Flight Safety Information - June 19, 2026 No. 120 In This Issue : Incident: JAL A35K over Greenland on Jun 14th 2026, engine oil problem : Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner - Cell Phone Smoke Incident (Japan) : AI 171 crash probe: Pilots’ body FIP claims electric failure led to Boeing accident, questions pilot suicide theory : The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau's Lack of Detail in Its AI171 Crash Interim Report Worries Experts : Bolen Highlights Importance of Fostering Innovation at Aviation Safety Conference : GPS jamming active when King Air struck mountain : WestJet flight evacuated at DIA after blown tires : Japan Airlines' CEO got a pay cut after worker misconduct. That's not so unusual in Japan. : American Airlines Tulsa base maintenance facility celebrates 80 years of excellence : Calendar of Events Incident: JAL A35K over Greenland on Jun 14th 2026, engine oil problem A JAL Japan Airlines Airbus A350-1000, registration JA02WJ performing flight JL-43 from Tokyo Haneda (Japan) to London Heathrow,EN (UK) with 222 passengers and 17 crew, was enroute at FL370 over Greenland when the crew decided to divert to Keflavik (Iceland) due to a malfunction with the right hand engine's oil system. The aircraft landed safely on Keflavik's runway 01. A replacement A350-1000 registration JA03WJ positioned from Tokyo Haneda to Keflavik, resumed the flight and reached London with a delay of about 30 hours. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground in Keflavik until Jun 17th, then positioned back to Haneda. https://avherald.com/h?article=53ab403a&opt=0 Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner - Cell Phone Smoke Incident (Japan) Date: Thursday 18 June 2026 Time: c. 13:00 Type: Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner Owner/operator: British Airways Registration: G-ZBKD MSN: 38618/361 Year of manufacture: 2015 Fatalities: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 211 Other fatalities: 0 Aircraft damage: None Location: Tokyo International Airport/Haneda (HND/RJTT) - Japan Phase: Taxi Nature: Passenger - Scheduled Departure airport: Tokyo International Airport/Haneda (HND/RJTT), Japan Destination airport: London Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL), UK Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources Narrative: A Boeing 787-9 of British Airways, operating BAW/BA6 from Tokyo/Haneda, Japan to London/Heathrow, UK, suffered a cell phone smoke incident while taxing to the runway for departure at Haneda. The crew quickly controlled the situation. The aircraft returned to the gate for inspection and restarted by the same plane with an hour of delay. No reported injuries among 211 occupants. https://www.aviation-safety.net/wikibase/572525 AI 171 crash probe: Pilots’ body FIP claims electric failure led to Boeing accident, questions pilot suicide theory The pilots’ body claimed that the rapid deployment of the backup turbine indicated that the aircraft suffered a catastrophic electrical failure before the engines stopped. According to FIP, the electrical failure may have triggered the engine switches and led to the crash. The Federation of Indian Pilots (FIP) has challenged the official narrative surrounding the crash of Air India Flight AI 171 in Ahmedabad, claiming that new simulator tests point towards a major systemic electrical failure rather than a deliberate action by the pilots. Addressing a press conference, FIP President Captain C.S. Randhawa alleged that crucial technical evidence was ignored during the investigation and that aviation experts were sidelined to support a predetermined conclusion. The official interim report into the crash had stated that the flight crew deliberately cut fuel supplies to the engines in a coordinated suicide pact. The report said the manual shutdown resulted in the aircraft’s ram air turbine, a backup power system activated during a complete power loss, dropping four seconds later. However, Randhawa said the FIP conducted detailed simulator tests by replicating the aircraft’s weight, balance and weather conditions linked to the flight. “Our simulator tests prove that a manual fuel cut-off takes a full 18 seconds to drop that backup turbine. The official timeline of four seconds is physically and technically impossible under a manual shutdown scenario,” he observed. The pilots’ body claimed that the rapid deployment of the backup turbine indicated that the aircraft suffered a catastrophic electrical failure before the engines stopped. According to FIP, the electrical failure may have triggered the engine switches and led to the crash. The FIP also stated that the lone survivor of Flight 171 reported seeing the cabin lights flicker and dim before the aircraft entered its final descent, which the federation said supported its electrical failure theory. The pilots’ body further claimed that the aircraft had a documented history of unresolved electrical problems before the fatal flight. FIP raises concerns over investigation The federation alleged that Captain R.S. Sandhu, regarded by it as India’s top Boeing 787 expert, was deliberately kept away from the investigative testing process. “They are ignoring the input of our most experienced pilot because his knowledge would completely disprove their ‘pilot suicide’ theory. It is easier to blame dead pilots who cannot defend themselves than to confront a major mechanical or software flaw,” Randhawa alleged. The FIP said it has submitted its simulator data and findings to Boeing and government aviation authorities. The federation has demanded that the final accident report should not be released until the technical differences regarding the ram air turbine deployment are fully examined. It has also called for the immediate reinstatement of Captain Sandhu to the official investigation team to ensure what it described as a transparent and unbiased review. https://www.thestatesman.com/india/ai-171-crash-probe-federation-of-indian-pilots-claims-electric-failure-air-india-boeing-accident-1503607709.html The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau's Lack of Detail in Its AI171 Crash Interim Report Worries Experts Investigation veterans say it fails both the letter and the spirit of the rules meant to protect public safety. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau's Lack of Detail in Its AI171 Crash Interim Report Worries Experts Charred remains lie at the Air India flight AI 171 crash site, at BJ Medical College hostel complex, in Ahmedabad, Wednesday, June 10, 2026. Photo: PTI. New Delhi: On June 12, 2025, India faced one of its worst aviation disasters. As many as 260 people died as the Air India flight 171 crashed into buildings and a massive fireball erupted. Twelve months on, the families of the victims and crew still await answers, and what they have got so far circumvents guidelines. The one year statement of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, the division of the Ministry of Civil Aviation which investigates aircraft accidents and incidents in India, was issued on the anniversary of the crash. It opens with a solemn tribute and the assurance that the investigation is being conducted under India’s Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2017, and “the standards and recommended practices contained in ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] Annex 13.” It notes that a preliminary factual report was released on July 12, 2025, and describes the last 12 months as “an extensive and rigorous examination of all relevant technical, operational, organisational and human factors associated with the accident.” Remarkably little official information has entered the public domain since the crash. Apart from the 15-page preliminary report released a month after the accident, investigators have disclosed few substantive findings. The preliminary report outlined a sequence of events in the aircraft’s final seconds – including fuel-control switch movements, deployment of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) and a brief cockpit exchange between the pilots – but stopped short of explaining why those events occurred and drew no conclusions about probable cause. With the final report still pending more than a year later, that document, released a year ago on June 12, remains the principal official account of what happened aboard Air India 171. The AAIB’s interim statement arrives at this juncture and falls well short of what Annex 13 of the ICAO, the United Nations agency that sets global standards for air accident investigations, expects from a genuine “interim statement,” and investigation veterans say it fails both the letter and the spirit of the rules meant to protect public safety. Annex 13: What Paragraph 6.6 actually requires Annex 13 is explicit about what must happen when a Final Report on an aircraft incident is delayed beyond 12 months. Paragraph 6.5 says the government conducting the investigation “shall make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, if possible, within twelve months.” Advertisement Paragraph 6.6 then adds a hard back stop: if that report is not out within a year, the government “shall make an interim statement publicly available on each anniversary of the occurrence, detailing the progress of the investigation and any safety issues raised.” The rationale is that Annex 13 does not treat accident investigations as exercises in assigning blame, but as tools for preventing future accidents, say aviation experts. The requirement for annual interim statements is intended to ensure that potentially important safety lessons are not locked away for years while investigations continue. By requiring investigators to disclose progress and any safety issues identified, ICAO seeks to allow airlines, regulators and manufacturers to take corrective action before a final report is published. Also read: Exclusive: A Year After Ahmedabad Crash, the DGCA Unit Meant to Keep Planes Airworthy Is Half-Empty ‘Significant progress’ is not ‘detailing’ Simon Hradecky, editor of The Aviation Herald and an electronics and aviation engineer, says that AAIB’s interim statement simply does not meet the threshold set by Paragraph 6.6. “Saying the investigation made ‘significant progress’ is anything but a detailing of the progress,” Hradecky notes. In his view, and in line with how serious investigations normally operate, a compliant interim statement should at minimum set out what investigative steps have been completed, describe the main factual results obtained so far, identify which work streams are ongoing, and indicate what further steps are planned. Advertisement “In my opinion – and I have seen many interim reports doing exactly that – an interim statement should start from the preliminary report and add all the new information to it,” Hradecky says. He points to the investigation into the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447 as a textbook example. The crash took place on June 1. French investigators published Interim Report 1 on July 2, 2009, Interim Report 2 on December 17, 2009, and Interim Report 3 on July 29, 2011, with each report expanding on the factual record and analytical findings of its predecessor before the final report was issued. AF447: How Annex 13 can work The AF 447, travelling from Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, to Paris in France, saw the Airbus craft crash into the Atlantic Ocean after entering an aerodynamic stall at 36,000 feet, killing all 228 people on board despite both engines continuing to operate. France’s BEA’s first interim report, released just weeks after the crash, ran to more than 100 pages and covered the flight history, crew qualifications, maintenance records, weather, Air Traffic Control communications, wreckage recovery and search efforts. Later interim reports added ACARS fault messages, pitot tube issues, maintenance logic, crew training, fatigue rules and Air France’s operational procedures. ACARS or Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System is the digital messaging system through which aircraft automatically transmit fault messages and operational data to airlines and maintenance teams via satellite. In the case of Air India 171, the Federation of Indian Pilots (FIP), which represents more than 6,000 pilots and is a petitioner before the Supreme Court, has similarly argued that the aircraft’s final ACARS transmissions should be placed on record, saying the messages could provide important clues about the aircraft’s condition in the moments before the crash. One interim report in the AF 447 crash also included a crucial passage on the “Unreliable IAS (indicated airspeed)” manoeuvre, effectively showing that the crew had been trained for the procedure at lower altitudes but faced the emergency at high altitude, in a regime for which they were not adequately prepared. In Hradecky’s reading, that interim passage briefly told the deeper truth of AF447: that the crash was not simply about the first officer Pierre Bonin pulling the nose up, but about the inadequacy of training, procedures and design setting the crew up for failure. The final report, he says, softened that framing. The French court’s recent decision finding Airbus guilty of manslaughter in connection with AF447 is, for many pilots, the ultimate confirmation that the early narrative – the one that hung everything on the first officer Bonin’s actions – was dangerously incomplete. What looked at first like “pilot error” has now been legally recognised as a chain of systemic failures for which the manufacturer bears criminal responsibility. Also read: Two Pilots Dead in 48 Hours as India Sits on Unimplemented Flight Safety Rules That history casts a dark shadow over how India is treating Air India AI 171 and its captain. With 260 people dead and a modern 787 written off, Captain Sumeet Sabharwal has become the easy focal point for blame: the last human in the loop, the name on the licence – exactly the kind of lone, convenient culprit AF447 has since shown to be a dangerous illusion. While the AAIB report is vague in its description of events, the report stops short of blaming the pilot. Appearing before the Supreme Court on November 13 last year, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta said the Ministry of Civil Aviation had already clarified that “blame was not attributable to anyone” and that “there is no question of blaming anyone in the report.” However, once the pilot-blame narrative emerged, it was everywhere. Beginning with The Wall Street Journal‘s July 10, 2025 report, published two days before the AAIB’s preliminary findings became public, a series of articles increasingly framed the investigation around pilots and fuel switches. These reports – dated July 11, July 17 and August 26 – did not cite data or evidence and were entirely dependent on anonymous sources. Reuters headlined its coverage ‘Air India crash report shows pilot confusion over engine switch movement.’ The BBC headline read, “pilot error.” Many reports by The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg and others increasingly focused on Captain Sabharwal, his personal life and anonymous-source claims about cockpit actions. By the time government lawyers were telling the Supreme Court that the AAIB report did not attribute blame to anyone, much of the international media had already spent months telling readers that investigators were focused on the pilots. ‘Rule’ when convenient, ‘guideline’ when not For Joe Jacobsen, deputy director of the Foundation for Aviation Safety, which has released key evidence pointing to electrical problems on crash flight VT-ANB, the problem with AAIB’s statement is systemic rather than semantic. “Annex 13 is treated as a rule when convenient, and as a guideline when not convenient for the parties involved,” he observes. The time bound requirement to issue a substantive interim statement exists for a reason: “The purpose of having a time guideline is to identify and fix the safety problems” while operators are still flying the same aircraft, on the same routes, with the same procedures. An interim statement that offers no more than a vague assurance of “significant progress” satisfies neither the safety purpose nor the accountability test, he says. The Vishwash Kumar example Sam Thomas, president of the Indian chapter of ALPA, pushes the argument beyond strict text to investigative culture. “Some things are common sense,” he says. “There’s no Annex 13 rule that says the eye witnesses in a crash can be interviewed eight months later.” And yet AAIB waited until March 29, 2026, to formally interview eyewitness Vishwash Kumar Ramesh, the lone survivor, months after the accident. “Why didn’t AAIB interview him immediately after the crash; when his recollections and memories were fresh?” asks Thomas. For him, this is exactly what it means to ignore the spirit of Annex 13: treating its standards as a checklist rather than as a framework for rigorous, timely, safety driven inquiry. “This is more about following the spirit of what Annex 13 lays out,” he concludes. Taken together, those choices – a content free interim statement, and critical witnesses interviewed long after the fact – paint a picture of an investigation that is formally open but substantively opaque. The technical machinery of Annex 13 is present on paper, but the discipline and urgency that give it meaning are conspicuously absent. The Wire has reached out to the AAIB asking for details on the timeline, comments on its lack of transparency and exact details on what it has investigated in the last year. It has also reached out to the DGCA, asking it about its oversight of AAIB, whether it has implemented any interim risk controls based on preliminary findings and the lack of its communication with operators, crews, and the public. This report will be updated if we get a response. https://thewire.in/government/aircraft-accident-investigation-bureau-air-india-171-crash-ahmedabad-interim-report-investigation-experts Bolen Highlights Importance of Fostering Innovation at Aviation Safety Conference NBAA President and CEO Ed Bolen highlighted the urgent need for continued government-industry collaboration to keep pace with rapid aviation innovation in a fireside chat with FAA Deputy Administrator Chris Rocheleau and EASA Executive Director Florian Guillermet at the 2026 International Aviation Safety Conference this week. Bolen moderated a panel with the two agency leaders, who detailed the enterprising ways government and industry are working together to foster continued innovation and investment in aviation, amid significant organizational change, and a rapidly shifting landscape. As one illustrative example, the panelists pointed to the FAA’s expanded eVTOL and Advanced Air Mobility Integration Pilot Program (eIPP). To date, the eIPP has received 33 applications and has been approved for eight test sites covering 26 states, involving real-world operations, including cargo delivery and medical transport. Both agencies view these programs as an important new testing model for validating new operational concepts before broader deployment of the new technologies. Expanding on the same theme, Rocheleau emphasized that regulators and industry need an aligned approach for accelerating standards development for new technologies as they enter the airspace faster than traditional rulemaking can accommodate. Similarly, Guillermet highlighted the potential of “direct submission” processes that would allow regulatory authorities to propose mature standards to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) without navigating lengthy procedural requirements. Bolen also asked the panelists about how they are integrating artificial intelligence (AI) I into their work, saying “AI can be a blessing. It can be a curse, it can be a force multiplier, it can be a security risk,” and probing how they are addressing these challenges. Rocheleau outlined AI applications across four areas at the FAA: safety data analysis, air traffic operations, rulemaking, and certification processes. Both agencies emphasized that AI could enhance safety oversight if deployed within clear regulatory frameworks. Bolen concluded by asking both leaders to share the progress they hope to see a year from now. Guillermet highlighted digitalization of regulatory processes and records in the EU, while Rocheleau outlined priorities including progress on eVTOL aircraft certification, the completion of a new air traffic control system, and meeting controller hiring and training goals. Both leaders agreed that as the pace of aviation innovation accelerates, alignment on safety will remain the top priority for regulators and industry on both sides of the Atlantic. https://nbaa.org/bolen-highlights-importance-of-fostering-innovation-at-aviation-safety-conference/ GPS jamming active when King Air struck mountain NTSB reports on New Mexico air ambulance crash that killed four, sparked wildfire A Beechcraft King Air collided with a New Mexico mountain ridge while attempting an instrument approach shortly after midnight on a moonless May 14, killing four people and igniting a wildfire that took nearly a month to extinguish. GPS interference—an increasingly common event in recent years—figures prominently in the preliminary report released by the NTSB. Investigators plotted GPS data of the fatal air ambulance flight from two sources: recorded ADS-B data, and a Spidertracks device onboard the aircraft. Two flight nurses and two pilots planned a short flight from their home base in Roswell Air Center Airport to Sierra Blanca Regional Airport in Ruidoso. Visibility was 10 miles with clear skies when the flight departed Roswell to pick up a patient for transport to Albuquerque. It is not clear whether the flight crew was aware of the GPS jamming underway in the region before the King Air lifted off at 11:52 p.m. local time on May 13. The pilots, operating under FAR Part 135, contacted air traffic control at 11:54 p.m. during the initial climb, and the flight was cleared "as filed" to their destination, minutes away, and directed to maintain 12,000 feet. Investigators compared the GPS data recorded by ADS-B and Spidertracks and found discrepancies in recorded altitudes that coincided with the military GPS jamming that was underway at the time. "The data from both sources were consistent with each other, except the recorded Spidertracks GPS altitude was generally about 600 [feet] higher than the recorded ADS-B altitudes and there were large gaps in the recorded ADS-B data," the preliminary report states. Just after midnight, an air traffic controller advised the King Air crew they were at 13,000 feet, 1,000 feet above their assigned altitude, and the pilots responded they were descending to their assigned altitude and had "lost GPS capability." The pilot requested a heading, and ATC vectored the aircraft to 275 degrees toward Ruidoso. The pilot requested the GPS approach to Runway 24. At 12:01 a.m., the approach controller contacted their operations supervisor to relay a request that the military stop jamming GPS, a call the operations supervisor placed at 12:05 a.m., according to the report. Two minutes later, the ADS-B data, which had been recorded at one-minute intervals during the jamming, resumed recording as normal, with positions updated every 2 to 3 seconds. Takeaways GPS jamming is increasingly common, and pilots should pay particular attention to related notams during IFR operations. As part of preflight planning, carefully assess how the loss of GPS navigation would affect the flight, factor in the overall risks, and decide how to navigate, approach, and land without it. Loss of GPS navigation is also likely to affect terrain awareness and obstacle warning systems. Even if navigation capability isn’t degraded, stay on an IFR clearance and fly the published instrument approach all the way to landing when flying at night over high terrain. Terminate any visual approach, particularly in or around high terrain, if unable to keep the airport in sight In addition to notams, the FAA Safety Team posts public notices of GPS interference events. These notices often include graphics, and additional details. The controller had meanwhile advised the King Air to fly 350 degrees to the REYOK waypoint, the initial approach fix for both the GPS and instrument landing system approaches to the runway, which guide aircraft just south of the Capitan Mountains, and a 10,201-foot peak located about 14 miles northeast of the airport. The King Air crew read back their clearance for the GPS approach, turned north as directed, and, during the turn, requested the ILS approach "due to the loss of GPS navigation capability." The airplane continued north for about 20 nautical miles, at a GPS altitude of 12,600 feet. "During this segment of the flight, the [approach] controller provided services to other traffic, including three additional aircraft that reported a loss of GPS. One of those aircraft expressed difficulty identifying a directed to ground based navigation aid and required additional assistance" from ATC, the report states. At 12:04 a.m., the approach controller advised the King Air to expect radar vectors utilizing right turns to align the airplane for a straight-in approach over the REYOK intersection 'in a couple of minutes.'" The aircraft never made a right turn. Instead, it turned left toward the airport¬—and the high terrain—about 12 nm from REYOK. At 12:08 a.m., the King Air, now about 31 nm northeast of the destination airport, reported "a visual on Ruidoso," and, 30 seconds later (after being stepped on by other radio traffic), repeated that they could "go visual" to their destination. The flight was cleared for the visual approach and advised they could cancel IFR in the air above 9,000 feet msl, or after landing. The crew advised they would cancel IFR "in just a couple of minutes." It was their final transmission. The King Air, miles north of a safe southwest route to Ruidoso, impacted terrain at 12:15 a.m. Mountain Daylight Time. More than 1,000 firefighters spent nearly a month working to douse the ensuing blaze, which burned 31,860 acres. 'Stop buzzer' GPS interference created by military jamming operations has been a concern for years, particularly as the dissemination of related notams has been inconsistent. In 2019 (and since), AOPA pressed the FAA to improve awareness of and mitigate the impacts of GPS interference caused by military jamming, advising pilots, as a stopgap measure, to request that ATC "stop buzzer" when navigation systems are affected. The NTSB report notes that ATC made exactly that request on May 14, but then followed up at 12:10 a.m. to advise the military that the King Air was on a visual approach, and jamming could resume. A public notice posted outside of the notam system by the FAA Safety Team detailed the GPS interference expected to originate from the White Sands Missile Range on the date of the flight, though it did not include a graphic depiction of the 240-nm radius around the listed latitude and longitude. The notice indicated GPS testing "may result in unreliable or unavailable GPS signal" within 240 miles from 4,000 feet to 10,000 feet agl. Higher altitudes could be affected up to 366 nautical miles from the center. The accident flight's destination airport is less than 70 nm from the center of the advisory area. "At 0010:27 ADS-B again began collecting data at about one-minute intervals. About the same time, the airplane began descending toward SRR followed by a slight right turn at 0013:26 and 9,820 ft Spidertrack GPS altitude," the report states. The aircraft struck terrain at 9,950 feet, 730 feet east and 230 feet below the Capitan Mountains Summit Radio Facility at 10,180 feet elevation. Investigators reviewed the ForeFlight briefing and notam information provided to the crew, and found it contained a notam indicating the automated weather broadcast transmitter was out of service, which would have disallowed the use of either the GPS or ILS approach to Ruidoso. An enroute navigation notam advised of GPS interference within an area defined by a coded latitude and longitude, with a center point within the White Sands Missile Test Range and a 240 nm radius, within which interference could be expected between 4,000 feet and 10,000 feet agl. AOPA has continued to press the FAA to make these advisories more visible to pilots. In some cases, notams or public notices are issued that link to maps depicting the affected area, though not always. Public notices of GPS interference activities (and other safety-related information) posted by the FAA Safety Team on a webpage more consistently include graphic depictions of affected GPS interference areas that are otherwise time-consuming to decode. The accident flight crew was dispatched just after 11 p.m., allowing the pilots less than an hour to complete all preflight planning and inspection tasks before launching. The ForeFlight briefing did make it clear that there were no weather reports or forecasts available from Sierra Blanca Regional Airport. Not only did that render both approaches to the destination runway unauthorized, it may have complicated efforts to correctly set the altimeter, which could have led to erroneous readings from that instrument while GPS interference was causing errors on the crew's other source of altitude information. The report does not state or speculate whether the crew intended to actually fly an approach not authorized in the absence of local weather information, or if they planned from the beginning of the flight to divert if they were unable to make a visual approach. While this appears to be the first fatal accident in which GPS interference was a factor, flight crew reports of GPS interference, including jamming, have increased sharply in recent years. A recent search of published reports in the Aviation Safety Reporting System database found five such reports from 2019, and four in 2020. The reports, many if not most of which occurred outside of the United States, increased from about half a dozen per year through 2023, up to 50 in 2024, and 40 in 2025. Many of these crews reported operational impacts including GPS navigation malfunction. https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2026/june/18/gps-jamming-active-when-king-air-struck-mountain WestJet flight evacuated at DIA after blown tires Passengers were evacuated using stairs and were bused back to the terminal, the airport said. DENVER — A WestJet flight from Denver to Calgary was evacuated at Denver International Airport Thursday afternoon, the airport said. The flight was cleared for takeoff from Runway 8 at 12:25 p.m. Wednesday, according to air traffic control audio. A few minutes later, air traffic control audio indicated tires on a landing gear were blown and smoke was visible from underneath the plane. Passengers were evacuated using stairs and were bused back to the terminal, the airport said. It's unclear how many people were on board. In an email to 9NEWS, WestJet said they "are actively supporting affected guests and working to re-accommodate them as quickly as possible." https://www.9news.com/article/travel/denver-international-airport/westjet-flight-evacuated-dia/73-515c3a0a-a6ea-416a-a3dd-e3d85ee9f2d3 Japan Airlines' CEO got a pay cut after worker misconduct. That's not so unusual in Japan. Japan Airlines CEO Mitsuko Tottori was among several executives at the company who took a temporary pay cut following the misconduct of two cabin crew members. In Japan, the conduct of lower-level employees could mean a pay cut at the top. Japan Airlines announced last Friday that its CEO, Mitsuko Tottori, is taking a temporary pay cut due to an "alcohol-related incident" involving cabin crew members — an episode the airline described as an "extremely serious management failure." A spokesperson for Japan Airlines told Business Insider that Tottori will receive a 30% reduction in monthly compensation for two months "to demonstrate our accountability for this incident." The top 5 hiring questions employers ask in 2026, answered Two executives in charge of safety and cabin operations will receive 20% pay reductions for one month, the spokesperson said. All other directors and executive officers will receive 10% reductions for a month. The spokesperson declined to specify the executives' compensation. The disciplinary actions came after two cabin attendants drank the day before a domestic flight, Kyodo News reported. Company policy mandates that flight attendants cannot drink beyond a certain time before a flight, the outlet reported. One cabin crew member was fired, while another crew member was suspended, the spokesperson said. https://www.businessinsider.com/japan-airlines-ceo-pay-cut-workers-misconduct-japan-corporate-culture-2026-6 American Airlines Tulsa base maintenance facility celebrates 80 years of excellence This recent photo of Tech Ops – Tulsa shows the growth of the maintenance base with the four original hangars visible and still in use today. Former military aircraft plant grows exponentially into the world’s largest commercial aircraft maintenance base. The facility now employs nearly 5,000 team members and is the backbone of the airline’s technical operations. TULSA, Okla. — For eight decades, the American Airlines base maintenance facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma (Tech Ops – Tulsa), has stood at the center of the airline’s technical operations, evolving into the world’s largest commercial aircraft maintenance base and a cornerstone of the airline’s commitment to safety and reliability. “American is proud to celebrate Tech Ops – Tulsa, a cornerstone of our aircraft maintenance operation,” said Senior Vice President of Technical Operations Kevin Brickner. “Our team of skilled aviation maintenance professionals — in Tulsa and across our system — is the best in the business, and they set the standard for safety, quality and ingenuity. We wouldn’t be where we are today without our team members, the City of Tulsa and the State of Oklahoma. We’re eagerly looking forward to the next 80 years in Tulsa and beyond.” It all started in 1945 when the U.S. government listed a military aircraft plant as surplus property. The property, with four large hangars anchoring more than 260 acres, caught the eye of American’s leaders who soon negotiated a lease with the City of Tulsa and began relocating its maintenance and engineering operations from New York’s La Guardia airport to the new Tulsa facility. The move reflected American’s growth and Tulsa’s emergence as a major aviation and aerospace hub, bolstered by a skilled local workforce, which still holds true today. The maintenance base opened in June 1946, and started overhauling Douglas DC-3 aircraft. American’s then CEO and industry pioneer Cyrus Rowlett “C.R.” Smith celebrated the facility’s opening with an eye toward the future. “We plan to become citizens of Tulsa and Oklahoma,” Smith said. “We plan a great expansion and development in this city and this state. Our future is ahead of us. We are looking forward.” Over the years, almost every aircraft type flown by American passed through Tulsa’s hangars. Early propeller-powered models such as the DC-3 and Convair 240 soon made way for turbofan engines powering Boeing 707s. Boeing 727s and 747s and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10s and legendary MD-80s later occupied hangars. Modern Boeing 737 and 787 families of aircraft touch down at the base for scheduled maintenance work today. Tech Ops – Tulsa, which is currently undergoing $400 million in improvements, has grown to 3.3 million square feet of hangar and shop space sprawling across 330 acres at Tulsa International Airport. Together with the airline’s nearby offsite composite repair and wheel and brake facilities, these technical centers of excellence provide maintenance and related support to more than 400 aircraft that visit the base annually. The source of the base’s success — and the standard set for the industry — is the people. Today, nearly 5,000 team members (including more than 2,300 licensed aviation maintenance technicians) work in aircraft overhaul, component repair, engine overhaul, engineering, supply chain, facilities maintenance and information technology, to keep Tech Ops – Tulsa moving 24/7. And they’re not just individual team members — the base has familial roots with generations of families working at the base over the decades. The Flagship San Francisco, a Douglas DC-3, leaves the hangar July 17, 1946, after undergoing the first aircraft overhaul at Tech Ops – Tulsa. Eighty years after the maintenance base opened, the airline continues looking forward to welcoming the next generation of aviation maintenance professionals through its hangar doors. In 2024, American announced a partnership with Tulsa Tech — the alma mater of many current Tech Ops – Tulsa Team members — providing interviews to top students and ongoing engagement opportunities with the airline’s team members, formalizing a decades-long relationship with the school. American also sponsored Tulsa Tech’s adult student team at the 2026 Aerospace Maintenance Council Competition. Tech Ops – Tulsa team members mentored students leading up to the competition, and that partnership paid off — the team took first place among all 47 schools. About American Airlines Group (NASDAQ: AAL) American Airlines is a premium global airline connecting more of the U.S. to the world. With roots tracing back to an air mail carrier in the Midwestern United States in 1926, American now operates more than 6,000 daily flights to more than 350 destinations in more than 60 countries and serves more than 200 million customers annually. Powered by a proud and talented team of 130,000 aviation professionals, American’s team lives out the airline’s purpose of caring for people on life’s journey every day. The world’s largest airline proudly celebrates its centennial year in 2026, reaching a milestone that reflects a century of innovation and the Forever ForwardSM spirit that changed the industry and the world. American introduced the first scheduled air cargo service, the first airport lounge and the first airline loyalty program and continues to reinvent the customer experience today. The airline is also a founding member of the oneworld alliance, whose members serve more than 900 destinations around the globe. https://news.aa.com/news/news-details/2026/American-Airlines-Tulsa-base-maintenance-facility-celebrates-80-years-of-excellence-OPS-OTH-06/default.aspx CALENDAR OF EVENTS . Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection, and Investigation Course 7 to 9 July 2026; Woburn MA 01801 USA : APSCON/APSCON Unmanned 2026 – Ft. Lauderdale, FL - July 13-17, 2026 . EAA AirVenture Oshkosh - July 20–26, 2026 . July 20-24, 2026 | Farnborough, UK - Farnborough Airshow 2026. . ICAO/EASA Third Global RSOO/RAIO Forum for Aviation Safety — September 29–30, 2026, in Georgetown, Guyana., https://www.icao.int/events : Aircraft Cabin Air International Conference - 22-23 September 2026 . IATA World Maintenance & Engineering Symposium (23-25 June, Madrid, Spain) . ISASI - BOSTON 2026 - September 28, 2026 – October 2, 2026 . Global Aviation Conference Frankfurt- 29-30SEP2026 - Frankfurt, Germany . 79TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SUMMIT MONTREAL | NOVEMBER 10-12, 2026. . 2026 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (NBAA-BACE) Oct. 20-22, 2026 | Las Vegas, NV . 2027 ACSF Safety Symposium - April 6-8, 2027 - ERAU Daytona Beach, FL Curt Lewis