight, and these 4 bolts were not installed when Boeing delivered the airplane, our own records reflect this. …As a result, this check job that should find minimal defects has in the past 365 calendar days recorded 392 nonconforming findings on 737 mid fuselage door installations (so both actual doors for the high density configs, and plugs like the one that blew out). That is a hideously high and very alarming number, and if our quality system on 737 was healthy, it would have stopped the line and driven the issue back to supplier after the first few instances. …Now, on the incident aircraft this check job was completed on 31 August 2023, and did turn up discrepancies, but on the RH side door, not the LH that actually failed. I could blame the team for missing certain details, but given the enormous volume of defects they were already finding and fixing, it was inevitable something would slip through- and on the incident aircraft something did. I know what you are thinking at this point, but grab some popcorn because there is a plot twist coming up. The next day on 1 September 2023 a different team (remember 737s flow through the factory quite quickly, 24 hours completely changes who is working on the plane) wrote up a finding for damaged and improperly installed rivets on the LH mid-exit door of the incident aircraft. …Because there are so many problems with the Spirit build in the 737, Spirit has teams on site in Renton performing warranty work for all of their shoddy quality, and this SAT promptly gets shunted into their queue as a warranty item. Lots of bickering ensues in the SAT messages, and it takes a bit for Spirit to get to the work package. Once they have finished, they send it back to a Boeing QA for final acceptance, but then Malicious Stupid Happens! The Boeing QA writes another record in CMES (again, the correct venue) stating (with pictures) that Spirit has not actually reworked the discrepant rivets, they *just painted over the defects*. In Boeing production speak, this is a “process failure”. For an A&P mechanic at an airline, this would be called “federal crime”. …finally we get to the damning entry which reads something along the lines of “coordinating with the doors team to determine if the door will have to be removed entirely, or just opened. If it is removed then a Removal will have to be written.” Note: a Removal is a type of record in CMES that requires formal sign off from QA that the airplane been restored to drawing requirements. If you have been paying attention to this situation closely, you may be able to spot the critical error: regardless of whether the door is simply opened or removed entirely, the 4 retaining bolts that keep it from sliding off of the door stops have to be pulled out. A removal should be written in either case for QA to verify install, but as it turns out, someone (exactly who will be a fun question for investigators) decides that the door only needs to be opened, and no formal Removal is generated in CMES (the reason for which is unclear, and a major process failure). Therefore, in the official build records of the airplane, a pressure seal that cannot be accessed without opening the door (and thereby removing retaining bolts) is documented as being replaced, but the door is never officially opened and thus no QA inspection is required. The commenter concludes, “Where are the bolts? Probably sitting forgotten and unlabeled (because there is no formal record number to label them with) on a work-in-progress bench, unless someone already tossed them in the scrap bin to tidy up.” Compact, shape-shifting robot by Transformers' inventors lands on Moon Japanese toy manufacturer Takara Tomy developed the lunar rover, SORA-Q, in association with JAXA, Sony Group, and Doshisha University. Jijo Malayil Published: Jan 19, 2024 01:12 PM EST The SORA-Q robot will travel on the lunar surface and take pictures. JAXA Aboard a Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's (JAXA) lunar expedition, a robot designed by the inventors of Transformers has landed on the moon. Lunar Excursion Vehicle-2 (LEV-2), nicknamed SORA-Q, is an ultra-compact, deformable lunar robot that Japanese toy manufacturer Takara Tomy, JAXA, Sony Group, and Doshisha University jointly developed. Envisioned as a highly compact payload, this technology was affixed to the Smart Lander for Investigating Moon (SLIM) spacecraft during JAXA's "Moon Sniper" mission that completed a soft landing on the lunar surface. Its purpose is to showcase movement capabilities and autonomous functionalities while operating in the elevated gravitational conditions of the lunar surface. Curt Lewis