Flight Safety Information - April 9, 2025 No. 071 In This Issue : Incident: Westjet B738 near Vancouver on Mar 31st 2025, first officer incapacitated : Incident: Norwegian Sweden B738 near Copenhagen on Apr 7th 2025, engine problem : Incident: ANZ DH8C near New Plymouth on Apr 8th 2025, smell of fuel in cabin : Incident: Delta B738 at Mexico City on Apr 7th 2025, cabin did not pressurize : Near-collision investigation reveals Reagan National Airport controllers failed to stop flights during military flyover : Top FAA air traffic control official stepping down : Pilots Discussed Alternate Ways to Land Before Deadly Jeju Air Crash : Pilot in 2019 Oʻahu Helicopter Crash Wasn’t Properly Certified, FAA Says : Why Are There So Many Aviation Accidents? : ACSF Symposium Challenges All To Dig Deeper on Safety : Army Adjusts Tracker Policy and Flight Training Following January Collision with Passenger Jet : ‘Malicious’ Radio Transmissions Heard During Aircraft Emergency : American Airlines 58% Pilots Wants to Change APA Union : Boeing 787 radio software safety fix didn't work, says Qatar : American Airlines flight from New York to Milan turns back due to unruly passenger : Calendar of Events Incident: Westjet B738 near Vancouver on Mar 31st 2025, first officer incapacitated A Westjet Boeing 737-800, registration C-FCSX performing flight WS-1770 from Vancouver,BC (Canada) to Phoenix,AZ (USA), was enroute at FL390 about 380nm southsoutheast of Vancouver when the captain decided to return to Vancouver declaring a medical emergency. The aircraft landed safely on Vancouver's runway 08R about 65 minutes later. The Canadian TSB reported the first officer became incapacitated. https://avherald.com/h?article=5263e5ab&opt=0 Incident: Norwegian Sweden B738 near Copenhagen on Apr 7th 2025, engine problem A Norwegian Air Sweden Boeing 737-800, registration SE-RRO performing flight D8-5351 from Stockholm (Sweden) to Alicante,SP (Spain), was enroute at FL370 about 270nm southwest of Copenhagen (Denmark) already in Dutch Airspace when the crew decided to divert to Copenhagen advising ATC they had a low oil quantity indication for the right hand engine (CFM56). The aircraft maintained FL370 initially and landed safely on Copenhagen's runway 04R about 45 minutes later. The aircraft is still on the ground in Copenhagen about 27 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=5263cfd7&opt=0 Incident: ANZ DH8C near New Plymouth on Apr 8th 2025, smell of fuel in cabin An ANZ Air New Zealand de Havilland Dash 8-300, registration ZK-NFB performing flight NZ-5202 from Blenheim to Auckland (New Zealand), was enroute at FL230 about 30nm eastnortheast of New Plymouth when a smell of fuel developed on board prompting the crew to divert to New Plymouth (New Zealand). The aircraft landed safely on New Plymouth's runway 23 about 20 minutes later. A rapid disembarkation followed. The airline reported the smell was identified to come from a passengers carry-on luggage. The aircraft is still on the ground in New Plymouth about 8 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=5263cd06&opt=0 Incident: Delta B738 at Mexico City on Apr 7th 2025, cabin did not pressurize A Delta Airlines Boeing 737-800, registration N399DA performing flight DL-576 from Mexico City (Mexico) to Atlanta,GA (USA), was climbing out of Mexico City's runway 23L when the crew stopped the climb at FL120 reporting problems with the cabin pressurization. The aircraft entered a hold and subsequently returned to Mexico City for a safe landing on runway 23L about 50 minutes after departure. The flight was cancelled. The aircraft is still on the ground in Mexico City about 18 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=5263c67d&opt=0 Near-collision investigation reveals Reagan National Airport controllers failed to stop flights during military flyover A federal investigation is focusing on an air traffic control communications breakdown that led to a formation of military jets coming within seconds of colliding with a Delta Air Lines flight near Reagan National Airport, multiple sources told CNN. The March 28 incident was in the same crowded Washington, DC, airspace that was the site of January’s fatal midair collision between a commercial flight and an Army helicopter. The new details, first reported by CNN, renew concerns about the safety of military and commercial aircraft operating in close proximity and raise new questions about whether air traffic controllers in the nation’s capital are too stressed in the wake of the worst US air disaster in decades. As previously reported by CNN, the night before the incident, a fight broke out in the Reagan National control tower, leading airport police to arrest an air traffic controller. According to previously unreleased air traffic control audio reviewed by CNN, collision alerts flashed in front of the air traffic controller responsible for handling the military jets as they maneuvered for a flyover of Arlington National Cemetery, with the controller frantically issuing instructions to the formation of four jets. “Drago 61, I need you to make a left turn, left turn heading 250 immediately,” the controller from Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control shouted via radio to the leader of the United States Air Force T-38 jets. “Traffic opposite direction departing Washington National.” The military jets – flying at more than 350 miles per hour – came less than 3,900 feet laterally and 100 feet vertically from the Delta Airbus A319, which just took off from the airport and was still climbing, according to a source briefed on the incident. A CNN analysis of the previously unreported distance between the flights put against speeds gathered by FlightRadar24 suggests the jets came within roughly five seconds of colliding. The new details add to growing scrutiny of the crammed airspace around Reagan National Airport in the wake of the January 29 collision of a US Army Blackhawk helicopter and an American Airlines regional jet, killing all 67 people on board. The Federal Aviation Administration has since imposed heavy restrictions on helicopters operating near the airport. The communications breakdown, according to sources familiar with the incident, appeared to occur when air traffic controllers in the Reagan National Airport control tower failed to hold departing flights for five minutes as planned leading up to the 3:17 p.m. flyover. A short pause in departures from the airport is standard protocol for Arlington cemetery flyovers, but for some reason that did not happen, that source said. The source added that two other commercial flights departed after the Delta flight, which received an in-cockpit collision alert known as a resolution advisory. The apparent failure stunned those briefed on the case who say aviation officials “now fear what else could happen.” The FAA, which is investigating the incident, responded by deploying a “critical incident stress management team” to the control tower to provide “confidential support for staff.” The National Transportation Safety Board is also investigating the case. CNN has reached out to both agencies for comment. Republican Sen. Ted Cruz, who chairs the Senate committee that oversees the FAA, said during a committee hearing last week that the incident was “far too close, seconds away from becoming yet another disaster.” “The air traffic center that controls airspace around D.C. notified DCA about the flyover,” Cruz said. “That should have led to halted traffic,” calling the incident a “serious communication breakdown is just the latest in a string of missteps that signal that the air traffic organization is under extreme stress.” https://www.yahoo.com/news/near-collision-investigation-reveals-reagan-223219953.html Top FAA air traffic control official stepping down WASHINGTON (Reuters) -The head of the Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic organization is stepping down after 40 years of federal government service, an agency spokesperson said on Tuesday. Tim Arel, who is chief operating officer of the FAA Air Traffic Organization, is taking part in the U.S. Transportation Department's voluntary deferred retirement program, the spokesperson said. "He has committed to stay for the next few months to ensure a smooth transition," according to the spokesperson, who said he had originally planned to retire by the end of 2025. His departure comes as lawmakers have been examining why the agency did not address concerns about close calls between helicopters and airplanes near Reagan Washington National Airport before a January 29 fatal collision between an American Airlines regional jet and Army helicopter that killed 67 people. Arel did not respond to an email seeking comment. Separately, the FAA said it has installed a new management team to oversee air traffic control at Reagan National, confirming a Washington Post report. The FAA brought in a new management team at Reagan "to ensure strong support for the workforce" and added priorities include reviewing safety data trends, performance management "and ensuring facility training is robust and consistently meets national standards," the agency said. The FAA is about 3,500 air traffic controllers short of targeted staffing levels and a series of near-miss incidents has raised concerns in recent years. A persistent shortage of controllers has delayed flights and, at many facilities, controllers are working mandatory overtime and six-day weeks. "There is no question that we are seeing too many close calls," Arel told employees in 2023. Senators last month pressed the FAA for failing to act on thousands of reports of helicopters in dangerous proximity to airplanes near Reagan. Acting FAA Administrator Chris Rocheleau acknowledged the data was troubling and said "clearly something was missed." In March, the FAA imposed permanent restrictions on helicopter traffic around the airport, which has the single busiest runway in the United States. The FAA has mandated a halt to air traffic when essential helicopters are operating near Reagan. Last week, the FAA said it may slow flight arrivals at Reagan after the collision. It is also increasing operational supervisor staffing from six to eight and an FAA stress management team will visit the airport offering confidential support for staff. The FAA is reviewing the airport's "arrival rate of aircraft per hour, which is disproportionately concentrated within the last 30 minutes of each hour." On March 28, a near-miss between a departing Delta Air Lines A319 and a group of Air Force jets approaching Arlington National Cemetery triggered a cockpit collision warning for the Delta plane, leading to renewed safety concerns. Also last month, a fight occurred in the Reagan air traffic control tower and an employee was arrested and placed on leave, the FAA said. https://www.yahoo.com/news/top-faa-air-traffic-control-203559616.html Pilots Discussed Alternate Ways to Land Before Deadly Jeju Air Crash The pilots’ conversation with air traffic controllers, revealed in a partial transcript, could offer clues to what caused the disaster in South Korea, which killed 179 people. The pilots of Jeju Air Flight 2216 signaled three different plans for landing the stricken plane in the minutes before it crashed and killed 179 people in December, according to a partial transcript of their communication with air traffic controllers obtained by The New York Times. The transcript shows that the pilots reported a bird strike and radioed a mayday call as they approached Muan International Airport in South Korea on the morning of Dec. 29. They said they would turn left, then asked to turn right, intending to approach the airport’s sole runway from the south. When that failed, air traffic controllers asked if they wanted to land from the opposite direction, and the pilots said yes. The plane landed on its belly, overran the runway and struck a concrete structure that housed navigation aids, bursting into a deadly fireball. Only two people — flight attendants at the very back of the plane, a Boeing 737-800 — survived. The cause of the disaster, the deadliest plane crash on South Korean soil, is still being investigated, and the exchange between the pilots and the control tower could be a crucial piece of the puzzle. That is because it covers a period of about four minutes during which both of the plane’s flight recorders, known as black boxes, had stopped recording. The transcript includes no information about the state of the jet’s two engines or its electrical supply, which are intense areas of focus for investigators. It is still unclear why the black boxes went dark or why the plane’s landing gear was not engaged. The transcript was read out on Saturday to relatives of the victims by a representative of a board that is investigating the crash. The official told them that the readout excluded parts of the conversation to protect the privacy of its participants, according to people who shared it with The Times. Officials have not publicly released the transcript, and the board did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Multiple investigations, including one by the police, are underway in South Korea into the cause of the accident and factors that might have made it deadlier, like the solid concrete structure at the end of the runway. American and French investigators are assisting in one of the investigations. Much of what happened on that December morning remains a mystery. As the plane, which took off from Bangkok, approached Muan in southwestern South Korea, it began its descent, reaching an altitude of about 700 feet before running into trouble. First came a warning: Air traffic controllers told the pilots to be cautious because there were birds in the area. About a minute later, both of the plane’s black boxes — its flight data recorder and its cockpit voice recorder — stopped recording. That outage has complicated the investigation. But videos shot by onlookers, a preliminary accident report issued by the Korean authorities, and now the transcript of the pilots’ exchange with the control tower provide some clues. This is what we know: Around 8:58 a.m., the pilots reported a bird strike to the tower and declared their intention to turn around. “Mayday, mayday,” one of the pilots said. “Going around.” Authorities later found feathers and blood from migratory ducks known as baikal teals in both of the jet’s engines. Eyewitness videos also recorded a loud bang from the plane’s right engine, which aviation experts have described as a compressor stall or a disruption in the engine’s airflow. After the mayday call, the control tower told the pilots to “maintain runway heading” and climb to 5,000 feet. The pilots agreed. That is standard procedure when an aircraft is unable to land, according to Hyoseok Chang, an assistant professor in the department of air transportation and logistics at Hanseo University in South Korea. In such procedures, the aircraft climbs to a safe altitude and waits in a holding pattern. But seconds after the pilots agreed to that plan, before the airplane could reach 5,000 feet, the control tower pressed them to state their intention. They answered that they would make a left turn and land shortly on Runway 1. (That is professional terminology for approaching the airport’s single runway from the south; Runway 19 refers to approaching it from the north.) The pilots may have determined that “returning all the way to the holding point and attempting another approach to Runway 1 could cause further issues with the aircraft,” Professor Chang said. The compressor stall observed in videos indicates that there was a problem with at least one of the jet’s engines. Ten seconds later, the pilots reported that they were unable to land. They asked whether they could “make a right turn and head to Runway 1,” and the tower gave them permission to do so. The transcript does not explain why this attempt failed, too. But at just after 9:01 a.m., air traffic controllers asked whether the pilots wanted to approach the runway from the north. “Do you wish to land on Runway 19?” the controllers asked. The pilots said yes, and the tower cleared them to land. Less than two minutes later, the plane hit the tarmac without its landing gear deployed. It skidded past the end of the runway, slammed into the concrete structure and burst into flames. It is not clear what the air traffic controllers or the pilots knew about the concrete structure, which housed what is known as an instrument landing system. Under international safety standards, such structures are supposed to be built to collapse on impact, but this one was not. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/08/world/asia/jeju-crash-communications.html Pilot in 2019 Oʻahu Helicopter Crash Wasn’t Properly Certified, FAA Says The FAA says a whistleblower was correct in saying the owner of the helicopter tour company shouldn’t have certified the pilot, but investigators didn’t substantiate allegations of broader problems. The pilot of an air tour helicopter that disintegrated in midair over Kailua in April 2019, killing him and two passengers, should not have been in the cockpit that day because the boss who cleared him to fly wasn’t qualified to make that call. That allegation, made by a Federal Aviation Administration whistleblower more than five years ago, was one of two substantiated by FAA investigators in a report published without fanfare in 2022 and recently disclosed to Civil Beat in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. But investigators did not substantiate the whistleblower’s broader allegations that the FAA’s office in Honolulu failed to enforce safety regulations for air tour companies. Nor does their report say anything about that office’s role in granting the operator of the air tour company the authority to certify the pilot working for her. U.S. Rep. Ed Case, who has made air tour safety a signature issue, hadn’t seen the report until Civil Beat asked him to comment on it. He called on the FAA to do a “more thorough and transparent investigation” of the whistleblower’s allegations. “Without a comprehensive review, there is little chance that those responsible for the agency’s failures will be held accountable, leaving public safety at continued risk,” he said in a written statement provided to Civil Beat. The investigation followed a deadly period for the companies that fly sightseers and adventurers around the islands. Between April and December of 2019, three crashes left 21 people dead: the Kailua accident, a skydiving plane crash in June that killed 11 and a Safari Aviation helicopter disaster on Kauaʻi that December that killed seven. In the case of the Kailua wreck, a local FAA manager had improperly granted the head of Novictor Aviation the authority to certify her own pilots to fly, according to the whistleblower and the FAA report. Just 10 days before the accident, the head of Novictor determined that the 28-year-old pilot was qualified to carry passengers on air tours. The wreck occurred on the pilot’s fourth day of flying tours around Oʻahu. The FAA’s Office of Audit and Evaluation found that no corrective action was required, however. Days after the wreck, an FAA inspector had revoked the owner’s authority to certify pilots, and agency staff later verified that the company’s pilots were qualified. That FAA inspector went public several months later with his allegations. Investigative staff of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation deemed his allegations credible, documenting them in a fact sheet released in January 2020. U.S. Sen. Roger Wicker, then chair of the committee, asked the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General to investigate. But that never happened, Civil Beat has learned. Instead, the Inspector General “re-referred” the case to the FAA’s Office of Audit and Evaluation in February 2022 – effectively allowing the FAA to investigate itself. Case questioned how that happened. “The lack of serious review and the failure to fully probe the causes at the heart of these concerns raises troubling concerns about the accuracy of the investigation’s findings,” Case told Civil Beat. The fact that the agency’s internal investigation substantiated two of the whistleblower’s four allegations “highlights a fundamental failure on the part of the FAA to properly oversee an industry that is clearly operating without sufficient oversight,” Case said. The FAA did not agree to an interview with an FAA official in Hawaiʻi and did not respond to a request for comment on Case’s criticism. The DOT’s Office of Inspector General didn’t respond to a question asking why it referred the matter to the FAA. Air tours are the only way to see some of Hawaiʻi’s most breathtaking features. But weather conditions can change rapidly as pilots navigate the mountainous terrain. There have been 95 accidents and other air safety incidents in the state over the past decade, according to the National Transportation Safety Board. Just last year, the NTSB, which investigates those incidents, pressed the FAA to increase its oversight of air tour operators in Hawaiʻi, particularly in light of what the NTSB says is pilots’ tendency to continue flying when conditions deteriorate. A week later, three people were killed when a helicopter broke up while flying off Kauaʻi’s Napali Coast in circumstances similar to those in Kailua. A Known Problem; A Pilot New To Hawaiʻi In the Kailua crash, the helicopter broke apart in midair and nose-dived onto a residential street in Coconut Grove, where it burst into flames. Surveillance video showed fragments of the helicopter landing in the neighborhood. The NTSB determined that the crash occurred after the helicopter hit severe turbulence and the pilot exceeded its recommended airspeed. That speed caused the helicopter’s main rotor to oscillate and strike the cabin, quickly destroying it. The manufacturer has warned pilots that the R44’s main rotor can flap dangerously during turbulence. It’s a particular risk for aviators in Hawaiʻi, where weather conditions change quickly. Among the team of investigators at the scene in April 2019 was Joe Monfort, an aviation safety inspector from the FAA’s Flight Standards District Office in Honolulu. Monfort, a 20-year Army veteran who retired as a warrant officer helicopter pilot, had been with the FAA since 2009. The FAA’s 2022 report details what Monfort and the other investigators learned about how the pilot, Joseph Berridge, had ended up in control of the Robinson R44 helicopter that day. Berridge had been hired in New Mexico by Novictor Aviation, which operates as Rainbow Helicopters on Oʻahu and the Big Island, about two weeks before the accident. And Novictor’s owner, Nicole Vandelaar — now Nicole Battjes — had just recently certified Berridge to fly in Hawaiʻi. But Monfort found that Battjes lacked the requisite experience to certify Berridge or anyone else, and that no one had observed her certifying pilots in the 24 months before, as required. Monfort concluded that an FAA official in the Honolulu office had improperly granted her this authority in November 2018. Monfort revoked it. All the other pilots Battjes had evaluated were re-evaluated by a qualified aviation safety inspector. The FAA never took any action against Novictor over that issue. In their report, FAA investigators wrote that those corrective actions were sufficient and that other issues were addressed through administrative action. Among those other issues: Novictor had hired Berridge without checking a national database regarding his driving record. The FAA sent the company a “Letter of Correction” for that oversight. John Cox, Novictor Aviation’s vice president of safety, told Civil Beat that the company fully cooperated with the FAA and NTSB investigations and that it works closely with the Honolulu Flight Standards District Office. Report Doesn’t Address FAA’s Role Though the FAA report repeatedly says that Battjes was improperly given authority to certify her pilots, it didn’t examine who gave her that authority or why. But a lawsuit filed over the crash shows that FAA officials in Hawaiʻi did discuss that issue, if obliquely. The suit was filed by the parents of crash victim Ryan McAuliffe against Novictor, the estate of the pilot and the U.S. government. The parties agreed to a confidential settlement in June. In a court filing, an attorney for the McAuliffes wrote that documents showed the government ”repeatedly acknowledged its role in improperly issuing authorizations that contributed to the subject crash.” The filing quoted an email sent by an acting assistant manager at the FAA’s Honolulu office in November 2019 in which the employee expressed concern about the best way to proceed with Novictor “in light of our errors and lack of oversight of the Check Pilot program at Novictor.” Aimee Lum, an attorney with the Honolulu law firm Davis, Levin and Livingston who represented the McAuliffes, declined to elaborate on the filing. Monfort’s allegations had gone much further than what the manager suggested in his email, saying that the same day he revoked Battjes’ authority to certify her pilots, an assistant FAA manager removed him from the Kailua investigation, citing his caseload. Monfort said that amounted to retaliation; the Senate committee said it corroborated the allegation. The FAA report has nothing to say on the matter. Monfort also alleged that FAA management had failed to require helicopter tour operators to correct deficiencies in their training programs. Investigators agreed that was true in one case that he had identified in 2018, but didn’t agree it was a pattern. And FAA investigators said they did not substantiate two of Monfort’s broader allegations about the Honolulu office’s oversight. One of them was related to a crash that happened eight months after the one in Kailua. Monfort claimed that managers in Honolulu’s Flight Standards District Office had prevented him from traveling to Kauaʻi from September through November 2019 to perform “required surveillance and inspection” of the air tour operator Safari Aviation. On Dec. 26, a Safari Aviation Airbus helicopter flown by the company’s chief pilot slammed into a ridge near Kekaha on Kauaʻi. Three children were among the six passengers who died along with the pilot. FAA investigators wrote that although there had been confusion over travel arrangements during this period, “there is no evidence” that managers “were actively trying to prevent the whistleblower from traveling.” https://www.civilbeat.org/2025/04/pilot-in-2019-oahu-helicopter-crash-wasnt-properly-certified-faa-says/ Why Are There So Many Aviation Accidents? By: Stephen Carbone While the latest aviation safety issues and accidents over the last few months scare some, to seasoned professionals the aviation tragedies and near misses do not come as a surprise. The only question is: Why did it take so long? There’s a long list of safety failures in the airline industry. United Airlines B777 plunged to the Pacific during climb in 2023, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) didn’t investigate it for months. A 265-pound main tire fell off a B777 taking off out of Los Angeles; it fell from over 200 feet — still spinning — into an airport parking lot. The nose tire came off a taxiing B757. Two mechanics were killed when an incorrectly pressurized tire exploded in Atlanta. Most memorable were the Endeavour regional jet that flipped in Toronto, the mid-air collision between a PSA Airlines regional plane and a military helicopter, and an Endeavour regional aircraft that struck a wing during a go-around at La Guardia airport. More such events never made the news or were easily forgotten. Boeing’s 737-Max was a failure on so many levels. But it wasn’t Boeing’s failure, as people were led to believe. Boeing makes products. Airlines buy these aircraft for technological improvements. It’s solely the airline’s responsibility to properly train their pilots and technicians to operate and maintain the aircraft — not the manufacturer’s. The Alaska Airlines flight 1282 door plug loss was Boeing’s fault; but Boeing didn’t own it alone. Blame for that failure was shared with the FAA, the contract fuselage producer, Spirit AeroSystems, and the NTSB. All missed the important cues. They permitted breakdowns in quality control; both internal and external quality evaluations were ignored and almost cost a plane full of people their lives. It’s impossible to analyze these multiple facts in so short a space, but Alaska flight 1282 was never recognized for what it was: a symptom. Why the Uptick of Safety Failures? First, the events playing out come on the tail end of Covid-19 shutdowns. When then-President Joe Biden started telework policies, many of the FAA aviation safety inspector (ASI) workforce stayed home. Onsite surveillance and oversight of FAA-certificate holders, including international component repair stations and overhaul facilities, were stopped. This means the United States has been blind to many FAA certificate holders’ activities, including many air operators, since 2020. Second, the FAA suffered a mass exodus of knowledgeable and experienced ASIs who refused the Covid shot. Airlines and their contract providers also surrendered to the mandate. Third, many “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI) hires, in both government and industry, further reduced the level of experience of many in the industry. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg ignored real safety issues by focusing on “racist roads” and DEI promotions. Buttigieg’s distractions meant safety took a back seat to ideology. The path to safety failure has been years in the making; problems hiding in plain sight evolved into nightmares of industry’s own creation. Root Causes The root causes of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines B737-Max accidents weren’t complacency, though it did play an important role. Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines’ bean counters played the most fundamental roles in the safety failures. Poor skills don’t result from manufacturers not providing training to their customers; poor skills come from over dependency on technology. Where do bean counters fit in? Airlines invest in new high technology aircraft, like the Boeing B737-Max, to exploit the cost-savings the technology promises. Bean counters expect pilots and technicians to ignore honing their skills and instead let the aircraft fly itself or fix itself. Meanwhile, new aircraft technologies will continue to evolve with future innovations, like one- or zero-pilot cockpits. Modern aircraft are also designed to be fuel-efficient; every aspect of an aircraft’s flight profile, from flight control settings to adjusting engine power, is intended to acquire the lowest fuel consumption. The caveat is the pilots must be hands-off. Today’s pilot programs the flight computer, which then plots the altitude, speed, and course. During the takeoff or landing phases, the pilot retracts/extends the gear and flaps, then sits back and babysits. Airlines push pilots to surrender authority to the aircraft because the aircraft computer flies more economically than the human pilot. While the results are improved fuel efficiency and lower costs, pilots become complacent. Their skills become stale; their competence atrophies. Technicians are also restricted. Troubleshooting skills are discouraged. Airline management wants the aircraft to tell the technician what to fix. Skills that were common knowledge decades ago are not so common today, especially with developing fly-by-wire systems. The old ways are forgotten; they’ll never be passed on to the next generation. Just as important, self-evaluations of safety and regulatory agencies are compromised. The FAA, still reeling from record ASI departures, is scrambling to train new-hire ASIs. Their experience levels have plummeted, meaning it will take incoming ASIs decades to build FAA job knowledge to pre-2020 levels. Remaining FAA veterans will never succeed in imparting decades of knowledge before they retire. All this while the FAA also faces challenges in aerospace and unmanned vehicles. Meanwhile, the NTSB, hypothetical transportation detectives, is now demonstrating a fundamental lack of industry knowledge. Investigatory protocols are being trashed. Whether it has been from ignorance or a collective lack of experience, since the NTSB was established in 1967, it has not produced an accident report that has increased safety. Based on the NTSB’s debatable authority, it’s unclear how the aviation industry can expect the NTSB to understand and support aviation safety. Travelers are scared; they’re asking themselves, “Is it safe?” We have an airline industry that thinks DEI trumps experience and knowledge; a regulator that thinks it can oversee such an industry with inspectors who have greatly reduced proficiency; an investigation agency that doesn’t take accidents seriously; and a media who can’t honestly report what’s happening. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy has his work cut out for him. He has critical problems with the quality of staff in both the FAA and the NTSB. He will have to think outside the box and trust the lower-level people — those who do the oversight, inspection, and surveillance — to fix these agencies. Why? Because bureaucrats and upper-management types broke these agencies to begin with. Stephen Carbone has spent 40 years in the aviation industry, 19 years of it with the airlines. He retired in 2022 after 20 years as an FAA inspector and NTSB major accident investigator before starting his own consulting business, Aircraft Maintenance Safety Professionals. https://thefederalist.com/2025/04/08/why-are-there-so-many-aviation-accidents/ ACSF Symposium Challenges All To Dig Deeper on Safety The Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) returned to Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) in Daytona Beach, Florida, for its annual Safety Symposium, opening the 2025 event with a focus on the human element in safety. Kicking off on Monday with a career panel and wrapping on Thursday with a series of workshops, the event has continued to grow with 150 attendees in person and more than 50 tuning in virtually for the first time through streaming sessions. Kent Stauffer, ACSF chair and v-p of safety for Flexjet, stressed that many of the sessions planned throughout the event surround the human element. He asked a blanket question of how attendees, mostly safety professionals, felt now about aviation, which elicited responses of concern, nervousness, and media attention. He said that follows with the question of, “What are you going to do about it?” He contended that it comes down to the human rather than technology. While technology has advanced and aided safety, it comes down to what is “uniquely human.” He noted that people reference human factors but asked what that means, and suggested that people need to dig deeper and think differently about decision-making. Technology focuses only on logic, but humans bring emotions. Pilots are taught that they can’t bring their emotions to the job, but Stauffer contended that people should prioritize both logic and emotion. Convergent CEO Tony Kern, a perennial favorite at Bombardier’s Safety Standdown and in recent years at ACSF’s Safety Symposium, followed that sentiment during his keynote, saying it is not possible to operate without emotions, but it is key to learn how to control them and use all of your resources. He noted that in aviation, people are taught how to do things right, but they are not taught as much about the wrongs—and there are many of those. But it’s a difficult prospect because of hubris, he maintained. The industry has settled on its knowledge that “we’re the safest industry ever—more likely to be struck by lightning in a terrorist camp [than to be in an accident]… but sometimes that happens.” Now the question is how people get ready for when things go wrong. Kern then hosted a special panel with ACSF president and CEO Bryan Burns and his son Ryan Burns to discuss the delineations with sports. Ryan Burns, who had started as quarterback at Stanford University, detailed the preparation necessary and the perseverance to get to that point, but also what happens when you allow your emotions and mental state to cloud your focus. Burns, who enjoyed successes initially followed by some losses, was forced to face that. He noted that he felt relief when he was told the starting job was getting handed to another. Kern noted the lessons that thread through that as well as aviation: readiness, teamwork, adversity, and persistence. But also the ability to address what is within and the mental health part of it. Several more sessions on various aspects of safety were scheduled throughout Tuesday and continuing into Wednesday. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2025-04-08/acsf-symposium-challenges-dig-deeper-human-role-safety Army Adjusts Tracker Policy and Flight Training Following January Collision with Passenger Jet WASHINGTON — The Army has made changes to how its helicopters use a safety system that broadcasts aircraft location and has reduced the number of flights over Washington following a collision with a passenger jet that killed 67 people, the head of Army aviation told The Associated Press on Tuesday. Investigators are still determining why the Army helicopter and the American Airlines jet collided near Ronald Reagan National Airport on Jan. 29, but the Federal Aviation Administration has data showing an alarming number of close calls around the airport. The safety system, called ADSB, short for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, has become a flashpoint as some have pointed to the likely lack of use by the Black Hawk helicopter that night as a potential cause of the crash. The ADSB-out part of the system is designed to help air traffic controllers and nearby planes better track an aircraft’s location with position updates every second. But it can also allow anyone — including a plane enthusiast on the ground — know precisely where a helicopter or airplane is located. Army helicopters in the past have turned off the system for many missions because they were deemed sensitive. The Army’s head of aviation, Brig. Gen. Matthew Braman, said there now will be fewer flights with the ADSB-out data turned off. And also fewer VIP flights In the months since the crash, the Army has halted the vast majority of flights it was conducting for general officers ranked three stars and above, to ferry them from the Pentagon’s helipad to regional locations. It has only resumed limited flights for the defense secretary, deputy defense secretary and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while a limited number of other senior military leaders can fly from Virginia’s Fort Belvoir, Braman said. The Army’s 12th Battalion is one of 28 agencies that used the low-altitude helicopter routes around Ronald Reagan National Airport. That includes the Department of Defense, individual military services, local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, emergency medical services, the National Guard, Coast Guard and others. Changes to ADSB-out policy Before the collision, the Army was exempt from broadcasting ADSB-out data during sensitive missions, according to an August 2024 memo obtained by the AP. Those missions could include ferrying a senior leader or training for an emergency where transmitting a landing location could expose sensitive tactical information on reaction plans. The Army still has that exemption, but is making changes to how it flies so the exemption won't be used as often, Braman said. In past training and evaluation flights — such as on the night of the crash — crews combined normal flight routes with practice landings at sensitive locations. That meant they had to fly with ADSB-out switched off for the whole flight, according to the memo. Now crews are separating normal training and evaluation flights from flights that rehearse the classified continuity of government mission, Braman said. That reduces the number of flights where ADSB-out data will be turned off. “If they are not going to one of those sensitive locations it should 100% be on,” Braman said. It’s assumed the three Army crew who were killed in the crash were flying with ADSB-out turned off, but crash investigators have not concluded that yet, he said. The other part of the system, ADSB-in, pulls in location data from nearby planes and helicopters. Few Army aircraft had ADSB-in, due to the cost, and were not required to have it. The Army has now authorized the purchase of 1,600 ADSB-in systems for its helicopter fleet. Army says the helicopter’s location was still known Even if ADSB-out was off, the Black Hawk’s transponder was in use and transmitting its position, Braman said. The FAA says ADSB-out data is more precise than the radar data communicated by a transponder, which depending on the mode in use can shield some aircraft information. The night of the crash, the Black Hawk was transmitting in three transponder modes — A, C, and S — which combined gave the helicopter’s identity, location and altitude. “There was no question where that aircraft was,” Braman said. There was “no point” during the flight where the jet and the airport control tower could not see the Black Hawk, he said. “I think there’s still a perception out there — I know there is — that the aircraft with ADBS-out in that segment around DCA were invisible. And that is so far from the truth,” Braman said. As a result of the crash, the FAA has permanently closed a route along the Potomac River that directly intersected the flight path for the runway where January’s collision took place. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/08/army-adjusts-tracker-policy-and-flight-training-following-january-collision-passenger-jet.html ‘Malicious’ Radio Transmissions Heard During Aircraft Emergency An unknown voice could be heard instructing pilots to go around. A controller and several pilots heard “malicious” transmissions on an air traffic control frequency Sunday. The incident occurred at Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport. According to air traffic control audio tapes, a voice can be heard on the frequency saying “go around.” The controller later said this was not an instruction from the tower. Some pilots also heard the transmission, but no action was taken. A Kalitta Air crew said they “clearly heard” the go-around instructions. The controller responded, saying he believed this transmission to be “malicious” in nature. “Exercise extreme caution for all frequencies and verify instructions,” the controller warned all aircraft. Aircraft Emergency Around the same time, American flight 672, operating from Dallas/Fort Worth to New York LaGuardia, was forced to divert to Cincinnati due to a right-hand engine issue. The crew proceeded to shut the engine down. An emergency was declared, and the Boeing 737-800 landed safely. While on approach, the controller warned the American crew of the unauthorized transmission, which had occurred roughly 15 minutes earlier. A Federal Aviation Administration spokesperson told AirlineGeeks that the agency had received a report of the unauthorized transmission but would not investigate until there were repeat incidents. If more were to take place, the matter could be referred to law enforcement, the spokesperson added. https://airlinegeeks.com/2025/04/08/malicious-radio-transmissions-heard-during-aircraft-emergency/ American Airlines 58% Pilots Wants to Change APA Union This push for union representation change isn't new for American Airlines pilots. FORT WORTH- American Airlines (AA) pilots are showing growing support for exploring a potential union change, with 58% of surveyed pilots indicating they favor investigating a merger with the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). The Allied Pilots Association (APA), which currently represents approximately 16,000 pilots at American Airlines (AA), recently conducted a poll showing majority interest in exploring alternatives. American Airlines Pilots Union Change The University of New Hampshire Survey Center interviewed 908 APA pilots in February, revealing significant backing for establishing a committee to examine merging with ALPA, which represents pilots at most major North American carriers including Delta Air Lines (DL) and United Airlines (UA). The survey results, detailed in a recent APA memo seen by AirlineGeeks, indicate a clear preference among American Airlines pilots to explore representation alternatives. Of the pilots polled, 58% expressed they either “strongly” or “somewhat favor” establishing a committee to investigate merging with ALPA, the larger aviation union that represents pilots across numerous North American airlines. However, the transition isn’t unanimously supported. Approximately 25% of surveyed pilots expressed firm opposition to an ALPA merger. These pilots indicated they either don’t want a committee formed, oppose funding such a committee, or have intrinsic opposition to changing unions. The University of New Hampshire pollster who briefed APA directors in late March noted there was no “unanimous sentiment on either side of the question,” though adding, “You have a majority who want to go forward.” History of Merger Efforts This push for union representation change isn’t new for American Airlines pilots. In 2023, an advocacy group called “AA Pilots for ALPA” reported to Forbes that they had collected 8,219 cards supporting a merger with ALPA. This figure represented approximately half of American Airlines’ total pilot workforce, demonstrating significant grassroots interest in changing representation. The potential shift comes at a time when pilot unions across the industry have been securing improved contracts following the post-pandemic recovery in air travel. ALPA, as the larger organization representing pilots at multiple major carriers, potentially offers different resources and bargaining leverage than the independent APA. If American Airlines pilots were to shift their representation from APA to ALPA, it would significantly consolidate pilot union representation among major U.S. carriers. ALPA already represents pilots at Delta, United, and numerous other airlines, making it the dominant pilot union in North America. https://aviationa2z.com/index.php/2025/04/08/american-airlines-58-pilots-wants-to-change-apa-union/#google_vignette Boeing 787 radio software safety fix didn't work, says Qatar Boeing issued a software safety patch for the VHF radio systems used on its 787 aircraft, and the update turned out to be ineffective, Qatar Airways has complained. In February, the US Department of Transportation issued an advisory [PDF] about a problem with the aircraft's electronics that was causing VHF radio traffic to unexpectedly switch between active and standby mode. In practice, this means pilots constantly have to check their radio settings to make sure all messages from air traffic control are received, and multiple cases of this unwanted switching have been reported. "The FAA has received reports indicating that VHF radio frequencies transfer between the active and standby windows of the TCP [tuning control panel] without flightcrew input," the dept said. "The flightcrew may not be aware of uncommanded frequency changes and could fail to receive air traffic control communications. This condition, if not addressed, could result in missed communications such as amended clearances and critical instructions for changes to flight path and consequent loss of safe separation between aircraft, collision, or runway incursion." Boeing issued a free software fix to stop the mode changes and, according to Uncle Sam, the update will take 90 minutes to install with an estimated labor cost of $127.50 per aircraft, with 157 US airplanes reportedly vulnerable. The problem affects 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 aircraft. The unsafe condition still exists on airplanes America's aviation watchdog the FAA has asked for feedback from airlines by April 14 on the situation, and Qatar Airways isn't waiting that long. It has already warned the patch isn't working as it should: The radios still change mode without warning. "Qatar Airways flight crew are still reporting similar issues from post-mod airplanes. [Qatar Airways] already reported the events to Boeing/Collins aerospace for further investigation and root cause determination," the airline said. "As of now, Qatar believes that the issue is not completely addressed, and the unsafe condition still exists on airplanes." Neither Qatar, Boeing, or the FAA representative were available for comment on the issue. Collins is a software provider for Boeing. https://www.theregister.com/2025/04/08/boeing_787_radio_software_patch/ American Airlines flight from New York to Milan turns back due to unruly passenger An American Airlines flight from New York to Milan was forced to turn back hours into the flight after passengers say there was a frightening incident on board with an unruly passenger. The FAA is investigating the incident. Flight 198 to Milan took off from John F. Kennedy International Airport around 7 p.m. Monday. Four hours into the journey, passengers say there was an announcement that the plane would be turning back to New York. People on board said the disruption began when a man became irate after not receiving his preferred meal and being told he couldn't sit in an exit row with a baby. The situation quickly escalated. "We've got this crazy man in the back" "We kind of noticed a scuffle in the back. They were asking around if there were any police officers or Army members, or somebody who could help because there were no air marshals on," passenger Krystie Tomlinson said. "They were telling everyone that there were technical issues on the plane, which is even scarier," passenger Michael Scigliano said. The real reason became apparent when they noticed the commotion in the back of the plane. "There was apparently somebody in the back, he was charging at the stewardesses. At some point, he charged past all of our seats and tried to barge into the pilot's cabin," Tomlinson said. "Apparently, the whole thing started because of a meal choice they didn't get. I guess they asked for it ahead of time. They never got exactly what they wanted. They also wanted to sit in an exit row. They had a baby with them, so they told them they couldn't and apparently those two things are what pushed the person over the edge." "The guy was still in the back of the plane unprotected, unrestrained, which was a little bit scary considering we had a plane full of 300 people and there was no air marshal on board, and we've got this crazy man in the back," Scigliano said. Passengers say they landed back in New York at 3 a.m. and then had to wait on the plane for the man to be escorted off by authorities. "Oftentimes, these are mental health issues. We don't know all the things that the pilot knows. Maybe the pilot felt, given the circumstances of disruption and the safety of other passengers, it was best to go back," aviation trial attorney Robert Clifford said. Passengers say they were relieved to be back on solid ground, but say they got no help from the airline. "Back to New York at 3:30 in the morning. They offered us nothing," Scigliano said. "I asked to use the American Airlines lounge to breastfeed and change. They said you can go in if you pay $79," Tomlinson said. Passengers stayed in the airport overnight, and their rebooked flight finally took off around 11 a.m. Tuesday, 16 hours after they left on their original flight. The FAA says in 2024 they recorded more than 1,800 unruly passenger incidents. https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/new-york-to-milan-flight-turns-back-unruly-passenger/ CALENDAR OF EVENTS · Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) Safety Symposium April 7-9, 2025 · AIA Conference: The Aviation Insurance Association's annual conference in Orlando, Florida from April 25–28, 2025 . 70th annual Business Aviation Safey Summit (BASS), May 6-7, 2025, Charlotte, N.C., organized by Flight Safety Foundation in partnership with NBAA and NATA. · Sixth Edition of International Accident Investigation Forum, 21 to 23 May 2025, Singapore · Flight Safety Foundation - Aviation Safety Forum June 5-6, 2025 - Brussels . 2025 EASA-FAA International Aviation Safety Conference, 10 Jun 2025 to 12 Jun 2025, Cologne, Germany · The 9th Shanghai International Aerospace Technology and Equipment Exposition 2025; June 11 to 13, 2025 . 3rd annual Asia Pacific Summit for Aviation Safety (AP-SAS), July 15-17, 2025, Singapore, organized by Flight Safety Foundation and CAAS. . Asia Pacific Aviation Safety Seminar 2025; 10-11 September 2025; Manila, Philippines · ISASI ANNUAL SEMINAR 2025'September 29, 2025 – October 3, 2025, DENVER, COLORADO . 29th annual Bombardier Safety Standdown, November 11-13, 2025; Wichita, Kansas · CHC Safety & Quality Summit, 11th – 13th November 2025, Vancouver, BC Canada Curt Lewis