Flight Safety Information - August 11, 2026 No. 156 In This Issue : Incident: SAA A320 at Cape Town on May 11th 2026, windshear and direct law degradation : Incident: Swiss A333 over Atlantic on Aug 9th 2026, smoke in cabin : Incident: Endeavor CRJ9 at New York on Aug 9th 2026, engine problem : Incident: Jetblue A320 Near Jacksonville on Aug 10th 2026, acrid smell on flight deck : Incident: Smartwings B38M at Prague on Aug 10th 2026, engine problem : Incident: France A320 near Porto on Aug 9th 2026, odour in cabin : An Airbus A380 took a 7-hour flight to nowhere after U-turning over central Africa : Trump ‘secretly used military jet’ to leave Turkey over Iran threat concerns : "Mayday, Mayday"... Passenger jet hit by flock of birds right after takeoff, flames burst from engine : Fiat Panda crashes into luxury jet as plane taxis for takeoff : Some Airlines Still Haven’t Signed Up to TSA’s Expensive New System to Let Pilots and Flight Attendants Skip : From "pilot error" to root cause: applying HFACS in aviation safety investigations : Why The FAA Tells Airline Pilots To Keep Mentally Flying The Aircraft Even With Autopilot On : Single point of failure: engine leaving wing in Louisville reminder of decades-old aviation lesson : Calendar of Events Incident: SAA A320 at Cape Town on May 11th 2026, windshear and direct law degradation A SAA South African Airways Airbus A320-200, registration ZS-SZE performing flight SA-327 from Johannesburg to Cape Town (South Africa) with 137 passengers and 6 crew, was nearing Cape Town when the crew was informed that other aircraft had been unable to land and had gone around. The crew entered an enroute hold to assess their options, when ATC informed them that aircraft were now able to land at Cape Town. The crew decided to continue to Cape Town thereafter and had cabin crew prepare for turbulence on approach. ATC subsequently vectored the aircraft onto base for a monitored approach, ATC instructed the crew to maintain minimum clean speed because of traffic ahead at 6000 feet, the crew slowed the aircraft to minimum clean. Shortly afterwards the crew received a windshear alert with 20-40 knots loss of airspeed. Autothrust went into ALPHA FLOOR, the crew selected flaps 1 to mitigate for the stall, at the same time the aircraft entered alternate law due to an elevator aileron computer (ELAC) pitch fault and the autopilot disengaged, the crew was unable to re-engage the autopilot. Soon after the aircraft encountered another windshear increasing the airspeed, the crew retracted the flaps but still received an overspeed warning. The crew continued the monitored approach with alternate law active, upon lowering the landing gear the aircraft changed to direct law. The aircraft landed safely on Cape Town's runway 01 about 11 minutes after the first windshear encounter. South Africa's AAID rated the occurrence a serious incident and opened an investigation. The aircraft returned to service about 2:15 hours after landing and performed the return flight with a delay of about 1:45 hours. https://avherald.com/h?article=539d6192&opt=0 Incident: Swiss A333 over Atlantic on Aug 9th 2026, smoke in cabin A Swiss International Airlines Airbus A330-300, registration HB-JHN performing flight LX-52 from Zurich (Switzerland) to Boston,MA (USA) with 206 passengers and 12 crew, was enroute at FL380 over the Atlantic Ocean about 660nm westsouthwest of Dublin (Ireland) when the crew decided to turn around and divert to Shannon (Ireland) due to smoke in the cabin ultimately changing to Dublin. The aircraft landed safely on Dublin's runway 28L about 100 minutes later. The remainder of the flight as well as the return flight were cancelled. The airline reported a powerbank of a passenger emitted smoke. The passengers were taken to hotels. A passenger reported there had been smoke in the business class due to an overheating power bank. On Aug 10th 2026 the Irish AAIU reported they have opened an investigation into the occurrence after reports of smoke in the cabin from a portable power bank, that had lodged into a passenger seat's reclining mechanism. The aircraft is still on the ground in Dublin about 14 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=53d226f3&opt=0 Incident: Endeavor CRJ9 at New York on Aug 9th 2026, engine problem An Endeavor Canadair CRJ-900 on behalf of Delta Airlines, registration N228PQ performing flight DL-4926 from New York La Guardia,NY to St. Louis,MO (USA) with 80 people on board, was climbing out of La Guardia's runway 31 when the crew stopped the climb at 5000 feet advising their right hand engine was indicating a little high subsequently adding the ITT was a bit high. The crew decided to return to La Guardia advising there was no emergency, ATC declared emergency for the flight however. The aircraft entered a hold and landed safely on La Guardia's runway 22 about one hour after departure. A replacement CRJ-900 registration N607LR reached St. Louis with a delay of about 14 hours. The occurrence aircraft returned to service about 14 hours after landing back. https://avherald.com/h?article=53d2b05b&opt=0 Incident: Jetblue A320 Near Jacksonville on Aug 10th 2026, acrid smell on flight deck A Jetblue Airbus A320-200, registration N705JB performing flight B6-1067 from Westchester,NY to West Palm Beach,FL (USA), was enroute at FL360 about 160nm northeast of Jacksonville,FL (USA) when the crew decided to divert to Jacksonville, where the aircraft landed safely on runway 26 about 30 minutes later. A passenger reported the captain told them after landing that there had been an acrid smell on the flight deck that had caused eye and lung irritation and made it difficult to breathe. https://avherald.com/h?article=53d2c00e&opt=0 Incident: Smartwings B38M at Prague on Aug 10th 2026, engine problem A Smartwings Boeing 737-8 MAX, registration OK-SWB performing flight QS-1286 (sched. dep Aug 9th, actual dep Aug 10th) from Prague (Czech Republic) to Tel Aviv (Israel) with 189 passengers and 6 crew, was climbing out of Prague's runway 12 when the crew stopped the climb at about FL240 due to problems with the right hand engine (LEAP). The aircraft returned to Prague for a safe landing on runway 12 about 50 minutes after departure. The airline reported the crew detected a fault in engine #2 and returned to Prague. A replacement Boeing 737-8 MAX registration OK-SWL reached Tel Aviv with a delay of about 5 hours. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground about 17 hours after landing back. https://avherald.com/h?article=53d2a26a&opt=0 Incident: France A320 near Porto on Aug 9th 2026, odour in cabin An Air France Airbus A320-200, registration F-HEPD performing flight AF-1162 from Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) to Tenerife South,CI (Spain), was enroute at FL350 about 100nm north of Porto (Portugal) when the crew decided to divert to Porto for a safe landing on runway 17 about 20 minutes later. A passenger reported an odour could be smelt in the cabin, shortly afterwards the crew initiated the diversion to Porto. A replacement A320-200 registration F-HEPF positioned from Paris CDG to Porto, resumed the flight and delivered the passengers to Tenerife with a delay of about 10 hours. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground in Porto for about 30 hours, then returned to Paris. https://avherald.com/h?article=53d29083&opt=0 An Airbus A380 took a 7-hour flight to nowhere after U-turning over central Africa Passengers on a trip from South Africa to London faced a 7-hour flight to nowhere. The British Airways Airbus A380 was already over five hours delayed before it took off. The double-decker airplane appeared to have an issue with its weather radar. British Airways passengers spent seven hours on an airplane only to end up back where they started. Flight 54 departed Johannesburg last Saturday, bound for London, a journey that typically lasts around 10-and-a-half hours. It took off more than five hours behind schedule, at 2:45 a.m. local time. While it isn't clear how many people were on board, the flight was operated by an Airbus A380, the world's largest passenger plane, with 469 seats in BA's configuration. The double-decker jet flew north for about two hours before U-turning over the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to data from Flightradar24. It headed back towards Johannesburg, but entered a holding pattern just north of the city. The quad-engine A380 would have been carrying huge amounts of fuel for its lengthy journey, which the pilots would need to jettison to reduce the airplane's weight and ensure a safe landing. Flight-tracking data shows it flew in a circle for over two hours before coming in to land. Online aviation enthusiasts picked up a text message sent via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System, or ACARS, citing issues with the airplane's weather radar — a key safety system so pilots can avoid storms. "We're sorry for the inconvenience caused to customers after their aircraft returned to Johannesburg due to a technical issue," a BA spokesperson said in a statement to Business Insider. "Following the aircraft's return, our teams provided overnight accommodation and support, and worked to minimise disruption," they added. https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/airbus-a380-took-7-hour-104853144.html Trump ‘secretly used military jet’ to leave Turkey over Iran threat concerns US president hid in catering container before flight following Nato summit, according to officials Two catering containers alongside Air Force One in Ankara, Turkey, on July 8th. Photograph: Doug Mills/The New York Times Top administration officials engaged in an elaborate deception to spirit US president Donald Trump out of Turkey during the Nato summit there last month, transporting him in a catering container to a military jet because of a threat against him and Air Force One from Iran, two senior US officials said on Monday. Trump and other officials had said publicly that he would be leaving Turkey on July 8th aboard one of the older versions of Air Force One rather than a luxury 747-8 donated by Qatar that he had flown in on. Trump told reporters at the time that he was making the switch for “old time’s sake”. Trump boarded the older plane from the left-side door in view of cameras, and news organisations reported he had travelled on it to Britain, where he switched back to the newer plane. The New York Times reported at the time that the decision was driven in part by concern about the security of the new plane donated by Qatar, which had not been equipped with all the defensive capabilities of older versions. But instead of flying out aboard that older, powder-blue, modified 747, Trump was whisked off that plane via a catering container that had been lifted to the opposite side of the plane from where the journalists travelling with him boarded, one of the US officials said. The president was then taken to a third plane, on which he flew in secret to Britain, the official with knowledge of the matter said. Reporters on the older plane were not told Trump had not flown with them from Turkey to an airbase in Britain, making them unwitting participants in the ruse and leaving them, along with some White House staff members, to serve as unknowing decoys. After Trump arrived in Britain, he was secretly moved back to the older version of Air Force One. He then disembarked in view of reporters and walked across the tarmac to the plane donated by Qatar, which he flew to Washington. The elaborate plan appears to have been developed in a matter of hours after officials determined that a threat against Trump from Iran was credible. It came after years of threats against Trump from Iran and amid the war he launched against that country. And it was an unusual instance of the public being deceived about a president’s whereabouts. Officials have not previously acknowledged that Trump was not where they claimed he was. The furtive operation was reported earlier by The Washington Post, which identified the plane that carried the president to Britain from Turkey as a C-32A, a military variant of a Boeing 757. Donald Mihalek, a former Secret Service agent who worked in the protective details for US presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama, said the service has used decoy motorcades and flights in the past to move presidents secretly. “Any time the president is in a theatre where there’s potential combat danger, the Secret Service has employed protective countermeasures including the use of a decoy,” Mihalek said. He added that the agency has long prioritised the security of the president over transparency with the public. “The agency is not the agency of public affairs,” he said. “The agency is the agency of the Secret Service. Their number one job is to keep the president safe.” In this case, the threat led the White House to purposely mislead reporters assigned to cover Trump, leaving journalists to report that he was travelling on board a plane that was being used as a decoy. After The New York Times reported last month on the security shortcomings of the Qatari-donated jet amid the concerns about the threat from Iran, Steven Cheung, the White House communications director, seemed to hint that subterfuge might have been involved in Trump’s departure from Turkey. “As the president has said recently, there are many enemies of America who have their sights on him, and we use every tool at our disposal – including distraction and misdirection – to address those threats,” he said at the time. The threat from Iran was not specific to the Qatari-donated jet, people familiar with the sequence of events said. Instead, Trump was being targeted on whatever aeroplane he was travelling on. Trump was briefed on the threat while in Turkey, and a plan was soon put in place, with a small group of top government officials involved, including Gen Dan Caine, the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, and defence secretary Pete Hegseth, according to the official with knowledge of the deception plan. The defence department and a spokesperson for Caine referred all questions to the White House on Monday. The White House reissued Cheung’s statement from the week of the Nato summit, only without the clause mentioning “distraction and misdirection”. The US officials with knowledge of the deception plan spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive security issues. When Trump arrived at the airport to leave Turkey, a camera that had been positioned beforehand captured him getting on the old Air Force One, and journalists travelling with him, rushing to board the plane through lower steps in the back, had only a glimpse of him. A pool report noted as the plane took off: “We have been advised to keep our window shades in the press cabin closed.” The older Air Force One landed at 10.16pm at the Mildenhall military base in England, a pool report said, with Trump stepping off it 40 minutes later. Before that, unbeknown to reporters, Trump was brought by vehicle from the third plane that he had arrived on to the older Air Force One, boarded it through a different entrance and strode down the step from the upper left-side door as he would typically do, according to the US official. He walked from there to the Qatari jet, as the small group of reporters who had travelled aboard the older jet watched. The president and the press pool then boarded the new plane to fly back to Washington. When asked by reporters during that flight back to the United States about why they had flown on the old Air Force One to England, Trump claimed he had wanted the troops stationed at the UK base to see the new plane. When pressed on why the window blinds had been directed to be shut on the flight from Turkey, Trump said he knew of no specific threat but described himself as under constant siege from Iran. “I’m number one on their list, before you,” he told the reporters. “But if I go, you go. Right? Trump and a number of his advisers have faced threats from Iran for years, especially after Trump, during his first term, ordered the killing of a powerful Iranian commander, Qassem Soleimani. Trump’s advisers during the 2024 campaign privately told allies they were given intelligence that Iran still hoped to harm Trump. That led to the occasional use of decoy planes during the campaign. His staff at times put the candidate aboard a secret jet, without alerting the media, while his staff flew in his private plane. The Biden administration increased security for Trump that summer after new intelligence about plots to kill him; a short time later, he faced an unrelated assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, at an outdoor rally. There was a second unrelated attempt in September 2024. The collective threats, which ranged from a prosecuted murder-for-hire plot by an Iranian proxy to the hacking of Trump campaign officials’ email and social media accounts, created a siege climate for the candidate and his aides. It led to fear, insularity and, at times, paranoia, that shaped how officials interacted with the Biden administration, which was responsible for allocating Secret Service resources, as well as with the media, and with other government officials. After The New York Times reported about the security concerns in Turkey, and the fact that the Qatari jet lacked the same defensive capabilities as the older presidential aircraft, Trump was enraged by the leaks. The justice department issued subpoenas for grand jury testimony to the reporters who had been on the bylines of the stories, as well as some of their family members. Those subpoenas were withdrawn after a federal judge admonished federal prosecutors for the process involved. – This article originally appeared in The New York Times https://www.irishtimes.com/world/us/2026/08/11/trump-secretly-used-military-jet-to-leave-turkey-over-iran-threat-concerns/ "Mayday, Mayday"... Passenger jet hit by flock of birds right after takeoff, flames burst from engine An American Airlines passenger jet struck birds while taking off from a U.S. airport, sending flames shooting from one of its engines. The plane immediately turned back and landed safely. According to ABC, CNN and other foreign media outlets, American Airlines Flight 1760, which was traveling from Myrtle Beach, State of South Carolina, to Charlotte on the 10th local time, hit birds shortly after takeoff. Radio communications at the time showed the captain alerting air traffic control to the emergency, saying, "Mayday, mayday, mayday. We have an engine problem." There were 181 people on board, including passengers and crew. Another pilot who witnessed the incident from the ground said over the radio, "It appears to have hit birds," adding, "It looks like a bird may have gone into the left engine at least." Video taken by a passenger on board showed flames briefly erupting from the aircraft's engine as it flew over the sea. A witness on the coast also said they heard several loud explosion-like sounds and saw an orange flash from the aircraft's left wing. The captain decided to turn back immediately after the incident, and emergency response teams were dispatched at the airport to prepare for the aircraft's landing. Fortunately, the plane landed safely and no injuries were reported. As the aircraft returned, airport officials reportedly found several dead birds around the runway. Meanwhile, data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) showed that more than 24,000 cases of wildlife-aircraft collisions were reported in the United States last year. Bird strikes are considered a persistent hazard in aircraft operations. The risk is especially high during takeoff and landing, when planes fly at lower altitudes and closer to the ground. https://www.sportschosun.com/en/culture/2026-08-11/202608110100063810003932 Fiat Panda crashes into luxury jet as plane taxis for takeoff A Fiat Panda crashed into a luxury plane as it was taxiing towards a runway at an airport in Italy. Footage shows the white car, operated by Milan Linate Airport’s handling company, smashing into the business jet on Monday morning (10 August). The vehicle cut across the aircraft’s path before ploughing into the plane’s nose. No physical injuries were reported. A Milan Airports spokesperson said: “Operations have been restored and flights are operating as scheduled. We apologise for any inconvenience and thank passengers for their understanding.” An investigation into the circumstances surrounding the collision is underway. https://www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/fiat-panda-plane-crash-airport-video-b3030979.html Some Airlines Still Haven’t Signed Up to TSA’s Expensive New System to Let Pilots and Flight Attendants Skip Several major U.S. airlines, including JetBlue and Frontier, still haven’t signed up for TSA’s new CMAP system, which lets crew skip regular security screening using facial recognition. Several major U.S. airlines are yet to sign up for a new (and expensive) federal government system that will allow their pilots and flight attendants to skip past regular TSA airport security screening by simply having a photo of their face taken and compared against a database of approved crew members. The system is called ‘Crew Member Access Point’ or CMAP for short, and it is replacing a similar but privately run special security lane called ‘Known Crew Member’ (KCM), which will be retired after 15 years at the end of 2026. JetBlue is one of several carriers that have yet to sign up to TSA’s new Crew Member Access Point (CMAP) initiative. Just like KCM, the new CMAP allows approved crew members to bypass normal security screening, with pilots and flight attendants able to get through the checkpoint in less than 60 seconds, on average. Crew members don’t have their bags screened and don’t pass through the metal detectors or newer millimeter wave machines. To add a layer of protection, however, crew members are randomly pulled aside and made to go through TSA PreCheck security. CMAP is slowly being rolled out nationwide, with the new system in operation at around 50 airports across the United States, with the plan to have CMAP in full operation across all U.S. airports by the end of the year. Once CMAP is activated at an airport, KCM can no longer be used. This is important as airlines have to sign up to use CMAP because they pay a per crew member fee for access to this service. Airlines, including American, Delta, and United, had already signed up to CMAP before the system even started to be rolled out, while several carriers have yet to register their pilots and flight attendants even as the rollout progresses. Two of the biggest airlines yet to join CMAP are Frontier Airlines and JetBlue. Passengers passing through a TSA checkpoint Most crew members will still be able to bypass regular TSA screening once CMAP is fully rolled out. The idea behind KCM and now CMAP is to increase crew productivity by reducing delays at TSA security checkpoints. Without access to CMAP in airports that have the new system, crew members must use regular TSA lines to access the secure part of the departures concourse, potentially slowing down their arrival at the gate. CMAP does, though, come at a cost. Previously, airlines paid for KCM through membership of the industry trade body Airlines 4 America (A4A), which ran the program alongside the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). The new system requires a seperate fee paid directly to the Department of Homeland Security. Airlines will need to pay $19 per crew member per year for access to CMAP, although the government won’t start collecting these fees until January 1, 2027, when the system has been fully deployed. With the most crew members of any U.S. airline, American Airlines faces the biggest CMAP bill, with annual fees of around $902,500 to cover its 47,500 strong workforce of pilots and flight attendants. United Airlines faces a similar annual bill of $893,000, and Delta Air Lines will be charged around $855,000 per year for its aircrew to access the program. In comparison, JetBlue faces an annual bill of around $222,000. CMAP utilises biometric data held by the federal government to identify crew members. Airlines hand the TSA their Master Crew Lists (used by airlines that operate to international destinations) or Master Personnel Lists (used by airlines that operate domestic flights only), which is then matched against existing government databases containing biometric data, like passports. When a crew member arrives at the CMAP checkpoint, they look at a camera and their biometric data is cross referenced against the database of approved employees. The system will then either clear, deny or randomly select the crew member of additional screening. Some flight attendants have raised concerns about the use of biometrics in CMAP, although use is voluntary and crew members must opt in to the system. https://www.paddleyourownkanoo.com/2026/08/10/some-airlines-still-havent-signed-up-to-tsas-expensive-new-system-to-let-pilots-and-flight-attendants-skip-past-regular-security/ From "pilot error" to root cause: applying HFACS in aviation safety investigations Ask most heads of safety what happens after an incident, and you'll hear a familiar pattern. An investigation opens, an owner is assigned, findings get written up, a report gets filed. Ask what happens to those findings six months and two incidents later, and the answer is usually: not much. They sit in a different system from the risk assessments that predicted the same failure modes, disconnected and easy to lose. Most investigations also stop at the front line. A worker made the wrong call, so the worker is the cause, case closed. That's rarely the full picture. The conditions that set someone up to make that call, training gaps, staffing decisions, workload, unclear standards, sit further back in the organization. If an investigation doesn't reach them, they stay in place for the next incident too. What is HFACS? The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) examines human error by classifying it against a structured taxonomy. Developed for aviation, it's now used across industrial domains. The premise is simple: in complex socio-technical systems, an accident is rarely the result of one person's mistake. It results from multiple contributions, some immediate, some sitting further back in the organization, from unsafe acts at the front line up through preconditions, line management deficiencies, and fallible decisions at the organizational level. Seeing it in practice: Colgan Air Flight 3407 On the night of 12 February 2009, Colgan Air Flight 3407 was flying from Newark to Buffalo with 49 people on board. The crew violated the Sterile Cockpit Rule during taxiing and continued talking through the flight. The first officer calculated approach speed for non-icing conditions when icing-adjusted speed was required, and the crew failed to monitor a known risky maneuver closely enough. When the stick shaker activated, the captain raised the angle of attack instead of lowering it, then overrode the stick pusher, the last functional barrier. The aircraft stalled, entered Loss of Control In-flight, and crashed 27 seconds later. All 49 on board and one person on the ground died.ice forming on a cockpit window Read at face value, this looks like a straightforward story of pilot error. HFACS is built to test whether that's actually true, and applying it surfaces a longer chain: fatigue and reduced mental awareness behind the unsafe acts, inadequate supervisory oversight and training behind those preconditions, and organizational culture and staffing decisions at the root. Why this matters beyond one flight Run through BowTieXP and IncidentXP, this analysis isn't a one-off report. The same barriers modeled proactively in a bowtie become the backbone of the reactive investigation, so nothing is rebuilt from scratch. Classified causes like fatigue, inadequate training, and culture feed into Safety Performance Indicators that an organization can track across its entire operation, not just after something goes wrong. The lesson from Colgan Air isn't that the crew didn't make mistakes. It's that stopping the analysis there would have missed what really needed to change. Read the full expert insight document The full Expert Insights piece by Captain Augusto Claudio Derghi walks through the complete causation paths, from unsafe acts up to fallible decisions, and shows exactly how BowTieXP and IncidentXP surface each layer. https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-insights/applying-hfacs-in-aviation-safety-investigations Why The FAA Tells Airline Pilots To Keep Mentally Flying The Aircraft Even With Autopilot On For much of a modern airline flight, the autopilot controls the aircraft with remarkable precision. It follows programmed routes, climbs and descends to assigned altitudes, captures instrument approaches, and can even land in extremely poor visibility under the right conditions. To passengers, that level of automation suggests the pilots' workload largely disappears once the autopilot is engaged. Inside the cockpit, however, the opposite philosophy applies. Rather than relaxing, pilots are expected to continue mentally flying the aircraft. That principle sits at the heart of the Federal Aviation Administration's Advisory Circular 120-71B, which instructs flight crews to "stay in the loop by mentally flying the aircraft" even when the autopilot is engaged. The guidance reflects decades of research showing that automation can reduce workload while simultaneously increasing the risk that pilots become passive monitors rather than active managers of the flight. Modern airline operations therefore treat the autopilot as a powerful tool, not a replacement for pilot judgment. Understanding why the FAA places such emphasis on mentally flying the airplane reveals one of the biggest challenges of today's highly automated flight decks: preventing the crew from falling behind the aircraft they are supervising. The phrase "mentally flying the aircraft" appears straightforward, but it describes a specific way of thinking rather than a physical flying technique. Even with the autopilot controlling the airplane, pilots are expected to anticipate every climb, turn, descent, and level-off before it happens. Instead of waiting to see what the aircraft does, they continually ask themselves what it should do next. If the airplane behaves differently than expected, the discrepancy can be identified within seconds. FAA Advisory Circular 120-71B emphasizes that pilots should monitor the flight instruments just as they would during manual flight. That means continuously cross-checking altitude, airspeed, navigation, vertical path, and aircraft configuration rather than assuming the automation has selected the correct action. The guidance also reminds crews that programming the flight management system is only part of the task. Equally important is confirming that the aircraft is actually following the intended flight path after each selection is made. One of the FAA's strongest recommendations is to verify the Flight Mode Annunciator, or FMA, every time a change is made on the autopilot mode control panel. The FMA is a small display that tells pilots exactly which lateral and vertical guidance modes are currently active. It serves as the aircraft's confirmation that the requested command has been accepted. If the displayed mode does not match what the crew expected, pilots are expected to identify the difference immediately rather than discovering it later through an unexpected climb, descent, or course deviation. The FAA's guidance reflects an important reality of modern automation. The autopilot does exactly what it has been instructed to do, not necessarily what the pilots intended it to do. Remaining mentally engaged throughout the flight allows crews to detect incorrect mode selections, programming errors, or unexpected transitions before they become operational problems, particularly during the busy arrival and approach phases when workload is naturally increasing. One of the biggest risks in a highly automated cockpit is not that the aircraft suddenly behaves unpredictably, but that the crew misunderstands what the automation is about to do. Human factors researchers Nadine Sarter and David Woods described this phenomenon as "automation surprise," arguing that modern flight management systems should be viewed as powerful and independent agents whose actions must be continuously interpreted by the pilots supervising them. Unlike a traditional mechanical system that responds directly to a control input, today's flight management computers make decisions based on hundreds of programmed rules, aircraft performance calculations, navigation data, and active flight modes. As a result, an airplane may begin climbing, leveling off, or changing its lateral path for reasons that are entirely logical to the computer but not immediately obvious to the crew if they have lost track of the automation's current state. Research has consistently found that while automation lowers workload, it can also reduce vigilance. Instead of actively scanning flight instruments and anticipating the aircraft's next action, pilots may become passive observers during long periods of routine flight. That reduced engagement makes it more difficult to recognize subtle changes in aircraft behavior, particularly when the automation transitions between modes without any physical input from the crew. Studies examining airline operations have found that mode confusion remains a recurring issue despite decades of advances in cockpit technology. One survey of 145 airline pilots reported an average of approximately two mode confusion events per pilot each year. Vertical Navigation, or VNAV, generated the greatest number of reported issues, particularly during arrivals and approaches when the flight management system is simultaneously managing altitude constraints, speed targets, and descent profiles. Those phases of flight leave little time for crews to diagnose an unexpected automation response before additional decisions are required. This research explains why FAA guidance emphasizes active monitoring rather than passive supervision. Closing that gap requires constant attention, disciplined cross-checking, and a willingness to question the automation whenever its behavior differs from the crew's expectations. https://simpleflying.com/faa-autopilot-mental-flying/ Single point of failure: engine leaving wing in Louisville reminder of decades-old aviation lesson August 9, 2026, © Leeham News: On the evening of November 4, 2025, a UPS-operated MD-11 freighter rolled down runway 17R at Kentucky's Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport. The taxi was normal. The roll was routine. Then, at rotation, the left engine and its pylon tore off and arced over the wing, trailing fire, and the airplane—a 34-year-old trijet UPS was planning to retire, loaded with fuel destined for Honolulu—climbed about 30 feet, rolled left, and came down across a petroleum-recycling yard and an adjacent warehouse. Black smoke and flames rose high over Louisville. Three crew died in the accident. According to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 11 people on the ground were also killed; another died in a hospital weeks later. A bell rang at rotation and kept ringing—25 seconds of alarm, the cockpit voice recorder shows, that did not tell the flight crew the engine had left the wing. They had no diagnosis. They had very low altitude. They had a catastrophically damaged airplane. The UPS crash file is still open. But the preliminary report, an investigative update, and two days of public hearing in May have already surfaced the proximate culprit, and it is a small one. The pylon's aft mount depends on a single spherical bearing. Its race fractured. The NTSB's metallurgists found fatigue running through the fracture, finished by overstress—which is to say the part was most of the way dead before the airplane ever moved, and the last sound margin let go on rotation. The crash site of the MD-11 that lost its No. 1 engine on rotation during a failed take-off in Louisville, Kentucky in November, 2024. Photo credit: US National Transportation Safety Board That is a single point of failure in the most literal sense: one part, no partner, and when it went the engine went with it. The airport cameras caught the whole sequence in a handful of frames—the engine lifting off its mount, riding up and over the leading edge, the fireball blooming at the wing root—images stark enough that the NTSB released them with the preliminary report. But the bearing is only the near cause. The hearing surfaced a deeper one. A February 2011 Boeing service letter had already named this exact failure—bearing races cracking at the same machined groove, on other airplanes, years earlier. A redesigned bearing without the offending groove existed. Its installation was recommended, not required, and the old part was never prohibited. Across the fleet the failure recurred—by the NTSB's accounting at least 10 times since 2002, four on FedEx MD-11s alone between 2017 and 2022. The reporting scattered exactly as a broken aggregation system would predict. Of the 10 incidents, seven reached Boeing, four reached the FAA, only two reached both—and the most recent, in December 2022, reached no one at all. Pieces of the picture existed but nobody put it all together. https://leehamnews.com/2026/08/10/single-point-of-failure-engine-leaving-wing-in-louisville-reminder-of-decades-old-aviation-lesson/ CALENDAR OF EVENTS . ALPA's 70th Air Safety Forum -September 14-17, 2026; Washington, DC . ICAO/EASA Third Global RSOO/RAIO Forum for Aviation Safety — September 29–30, 2026, in Georgetown, Guyana., https://www.icao.int/events : NATA Ground Handling Safety Symposium - September 15-16, 2026 Dallas/Fort Worth, TX www.nata.aero/ghss : Aircraft Cabin Air International Conference - 22-23 September 2026 . ISASI - BOSTON 2026 - September 28, 2026 – October 2, 2026 . Global Aviation Conference Frankfurt- 29-30SEP2026 - Frankfurt, Germany . Defence Aviation Safety Conference 2026 — October 5–6, 2026, United Kingdom. . European Aviation Training Summit 3 – 5 November 2026 • Estoril Congress Centre, Cascais, Portugal . 79TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SUMMIT MONTREAL | NOVEMBER 10-12, 2026. . Airlines 2026 conference - November 11, 2026 (London) . 2026 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (NBAA-BACE) Oct. 20-22, 2026 | Las Vegas, NV . Bombardier Safety Standdown (November 10–12, 2026 in Wichita, KS) . 2027 ACSF Safety Symposium - April 6-8, 2027 - ERAU Daytona Beach, FL Curt Lewis